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This research critically challenges the conventional understanding of terrorism, which is 
influenced by the views of states that label certain non-state actors as terrorists and their action 
as terrorism. The research demonstrates that there is a need to critically study the characteristics 
of every armed conflict constructed as terrorism. This is the case of the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict, which is constructed in the Turkish official discourse as a phenomenon of terrorism 
perpetrated by the PKK. In addition, the Turkish narrative of terrorism is not limited to the 
PKK, but it transcends to the Syrian Kurdish PYD and YPG, and other Kurdish movements 
and individuals. The findings of this research reveal that the Turkish official narrative of 
terrorism functions to achieve two main goals. The first goal is to delegitimize the PKK and 
the other Kurdish movements. The second goal is to legitimize the repressive policies of the 
Turkish authorities regarding these movements in particular and the Kurds in general. This is 
interconnected with the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question and framing it in the 
context of the narrative of terrorism.     
 
The research also reveals that the language and policy of peace and war could change according 
to the interests of states’ elites. This is the case of the approach of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Kurdish question, which changed under the influence of the elections and voting 
agendas of Erdogan and AKP. The research found that during the peace process and before the 
June 2015 elections, the approach of Turkish authorities was pro-peace negotiations and non-
military action. However, as the AKP was not able to secure the majority that it sought in the 
June elections, the AKP authorities abandoned the peace process and adopted a military 
campaign and repressive policies. The latter matched the appeal of the AKP leadership to the 
votes of nationalist Turks in the November 2015 elections and the April 2017 referendum.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Nietzsche posed the question that “what signposts does linguistics, especially the study of 
etymology, give to the history of the evolution of moral concepts?” (quoted in Ansell-Pearson, 
2007: 34). Nietzsche pioneered questioning the way that etymology or genealogy of words 
influences the change of concepts which represent the good vs. bad dichotomy (Ansell-
Pearson, 2007: xiii-xxix; Nietzsche, 2009: 14-41). In other words, Nietzsche’s perspective was 
one of the early explorations in the genealogy of concepts. An example on the genealogy of 
concepts is the term ‘comrade’. The original meaning of the word comrade is ‘roommate’ 
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). However, the word gained a political characteristic when the 
leftist movements began to use it at the beginning of the 20th century to denote their partisans. 
Similar historical change of connotation is applied to the word ‘terror’ and its associated terms 
of ‘terrorist, and terrorism’. Many scholars argue that ‘terror’ as a political term was first used 
during the French revolution to describe the violent acts of French revolutionary government 
against the public during the years of 1793-1794, and this period was named by some historians 
as ‘the Reign of Terror’ (Kushner, 2003: 360; Weinberg & Eubank, 2006: 26). However, the 
concept of terrorism is mainly used today by governments to name the violent acts of certain 
non-state actors. This concept has become a powerful tool used by governments that label 
certain groups and movements as ‘terrorists’ and their action as ‘terrorism’ regardless of their 





This suggests that the concept of terrorism and its associated narratives are not objective 
realities, but they are constructed according to certain political and historical conditions. 
Zulaika and Douglass (1996: x) stated that “yesterday’s terrorists are today’s Nobel Peace Prize 
winners” as they referred to the revolutionary leaders Nelson Mandela who was the head of 
African National Congress (ANC) and Yassir Arafat who was the head of Palestinian 
Liberation Movement (PLO). Both leaders were labelled as terrorists for long-term. However, 
they were honoured later with the Nobel Prize of peace. This also implies that language, and 
specifically discourse constructs meanings or realties about social phenomena. Therefore, 
language is powerful. Foucault (1972, 1976, 1977) and other scholars emphasize this powerful 
role of language, and accordingly, assert the relationship of discourse, knowledge and power. 
Likewise, scholars like Hansen (2006), Epstein (2008), and Yongtao (2010) emphasise the role 
of discourse in the formation of political realities, which influence state policies. 
 
Although the dominant knowledge about the discourse of terrorism represents it as a single 
entity, there is more than one discourse of terrorism. This is because it is suggested that there 
are multiple international discourses of counter-terrorism. For example, Keohane (2005) and 
Jackson (2007) highlighted the dissimilarities between the discourses of terrorism adopted by 
the US administration and those adopted by the majority of Western European countries. The 
European discourses have been influenced by the European approach which prefers combating 
terrorism through judicial measures and they have shown fewer tendencies towards military 
confrontation (Keohane, 2005: 5-9).1 On the other hand, the American discourse is influenced 
by the military approach adopted by the US administrations and the rhetoric of ‘War on Terror’ 
which is used by politicians in both state polices and election campaigns (Keohane, 2005; 
Jackson, 2007). Keohane (2005) and Jackson (2007) argue that the American discourse 
                                                          
1 See also Hulsse & Spencer (2008).  
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is intertwined with the state political institutions to the extent that it is difficult to change it in 
order to adopt more peaceful approach. Although the Western European countries are generally 
inclined towards non-military approach of counter-terrorism, there are various discourses 
among them and there is no such a unified discourse for all Western European countries. The 
Turkish discourse of counter-terrorism, which this research deals with is even more complex 
than the American discourse. This is because the Turkish discourse is deeply intertwined with 
the following two main factors: 1. The powerful position of Turkish military who have been in 
long-term conflict with the Kurdistan Workers Party (in Kurdish: Partiya Karkerȇn Kurdistan, 
PKK). 2. The various measures of other state institutions and laws that target Kurdish 
nationalism under the label of ‘counter-terrorism’.2 
 
Guided by some major perspectives on the relationship of discourse, knowledge and power, 
this research explores the constructions of the Turkish official discourse regarding the PKK, 
the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).3 
The PYD and YPG are considered by the Turkish authorities as organic parts of the PKK. This 
is although both groups act in Syria. The PYD is a Syrian Kurdish political party, and the YPG 
is the armed force of the Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous administration of Rojava.4 Rojava 
is the short Kurdish term used instead of Rojava Kurdistan (in English: Western Kurdistan), 
which is the Syrian Kurdish region. Rojava is a de-facto semi-autonomous administration, 
which was formed in 2012 and afterwards by the PYD and other affiliated political parties and 
groups, and it consisted of the three administrative cantons of Jizir (in Arabic: Jazeerah), 
Kobani and Afrin (see Map 4). This is although Rojava administration is not recognized by the 
                                                          
2 For more about the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, go to historical background of the conflict in chapter 4.  
3 In Kurdish: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD, and Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG.  
4 Rojava Kurdistan is claimed by the Kurds as part of their historical homeland, Kurdistan which was divided and 
annexed to 4 countries following the demise of Ottoman empire (See KNK, 2014: 6).  Dividing Kurdistan and 
annexing it to the nation-states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria is explained in chapter 4. 
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Syrian regime.  The researcher frequently uses PYD-YPG instead of PYD and YPG. This is 
because the Turkish official texts use the acronyms ‘PYD or YPG’ as reference to both 
organizations.   
 
The research also explores the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurds and 
Kurdish question during the peace process and following its failure. The peace process was 
initiated in 2012 by both the Turkish authorities and the PKK to end the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict, and to find a solution for the Kurdish question.5 However, the process failed in 2015. 
The constructions and narratives of the Turkish authorities during the peace process and 
following its failure also encompass the legal Kurdish parities of the Peoples’ Democratic Party 
(HDP), Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) and other pro-Kurdish groups and activists who 
were usually constructed by the Turkish authorities as supporters of the PKK. The research 
uses both terms ‘construction’ and ‘narrative’. Both terms have the same semantic indication 
in the research. However, the research uses both terms to tackle the grammatical indication of 
each term. The term ‘construction’ usually indicates ‘nominal sentences’ while the term 
‘narrative’ usually indicates ‘verbal sentences’. 
 
This introductory chapter identifies the research objectives and questions, and discusses each 
of the research methodology, research data, and its ethical considerations. In addition, this 
chapter provides an outline for the chapters of research. 
 
   
 
                                                          
5 The Turkish authorities denied the term ‘Kurdish question’ and used instead other terms like ‘the problems of 
Kurds’. This is detailed in chapter 7.   
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Research questions and objectives 
The research has the following major questions: 
• How has the Turkish official discourse constructed the Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the People’s Protection Units (YPG)?  
• How did the Turkish authorities construct and deal with the Kurdish question during 
the peace process and following its failure?  
• How did such constructions function in producing particular meanings for events or 
legitimatising particular actors or policies?   
• How did these constructions interact with the way that the Turkish authorities dealt with 
the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and civic Kurdish activists in Turkey?   
 
The major objective of this research is to contribute to the literature of terrorism studies. In 
particular, the research is a contribution in the discursive studies of terrorism. The research also 
contributes to the literature on the Kurdish question and Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The research 
critically challenges the conventional understanding of ‘terrorism’ which is influenced by the 
official narratives of states that usually target non-state actors. For this purpose, the research 
highlights the need to comprehensively deal with the characteristics of each case study that has 
been constructed in the mainstream studies and official discourses as ‘terrorism’.  The research 
highlights that the discursive studies of terrorism mainly concentrate on the American narrative 
of ‘War on Terror’, and they lack such comprehensive studies on the characteristics of 
individual case studies. In the case of this research, the literature review reveals that the 
construction of the PKK in the Turkish official discourse is narrowly studied in the discursive 
filed of terrorism studies. In addition, the literature lacks research on the construction of the 
Syrian Kurdish PYD and YPG in the Turkish official discourse. Accordingly, this research 
intended to be a contribution in bridging these gaps in the literature.   
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In addition to the label of ‘terrorist’, the research deals with other labels and constructions 
about the PKK, YPG, and PYD in the Turkish official discourse. The latter usually describe 
the PKK, PYD-YPG as separatists, criminals, and as a security threat against the international 
community. However, such constructions are part of the dominant narrative of terrorism. The 
narrative of terrorism constituted the major element of the approach of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question in the period that the research studies. Therefore, the 
constructions and narratives that this research deal with are formed in the context of the Turkish 
official narrative of terrorism, and vice versa, they form the narrative of terrorism itself.6  
 
Research methodology  
Searching for a satisfactory response to the question of ‘what is terrorism?’ is a principal 
motivation for this research. However, the constructionist philosophical orientation of the 
research and the shortage of relevant discursive studies in the literature, have encouraged the 
researcher to study the discourse of terrorism. Thus, the constructionist approach directed the 
researcher to dislocate the initial enquiry of ‘what is terrorism?’ from its positivist realm of 
causality to be more compatible with the constructionist key enquiry of ‘how knowledge is 
constructed?’ Accordingly, the main questions of the research initiate with ‘how’ instead of 
‘what’. The compatibility of constructionist philosophy with the study of discourse developed 
the objective of research from enquiring terrorism as a phenomenon to questioning the 
discourse of terrorism itself. Wood and Kroger (2000: 8-10) emphasize that exploring the 
discursive construction of social phenomenon requires shifting the focus of study from the 
phenomenon to the discourse itself. 
                                                          




This research employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a philosophical and analytical 
approach, which is compatible with both constructionism and the study of the discourse of 
terrorism more than other approaches. CDA agrees the constructionist philosophy that 
knowledge about social phenomena is not fixed reality, but it is constructed according to the 
interpretations of researcher and the dominant social and historical conditions (Burr, 2003; 
Wodak, 2001a). In addition, both CDA and constructionism highlight that there is a 
relationship between knowledge and power (Burr, 2003; Wodak, 2001a). Analytical 
approaches like conversation analysis and ethnomethodology also agree the perspectives of 
constructionism. However, they are not compatible with the research objective. Conversation 
analysis and ethnomethodology agree constructionism that knowledge is influenced by the 
interpretations of researcher and the social and historical conditions. Nevertheless, these 
approaches mainly depend on the micro analysis of text, which is not enough to deal with the 
various manifestations and implications of dominance and ideology in the texts that represent 
political discourses like the discourse of terrorism (Bloor & Wood, 2006; Goodwin & Heritage, 
1990).  Unlike conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, CDA’s analytical mechanism has 
two components; macro and micro, which work in tandem. This is explained later in this 
chapter and in chapter 3.  
 
Post-structuralist discourse analysis also matches the study of the discourse of terrorism. 
However, it is less compatible with the objectives and questions of this research as it overlooks 
the role of agency. Post-structuralist approach agrees with both the constructionist philosophy 
and this research that text has no single and durable meaning and that the analysis of text 
requires exploring the social and historical conditions which influence its production and 
dissemination (Burr, 2003; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Young, 1981). In addition, they agree that 
discourse study requires understanding the discourse-power relationship. However, post-
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structuralist approach overlooks the role of agency in the construction and maintenance of the 
representations of discourse (Burr, 2003; Hall, 2001). Accordingly, overlooking the role of 
agency in the study of discourse of terrorism diverts the research from its objectives and 
questions, which focus on the role of agency in the discursive constructions and practices. 
 
CDA, on the other hand, emphasizes the principal role of agency in the production and 
maintenance of discourses (Van Dijk, 1993, 2003; Wodak, 1996, 2001a, 2001b). In other 
words, CDA aims at revealing the relationship between powerful groups (or agency) and 
discourse to be discourse-power relationship. Establishing the relationship between agency, 
discourse and power facilitates drawing an analytical framework, which concentrates on the 
aspects of ideology, dominance and power relations. The CDA mechanism of establishing the 
relationship of discourse-power-agency also assists in exploring the consequences of this 
relationship. As CDA highlights the role of agency, it connects the structural elements of text 
to the discursive practices and the wider social and political milieu. However, this research has 
its own position regarding the role of agency, which is not in conformity with the perspective 
of CDA. While CDA maintains that agency manipulates discourse, this research emphasizes 
that it is only possible that agency manipulates the discursive constructions and practices, but 
not the entire discourse because the context of discourse is beyond the capacity of agency to 
manipulate. This is also explained in chapter 3.  
 
In the light of CDA insights, this research adopted an analytical framework which deals with 
text on two levels: Micro and macro. The micro analysis of text focuses on semantic and 
grammatical structures of text, while the macro level of analysis deals with the socio-political 
and historical contexts which govern the production and dissemination of text (O’Halloran, 
2005; Titscher et al., 2000). However, the two levels work in tandem as they form the overall 
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analytical outcome. The micro-macro analytical framework facilitates deciphering the features 
of text which serve ideology, dominance and power relations (Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 
2003, 2006a, 2006b). This is explained in the section of the framework of data analysis in 
chapter 3. 
 
Research data  
This research is discourse-centred, and therefore, its data and the field of generating them are 
different from the actor-centred researches. The actor-centred approach usually depends on 
data generated directly from actors through interviews, groups discussion, questioners and 
other similar methods (Dubios & Ford, 2015).7 However, the data of this research are texts 
which represent the Turkish official discourse and policy. These texts were generated from 
their usual fields of dissemination including the means of broadcast media, the press, and 
internal communication. Devine (2003) argues that the main characteristic of secondary data 
is that they have been already published. Therefore, reliance on such data undermines the 
validity of research. Likewise, Gunning (2007: 365-366) argues that depending on the 
secondary data is a major deficiency of the conventional studies of terrorism. However, the 
texts that this research depends on form the interpretation of the research for particular 
discursive constructions on terrorism. Therefore, such texts are primary data for this discursive 
research. Hülsse and Spencer (2008: 576) stated that “the primary source of terrorism research 
must be the discourse in which the social construction of terrorism takes place, that is, the 
discourse that constitutes a particular group of people as ‘terrorists’”. 
 
                                                          
7 Actor-centered research on terrorism usually generates its data from actors involved in the armed conflict, or it 
uses secondary sources of data generated originally from them (Jackson et al., 2011).   
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Text for CDA is represented in written, spoken and visual languages in many forms such as 
reports disseminated through newspapers, television, and the internet, or transcripts of 
conversations and interviews (Fairclough, 2003: 3). However, the data of this research mainly 
consists of written texts in addition to several spoken texts. The visual texts are excluded from 
this research because they require special techniques to generate and analyse, which are beyond  
the skills of researcher and the capacity of the research (Ball & Smith, 1992; Underhill, 1987). 
The research mainly depends on written texts because the written texts that tell the view of the 
Turkish officials are more available in English than the spoken texts. However, the generated 
written texts are sufficient in representing the view and policy of the Turkish authorities, which 
is the core of this research.  
 
The generated texts are mainly in English. This is because the researcher does not read Turkish. 
In order to overcome any potential inaccuracy in the English texts that include the statements 
of the Turkish officials, the research gave the priority to texts generated from the official 
websites of the Turkish authorities, and the English versions of the main Turkish newspapers. 
In addition, the researcher compared various texts to choose the texts that have more content 
matches in other texts. This in case more than one text were available about the same event or 
statement.  
 
This research deals with two sets of texts. The first set consists of official texts, reports and 
other documents that reflect the view and policy of the Turkish authorities. The research 
concentrates on extracting certain statements by the Turkish officials, which are relevant to the 
research’s subject (see the list of main Turkish officials whose statements are dealt with in 
Appendix Table 6). The research uses the term ‘statement’ to denote relevant part of 
statements, speeches, interviews, and other texts by the Turkish officials. These are usually 
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published in the websites of the Turkish authorities like the websites of the Turkish presidency, 
the Turkish prime-ministry, and the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. This in addition to the 
texts of the Turkish and international news agencies, and research centres that quote the Turkish 
officials. The second set of texts that the research deals with reflect certain views, which are 
usually dissimilar to the Turkish official view and challenge it. These mainly consist of the 
views of international human rights institutions and organizations, journalists, research centres, 
other non-governmental organizations, and the statements of Kurdish parties and activists who 
are the subject of this research. The texts of these views are mainly extracted from reports, 
articles, and other texts of the press, which are disseminated through the internet. For example, 
the reports about Turkey and Kurds by the Office of UN High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and 
Freedom House.  
 
The research generated texts from various English language newspapers, magazines and TV 
stations. The research widely uses the English texts of the main Turkish news agencies and 
newspapers including Anadolu Agency, Hurriyet Daily News, Daily Sabah, and Today’s 
Zaman. This in addition to the reports and texts of major international news agencies such as 
BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welle, France 24, EuroNews, Al-Jazeera, and widespread newspapers 
and magazines such as the New York Times, Washington Post, the Guardian, the Wall Street 
Journal, the Daily Star, the Economist, the Financial Times, the Independent, Time, Newsweek, 
and Spiegel International. The databases of many TV stations, newspapers and magazines are 
available on their internet websites. However, it was difficult to access the archives of 
particular Turkish sources. Therefore, the researcher resorted to accessible online databases 




The generated data are related to two main criteria connected to the approaches of the AKP 
authorities regarding the PKK, YPG, and PYD in particular, and the Kurdish question in 
general. The AKP is the acronym of the Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (in 
Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The first criterion is related to the construction of the 
PKK, PYD and YPG in the contemporary Turkish official discourse, which reflects the 
language and policy of AKP authorities regarding these movements. The second criterion is 
related to the approach of the AKP authorities regarding the Kurdish question during the peace 
process and following its failure. The research considers the speech of Erdogan in the 4th 
congress of AKP on 30 September 2012 as the beginning of the initiative of peace process, 
which was also called for by the PKK imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan in March, 2013 (in 
English: Ojalan).8 The peace process had major influence on the language and policy of the 
AKP authorities regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question. In addition, the process was 
influenced by certain election and voting agendas of the Turkish AK ruling party. Following 
the failure of the process in 2015 the Turkish authorities adopted different language and policy 
regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question. The latter approach has been adopted by the Turkish 
authorities until the moment of writing this research. Accordingly, the generated texts were 
produced between the date of initiating the peace process in September 2012 and the date of 
accomplishing the data analysis in early 2018.  
 
Generating texts according to certain historical events helps in exploring the influence of 
historical and political conditions on the changes of discourse. This is the case of the changes 
in the language and policy of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question during the 
                                                          
8  The last name of PKK leader Ocalan is pronounced ‘Ojalan’ in English. The international (English) sources 
transliterate ‘Ocalan’ copying the Turkish sources. The latter is the transliteration of the name as it is 




peace process and following its failure. Comparing texts produced following certain events to 
relevant texts produced before them helps in such exploration. Foucault (1972, 1984) argues 
that discourse is contingent and is not subject to gradual evolvements, and that this contingency 
depends on certain historical events which are influenced by certain social conditions. Wodak 
(1996, 2001b) agrees the Foucauldian perspective that discourses are neither fixed nor 
developing entities, but they are contingent and change according to certain historical 
conditions. However, there are certain rules govern such historical changes (Foucault, 1972, 
1984; Wodak, 2001b). These rules are embodied in social structures and power relations, which 
are in the case of the discourse of terrorism influenced by the wider political and historical 
contexts. Thus, exploring the linguistic manifestations of the discourse of terrorism should be 
in the light of understanding the political and historical contexts that influence the construction 
of this discourse.  
 
The strategy of data sampling of this research is purposive and selective. This sort of sampling 
strategy is compatible with CDA. Generating data according to random sampling is less 
suitable for the purposes of CDA, and accordingly, the goals of this research. CDA is more 
compatible with texts that are rich in linguistic details. Usually, texts with linguistic details 
inform the attributes of ideology, dominance and power relations which are the target of CDA 
(Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 2009). Such linguistic details consist of many grammatical and 
semantic structures such as nominalization and assumptions which are usually used either to 
hide or highlight certain information, or as metaphors and hyperboles which are usually used 
to make the recipient of text impressed by its message. Accordingly, generating sufficient 
number of such texts requires a proper process of selection. On the contrary, random sampling 
might result in many short texts which lack such linguistic details. However, the research needs 
to acquire a considerable level of credibility. Therefore, the adopted sampling strategy targeted 
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various sources and views. The targeted texts were generated from various official and non-
official sources as explained earlier.   
 
The number of texts that the research generated matched the purposes of the research and were 
sufficient in answering its question. This is although the analysis exceeded the initially 
dedicated timeframe of 16 months. This period was allocated for the tasks of data analysis and 
writing the chapters of analysis. The research proposal estimated the targeted number of texts 
according to this timeframe, and according to the estimated average time that the analysis of 
each text would take. However, as the research progressed, the researcher discovered that the 
generated texts were not similar in the length and richness of their linguistic structures. The 
generated texts that the research dealt with are different in size and linguistic structures. The 
longer texts usually needed more time to analyse. Certain texts are long and rich in their 
linguistic structures such as the texts of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, which are dealt 
with in chapter 5 and 6. Such texts required months to analyse and to connect their 
argumentative points to the points of other texts. Other short texts required much shorter time 
to analyse. Therefore, it was not possible to estimate the average time that the analysis of each 
single text required. However, the analysis dealt with more than 120 text, which reflect the 
view of the Turkish authorities. These texts were challenged by other texts from various 
sources. The latter mainly supported the arguments that critically challenged the view of the 
Turkish authorities. The generated texts sufficiently achieved the goals of the research as they 
constituted the representation of the Turkish official discourse and policy, and they supported 






Ethical considerations   
There is no doubt that the researches that generate data through contacting human subjects who 
involved or subjected to violence are quite sensitive. In particular, contacting individuals 
involved in armed conflict who are described either as ‘terrorists or counter-terrorists’ is a 
sensitive issue, which requires a considerable level of caution (Smyth, 2009). Research which 
involves individuals who have taken part of violent activities could also involve complex moral 
and ethical dilemmas. In particular, infringing the confidentiality of such respondents might 
compromise other people and vitiate the credibility of researcher. This was the case of data 
generated from interviews with former members of the Irish Republic Army (IRA) which were 
stored by the American University of Boston (BBC, May, 2014; Boland, May, 2014). Upon 
the order of a US federal court, many tapes of these interviews were handed to the police of 
Northern Ireland, who consequently arrested and questioned Gerry Adams the leader of Sinn 
Féin (Boland, May, 2014). Adams’ arrest was based on claims that he was involved in killing 
a woman in 1972 during the conflict, and these claims were supported by information taken 
from the taped interviews of Boston University with former Sinn Féin members (BBC, May, 
2014; Boland, May, 2014). However, this research is not challenging similar moral and ethical 
dilemmas because it does not deal with actors, but it is limited to available texts that constitute 
discursive constructions and policies. In other words, the research does not interview or contact 
the Turkish authorities or the members of the PKK and the other Kurdish movements.
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Research outline  
In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, this research has 7 chapters. 4 of these 
chapters are dedicated to the analysis of data, and accordingly, the latter chapters form the 
response to the research questions.  Each research chapter has an introduction and a conclusion. 
The major areas that each chapter deals with are summarized below.    
Chapter 2: Literature review 
Literature review chapter has five sections. The first section provides a critique for the 
mainstream studies of terrorism supported by the work of scholars of critical studies of 
terrorism (CST). This section critiques the mainstream studies of terrorism, which considers 
terrorism as a reality although it is subjectively constructed and liable to change as any 
constructed concept. In addition, the section critiques the way that the mainstream studies 
overlook the violence or repression of state apparatus including military, security forces and 
other governmental institutions and limit terrorism as a description to the armed violence of 
certain non-state actors regardless of the dissimilarity in their methods of action and 
motivations.    
 
The second section of chapter deals with the discursive studies of terrorism. These studies 
consider terrorism as a linguistic construction, and they critically deal with the inconsistencies 
of the conventional knowledge about terrorism. The third section compares the view of critical 
discursive studies on terrorism to the view of mainstream studies regarding the relationship 
between media and terrorism.  The section highlighted that while the mainstream scholars 
consider media as a tool which serves the propaganda of terrorists, the critical scholars 
demonstrate that corporate broadcasting media usually serve the governmental narrative 
regarding terrorism, and consequently, critical scholars explain the ways according to which 
terrorism is constructed and terrorist events are framed by the corporate media.  
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The fourth section of this chapter deals with the literature on the PKK and the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict. Supported by critical studies, the section reveals the inconsistencies of the mainstream 
studies on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which usually overlook the political and historical 
origins of the conflict and favour the Turkish narrative that frames the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 
as terrorism. The last section of this chapter deals with the studies on the PYD-YPG and the 
Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous administration of Rojava. This section deals with two types 
of studies. One type favours the Turkish official view and considers the PYD-YPG as a security 
threat against Turkey because they are organic parts of the PKK. The other type deals with the 
political and historical origins of the Kurdish question and highlight the antagonism of the 
Turkish authorities towards the Kurdish autonomy in Syria. However, the literature review 
reveals that the studies on the PKK and PYD-YPG are insufficient in exploring the construction 
of these movements in the Turkish official discourse.  
 
Chapter 3: Discourse and the methodological implications of critical discourse analysis. 
This chapter provides a background for the meaning of discourse and the philosophical and 
analytical implications of CDA, which is the approach employed in this research. The chapter 
also draws a theoretical framework for the research. The chapter has two main sections. The 
first section discusses discourse theory. This section deals with the definition of discourse in 
the light of the perspectives of critical discourse analysts and other scholars. In addition, it deals 
with the inter-textuality and inter-discursivity of text, discourse and genre.9  The section also 
debates the role of agency in discourse and the manipulation of discursive practices and 
constructions by powerful groups. Furthermore, the section explains ideology and its relation 
to dominance and power relations. The second section of the chapter discusses CDA as an 
                                                          
9 Genre is the way of producing a discursive text such as a press conference (Fairclough, 2003: 65-68). This is 
explained in chapter 3.  
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analytical approach. This section discusses the CDA theoretical insights regarding the analysis 
of language, which facilitate understanding the relationship between the discursive practices 
and constructions and the wider social and historical context. In the light of these theoretical 
insights the chapter draws a framework for the data analysis of this research.  
 
Chapter 4: Historical background: The Turkish-Kurdish conflict and the opening 
approach of the AKP.  
The chapter provides a historical background for the conflict between the Turkish government 
and the PKK. The first section of this chapter discusses the historical roots of the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict. The section highlights the main characteristics of the repressive policies of 
the Turkish governments against the Kurds and Kurdish identity before the emergence of the 
PKK. Then it discusses the policies adopted by the Turkish governments to repress the PKK 
rebellion, and it highlights the impacts of the armed action on human rights in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey. The section reveals the special measures that were adopted by the Turkish 
governments against the Kurds during the conflict. However, the discussion of impacts of the 
conflict in this chapter was limited to the era before launching the peace process in 2012.10 The 
latter is the focus of the analysis chapters. The last part of this section is about the abduction of 
the leader of the PKK, Ocalan by the Turkish authorities in 1999, and the ensuing stance of the 
EU regarding the PKK and Turkish treatment of Kurds (Gunter, 2008:  Marcus, 2007). 
 
The second section of this chapter provides a background for the AKP, and its opening 
approach regarding the Kurds. The section discusses the ideological background of the AKP, 
and it highlights the agendas of AKP regarding each of the role of the Turkish military and 
                                                          
10 The research considers the Erdogan speech in the September 2012 Congress in which he called for a peace 
approach to the conflict as the beginning of the peace process (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). See chapter 7.  
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elections, and its ambition to change the Turkish ruling system from parliamentary to 
presidential by amending the Turkish constitution. The section concentrates on the relationship 
between these agenda of the AKP and its Kurdish opining approach.        
  
Chapter 5-8: Data analysis 
Data analysis is allocated four chapters including chapters 5-8. The analysis aims at responding 
the research questions, which are mainly about both the discursive constructions and polices 
of the Turkish authorities. The first two chapters deal with the construction of the PKK and 
PYD-YPG in the Turkish official texts, and the last two chapters deal with the changes in the 
constructions and policies of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question 
during the peace process and following its failure.  
 
Chapter 5: Analysis of the discursive constructions of PKK in the Turkish official texts.  
This is the first chapter of analysis and it deals with the constructions of the PKK in the Turkish 
official texts. In particular, the analysis deals with the relevant texts of the Turkish ministry of 
foreign affairs, Turkish anti-terrorism law and relevant legislations, and the statements of 
Turkish officials. The chapter begins with exploring the definition of terrorism according to 
the Turkish anti-terrorism law. Then the chapter highlights the way that the Turkish official 
discourse constructs the Kurdish nationalism as separatism and separatism as terrorism. Next, 
the analysis concentrates on the construction of the PKK in the Turkish official texts and 
statements. In the context of the dominant narrative of terrorism, the Turkish official discourse 
constructs the PKK as separatist, Marxist-Leninist, racist and criminal organization that is 
involved in both killing civilians and international drug trafficking. The analysis compares the 
way according to which the Turkish official texts define and designate the PKK as terrorist 
with the ways according to which they define and designate other groups. In addition, the 
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analysis reveals that the Turkish official texts omit the full name of the Kurdistan Workers 
Party. The chapter also critically challenged the arguments of the Turkish texts depending on 
various texts from different sources, and it reveals how these constructions serve certain 
ideological considerations and agendas of the Turkish authorities.  
 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the discursive constructions of PYD and YPG in the Turkish 
official texts.  
This chapter deals with the construction of the PYD and YPG in the Turkish official texts. The 
major construction of the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official texts is that they are organic parts 
of the PKK, and accordingly, they constitute a threat to the national security of Turkey. The 
chapter refers to the statements of the Turkish officials, which accuse the PYD and YPG of 
conducting ‘terrorist’ attacks in Turkey.  The analysis also highlighted the way that the Turkish 
official discourse constructs the PYD and YPG as both proxies used by other countries against 
Turkey and as threat to the same countries. The analysis deals with the construction of the PYD 
and YPG as a threat to the international community and as a separatist organization who 
threaten the territorial integrity of Syria. In addition, the analysis deals with the way the Turkish 
official discourse constructs the PYD and YPG as criminal organization that are involved in 
the ethnic cleansing of Syrians. The analysis critically uses various sources that challenge the 
constructions and narratives of Turkish official discourse about the PYD and YPG. The last 
section of the chapter reveals the relationship between these constructions and narratives and 






Chapter 7: The approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question 
during the peace process.    
The research uses the term ‘approach’ to denote both the constructions and policies that were 
adopted by the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question.  This chapter begins with 
the calls for the peace process by both the leader of the PKK, Ocalan and the Turkish officials. 
The analysis highlights the pro-peace constructions of the Turkish authorities, which 
disfavoured the military option against the PKK. The analysis deals with the narratives and 
constructions of ‘brothering discourse’, which were repeated in the statements of the Turkish 
officials as they addressed the Kurds during the peace process. The brothering discourse is also 
defined in chapter 4.  
 
The analysis critically reveals the ways according to which the Turkish authorities denied the 
existence of the Kurdish question and constructed it instead as problems of both terrorism and 
underdevelopment. The analysis also reveals the outcomes, which the Turkish authorities 
expected from the peace process. In particular, it discusses the way the Turkish officials 
constructed the disarmament of the PKK as the prerequisite and major goal of the peace 
process.  The analysis also reveals the ways that the Turkish officials constructed their rejection 
for the Kurdish demand of autonomy in the Kurdish region of Turkey. In addition, the analysis 
deals with the democratic reforms, which the Turkish officials constructed as a response to the 






Chapter 8: The impacts of the events and agendas of October, 2014-April, 2017 on the 
approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the peace process and the Kurdish 
question.  
This chapter begins with a section about the Kobani crisis, which left impacts on the peace 
process. This crisis followed the invasion of Kobani by the Jihadist organization of Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014. As stated earlier in this chapter, Kobani is one of 
the cantons of Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous administration of Rojava. This section 
discusses the attitude of the Turkish authorities regarding the pro-Kobani Kurdish protests in 
Turkey and highlights the security measures and special laws, which were adopted by the 
Turkish authorities.  
 
The analysis highlights the relationship between the elections and voting agendas of the AKP 
and its Kurdish policy. The analysis highlights two relevant stages. The first stage was during 
the peace process and before the June 2015 elections. During this stage the Turkish authorities 
and the representatives of Kurds announced the Dolmabahce agreement of peace. The second 
stage followed the June 2015 elections. The analysis reveals the change of the language and 
policy of the Turkish authorities following the June elections as the Turkish authorities ended 
the peace process and launched a military campaign against the PKK. The chapter also explores 
the impacts of the campaign on human rights. The analysis focuses on the approach of the 
Turkish authorities against the pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), and it reveals 
the relationship between the elections’ agenda of AKP and its anti-HDP approach.  
 
The chapter then discusses the repressive response of the Turkish authorities regarding the 
deceleration of autonomy for the Kurdish region in Turkey in December, 2015 by the 
representative of Kurds. The analysis discloses the relationship between the repressive policy 
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of the Turkish authorities and the AKP agenda of conducting the referendum to change the 
Turkish constitution in April, 2017. In addition, the analysis highlights the impacts of the 
Turkish military and security measures against autonomy on human rights. Finally. the chapter 
discusses the relationship between the Syrian Kurdish autonomy and the Kurdish declaration 
of autonomy in Turkey. The analysis highlights the way the Turkish authorities constructed 
both the Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria as both ‘action of terrorism by the PKK’ and 
‘source of PKK terrorism’, which required counter-terrorism measures by the Turkish 
authorities.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion.  
This chapter is the last chapter of research. The chapter consists of four main sections. The first 
section discusses the location of the research in the academic literature. This section highlights 
the relevant gaps in the literature and the contribution of the research in the bridging these gaps. 
The second section, which takes more space in the chapter, forms the major arguments that 
constitute the response to the research questions. This is done by summarising the major 
findings of the analysis and linking them together. The third section highlights the main 
features of analysed texts in the light of CDA perspectives. The last section provides 














Following the attacks of 9/11/2001 in the US by Al-Qaeda the concept of terrorism and its 
associated narratives have become widespread and the literature on terrorism has rapidly 
grown. The mainstream literature on terrorism has been influenced by the realist perspectives 
which have dominated the field of politics and international relations studies. These 
perspectives usually consider social phenomena as objective realties. Therefore, they usually 
deal with such phenomena through the lens of causality similarly to the scientific methods of 
measurement (Manicas, 2006: 15-25). That is, the mainstream studies usually deal with the 
causes and effects of terrorism in order to understand it. However, the mainstream studies have 
been contested by critical studies on terrorism (CST) which highlights that terrorism is not an 
objective phenomenon and that the study of terrorism is influenced by the subjectivity of 
researcher. Some scholars of CST like Jackson et al., (2011) are influenced by the 
constructionist philosophy which reveals the role of language in constructing realities.11 
Jackson et al., (2011) do not deal with terrorism as a reality but as a linguistic construction 
which is changeable according to the historical and political conditions. This is further 
elaborated in this chapter which reveals the major inconsistencies of mainstream studies on 
terrorism. In addition, the chapter exposes the deficiencies in the other areas of literature related 
to the subject of this research.    
 
The major areas of literature related to the subject of this research are the studies of terrorism 
and discourse of terrorism. However, the literature review also deals with the Kurdish studies 
and Turkish official position regarding the Kurdish question. This is as this research 
                                                          
11 For more about constructionism, see Burr (2003).  
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concentrates on the Turkish official discourse regarding the PKK and other related Kurdish 
movements and the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question. This 
chapter illustrates the location of the research in the literature and its contribution in bridging 
certain gaps of the literature. The chapter has five sections. Firstly, terrorism studies. This 
section critically deals with the perspectives of mainstream scholars from the point of view of 
scholars of critical studies on terrorism (CST). Secondly, discursive studies of terrorism. This 
section deals with literature on the political discourse of terrorism. Thirdly, broadcasting media 
and the discourse of terrorism. This section is also part of the discursive studies, but it 
concentrates on the ways the discourse of terrorism is framed and disseminated in the broadcast 
media and press. Fourthly, studies on the PKK and Turkish-Kurdish conflict. This section deals 
with both the mainstream and critical studies and it highlights the historical and political origins 
of the conflict and Kurdish question. Finally, studies on the PYD-YPG and Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy of Rojava. Like the previous section, this section highlights the importance of 
dealing with origins of the Kurdish question, and it also underlines the importance of discussing 
the position of the Turkish authorities regarding the PYD-YPG and Rojava.  Accordingly, the 
literature of this research has three interconnected characteristics. First, it is related to politics 
and international relations as it deals with terrorism studies in relation to foreign and domestic 
state policies. Second, it is associated with language philosophy as it deals with discourse. 
While this chapter is limited to the discursive studies on terrorism, chapter 3 deals with 
discourse theory. Thirdly, it is related to history as it deals with the historical origins of the 
Kurdish question and the evolvement of PKK and other Kurdish movements.  
 
Terrorism studies  
This section deals critically with the work of scholars of mainstream field like Alexander (1979, 
2010), Hoffman (2006), Richardson (2006, 2007, 2009), Wilkinson (2007, 2011), and others. 
26 
 
The critical view of this section is supported by the work of CST scholars Blakeley (2009, 
2010), Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, and Smyth (2011) and others. Although this research locates 
itself in the field of CST, it does not adhere to particular theoretical framework adopted by 
scholars of CST. In particular, this research is a contribution in the discursive study of terrorism 
which is a growing segment of CST. The discursive studies are discussed in the next section. 
This section consists of three points of critique for the mainstream studies. 
 
The first point of critique is that although the concept of terrorism is subjectively constructed 
and historically changeable, the mainstream scholars usually deal with terrorism as a reality 
taken for granted. Such an objective understanding of terrorism by the mainstream scholars has 
theoretical implications explained below.  
 
Although it is conventionally agreed that terrorism denotes the usage of exemplary violence 
for the purpose of intimidating the wider audience, there is no universal consensus over the 
definition of terrorism. The majority of mainstream studies argue that terrorists use armed 
violence against certain targets in order to intimidate the wider community of ‘audience’ 
individuals who become informed about the terrorist event. However, the mainstream studies 
phrase this argument in various ways. In addition, scholars of the mainstream studies usually 
admit the lack of consensus about the definition of terrorism (Alexander, 2010: 2-4; Hoffman, 
2006: 201-21). Schmid (2011: 42) quoted sociologist, Philip Schlesinger that ‘no commonly 
agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is in itself 
part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives”. 
 
This demonstrates that there are two conflicting arguments regarding the definition of 
terrorism. One argument is supported by many developing countries and organizations, which 
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distinguishes armed action of national liberation movements from terrorism. This also has some 
supportive grounds in international law. The confusion of terrorism with the armed action of 
national liberation movements is discussed later in this section. The other argument is 
supported by the US and its NATO allies who consider the attacks of non-state actors on the 
forces of certain governments as terrorism regardless of the motivations of such non-state 
actors.12 This has also been reflected in the mainstream literature. The mainstream scholars 
Alexander (2010: 7) and Hoffman (2006: 30-35) have considered targeting governmental 
forces as terrorism, while Wilkinson (2011: 62 & 139) accepted this argument implicitly. 
Conversely, Richardson (2007: 6-10) limited terrorism to the acts of targeting civilians. 
However, she disregards this perspective when she implies that the guerrilla movements, which 
peruse national goals, are terrorists although such movements usually target militants.  
 
On the other hand, scholars of CST like Jackson et al., (2011) have questioned the concept of 
terrorism arguing that it is a socio-linguistic construction. Jackson et al., (2011: 3) stated that 
“terrorism is not a self-evident, exceptional category of political violence. Rather, it is a social 
construction - a linguistic term or label that is applied to certain acts through a range of specific 
political, legal and academic processes”. Accordingly, the definition of terrorism is subjective 
and there is no objective definition for terrorism. Jackson et al., (2011: 113) argue that there is 
no inevitable interpretation or meaning for particular social phenomenon. Instead, language 
constructs certain meaning for certain phenomenon by excluding other meanings or 
interpretations. This is the case when politicians describe certain incident of political violence 
as terrorism avoiding other interpretations such as ‘criminal act’ or ‘military act’. Thus, 
‘terrorism’ is not an ontologically fixed label for certain type of violence. Instead, the label is 
                                                          
12 Held (2008: 17-19) argues that the argument which considers targeting of non-combatant individuals of armed 
forces as terrorism is challenged by two questions: 1. If targeting non-combatant governmental militants is 
terrorism, what is the description of targeting non-combatant terrorists? 2. What if the targeted individuals are 
indirectly involved in the conflict through directing or supporting combatants? 
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formed according to both its social and historical context and its subjective interpretation. This 
constructionist point of departure regarding the concept of terrorism has established the 
theoretical ground for CST.  
 
Although the concept of terrorism is changeable according to related political and historical 
conditions, the mainstream scholars deal with it objectively. The term ‘terror’ was used to 
describe the acts of violence (or repression) by the revolutionary government that ruled France 
during the years 1793-1794. However, the label ‘terrorist’ was used later by the colonial powers 
and governments against anti-colonial and revolutionary movements. Many of these 
movements have become governmental parties like African National Congress (ANC) and 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996: x). Another historical 
example, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was supported by the US during the Iraq-Iran 
war of 1980-1988 (Ehteshami, 2002: 279-300; Harris & Aid, August 2013). However, 
following the September 11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, the US accused the Saddam regime of 
sponsoring the terrorism of Al-Qaeda. Such accusations of Saddam-Al-Qaeda collaboration are 
supported by some mainstream scholars like Alexander (Alexander, 2010: 25 & 42), but they 
are opposed by others like Wilkinson (2011:51) and Richardson (2007: 170-199).  
 
The objective understanding of terrorism has limited the capacity of mainstream studies to 
become a tool serving the governmental views of counter-terrorism. The mainstream studies 
usually overlook exploring the concept of terrorism because they have taken it for granted. 
Therefore, they usually focus on the causes and effects of terrorism. This in order to find and 
recommend strategies of counter-terrorism. Alexander (2010) deals with the involvement of 
Americans in international and domestic terrorism. In addition, he evaluates the American 
strategies of dealing with terrorism. Likewise, Wilkinson (2011) discusses the threats that 
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terrorism poses to the liberal democratic countries and assesses their strategies of counter-
terrorism. Whereas, Hoffman (2006) deals with the historical evolution of terrorism and 
terrorist groups. He focuses on the motivations and tactics of Al-Qaeda and Jihadist groups in 
addition to those of secular groups. Although Richardson (2007) put a light on some 
contradictories related to the conventional understanding of terrorism, she gives more space to 
the discussion of the causes of terrorism and motives of terrorists. Like other mainstream 
scholars, Richardson (2007) recommends new security tactics for counter-terrorism. 
Accordingly, the mainstream work gives more space for the policies of counter-terrorism 
adopted by state which usually favors using force, and accordingly, the mainstream work 
tolerates state violence.  
 
Dealing with terrorism as a stand-alone phenomenon regardless of its social and historical 
context made the mainstream scholars use the label of terrorism as a general brand against 
various actions by actors who have various motives and methods. For example, Alexander 
(2010: 20) considers as terrorism the sabotage acts of radical environmentalists and animal 
sympathizers like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Constructing the action of these 
movements as terrorism implies that their actions have impacts similar to those of armed groups 
like Al-Qaeda. However, scholars like Held (2008) argue that there are many forms of 
terrorism. Held (2008: 13) states that “it is a serious mistake to suppose that all terrorism is 
alike. Terrorism has different forms, as does war”. 
 
The mainstream scholars usually demonize ‘terrorists’. Richardson (2007: 7) argues that 
motives cannot change the characteristic of terrorist acts because terrorism is a warfare method 
and the description of a terrorist act is not changed by the goals of its perpetrator. She (2007:3) 
states that “terrorism is something the bad guys do”, while Wilkinson (2011: 35-36), Alexander 
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(2010: 10-11), and Hoffman (2006: 17-18) connect terrorism and terrorist groups to organized 
crime. 
 
The second point of critique is that the mainstream scholars focus on armed violence of non-
state actors, which they construct as terrorism. However, they deal narrowly with the violence 
of the repressive state apparatus, which they usually do not consider as terrorism. The 
mainstream scholars also repeat a list of sates who sponsor terrorism, but they overlook other 
states who have sponsored terrorism. This is explained below.   
         
Mainstream scholars usually highlight terrorism of non-state actors and hardly deal with state 
terrorism. Richardson (2007: 5, 2009: 50) stated that “terrorism is not the act of a state but of 
substate terrorist groups”. Likewise, Hoffman (2006), Alexander (2010), and Horgan (2005) 
limit their work to the terrorism of non-state actors. Although Wilkinson (2011: 6) admits that 
terrorism is also practiced by states, he argues that the threat of terrorism to democratic 
governments is mainly posed by non-state actors. Wilkinson (2011: 10) and other mainstream 
scholars like Chaliand and Blin (2007: 205-207), Lutz and Lutz (2008: 166-174), Moghadam 
(2006a: 23, 2006b: 98), and Bloom (2006: 33) refer to state-terrorism. However, they usually 
limit their reference to historical examples of state violence or repression by notorious regimes 
like those of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, and they overlook discussing similar acts of 
terrorism by Western colonialist powers and their allies during the colonial era. Furthermore, 
some mainstream scholars like Lutz and Lutz (2008: 104 & 286) describe the armed struggle 
for independence in the British and French colonies as acts of terrorism and legitimize the 
policies of counter-insurgency by colonialists. Others like Stohl (2006) and Hoffman (2006) 
argue against labeling state violations as terrorism, and they use other descriptions for such 
violations. Hoffman (2006: 26-28) argues that there is no need to describe state violations as 
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terrorism because they are already classified by international law as ‘war crime’, while Stohl 
(2006: 60-65) argues for using ‘repression’ as a label for state violations.  
 
On the contrary, scholars of CST argue that states have practiced terrorism, and that state 
terrorism is severer and wider in scale than that of non-state actors. Jackson et al., (2011: 180) 
disagree with the mainstream argument which detaches terrorism from the crimes classified by 
international law. Instead, they (2011: 180-181) argue that regardless of crime classification by 
international law, such violations of state are accompanied with terrorism because a major aim 
of perpetrating them is to intimidate the wider community of audience. That is, the exemplary 
violence or repression of state aims at intimidating the wider audience, which is the community 
of dissidents (Blakeley, 2009: 33-35; Jackson et al., 2011: 177-178). Norris, Kern and Just 
(2003:10) and Raphael (2010: 164-165) argue that because state has more resources, it has been 
more able than non-state actors to perpetrate violence on a large-scale. For example, the carpet-
bombing of Hamburg by the allies during the Second World War was not merely a military 
action but also an act of large-scale intimidation (Norris et al., 2003: 10).  
 
Blakeley (2009: 80-105), Jackson et al., (2011: 183-185) and Norris et al., (2003: 10) refer to 
examples of crimes against humanity and genocides accompanied with terrorism perpetrated 
by states such as those by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia and those by the US in Vietnam in 
addition to the violations of imperial powers in their colonies such as the violence of French 
authorities in Algeria, Great Britain in Kenya, and Japan in China and Korea. These scholars 
argue that the main aim of state violence in these cases was silencing insurgencies and 
liberation movements. For example, the US adopted Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam 
which aimed at intimidating the sympathizers of the National Liberation Front through 
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arbitrary detention of large numbers of population, torture, and assassination (Blakeley, 2010: 
23).13   
 
The mainstream scholars usually limit state sponsorship of terrorism to the support of particular 
states for certain anti-state groups. The conventional list of state sponsoring terrorism, which 
is usually repeated in the work of many mainstream scholars, includes Iran, Syria, North Korea, 
Iraq under the Saddam regime, and Libya under the Gadhafi regime which have usually 
supported armed groups classified as terrorist like the Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah 
(Alexander, 2010: 13-15; Alexander & Hoenig, 2008: 53-55; Richardson, 2009: 40; Wilkinson, 
2011: 166).   
 
On the other hand, scholars of CST have different view regarding the sponsorship of terrorism 
as they argue that sponsorship of terrorism is not limited to supporting anti-state groups, but it 
is also perpetrated by supporting pro-state groups who practice terrorist violence such as the 
paramilitary groups of counter-terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011: 185-186). Thus, the excessive 
use of force as a policy of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency generates terrorism, itself 
(Blakeley, 2009: 144-145). Such view considers as sponsorship of terrorism, the support of the 
US and its allies for both the campaigns of counter-insurgency and pro-insurgency in other 
countries (Blakeley, 2009: 12-24). For example, the US supported the Counter-insurgency 
campaign of Operation Condor, which was adopted during the 1970s by many governments of 
Latin America including Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay 
and Uruguay (Blakeley, 2009: 102-103; Jackson et al., 2011: 191; Lazzara, 2011: 92-94). The 
US also supported insurgency campaigns against certain governments such as its support for 
                                                          
13 The National Front of the Liberation of South Vietnam fought both the Southern Vietnamese government and 
the US during the years 1960–1975. See Tanham, G. K. (2006).  
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the military coup of Guatemala in 1954, the 1979-1990 Nicaraguan Contras, and the anti-Castro 
groups (Blakeley, 2009: 92-100). 14 
 
The third point of critique is that the mainstream studies usually confuse terrorism with the 
armed struggle of national liberation movements. For example, Hoffman (2006: 16), Weinberg 
and Eubank (2006: 44-46), and Stepanova (2008: 35-37) consider as terrorism, the armed 
action of national movements who struggled against the colonial rule of Britain and France 
during the 1940s and 1950s like the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). Hoffman (2016: 
71-74), Alexander (2010: 20) and Stepanova (2008: 36-40) also consider as terrorism, the 
action of national movements which emerged later like the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO).15 Accordingly, the mainstream scholars disregard or overlook discussing the right to 
self-determination for the subjugated peoples. As discussed earlier Richardson (2007: 6-12) 
denies that goals and motives could render legitimate the terrorist actions because terrorism is 
a warfare action. Whereas, Wilkinson (2011: 195) admits that the right to self-determination is 
compatible with the values of liberal democracies. However, he stated that “terrorism is a 
method which can be used for an infinite variety of goals” (Wilkinson, 2011: 195). 
Accordingly, Wilkinson (2011) implies that the just values of self-determination are not enough 
to legitimise the armed action of national liberation movements.  
 
This is although the armed struggle of subjugated peoples for the right to self-determination is 
warranted by the international law. In particular, the UN Resolution of 3103 in 1973 gives the 
armed struggle for the right to-self-determination a legal status distinguishing it from other 
                                                          
14 For more on CST description of state sponsored terrorism, see Druliolle (2011), Hamilton (2010), Lessa 
(2011), Lira (2011), Raphael, (2010) and Salvi (2011).   




kinds of internal conflict (UN General Assembly, December, 1973). According to this 
resolution and the other related principles of the international law, Moltchanova (2009: 87) 
argues that both the Russian-Chechen and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts are conflicts between 
nations. This is although the Russian and Georgian governments describe these conflicts as 
internal conflicts and branded the rebels as terrorists. To deal with the confusion of terrorism 
with the armed actions of national liberation movements, Achour (2009: 21-22) argues that the 
definition of terrorism needs to consider the legitimacy of armed struggle for the right to self-
determination which is guaranteed by the international law. Although scholars of CST like 
Jackson et al., (2011) and Blakeley (2009) critically deal with the subject of confusing 
terrorism with the action of national liberation movements, they do not provide in-depth 
discussion about the legitimacy of such armed action in the light of the international law.   
 
Mainstream scholars like Hoffman (2006), Wilkinson (2011) and Richardson (2007) 
distinguish acts of terrorism from those of guerrilla operations, which applies to the PKK as a 
guerrilla movement. Still, they argue that the guerrilla warfare is somehow interconnected with 
terrorism. Hoffman (2006: 35) and Richardson (2007: 6) argue that the number of militants in 
the terrorist operations is much smaller than those of guerrilla operations. In addition, guerrilla 
militants usually attack military and manage to control territories, while terrorists have no such 
capabilities. Likewise, Wilkinson (2011: 15) defines guerrilla action as an unconventional 
warfare method which depends generally on the tactic of surprising the governmental forces 
with unanticipated attacks. However, Wilkinson (2011) and Hoffman (2006) argue that 
guerrilla warfare is accompanied with terrorism. Likewise, Clutterbuck (1980: 20) argues that 
regardless of considering it as legitimate or not, guerrilla warfare is inevitably interconnected 
with terrorism.  
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It is plausible to argue that the description of certain guerrilla movement as terrorist by the 
mainstream studies is influenced by the dominant Western political discourse. For example, 
Hoffman, (2006: 35) admits that his reference to certain guerrilla groups as terrorist depends 
on the classification adopted by the US department of state. This is although such classification 
depends on state interests regardless of the conventional definition and criteria which identify 
terrorism. That is, states do not adhere to certain academic measures to judge whether a group 
is terrorist or not, but they designate certain groups as terrorist according to their interests. On 
the other hand, the mainstream literature does not equally refer to the violence of certain 
movements supported by the Western states of NATO. For example, the guerrilla organization 
of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was supported by the US and its Western allies, is 
hardly referred to as terrorist organization in the mainstream literature although it was involved 
in violence against civilians before and after the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo (Fulton, 
2010: 130-136; Raimondo, 2000).  
 
As stated earlier in the introduction of this research, the majority of literature on terrorism 
studies, including mainstream and critical studies, is actor-centred (Hulsse & Spencer, 2008: 
572). Therefore, there is a need to deal with the concept of terrorism itself through the discourse 
of terrorism. The majority of literature deals with actors ‘terrorists’, ‘anti-terrorists’, and those 
affected by their actions. As discussed earlier in this section, the mainstream studies usually 
consider terrorism as a stable concept. Therefore, these studies are generally limited to the 
causes and effects of terrorism. Although CST scholars like Jackson et al., (2011: 9-28 & 99-
121) deal with the theoretical background of the concept of terrorism and its definitional 
dilemma, they do not deal with the discursive constructions of terrorism. This is although the 
debates regarding the concept and definition of terrorism by Jackson et al., (2011) and other 
scholars are useful in building the theoretical ground for this research.  
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Discursive studies of terrorism  
The discursive research of terrorism is a growing body of the critical studies on terrorism 
(CST). Discourse of terrorism was discussed by scholars like Zulaika and Douglass (1996) 
before Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11. Zulaika and Douglass (1996) argue that terrorism is a 
linguistic construction and dealt with the contradictories around the discourse of terrorism. 
They argue that the exaggerative language of describing terrorism by governmental security 
agencies and media has constructed terrorism the way we understand (Zulaika & Douglass, 
1996: 7-23). They also contend that terrorism as both concept and label is not stable but 
changeable according to the political and historical conditions. While the work of Zulaika and 
Douglass (1996) deals with pre-9/11 American discourse of terrorism, the bulk of discursive 
studies of terrorism deal with the post-9/11 American discourse because they have been 
produced following 9/11.  In particular, they are connected with the ‘War on Terror’ narrative 
of the US president, George Bush. This is discerned in the work of Spencer (2008), Bhatia 
(2009), Bartolucci (2010), and Cetti (2010). 
 
Hülsse and Spencer (2008) discuss the post 9/11 metaphorical constructions of terrorism in the 
German press. Although Hülsse and Spencer (2008) depend on press outlets in their analysis, 
they focus on the German discourse of terrorism in general, and their argument does not 
concentrate on the relationship between political and media discourses. As a sample, they 
analyse the texts of Bild Zeitung tabloid on Al-Qaeda between the years 2001-2005 (Hülsse & 
Spencer, 2008: 580). They argue that Bild Zeitung metaphorically constructed Al-Qaeda as a 
military organization then it reconstructed it as criminal organization during the years-2001-
2005. Following the event of 9/11 Bild Zeitung used metaphorical constructions like “death 
troops” and “terrorist army” (Hülsse & Spencer, 2008: 581). However, following the attacks 
of 2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London Bild Zeitung mainly used criminalizing metaphors 
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like “murder”, “criminal assault”, and “suspect” to describe Al-Qaeda members and their 
actions (Hülsse & Spencer, 2008: 582-283). They argue that the metaphorical changes reflected 
the way that the threat of Al-Qaeda was understood in Germany. Hülsse and Spencer (2008: 
585-287) contend that the military metaphors constituted Al-Qaeda terrorism as an external 
threat, which attacked the US and incited military response by the US and its allies in 
Afghanistan, while the criminal metaphor constituted it as an internal criminal threat, which 
attacked European countries, and accordingly, judicial measures were required to deal with any 
potential threat against Germany.  
 
Although Hülsse and Spencer (2008) provide an analytical understanding for the changeable 
character of the discourse of terrorism according to its metaphorical constructions, they 
disregard the role of agency in the construction of this discourse. Their analysis for the outlets 
of Bild Zeitung on the attacks of 9/11 overlooked the role of the US president, Bush in the 
construction of Al-Qaeda according to his narrative of ‘War on Terror’ which influenced the 
Western media including Bild Zeitung. It is plausible to argue that the reason Hülsse and 
Spencer (2008: 584) overlooked the role of Bush is that they adhered to the post-structuralist 
approach which downplays the role of agency in the construction of discourse. That is, post-
structuralist approach disagrees that political elites influence the construction of discourse. As 
discussed earlier in the introduction of this research, post-structuralists argue that discourse is 
above the capacity of subjects ‘individuals’ to be manipulated because discourse determines 
the position of subjects, and accordingly, their discourse practices (Foucault, 1972: 40-55; Hall, 
2001: 72). Foucault (1972: 55) stated that “discourse is not the majestically unfolding 
manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which 
the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined”. 16 
                                                          
16 For more on post-structuralism see Sarup (1993). 
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On the other hand, scholars like Bhatia (2009), Bartolucci (2010), and Cetti (2010) highlight 
the role of political elites in the construction of discourse. Bhatia (2009) and Bartolucci (2010) 
analyses for the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ imply the role of Bush in the formation of the 
contemporary discourses of terrorism. Likewise, Cetti (2010: 59) analysis of the narrative of 
‘War on Terror’ shows the role of Western European political elites in the formation of the 
discourse of ‘security state’ which has given the priority to security concerns at the expense of 
law and human rights, and accordingly, impacted on the status of asylum seekers in the Western 
European countries. It is plausible to argue that the analyses of these scholars are influenced 
by the perspectives which emphasise the significance of social structures and power relations 
in the formation of discourse. In particular, Bhatia (2009), Bartolucci (2010) works are 
influenced by the perspective of critical discourse analysis scholar, Van Dijk (1995: 26) who 
emphasises the importance of considering ideology and power relations in the construction of 
linguistic structures which are built on the oppositional dichotomy of “a positive self-
presentation of the ingroup and a negative other-presentation of the outgroup”. Chapter 3 
provides further discussion for the notion of ideology according to the perspectives of CDA 
scholars. 17   
  
Bhatia (2009) discusses metaphor as a principal linguistic technique used in the statements of 
Bush administration which connected Saddam regime to Al-Qaeda. Bhatia (2009: 280) defines 
metaphor as a word or phrase dislocated from its context to be located in unusual context. 
Metaphors usually aim at excreting emotional influence over the cognition of the recipients of 
text to make them accept the message of text. For example, Bush used the phrase of ‘axis of 
evil’ as a reference to Iran, North Korea, and Iraq during Saddam regime, which portrayed 
                                                          




states as human beings (Bhatia, 2009: 281). Another example, the Bush narrative of ‘War on 
Terror’ categorised Saddam regime as an imminent threat to the civilized world thorough the 
repetition of the word ‘evil’ and its synonymous or the usage of emotional and frightening 
metaphors such as “mass murderer’’ as a label for Saddam (Bhatia, 2009: 282). Such 
demonization of Saddam regime facilitated the Bush narrative that the regime was sponsoring 
Al-Qaeda and possessing Weapons of Mass Distraction (WMD). Bhatia (2009) analysis shows 
that the discursive constructions of terrorism usually depend on the oppositional binary 
between ‘us; the West’ and ‘them; the terrorists’. This binary is accomplished by the adoption 
of negative metaphors, which categorise the negative understanding of ‘the other’ certain 
actors, states, and communities (Bhatia, 2009: 282).  
 
Likewise, Bartolucci (2010) discusses the discourse of terrorism adopted by the political elites 
in both the US and Morocco. She analyzed parts of Bush statements and speeches of the 
narrative of ‘War on Terror’. Bartolucci (2010: 123-124) analysis reveals that the narrative of 
‘War on Terror’ depended on ‘the othering discourse’ which created a simple dichotomy 
between the good civilized West vs. ‘the other evil’ terrorists, who are usually radical Muslims. 
Bartolucci (2010:124-125) argues that accepting the negative character of Muslims in the US 
was facilitated by the prevailed negative cultural knowledge about Muslims in the West. Such 
a negative knowledge was formed through the media and historical and political writings like 
'Clash of Civilizations’ for Samuel Huntington which portrayed Islam as a source of violence 
and tension between Muslims and the West.   
 
Bartolucci (2010) argues that the discursive narrative of ‘War on Terror’ has influenced the 
discourse of Moroccan elites about terrorism, and accordingly the governmental practices 
against various opposition groups and individuals.  The Moroccan political discourse of elites 
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regarding terrorism has copied the American discourse in dealing with radical Islam as sources 
of terrorism (Bartolucci, 2010: 127). The Moroccan discourse of terrorism has inter-
discursively connected terrorism to Islamism and radicalism, and accordingly, facilitated the 
policies of empowering state security institutions and silencing various Islamist opposition 
parties (Bartolucci, 2010: 128-130). In addition, the Moroccan government employed the 
discursive connection of terrorism with radicalism in establishing its narrative that the Polisario 
Front, which is a national liberation movement of Western Sahara, has been affiliated with 
Jihadist terrorists in Morocco (Bartolucci, 2010: 130-131). This is in order to legitimate the 
implementation of anti-terrorism law against the Polisario.  
 
Cetti (2010) deals with the discourse of terrorism and its impact on the conditions of asylum 
seekers in Europe. Cetti (2010: 59-63) argues that the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ has paved 
the ground for the conditions of ‘security state’ in the Western European countries, which 
legitimated more governmental security policies. Cetti (2010) argues that asylum seekers have 
been regarded as a security burden, and in some cases as potential terrorists. The discursive 
constructions of ‘War on Terror’ and ‘security’ of Europeans have intermingled with the 
necessities of protecting the national identity and space from the unwanted ‘alien’ asylum 
seekers (Cetti, 2010: 65-68). In addition, these discursive constructions have laid the ground 
for the public acceptance of the policies of Western European governments against asylums 
seekers although these policies violate human rights (Cetti, 2010: 68-70). Thus, Cetti (2010) 
implies that ‘national identity’ played a major role in the formation of discursive constructions 
about insecurity and terrorism threat, which influenced public opinion, and accordingly, 





Broadcast media and the discourse of terrorism  
Mainstream scholars of terrorism studies usually endorse the view that media is used by 
terrorists as a propaganda tribune. This is discerned in the work of mainstream scholars like 
Alexander (1979) and Wilkinson (2011). Alexander (1979: 161) argues that terrorists depend 
on the media in publicising their threat which he named as ‘war of nerves’ (Alexander, 1979: 
161). That is, media assists propagandising for terrorists, unintentionally. For example, the 
coverage of the kidnap of the newspaper heiress, Patricia Hearst by the leftist Symbionese 
Liberation Army (SLA) in February 1974 helped publicizing the group’s message (Alexander, 
1979: 161-162). This strategy also encourages executing similar acts by other terrorist groups 
and individuals (Alexander, 1979: 163-164). Likewise, Wilkinson (2011) emphasizes the 
importance of media to terrorists. Wilkinson (2011: 150) quoted the former British Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher statement that media is considered by terrorists as their “oxygen 
of publicity’’. Wilkinson (2011: 150-152) argues that in addition to TV, the contemporary 
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda resort to social media and the available space on the internet to 
propagandize. Furthermore, the internet has given terrorists more freedom to disseminate their 
publications.   
 
On the other hand, scholars like Dimaggio (2008), Graber (2003), and Norris et al., (2003: 10), 
argue that the corporate broadcast media usually serve the governmental narrative of counter-
terrorism. Their argument is based on their analyses of the bias of US corporate media for the 
advantage of the Bush doctrine of ‘War on Terror’ following Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11.    
 
Dimaggio (2008) argues that there is a relationship between reporting by the media agencies 
and their ownership (Dimaggio, 2008: 2). Dimaggio (2008: 21) contends that the American 
corporate media is monopolised by a few elites whose interests are in conformity with the 
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dominant narrative of ‘War on Terror’. He compares the British press to the American and 
argues that the British media agencies are less consolidated in corporate managements, 
dissimilarly to the American (Dimaggio, 2008: 51-52). Therefore, the British press has given 
more space to views which have been critical to the doctrine of ‘War on Terror’. Dimaggio 
(2008: 51-52) compares the press outlets of two cities, New York and London. Although both 
cities are similar in the number of populations, London has 4 widespread papers; the Telegraph, 
the Time, the Independent, and the Guardian, while New York has only New York Times as a 
widespread paper. Dimaggio (2008) compares the consumption of New York and London 
papers in 2005 to be 1.1 million to 2.2 million. He argues that the freedom from corporative 
management gives papers like the Guardian and the Independent the freedom to host views 
critical to the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ and the governmental military policies (Dimaggio, 
2008: 51-52). However, the gradual monopolization of media in UK and the growth of pro-war 
political alliance between the US and UK might lead to the convergence of British media to 
become more intolerant towards the critical views similarly to the US media (Dimaggio, 2008: 
53). 
 
Dimaggio (2008) and Norris et al., (2003) argue that corporate media adopt framing as a 
dominant conventional principle in reporting about terrorism. Framing is a process according 
to which report producers adhere to the dominant political discourse. That is, framing demands 
interpreting certain events according to the dominant understanding. This requires the report 
producer to select certain parts of the story and omit others in order to match the dominant 
frame (Dimaggio, 2008: 41-42). That is, framing prioritizes certain sides of the story, and 
accordingly, to construct it according to the dominant understanding. Thus, the process of 
conventional framing usually adheres to the dominant ideological view accepted by the public 
or the wide community of audience.  Norris et al., (2003) argue that the frame of the narrative 
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of ‘War on Terror’ has two functions. One function is cognitive which connects various events 
and facts such as admitting the relationship between Saddam regime and Al-Qaeda, and the 
other function is evaluative which labels certain elements positively and others negatively. The 
cognitive and evaluative functions of the frame facilitate the establishment of the messages of 
political leaders and conveying them to the public, smoothly. This is recognized in the way that 
the frame of the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ assisted the message of president Bush, which 
distinguished the nations who were friends of the US from those who were its enemies 
according to their willingness or unwillingness to participate in the War on Terror. This is 
discerned in Bush statement “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in 
Norris et al., 2003: 15).  
 
Dimaggio (2008) and Graber (2003) and Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007) argue that the frame 
of the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ in the US has been assisted by both corporate media 
dependence on official sources and its practicing of self-censorship against anti-war views. 
Dimaggio (2008) argues that the American corporate media has relied on official information 
and arguments regarding 9/11. This is because the governmental narrative about security issues 
is usually more reliable by the public. In addition, generating data for the media reports from 
official statements costs less than generating them through investigative journalism (Dimaggio, 
2008: 49).  Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007: 94-98) argue that CNN coverage of the 20013 war 
of Iraq depended heavily on the information provided by US government and military. 
Furthermore, the Bush administration supported reliance on its narrative of ‘War on Terror’ by 
sponsoring news programs, which served as platforms to propagandize the narrative. For 
example, in 2005 the US administration sponsored a large number of news programs on the 
2003 war of Iraq and the Iraqi political progress, which were conducted by Lincoln Group 
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(Dimaggio, 2008, 47-48). Such programs overwhelmed the corporate media without adequate 
awareness by the public that these programs were sponsored by the government.  
 
In addition to reliance on the official sources, the US corporate media has practiced self-
censorship against anti-war views. Graber (2003: 37-38) and Dimaggio (2008: 43-46) argue 
that the propaganda of ‘War on Terror’ has connected the issues of 9/11 to national sentiments 
and considered anti-war views as ‘unpatriotic’. Graber (2003: 35-37) argues that following the 
attacks of 9/11 the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice requested from the major 
American media agencies to adopt certain procedures in covering the events related to 9/11. 
Censorship was practiced by top media authorities of editors and owners who rejected reports 
which contradict with the administration’s narrative of ‘War on Terror’ and also fired reporters 
who insisted on including critical views, while those who adhered to the narrative had more 
chance of getting promotions (Dimaggio, 2008: 45; Graber, 2003: 37-38). Thus, journalists and 
reporters practised self-censorship in order to avoid both firing and the stigma of ‘unpatriotic’.  
Accordingly, the media plays a principal role in conveying the messages of elites to the wider 
audience. However, it usually reconstructs these messages while disseminating them. Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin (2007) and Hodge (2011) explain how the media reconstructed and 
disseminated the political elites’ discourse of terrorism. 
 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007) argue that news has created a new crisis of insecurity framed 
as the crisis of ‘War on Terror’ era, which followed the crisis of Cold War era. The new crisis 
is due to the way news about terror has been formed and disseminated by the TV news stations 
which have ‘amplified’ the threat of terrorism (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2007: 23-24). Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin (2007) argue that such a crisis of insecurity has served the goal of terrorists in 
creating fear among the wider audience. Since terrorism depends on its message of threat to 
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the wider audience by perpetrating exemplary violence, exaggerating the violence of terrorist 
events by the media serves the message of terrorists. In addition, Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
(2007: 15) argue that the excessive news coverage of the subject of terrorism following 9/11 
has made the news “a terrorist weapon, and news was ultimately unable to contain its own 
hijacking in this way”. 
 
Political discourse has framed the news coverage of events and the way these events connected 
to ‘War on Terror’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2007: 74-98). That is, political discourse 
establishes frames for what is discussed in the news. As Hoskins and O’Loughlin, (2007: 77) 
analysed the CNN coverage for the 2003 Iraq war, they found that TV coverage reproduced 
the political discourse of ‘democratic imperialism’ which was adopted by the Bush 
administration. Democratic imperialism suggests spreading democracy in other countries in 
order to maintain the American homeland security. This discourse was connected by the 
administration to its doctrine of ‘War on Terror’ in order to smooth the path of legitimating its 
military policies. Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2007) argue that the CNN coverage usually 
delegitimized and downgraded perspectives which contradicted with the pro-war views. The 
pro-war views usually argued that the regime of Saddam was a threat because it had ties with 
Al-Qaeda and possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and it also argued that the US 
invasion would establish democracy in Iraq (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2007: 81-88).   
 
For example, few hours before starting the 2003 war on Iraq, the CNN interviewed Hans Blix, 
the chief UN inspector of Iraqi WMD (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2007: 79-81). The interviewer 
kept adhering to the CNN pro-war inclination, and accordingly, repeated the argument that the 
war is the logical and inevitable response to the lack of cooperation of Saddam regime with the 
UN inspectors of Iraqi WMD. This is although Blix stated that Saddam regime was cooperative 
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to some extent and that war was not the proper option to deal with the Iraqi program of WMD. 
Hence, the interviewer used his position, which was more powerful than that of Blix as 
interviewee, in order to manipulate the production of the outlet of interview according to the 
view of CNN. This supports the CDA perspective that ideology and power relations influence 
the production of discourse constructions (Fairclough, 1995: 92-102, 2003: 55-60; Van Dijk, 
2006b: 126).   
 
Hodge (2011) argues that media re-contextualizes the discourse of political elites. Media locate 
the original narrative in other contexts and connect it to other texts. This process is described 
by Foucault as ‘discursive formation’ which is accompanied with the overlapping of more than 
one discourse (cited in Hodge, 2011: 85).  In order to explore media re-contextualization of the 
political elites’ discourse of terrorism, Hodge (2011) explores the media outlets of the Bush 
narratives of ‘War on Terror’. He argues that the powerful position of Bush who was the 
deliverer of the narrative through his statements and speeches strengthened the status of the 
narrative to become a reflection of reality or established a ‘regime of truth’ about 9/11 and post 
9/11 terrorist threats (Hodge, 2011: 5-6). However, the original statements of Bush’s narrative 
of ‘War on Terror’ have been re-contextualized by the media. For example, the following text 
was disseminated by CNN in May 6, 2004:  
                 “We are seeing indications that Al Qaeda continues to prepare to strike 
 U.S. interests abroad,” the State Department said in its worldwide caution.  
“Al Qaeda attacks could possibly involve nonconventional weapons such as 
                  chemical or biological agents as well as conventional ‘weapons of terror’. 
 We also cannot rule out that Al Qaeda will attempt a catastrophic attack  




The text limits the statement of US department of state about the threat of Al-Qaeda to the 
clauses which describe the threat of Al-Qaeda weapons. However, the most important aspect 
of re-contextualization is highlighting the repeated phrase of ‘weapons of terror’, which was 
first used by Bush in 2002 to describe the WMD of Saddam regime (Hodge, 2011: 91). 
Highlighting and repeating this phrase and similar phrases about the threat of terrorism 
facilitate establishing them as realities which are parts of the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ 
(Hodge, 2011: 92). In addition, such repetition of this phrase implies that Saddam pursued 
possessing WMD to use them as a terrorist threat similarly to Al-Qaeda. Accordingly, the text 
connected different actors; Saddam regime and Al-Qaeda and similar type of threat; the WMD 
‘weapons of terror’. This leads to the argument that Hodge’s concept of re-contextualizes is 
affiliated with framing which is discussed earlier by Dimaggio (2008) and Norris et al., (2003). 
The latter emphasizes that media texts are produced according to the context of the dominant 
frame or discourse of ‘War on Terror’.   
 
It is plausible to argue that the majority of works on the discursive constructions of terrorism 
either in the official or media discourses have two major characteristics:  Firstly, the discursive 
studies focus on the narratives of ‘War on Terror’, and accordingly, they give more space to 
the American discourse. Whereas, no adequate space is given to study of non-American 
discourses of terrorism, which are usually studied in the context of the narrative of ‘War on 
Terror’, and accordingly no adequate space was given to the characteristics of each case study. 
This is although the works of scholars like Hülsse and Spencer (2008), Bhatia (2009), 
Bartolucci (2010), and Cetti (2010) have critically dealt with the effects of the narrative of 
‘War on Terror’ outside the US. This implies that the doctrine of ‘War on Terror’ and its 
discursive constructions in the US have influenced significantly on the discourses of terrorism 
outside the US. This is more discerned in the cases of the Moroccan discourse of terrorism 
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discussed by Bartolucci (2010), and the European discourse of ‘state security’ which is 
influenced by the European interpretations for the narrative of ‘War on Terror’ discussed by 
Cetti (2010).  
 
Secondly, the discursive studies imply that identity is a principal discursive construction of the 
discourse of terrorism, and accordingly, it influences the internal and foreign policies of state. 
This is discerned in the works of Bhatia (2009), Bartolucci (2010), and Cetti (2010) who reveal 
the influence of identity over the discursive constructions of ‘War on Terror’. This is as they 
highlighted that these constructions are built on the oppositional binary between ‘American, 
Western, non-Western, and Muslims’ through the linguistic terms of ‘us’’ vs. ‘them’.  These 
scholars also explain how these discursive constructions, which imply different identities, 
influenced certain policies such as the American wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
European policies against asylum seekers.  
  
Studies on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and the PKK  
It is plausible to argue that the bulk of work on the PKK and Turkish-Kurdish conflict is flawed 
with bias and inconsistencies. The majority of literature usually favours the position of the 
Turkish state. This is because the majority of professional and academic work on the political 
and security issues related to Turkey is funded or supported by the Turkish state and agencies. 
In addition, the Turkish governments have usually restricted research on the Kurdish issues 
inside Turkey. Therefore, many independent researchers generated their secondary data from 
the Turkish sources. The majority of such work refer to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a matter 
of terrorism and criminality. Thus, the political origins of the Kurdish question either 
overlooked or underestimated due to the domination of the narrative of terrorism. This is 
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discerned in the work of Criss (1995), Radu (2001), Cornell, (2001), Dikici (2008), Heper 
(2007), Yilmaz (2011), and Cinar (2010).   
 
Criss (1995), Cornell (2001), and Radu (2001) argue that the Kurdish problem is separate from 
the terrorism of PKK and that the PKK aims at diffusing Marxist socialism. Criss (1995: 25-
28) argues that the Kurdish problem is not an ethnic separatism, but an issue of 
underdevelopment. This is because there is no Kurdish national identity in Turkey, but Kurdish 
cultural identity. Criss (1995: 34-36) recommends solving the Kurdish problem through both 
economic investments in the southeast of Turkey where Kurds live and to allow the Kurds to 
learn their language.18  Criss (1995) disfavors any kind of negotiations with the PKK who does 
not represent Kurds because the PKK is terrorist origination who aims at spreading Marxism. 
Likewise, Radu (2001: 48-54) argues that the PKK as a Marxist organization does not match 
the Kurdish tribal society. He argues that the main aim of PKK is to spread socialism beyond 
Turkey and all around the world. Radu (2001: 50-51) argues that in order to recruit more Kurds 
who disagree with such socialist ideology, the PKK uses the propaganda of Kurdish 
nationalism. He added that following the capture of Ocalan, Kurds no more approve the PKK 
(Radu, 2001: 58-62). Cornell (2001) also rendered the infiltration of the PKK into the Kurdish 
society to the feudal nature of this society which has not accepted the Turkish identity. The 
Turkish identity according to Cornell (2001) has proven to be the backbone of the development 
of Turkey, and he recommends that Kurds accept the Turkish identity in order to end the 
conflict (Cornell, 2001: 43). However, Cornell (2001: 43-46) admits that it is productive for 
the Turkish state to grant Kurds some cultural rights in order to ease the Kurdish integration 
                                                          
18 The Turkish official texts usually use the term ‘the southeast’ a reference to the Kurdish region of Turkey, and 
less frequently ‘east and southeast of Turkey’.  
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into the Turkish community. Cornell (2001: 40) also stated that “most Kurds do not desire a 
separate Kurdish state”. 
 
Criss (1995: 28-29), Cornell (2001: 41), Radu (2011: 55), Heper (2007: 160-161), Dikici (2008: 
121-122), Yilmaz (2011: 144), and Cinar (2010: 58) connect the PKK to organized crimes. In 
particular, they connect it to drug trafficking. Such accusations have been used by the Turkish 
governments against the PKK although they provided no concrete evidence to prove them. On 
the contrary to these accusations, the 1996 Susurluk scandal revealed the relationship between 
some chief state agents of counter-terrorism and criminal actions including murdering and drug 
trafficking (Alexander et al., 2008: 405-407; Gunter, 2008:117-118; Jongerden, 2007: 55-56 
& 65). Susurluk scandal was the only case of political drug trafficking and organized crimes in 
Turkey that was discussed by the Turkish parliament and in the media.19 This is also discussed 
in chapter 5.  
 
Although some Turkish scholars like Heper (2007) admit the grievances of Kurds in Turkey, 
they use vague and euphemistic expressions to describe the Turkish role in these grievances.  
Heper (2007: 6-8) described the forced evacuation of Kurds from the Kurdish region of Turkey 
towards the west of Turkey and central Anatolia as “re-acculturation” or “voluntary or 
unconscious assimilation”. He also located under the title of “maintaining law and order” his 
description for the massacres perpetrated by the Turkish governments like the massacre of 
1937-1938 in the Kurdish province of Dersim (Heper, 2007: 158).  In addition, Heper (2007: 
160-161) argues that the crimes, which targeted the Kurds during the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 
were perpetrated by the Kurds themselves either by the PKK or by the pro-state Kurdish village 
                                                          
19 Gunter (2008: 117-118) argues that the Susurluk scandal drew the attentions in Turkey towards the Turkish 




guards whose behavior did not represent the policy of Turkish government which punished the 
perpetrator whenever it discovered them. This argument contradicts with that the village guards 
acted according to the instructions of Turkish military and security forces (Gunter, 2008: 117). 
It also contradicts with many reports by human rights organisations which demonstrate that a 
large number of violent crimes were perpetrated by the Turkish forces and paramilitary death-
squads (HRW, 1994; Jongerden, 2007; Yildiz & Chomsky, 2005).  
 
Scholars like Casier (2010, 2011), Gunter (2008), Marcus (2007), Özcan (2006), Yildiz and 
Breau (2010), and Yildiz and Muller (2008) deal with the historical and political origins of the 
Turkish- Kurdish conflict. They connect the conflict to the Kurdish question and the long-term 
discrimination and violence practiced by the Turkish governments against Kurds. Yildiz and 
Breau (2010), and Casier (2010, 2011) also provide critical perspectives regarding the 
designation of PKK as a terrorist organisation by the US and EU governments. They argue that 
such designation would lead to the protraction of the conflict.   
 
Gunter (2008), Marcus (2007), and Ozcan (2006) depended on various sources and views to 
generate their data. However, they agree that the denial of Kurdish identity and the long-term 
repression by the Turkish state are the principal origins of the PKK and Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict. Ozcan (2006: 5-6) depends on both the PKK and Turkish government sources 
including PKK publications, interviews with Ocalan and Kurdish activists and texts by the 
Turkish government and media in relation to Kurds in addition to a clandestine questioner he 
conducted in Turkey. Gunter (2008: ix- xi) also generated his data from various sources. These 
include interviews with Kurdish activists and parties who have different views, international 
human rights activists and sources, and Turkish official sources. On the other hand, Marcus 
(2007: vii-x) depended on interviews with PKK deserters and some Kurdish activists who were 
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unfriendly with the PKK in addition to Turkish sources. While both Ozcan (2006: 54-72) and 
Gunter (2008: 4-11) explain the historical and political conditions, which encouraged the 
emergence of the PKK including the long-term denial of Kurdish identity and repression by 
the Turkish governments, Marcus (2007: 15-51 & 83-85) discusses such origins briefly but 
gives more space to discuss the biography of Ocalan as the founder of the PKK. This is although 
Marcus (2007) admits that the conflict is the result of the repressive policies of the Turkish 
governments and the denial of Kurdish national rights.   
 
Ozcan (2006), Marcus (2007), and Gunter (2008) discuss the evolvement of PKK and the 
changes of its political goals. While Gunter (2008) focuses on the period following the 
abduction of Ocalan, both Ozcan (2006) and Marcus (2007) discuss the PKK since its 
establishment until the years following the abduction of Ocalan. Gunter (2008: 59-92) 
discusses the initiative of peace by Ocalan and his calls of solving the Kurdish question in a 
democratic Turkey. Ozcan (2006) and Marcus (2007) explain the process of establishing the 
PKK in 1978 as a national liberation armed movement with Marxist ideology and its 
evolvement. Although both Ozcan (2006) and Marcus (2007) focus on Ocalan as the founder 
and leader of PKK, they judge him from different angles. Ozcan (2006: 80-108,157-165 & 
193-197) deals with the charisma of Ocalan as the principal founder of the ideology of the PKK 
who reconstructed this ideology according to the changing political conditions, and he critiques 
these changes theoretically. Whereas, Marcus (2007: 96 & 101) depending on the narrative of 
PKK deserters, focuses on Ocalan’s organizational actions and describes him as a dictator. In 
addition, Marcus (2007: 52-296) details the military progress and decline of the movement in 




Casier (2010, 2011), Yildiz and Breau (2010) critically discuss the impacts of designating the 
PKK as a terrorist organization by the EU. Casier (2010: 12-13) argues that designating of PKK 
as a terrorist organization by the EU reduced the trust of PKK in the EU intentions to end the 
conflict and solve the Kurdish question in Turkey. Therefore, PKK has become less energetic 
to support the idea of the membership of Turkey in the EU, and less willing to make 
concessions for the advantage of conflict resolution (Casier, 2010: 20-23). Casier (2011) also 
argues that the debates of the EU parliament regarding the Kurdish human rights are impacted 
negatively by the status of PKK as an organization designated terrorist by the EU. This is 
although the leftists and Greens in the parliament have expressed their solidarity with the Kurds 
(Casier, 2011). Likewise, Yildiz and Breau (2010) discussed the Turkish-Kurdish conflict from 
the perspective of the international law highlighting the repression practiced by the Turkish 
state. Yildiz and Breau (2010: 150) argue that the designation of the PKK as a terrorist 
organization by the US and EU is influenced by their political will of appeasing Turkey. 
Therefore, such designation disrupts and complicate any process of conflict resolution in 
Turkey. Although Casier (2010, 2011), Yildiz and Breau (2010) highlight the impacts of 
labelling the PKK as terrorist on protracting the conflict, they do not cover the Turkish official 
discursive constructions of terrorism regarding the PKK.  
 
Studies on the PYD-YPG and Roajva autonomy  
The Syrian Kurdish developments during the ongoing Syrian civil war and the position of the 
Turkish authorities regarding such developments are growing subjects of academic studies. In 
particular, the Turkish policy regarding the PYD-YPG and semi-autonomous administration of 
Rojava has become significant since the invasion of Rojava canton of Kobani by ISIL in 2014. 
Therefore, the quantity of the literature on the contemporary Syrian Kurdish issues is 
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considerably small although it is steadily growing. However, the literature on the PYD-YPG 
and the Syrian Kurdish autonomy has two dissimilar directions.  
 
One main direction of this literature favours the narrative of the Turkish authorities, which 
constructs the PYD-YPG to be organic parts of the PKK and considers the Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy as a threat to the national security of Turkey. This is discerned in the work of Acun 
and Keskin (2017), Dal (2016), and Orton (June, 2015, 2017). Acun and Keskin (2017) and 
Orton (2017) construct the YPG as criminal and terrorist organization, while Dal (2016) 
compares the YPG threat to Turkey to that of ISIL.  Orton (2017) even considers the YPG to 
be a threat to the international security. In particular, he constructed it as a threat to the security 
of the Western countries.   
 
Such kind of work overlooks both the origins of the Kurdish question and the antagonism of 
the Turkish authorities against the Syrian Kurdish autonomy. In addition, it omits referring to 
the Turkish involvement in the Syrian conflict, which has constituted a security threat against 
Syria, and particularly against the Syrian Kurds. This is as the Turkish authorise have played a 
main role in supporting the armed Jihadist groups in Syria (Graeber, 18 November, 2015; 
Spencer & Sanchez, 2014; Tastekin, 30 July, 2017; Tax, 2016). In addition, this kind of work 
downgrades the role of YPG in the international campaign against ISIL (Acun & Keskin 2017; 
Dal, 2016; Orton, June, 2015; 2017). Acun and Keskin (2017: 9) described the YPG-ISIL 
conflict as “skirmishes”, which the YPG-PYD invest to gain a political relationship with the 
US.     
 
The other main direction in the literature on PYD-YPG and Syrian Kurdish autonomy 
highlights the political and historical background of the Syrian Kurdish question. In addition, 
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it discusses the antagonism of the Turkish authorities against the Syrian Kurdish autonomy. 
This is discerned in the work of Gunter (2013), Knapp et al., (2016), and Radpey (2016).  
Gunter (2013) argues that the PYD played an important role in strengthening the position of 
Kurds in Syria. However, this position is threatened by the disunity of Syrian Kurds and the 
antagonistic attitude of Turkey regarding the Kurdish developments in Syria (Gunter, 2013). 
Gunter (2013) also argues that the Kurdish developments in Syria constituted a major factor, 
which pressed Turkey to conduct the peace process with the PKK.  Likewise, Radpey (2016) 
highlights the growing role of Kurds in Syria and makes a comparison between the status of 
their autonomy and that of Iraqi Kurds. However, Radpey (2016) describes the autonomy of 
Syrian Kurds as fragile experience, which lacks international recognition, and faces the 
antagonism of Turkey. Radpey (2016) also highlights the role of YPG in fighting against ISIL. 
Likewise, Knapp et al., (2016) highlight this role of the YPG, and they consider the Rojava 
autonomy as a unique experience of democracy in the Middle East where women and various 
religious and ethnic groups enjoy political representation and progressive rights. Knapp et al., 
(2016) also constructed the Turkish policy regarding Rojava as antagonistic and intimidating. 
This is although they admitted that the model of autonomy adopted in Rojava is stemmed from 
the perspectives of Ocalan, which are also adopted by the PKK. Although these scholars deal 
in their work with the attitude of Turkey regarding the PYD-YPG and Rojava, their work do 
not deal with the discursive construction of the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official discourse.  
 
The literature review revealed that there is a deficiency in the literature regarding the study of 
the construction of the PKK, PYD and YPG in the Turkish official narrative of terrorism. This 
is although the critical studies deal with the Turkish policy regarding the Kurdish question. 
This research contributes in dealing with such deficiencies as it concentrates on the 
constructions of the PKK and PYD-YPG in the Turkish official discourse. However, this study 
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is not detached from the study of the Turkish official policy regarding the Kurdish question. 
This is as the research explores the change in the language and policy of the Turkish authorities 
during the peace process and following its failure. Overall, this research is a contribution in the 
discursive studies of terrorism as it employs the case of the Turkish official discourse regarding 
the PKK and the other Kurdish movements whom the Turkish official discourse connects to 
‘the PKK terrorism’.   
 
Conclusion 
Terrorism is not an objective phenomenon exists independently from the way it is studied, but 
it is a linguistic construction which is influenced by the subjective interpretations of researcher. 
Viewing terrorism objectively made the mainstream studies revolve around researching the 
causes and effects of terrorism. The absence of consensus over the definition of terrorism made 
the mainstream studies, which are influenced by the view of state, overlook the violence of 
state and construct certain non-state actors as terrorists regardless of their characteristics, 
motivations and methods of action. Although CST have dealt with many of these 
inconsistencies of the mainstream studies, they remain actor-centered studies like the 
mainstream studies.  
 
The traditional actor-centered approach of terrorism allows narrow space to question the 
concept of terrorism itself. This deficiency paved the ground for the emergence of a new 
approach, which deals with the concept of terrorism through the discursive study of terrorism. 
In order to understand the construction of the discourse of terrorism and the way it is 
communicated to the wider audience, it is important to study the reconstruction and 
dissemination of this discourse in the broadcast media. However, the majority of discursive 
studies of terrorism rotate around the American narrative of ‘War on Terror’. Although these 
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studies reveal that this narrative has influenced the discourses of terrorism around the world, 
there is a need for comprehensive studies of each case study. This requires concentrating on 
the historical and political characteristics of the targeted case study.   
 
Critical scholars reveal the historical and political origins of the Turkish- Kurdish conflict 
unlike the mainstream scholars who overlook such origins influencing by the view of Turkish 
state. Few scholars also highlighted the impacts of the designation of the PKK as a terrorist 
organization by the US and EU on both conflict resolution and human rights in Turkey. 
However, they do not deal with the Turkish official narrative of terrorism and its constructions. 
In addition, although the construction of the Syrian Kurdish PYD- YPG as part of the PKK in 
the Turkish official discourse is a growing subject, it is not covered yet in the discursive 
literature on terrorism. These gaps in the literature made it productive to conduct a research to 
critically study the construction of the PKK, the PYD and YPG in the Turkish official discourse 



















Discourse is embodied in the usage of language as a social practice which forms the way we 
understand the world (Locke, 2004: 13-14). Therefore, the structure of discourse and the level 
of accepting it depend on social and historical contexts. This is the same constructionist 
argument that constructing knowledge depends on the dominant social and historical 
conditions (Burr, 2003). The linguistic and social characters of discourse have been explored 
by critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA represents a dialogue between the disciplines of 
linguistic and social analyses (Fairclough, 2001b). More important, as a multidisciplinary 
approach, CDA studies the mechanisms of constructing discourse and exploring its features of 
dominance and power relations (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 21). Accordingly, CDA does not deal 
with text passively, unlike content analysis, but it aims at disclosing the implied messages of 
text and its hidden agenda of dominance and power relations (Fairclough, 2003; Mayr, 2008; 
Van Dijk, 2001). This process is conducted by connecting the language of text with the social 
practices and structures and the wider social and historical contexts. Accordingly, for critical 
discourse analysts, language is “entwined in social power in a number of ways: language 
indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to 
power” (Wodak, 2001a: 11). 
 
This chapter employs the perspectives of several critical discourse analysts (CDA). However, 
it gives more space to the perspectives of three main founders of CDA. These are Fairclough 
(2001a, 2001b, 2003), Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b, 2009) and Wodak (1989, 2001a, 2001b). 
Fairclough (2001a, 2001b, 2003) deals with the social identity of actors who influence and are 
influenced by discourse and the way according to which the discursive constructions produced. 
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Whereas, Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b, 2009) focuses on the socio-cognitive character of 
discourse which serve ideology and dominance. Wodak (2001a) concentrates on the historical 
contexts that influence the production of discursive constructions (Wodak, 2001a: 63-92). Both 
Fairclough (2003, 1992) and Wodak (2001a, 2001b) deal with the inter-textual and inter-
discursive relations of discursive practices and constructions, which have become more 
complex in the era of globalization. However, the three scholars agree that the discursive 
practices and constructions are studied according to their social and historical conditions and 
that the principal task of CDA is to reveal the features of text that serve dominance and power 
relations.   
 
This chapter studies discourse and the methodological implications of critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) in relation to the research. In order to make the theoretical explanation of this 
chapter consistent with the following chapters of data analysis and the purposes of this research, 
the discussion frequently employs examples referring to the discourses of terrorism. The 
chapter consists of two sections. The first section deals with discourse theory, consisting of the 
following subtopics: 
• Definition of discourse, which theoretically elaborates the definitions of discourse in 
the light of the perspectives of CDA scholars and others. 
•  Inter-textuality and inter-discursivity, which explains the relationships of texts, 
genres and discourses. 
•  Discourse manipulation, which focuses on the role of agency in the manipulation of 
discursive practices and constructions.  
•  CDA and ideology. This subtopic discusses the mechanisms according to which 
ideology forms the attitudes of group members and how such attitudes serve 
dominance and power relations.  
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The second section deals with the methods of CDA, and it consists of the following subtopics: 
• Critical discourse analysis of text. This subtopic discusses theoretically the analytical 
mechanism of text in the light of both language function and socio-historical conditions.  
• The framework of analysis. This subtopic explains the framework according to which 
the analysis of data is conducted. The framework also highlights certain linguistic 
techniques that serve bias and ideology in the texts, which the analysis aims at 
revealing.  
 
Section I. Discourse theory  
Discourse  
Oxford dictionary defines discourse as “written or spoken communication or debate” (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2013). That is, discourse indicates a linguistic structure representing a meaning 
or an interpretation for a particular phenomenon. However, this definition deals only with the 
linguistic character of discourse. Mayr (2008) argues that limiting discourse to its linguistic 
character is contested by the functional definition of discourse, which highlights the social 
functions of discourse (Mayr, 2008). According to the functional definition, understanding 
discourse transcends its linguistic structure to include its historical and cultural contexts (Mayr, 
2008: 7). Foucault (1972: 40-49) argues that discourse is not merely a linguistic description for 
certain phenomenon, but it is systematic practice constituting the phenomenon itself. 
Therefore, discourse is not reducible to being merely a linguistic structure, but it consists of 
both language and social practice (Hall, 2001: 72). To explain it in easier way, Epstein (2008: 
4) stated that “discourses are sense-making practices. We string words together into sentences 
to make sense of the world around us, both to ourselves and to others’’. In other words, 
discourse constructs realities. Critical discourse analysts usually refer to the forms that 
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represent discourse in written, spoken and visual languages as ‘text’. Fairclough (2003: 3) 
states that “any actual instance of language in use is a ‘text’”.20  
 
Discourse participates in the formation of three types of social practice (Fairclough, 2003). 
Firstly, discourse represents the way of understanding social life and phenomena, which are 
interpreted differently according to different representations (Fairclough, 2003: 206). 
Secondly, it determines the way that genre operates (Fairclough, 2003: 206). Genre is the way 
of producing certain discourses according to certain conventions (Fairclough, 2003: 65-68). 
For example, TV reports, press reports, press conferences, and documentaries are genres which 
require certain conventions or methods to organize and conduct. Finally, discourse constitutes 
the style of actors, or their “way of being” (Fairclough, 2003: 206).21 This is discerned in the 
social positions of elites who influence the production of discourse, such as politicians 
regarding the discourse of terrorism (Bartolucci, 2010; Zulaika & Douglass, 2002). This 
demonstrates that discourse, genre and style influence and are influenced by the construction 
and function of each other. Discourse influences the way that genre functions and the way that 
identity is formed, and vice versa, genre and identity influence the production of discourse.  
 
The production of discourse is influenced by its social and historical context (Fairclough, 2003; 
Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak, 2001a). Therefore, different historical and social contexts might 
produce different discourses or different interpretation and representations for certain 
phenomenon. That is, the dominant context influences both the production and reception of 
discourse. Hodges (2011: 6) stated that “discourse regulates the way a topic can be talked about 
                                                          
20 Fairclough (2001a: 122) argues that discourse is not only represented in written and spoken language, but it 
encompasses all forms of “semiosis”. Semiosis denotes all types of sign systems and meaning-making including 
written, spoken, and visual languages, in addition to bodily movements (Fairclough, 2001a). In the case of 
political discourse, semiosis can be represented in many forms such as the outlets of press conferences, media 
reports, newspaper articles, and pictures. 
21 Style indicates the identity of actors in relation to the discursive constructions and practices.  
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meaningfully in a particular culture at a particular point in history’’. Accordingly, different 
historical contexts influence the production of different discourses which all claim the truth 
regarding the same phenomenon. For example, a certain group labelled as ‘terrorists’ might be 
described as a movement of ‘freedom fighters’ by their local community or even by wider 
communities. This can be discerned in the case of Palestine Liberation  Organization (PLO), 
which was considered as a terrorist organization by the US and other allies of Israel before the 
1991 negotiations of peace between PLO and Israel (Zulaika & Douglass,1996: 177-178).22 
However, since its establishment, Arab states have considered the PLO as a legitimate 
organization representing the struggle of the Palestinian people for freedom (Zulaika & 
Douglass, 1996: 177-178). A similar historical dichotomy is also discerned in the case of the 
African National Congress (ANC) which was labelled as a terrorist organization by some 
Western governments but was considered as a legitimate organization by many African states 
(Lapsley, June, 2004).  
 
It is also plausible to argue that the extent to which discourse is accepted depends on its 
pervasiveness and publicity. In the contemporary historical and social context, the 
pervasiveness of the terms of terrorism, terror, and terrorist in addition to their associated 
narratives has warranted the label of terrorism a status of objective truth (Bartolucci, 2010). 
Therefore, any efforts by researchers to question the creditability of this label might be 
considered as an abnormal endeavour (Bartolucci, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011).  
 
                                                          
22 See also: 22 USC § 5201 - Findings; determinations. Cornell University Law School. Available at: 




Inter-textuality and inter-discursivity23  
Wodak (2001a: 46) argues that discourses are not closed but are open to hybrid relations with 
various topics and texts (Wodak, 2001a: 46).  Such hybridity is named by some scholars as 
inter-textuality. Mayr (2008: 21) stated “inter-textuality refers to the way in which discourses 
are always connected to other discourses”, while Hodges (2011: 8) argues that inter-textuality 
is a process by which a text or part of text is de-contextualized and re-contextualized into other 
settings. Accordingly, the re-contextualized text might keep the aspects of previous context 
and acquire aspects of new context.24 Hodges (2011: 10) depends on Derrida’s approach 
(1977), which identifies two forms of merging text. These are iterability which denotes the 
repetition of text in many contexts, and citationality which refers to the quotation of text 
through direct or indirect reported speech. Accordingly, inter-textuality involves repetition and 
reshaping of text (Hodges, 2011: 10-11).    
 
The means of communication play a principal role in the production of inter-textuality. This is 
discerned in news releases of broadcast media, which convey messages of various institutions 
to the recipients (Fairclough, 2003: 34). Usually, there is distance between the recipients and 
the original source of news such as the distance between TV viewers as recipients and the 
interviewee in the field of conflict as original sources of news. Therefore, the means of 
communication, particularly the broadcast media and press mediate between the original 
                                                          
23 Fairclough (1992) and Hansen (2006) distinguished two types of inter-textuality. Fairclough, (1992: 104) named 
them as “manifest inter-textuality” and “constitutive inter-textuality”, while Hansen (2006: 51) named them as 
“explicit intertextuality” and “implicit intertextuality”. In the manifest or explicit inter-textuality, the convergence 
of texts is explored directly through quotation marks or grammatical cues, while in the constitutive or implicit 
inter-textuality one text represents more than one discourse. In other words, manifest inter-textuality of texts is 
noticed through their quotation marks and grammatical structures, while the constitutive inter-textuality of texts 
is observed through their semantic structures and accounts. Fairclough (2003: 218) also names the latter as ‘inter-
discursivity’, denoting the articulation of the discursive constructions of more than one discourse in a single text. 
Thus, in addition to the discourse it represents, the inter-discursive text is connected somehow to other discourses. 
Likewise, Hansen (2006:7) in her study of discourse and foreign policy distinguishes two kinds of intertextuality 
by stating that intertextual texts “build their arguments and authority through references to other texts: by making 
direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases”.  
24 See also the literature review chapter.  
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sources and the recipients through the process of reporting what happened and what was said.25 
However, such reports usually do not convey what happened and what was said exactly as it 
was happened or said. They usually reshape the story or message by adding other texts for more 
detail or by selecting parts of the original story or message. This is the case of governmental 
messages regarding policies of counter-terrorism, which are usually mediated according to 
certain settings by the media and press agencies (Crelinsten, 1998). Accordingly, news-makers 
usually select certain information and exclude other information.26 Fairclough (2003: 85) stated 
that “making news is a heavily interpretative and constructive process”.   
 
Wodak (2001a) and Fairclough (2003) agree that inter-discursivity is embodied in the 
interaction between various texts, genres, and discourses. In the era of globalization, the 
relationship between politics and the means of communication has become more complex 
making various genres, texts, and discourses interconnect with each other (Fairclough, 2003: 
47; Wodak, 2001a: 64). This is discerned in various texts, which label the PKK as a terrorist 
organization as part of the global discourse of terrorism disseminated through various genres 
such as press reports, TV reports, and press conferences.27 On the other side, some of these 
texts might connect various discourses to each other. For example, the Council on Foreign 
Relations, which is an American think tank, published a report in 2007 describing the PKK as 
a terrorist, Marxist, and separatist organization (Bruno, 2007). Accordingly, this report refers 
to the discursive constructions of three discourses: counter-terrorism, anti-Marxism, and state 
sovereignty. In other words, text which represents one discourse, or more is represented 
                                                          
25 "The genres of governance are essentially mediated genres specialized for "action at a distance" (Fairclough, 
2003: 34).   
26 This might reach the level of ideological manipulation which Fairclough (2003: 85) named as “focalization”. 
Focalization is responsible for the creation of certain concealed relations of protagonism and antagonism between 
different parties. This is discerned in the role of media and press in creating an antagonistic relationship between 
the US states and certain groups labelled as terrorist.   
27 See, for example, Bruno (October 2007), Freedman & Levitt (December, 2008), US Department of State 
(September, 2012), US Department of State (April, 2013), BBC (May, 2008), and CNN (December, 2007).    
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through one genre or more, and vice versa, discourse is represented in one or more texts and 
genres. Figure 1 below is an example of inter-textuality and inter-discursivity. 
 
 
Figure 1. Inter-textuality and inter-discursivity 
 
Inter-discursivity takes also the form of connecting discourses which prevail in different 
historical periods (Titscher et al., 2000: 23; Wodak, 2001a: 67-70). Bankoff (2003) explains 
the inter-discursive relationship between the Western discourse of terrorism and other historical 
Western discourses, which label the developing countries of southern hemisphere as sources 
of threat and dangers. Bankoff (2003: 415-417) argues that the discourse of ‘Tropicality’ was 
a Western source of knowledge about the southern hemisphere during the period between the 
17th and early 20th century, and that this discourse described the tropical areas of southern 
hemisphere as origins of diseases. Following World War II, the Western knowledge was 
influenced by the discourse of ‘underdevelopment’ which described the southern hemisphere 
as a region of poverty (Bankoff, 2003). This knowledge was also influenced by the discourse 
of ‘natural disasters’ which prevailed in the late 20th century describing the southern 
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hemisphere as the geographical area of natural hazards. Bankoff (2003: 417-420) argues that 
the narratives of Western discourse of terrorism are influenced by the narratives of such 
historical discourses which portrayed the southern hemisphere as origin of dangers and threats.  
 
Manipulating the discursive practices and constructions   
As explained in the introduction of this research, CDA emphasizes the role of agency in the 
production and maintenance of discourse, while post-structuralist scholars like Foucault (1976, 
1977) deny such a role (Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 1993, 2003; Wodak, 2001a, 2001b). 
Although Foucault agrees that dominant discourse usually functions to advantage powerful 
groups, he denies the ability of agency to manipulate discourse (cited in Burr, 2003: 78; Hall, 
2001: 79-80).28 Foucault argues that whatever the subjects ‘elites’ are able to produce, their 
production is part of discursive practices which operate according to certain historical and 
cultural conditions, and such conditions  are above the ability of ‘subjects’ to manipulate (cited 
in Hall, 2001: 79-80). On the other hand, critical discourse analysts emphasize that dominant 
discourse which serves the interests of powerful groups is manipulated by these groups (Van 
Dijk, 1993, 2003; Wodak, 2001a). Wodak (2001a: 10) stated that “for CDA, language is not 
powerful on its own-it gains power by the use powerful people make of it”.  
 
It is plausible to argue that powerful groups are able to influence or manipulate textual 
constructions and discursive practices, but they are not able to manipulate discourse as an 
entity. This is because discourse is “text in context” (Titscher et al., 2000: 23). Thus, there is 
no discourse without historical and social context. Powerful groups are able to manipulate the 
discursive text and practices, but they cannot do so regarding the context. For example, the 
speeches of the president Bush about Al-Qaeda influence the production of discursive texts of 
                                                          
28 See also O’Farrell (2005).  
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‘War on Terror’, and accordingly, influence the related discursive practices. However, these 
speeches might not be in such a position if the political and historical contexts were different. 
Both constructionists and critical discourse analysts agree that the social and historical contexts 
influence the production of knowledge about social phenomena. Thus, the historical and socio-
political contexts in the case of political discourses like the discourse of terrorism constitute a 
major pillar of the entity of discourse. Therefore, this research is not in conformity with the 
CDA perspective that agency manipulates the entire discourse, but it agrees CDA that agency 
is able to manipulate discursive constructions and practices.  
 
In addition, agency is not represented in powerful individuals, but it is embodied in institutions. 
Mayr (2008: 3) argues that institutions are the principal sites for “reality construction”.  These 
are usually state institutions in addition to other institutions affiliating with them (Mayr, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the term ‘institution’ is not embodied in physical settings, but it is embodied in 
various groups that execute institutional power like the groups that act as part of the institutions 
of the media and governments. Therefore, the power that institutional discourse yields is 
institutional power (Mayr, 2008: 4). This power originates from discursive practices which lead 
to discursive constructions legitimating certain norms, rules, laws, and policies (Van Dijk, 
1993, 2003). Accordingly, politicians and journalists are elites or members of powerful groups 
as they play a major role in the practices and constructions of the discourse of terrorism. 
Bartolucci (2010: 131) stated that “the (re)creation of the discourse surrounding the events that 
took place on 11 September 2001 in America was undoubtedly an elite project widely 
reproduced by the media. In situations of ‘crisis’, political elites have the greatest rhetorical 
power”. Likewise, Silberstein (2002) argues that the rhetorical skills of political elites, which 
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were facilitated by the media influenced both of public reaction and knowledge about the 
attacks of September 11.29  
 
Discursive constructions do not operate only by a single institutional body or social group. Van 
Dijk (2001) argues that discourse involves a network of social groups.  Accordingly, various 
institutional and social bodies influence the production, dissemination, and function of 
discursive constructions. For example, the discourse of counter-terrorism is disseminated and 
reproduced by the media and press. However, the circulation and function of this discourse is 
beyond the capacity of media and press outlets. This is because counter-terrorism as discourse 
is originated from the political discourse of government and is legitimated by laws of counter-
terrorism. The latter are usually enacted by the parliament or other legislative bodies of state. 
Such laws are safeguarded by other judicial and military institutions of state, which adopt 
certain measures of counter-terrorism. Thus, all these institutions participate in the production 
and maintenance of the discursive practices and constructions of the discourse of counter-
terrorism.    
 
Van Dijk (2006a) argues that manipulating discourse is accompanied by power abuse. In other 
words, manipulation is usually facilitated by illegitimate discursive practices (Van Dijk, 2006a: 
360-361). Manipulation is different from legitimate persuasion in that the recipient of discourse 
in manipulation cannot understand the real purposes and aims behind the discursive practices 
which usually serve the manipulator (Van Dijk, 2006a: 361).  The practice of manipulation has 
social, cognitive and discursive features (Van Dijk, 2006a: 361). Firstly, it has social feature 
as it indicates interaction between social actors resulting in power abuse. Secondly, it has 
                                                          
29 See also Zulaika & Douglass (1996) on how political elites use the media as a major tool in exaggerating the 
threat of terrorism, and accordingly, constructing the discourse of terrorism. 
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cognitive feature as it is about controlling the minds of the manipulated. Finally, it has 
discursive feature as it is practiced through written, spoken and visual representations of 
discourse. It is proper to name the last character as ‘textual’ instead of discursive because the 
discursive character is wider than the textual representation, and in the first place, discourse 
encompasses the social, cognitive and textual characters. Accordingly, the textual 
constructions and practices are subject to manipulation, but not the entire discourse as 
explained earlier. As stated earlier, this research disagrees with the perspective that discourse 
is manipulated as an entity, but it emphasizes that only the discursive constructions and 
practices are subject to manipulation.30 
  
CDA and ideology  
Van Dijk (2006b: 116) describes ideologies as “belief systems”. Ideologies are fundamental 
beliefs which are usually built on abstracts and assumptions. However, ideologies are powerful 
as they organize the social cognition shared by members of particular social group, and 
accordingly, they influence the attitude of group members towards certain matters (Van Dijk, 
2006b). That is, ideologies form the foundations for certain attitudes and social practices by 
the members of group (Van Dijk, 2006b: 117-118). For example, the Islamic Salafist ideology 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which considers non-Muslims as infidels (in 
Arabic: Kufar), depends on Quran texts which are considered by Salafists as the holy and 
                                                          
30 Van Dijk (2003) distinguishes two strategies of manipulation in the discursive practices and constructions. 1. 
The manipulation of the context of producing the discursive constructions (Van Dijk, 2003). This is mainly 
practiced by limiting access to the sources of discursive constructions to those who support certain views, while 
depriving those who have opposite views from such access, e.g. limiting the attendance of a forum on an internal 
conflict to the representative of government and ignoring the view of rebels. 2. The manipulation of the linguistic 
structure of discursive constructions (Van Dijk, 2003). This kind of manipulation is practiced through the 
construction of text for the purpose of conveying certain message. That is, structuring the text in a particular 
semantic or grammatical structure for the purpose of conveying certain message. For example, using the label of 
‘bunch of criminal gangs’ to describe rebels. This aims at building the assumption that the rebels are merely 
criminals, and therefore, it necessary to adopt certain measures by the government to chase them as it does 
regarding any criminals.30 Structure manipulation is also practiced by choosing and advancing certain topics as 
hegemonic topics such as ‘War on Terror’ as a topic for a forum about an internal conflict.  
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unquestionable truth.31 Such Salafist beliefs which are built on certain assumptions influenced 
the attitude and behaviour of ISIL members and sympathizers towards non-Muslims.32 
 
Ideology has a social function in constructing and maintaining the identity of social group (Van 
Dijk, 2006b). As ideology preserves values, attitudes and beliefs shared by members of certain 
group, it demarcates the borders of the group by differentiating group members from aliens, or 
the ‘in-group’ from the ‘out-group’. Thus, ideology identifies individuals who belong to the 
group and those who are not. For example, we are national citizens and they are alien 
immigrants. Referring to the in-group and out-group is usually accompanied by the polarization 
of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the others (Van Dijk, 2006b: 126). 
This kind of dichotomy is described by Hansen (2006: 33-34) as creating the identity of ‘the 
self’ though the construction of the identity of ‘the other’ or through the discursive 
constructions of “otherness”. Bartolucci (2010: 123) also named this as the “othering 
discourse”. Bartolucci’s view on the othering discourse is also discussed in the framework of 
textual analysis.  
 
Although critical discourse analysts are influenced by the Foucauldian notion of disciplinary 
power (Foucault, 1977), their notion of ideological power is influenced by the Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony (Mayr, 2008: 11-14). The Gramscian concept maintains that ideological 
power is exercised subtly and routinely through the acceptance of the dominated (Mayr, 2008: 
11-14). Thus, ideology facilitates ‘discursive dominance’. Dominance is not merely imposed 
from above, but it is the result of a relationship between the dictating dominant and the passive 
dominated. That is, dominance is maintained by the legitimacy that the dominated gives to the 
                                                          
31 Kufar is plural of a single Kafir (in English: infidel).   
32 Another example is the racist ideology of Apartheid which was built on assumptions downgrading the black-
skin human-being and praising the white.   
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dominant through their consent (Mayr, 2008). Fairclough (2003: 9) argues that ideologies are 
representations of the world which facilitate the maintenance of power relations and 
dominance. Ideologies serve the construction and maintenance of certain discourses which in 
turn serve certain social practices and structures. Accordingly, ideologies and discursive 
practices and constructions reciprocally influence each other. 
 
Wodak (2001a: 10) stated that “one of the aims of CDA is to `demystify' discourses by 
deciphering ideologies”. Features of ideology are discerned in various explicit and implicit 
textual forms. Assumptions usually have ideological functions as they have no place for the 
voices that contradict with their ideological accounts (Fairclough 2003: 55-60). In addition, 
certain semantic and grammatical structures and techniques of text have ideological functions. 
The ideological structures of text usually highlight the information that serves the in-group at 
the expense of the out-group, or they might downgrade these of the out-group for the advantage 
of the in-group. This is discerned in news reports which marginalize certain information, which 
is closely connected to the story of report because such information favours the out-group, 
while they highlight the information that serves the in-group although such information is less 
relevant to the story. Van Dijk (1995: 27) stated that according to this type of bias "our negative 
points and their positive points will remain implicit''. However, the relationship between 
ideology and text is reciprocal. That is, a text that serves certain ideology is produced according 
to certain ideological considerations. Certain linguistic structures and techniques of the text, 







Section II. Methods of critical discourse analysis 
Critical discourse analysis of text  
Wodak (2001a: 8) argues that in order to conduct CDA of text, it is necessary to be familiar 
with the essential principles of Halliday’s theory of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). 
Likewise, Fairclough (2003: 5) refers to SFL as a significant source for CDA acknowledging 
that it has a significant role in the majority of work on CDA. SFL emphasizes the relation 
between the grammatical aspects of language, its purposes, and the related social relations and 
structures (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 2001a).  
 
According to the theory of SFL, language has three meanings or “meta-functions” (Mayr, 2008: 
17). These meanings are realized in various linguistic units including texts, clauses, sentences, 
phrases, and words. These functions are the following (Mayr, 2008):33 Firstly, ideational 
function according to which language is a tool of understanding the world. Secondly, 
interpersonal function which identifies language as a tool of interaction and communication 
between individuals and groups, and accordingly, it reveals the social relations between the 
producer(s) and recipient(s). Finally, textual function. This function indicates that language is 
textually organized and has the properties of cohesiveness and coherence. Textual function 
serves the understanding of the ways that certain information is back-grounded while others 
are fore-grounded (Mayr, 2008: 17).  Locke (2004) argues that Fairclough (1992a) employed 
                                                          
33 The meta-functions of SLF are also realized as three linguistic systems of clauses and sentences (Mayr, 2008). 
These are the following: 
 
1. Transitivity, which is related to ideational function, refers to the inclusion of essential elements of 
sentence or clause. These elements are: Process + Participants (s) + Circumstance. Process refers to verb; 
participant refers to noun, and circumstance refers to prepositional phrase.  
2.  Modality, which is related to interpersonal meanings, consists of three major patterns. Frist, the goal of 
text as declarative, interrogative, or imperative. Second, the attitude of producer. Finally, the degree of 
certainty or uncertainty regarding particular argument or information presented in the text.  




the meta-functions of language of the SFL theory in his approach of textual analysis. However, 
Fairclough (1992a) identifies two sub-functions for the interpersonal function (cited in Locke, 
2004). These are identity function which refers to social identity, and relational function which 
indicates social relations, particularly the relations between the producer(s) of text and the 
recipient(s) (Locke, 2004: 45-46). However, Fairclough (2001a, 2003) has not adopted a 
particular framework for textual analysis, although he distinguishes the major areas of such 
analysis.  
 
The critical discourse analysis of text accompanies exploring the social practices and the wider 
social and historical contexts of text production and dissemination (Wodak, 2001a, 2001b). 
CDA of text has three major angles. Firstly, analysis of the linguistic and semantic structures 
of text (Janks, 1997; O’Halloran, 2005). Secondly, analysis of the social practices according to 
which the text was produced and received or what O’Halloran (2005: 339) referred to as 
“processing analysis”. These practices are embodied in the interactions between writer and 
reader, or speaker and listener. Thirdly, analysis of the wider social and historical structures 
and conditions according to which the text was produced, disseminated and received (Janks, 
1997; O’Halloran, 2005).  This is compatible with the constructionist perspective that 
knowledge is influenced by social and historical conditions (Burr, 2003).  This is also in 
agreement with Titscher et al., (2000: 23) description of discourse as “text in context”.   
 
CDA aims at revealing the hidden agendas and unexpressed messages of text by connecting 
the text to its wider social and historical contexts. The goal of this strategy is to explore the 
aspects of bias which usually serve dominance and power relations (Van Dijk, 2001, 2003). 
CDA strategy depends on that "what is ‘said’ in a text is always said against the background of 
what is ‘unsaid’ – what is made explicit is always grounded in what is left implicit" (Fairclough, 
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2003: 17). Therefore, CDA requires inspecting the text critically (Fairclough, 2001a, 2003). In 
other words, the critical discourse analyst should not deal with the text passively, or as if the 
text has straightforward implications. This is because treating text passively by the researcher 
mismatches the complicated task of deciphering its hidden features of dominance and power 
relations, which is the main commitment of CDA. Such a commitment of CDA requires 
connecting the micro analysis of the linguistic structures of text to the wider social and 
historical contexts which influence its production and dissemination.   
 
There is no complete and definitive analysis for text (Fairclough, 2003: 14). Therefore, the 
researcher needs to employ reflexivity in order to obtain a certain level of credibility (Elliott, 
2005; Kalof et al., 2008). By adopting reflexivity, the researcher acknowledges their position 
regarding the subject of the research and its questions (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). As there 
is no definite reality about social phenomena, the analytical outcomes of any research do not 
constitute the definite reality about the phenomenon. In addition, analysis is usually selective 
as it is processed according to the questions that the researcher frames for their research. Thus, 
there is no objective analysis, but the analysis is usually influenced by the subjectivity of 
researcher (Fairclough, 2003: 14-16). Therefore, there is a need to acknowledge subjectivity 
by adopting reflexivity, which assists both the reader and researcher in understanding the 
influence of the position of researcher on the outcome of analysis (Elliott, 2005; Kalof et al., 
2008). Accordingly, reflexivity encourages the researcher in committing themselves to 
rigorous efforts in order to obtain a considerable level of credibility for the outcomes of analysis 
(Elliott, 2005; Kalof et al., 2008). Such efforts are usually exerted through targeting various 





Framework of textual analysis  
To build the framework of analysis, this research is guided by the perspectives of the major 
scholars of CDA Fairclough, Van Dijk, and Wodak in addition to the perspectives of other 
scholars. The framework of analysis is intended to match the purpose of the research and its 
questions. The main enquiries of this research are about each of constructions of the Turkish 
official discourse, function of these constructions and impacts of the function. This is presented 
in the research questions, which are stated below:  
• How has the Turkish official discourse constructed the Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the People’s Protection Units (YPG)?  
• How did the Turkish authorities construct and deal with the Kurdish question during 
the peace process and following its failure?  
• How did such constructions function in producing particular meanings for events or 
legitimatising particular actors or policies?   
• How did these constructions interact with the way that the Turkish authorities dealt 
with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and Kurdish activists in Turkey?   
 
To ensure that the data generation matches the objectives of research, the researcher considered 
the importance of style and genre in the targeted texts that reflect the official Turkish view. 
Style reflects the identity of the producer or disseminator of text, and in the case of the texts 
that reflect the Turkish official view in this research the producers are the Turkish authorities 
and high-ranking Turkish officials. Genre is the convention of producing the text, and in the 
case of the texts that reflect the Turkish official view in this research, they are directly published 
by the Turkish authorities, or they are statements by the Turkish officials published through 
the media.34 The relationship between style and genre is discussed earlier under the topic of 
                                                          
34 For more about style and genre, go to ‘inter-textuality and inter-discursivity’.   
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inter-textuality and inter-discursivity. Although the Turkish official texts are the main target of 
the analysis as they reflect the Turkish official discourse, the research is not limited to these 
texts, but it also deals with other texts, which reflect different views and accounts. These texts 
usually challenge the Turkish official view and reveal the impacts of the Turkish policy 
regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question, and they are usually taken from various non-Turkish 
sources such as the reports of human rights organizations. Such texts serve the objectives of 
CDA in revealing the implied messages and hidden agendas, which serve dominance and 
power relations in the Turkish official texts. 
 
The analysis deals with the text on two levels; micro and macro. The micro level deals with the 
internal features of text embodied in grammatical and semantic structures of phrases, sentences 
and clauses. These are described by Titscher et al., (2000: 20-24) as internal properties of text, 
while they consider the features that the macro level of analysis deals with as external 
properties. Wodak (2001a: 65) named the micro level of analysis as “immanent critique”, while 
she named the wider macro level as “socio-diagnostic critique”. In other words, the macro level 
deals critically with the relations of text with its wider socio-political and historical contexts. 
However, the two levels of analysis are not discrete entities, but they rely on each other in order 
to function in producing their analytical outcomes (Fairclough, 2003: 38). In some texts the 
macro aspects of analysis are more noticeable and in other texts the micro aspects are more 
noticeable. This also depends on the type of message of the text that the analysis targets to 
reveal. However, the main characteristic of analysis is that the linguistic structures of text are 





The analysis also deals with the interdiscursive aspects of several discursive constructions. In 
particular, it deals with the interconnection of several discursive constructions in the context of 
the dominant narrative of terrorism. For example, the Turkish PM Davutoglu accused the PKK 
of an attack in Ankara and stated that "there are very serious, almost certain indications that 
point to the separatist terror organisation” (quoted in BBC, 14 March, 2016b). Accordingly, 
the PKK is constructed as ‘separatist and terrorist’ organization in the Turkish official 
discourse. This demonstrate an interdiscursive relationship between the constructions of 
separatism and those of terrorism. However, the Kurdish separatism is considered as a form of 
terrorism in the Turkish official definition of terrorism (see the Turkish anti-terrorism law in 
Legislationline, 2016). This is explained in chapter 5. Other interdiscursive features of the 
constructions of the narrative of terrorism are dealt with in chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this research.  
 
The analysis also aims at revealing the change of Turkish official language according to major 
events. The analysis compares the dominant language and policy of the Turkish authorities 
during the peace process to those following its failure. This is the main focus of chapter 7 and 
8 of the research, and it is achieved by comparing various texts, which reflect the Turkish 
official view and policy. Thus, the analysis questions the main argument of constructionists, 
which highlights the role of historical and social (or political) conditions in the formation of 
discourse. As explained earlier in this chapter, Wodak (2001a, 2001b) Van Dijk (2001) and 
Fairclough (2003) highlighted this role of the historical and social context in the production of 
different discursive interpretations for the same phenomenon.  
 
To reveal the implied messages and the hidden agendas that the text serves, the analysis 
explores the bias techniques of text. As explained earlier, CDA targets revealing the bias 
aspects of text that favour certain accounts, which is named by Van Dijk (2003) as ‘the 
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manipulation of discourse’.35 However, this research limits the capability of agency to the 
manipulation of discursive constructions and practices.  Accordingly, the focus of this 
research is on the political messages and agendas that certain texts serve. In particular, the 
strategy of analysis targets such messages that reflect or serve certain ideological 
implication, agendas and policies, which serve dominance and power relations. For 
example, Erdogan labelled the PKK militants as “atheists” (quoted in Akyol, 11 June, 
2016). This construction reflects the Islamist ideology of the ruling AKP. The construction 
also serves the agenda of inciting the antagonism of conservative Muslims in Turkey 
against the PKK.  
 
There are various techniques of bias and imbalance judgement in texts, and accordingly, 
texts have different degrees of bias that favour certain accounts that usually serve certain 
ideological considerations. To cover all techniques of bias in texts is beyond the capacity 
of this research. Therefore, the research is limited to explore the techniques of bias that 
match the purposes of research and its questions.36 The following are some examples of 
linguistic techniques that serve bias and ideological implications in the text:  
 
a). The usage of certain lexicons, semantic structures and rhetorical figures like metaphors, 
hyperboles, and euphemisms (Van Dijk, 2006, 2006a, 2006b). One important lexical 
pattern serving the bias of text producer is metaphor. The theoretical meaning of the term 
metaphor is explained in the chapter of literature review as dislocating a word or phrase 
from its usual context and placing it in unusual context (Bhatia, 2009: 280). Metaphor 
leave emotional influence over the audience and it is used to make the recipient accept the 
                                                          
35 For more details on the Van Dijk perspective of manipulating discourse.  
36 These techniques are also the clues for exploring the bias.  
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message of the biased text. For example, Erdogan described the PKK as “blood sucking 
vampires” while calling the public to devalue it (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 
2014). Hyperbole is another lexical pattern, which serves the interests of producer by using 
exaggerative or exciting semantic structures in order to influence the cognition of recipient 
(The Free Dictionary, 2013). An example of hyperbole is taken from a speech by Bush in 
which he loathed Al-Qaeda as he stated that “these terrorists kill not merely to end lives, 
but to disrupt and end a way of life” (Bartolucci, 2010: 124). Euphemism is used to 
alleviate the impacts of harmful or negative action by the party that the text producer is 
biased in their favour. This usually takes the form of excusing the negative action. An 
example of euphemism is the excuse used in this sentence ‘there are casualties among 
civilians who were hit by a rocket which targeted terrorists who hid themselves in a 
populated area’. This implies that the rocket hit civilians because terrorists hid themselves 
among them.  
 
b). Omitting or back-grounding important or relevant information (Fairclough, 2003; Mayr, 
2008). Such techniques are used by the producer of text in order to oppress views or hide 
information which contradicts with their argument or interests (Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 
2006b). The main type of omitting certain information in a narrative is to describes an event in 
a way, which does not match its main characteristics. This is discerned in describing the conflict 
as an act of terrorism by one actor; the terrorist group. Thus, the violence of the governmental 
forces is omitted. Other types of omitting certain information in a narrative employ certain 
linguistic structures such as passive sentences without agents (Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 
2006). For example, ‘the security forces killed three people’. This sentence is an active sentence 
as it has the three principal elements of active sentence including ‘the security forces’ as the 
actor, the act of killing as a process, and ‘three people’ as the affected. However, it will be 
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passive sentence with omitted agent if it is structured as ‘three people were killed’. By making 
the agent unknown in the last sentence the producer concealed who is responsible for the 
negative act of killing. However, this is not the case when the producer avoids repetition 
because the agent was made known elsewhere in the text.    
 
The main type of back-grounding important information in the text is affiliated with 
foregrounding other information. This is the case when the text producer highlights the less 
relevant information at the expense of the more relevant information (Fairclough, 2003). For 
example, a report on an armed conflict between an armed movement and government might 
allocate large space for the view of the government and a marginal area or very little space for 
the view of armed movement. Another form of back-grounding important information or 
responsibility is through the usage of a passive sentence which refers to the agent at the end 
(Fairclough, 2003). An example on passive sentence is ‘some demonstrators were killed when 
they clashed with security forces who opened fire’. Whereas, the active form of this sentence 
will be ‘the security forces opened fire causing the death of some demonstrators’.  
 
c). Patterns of the ‘othering discourse’ which is described as a major technique of serving 
ideology. As it is explained earlier in the section of ideology, these patterns of text usually 
serve the self-image and downgrade the other’s-image. They are usually affiliated with the 
usage of pronouns such as us, our, we versus them, their, they. An example of the othering 
discourse is taken from the anti-Al-Qaeda speech of president Bush who stated:  
"Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here 
in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-
appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of 
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speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (quoted 
in Bartolucci, 2010: 124).  
In this text Bush made a dichotomy not only between the Americans and ‘terrorists’ but also 
between the superior American social and political life and the inferior life of the communities 
where the terrorists came from. He indicates that the communities of terrorists have much lower 
social and political life than that of the Americans, and therefore, terrorists feel unfortunate and 
jealous, and they hate Americans.  
 
d). Creating assumptions, abstracting, and generalization (Fairclough, 2003). Assumption is 
the understanding of a phenomenon without investigation. In other words, to create an 
assumption, the text producer tries to make the recipient consider the information that the text 
provides as realties (Locke, 2004: 59-60). Accordingly, assumptions serve ideology. This is 
also explained in this chapter under the topic of ideology. Abstracting information has a similar 
function. This is because in the abstracted text, important details are missing, and this prevents 
the recipient of text from the proper understanding of the phenomenon that the text deals with 
(Fairclough, 2003). This is discerned in news reports which copy the narrative of other media 
agencies about certain conflict. This is even when the original source of narrative is the 
government who is party of the conflict. Generalization is a technique used to give a description 
for a certain case, which was originally used to describe other case or cases. Accordingly, the 
text producer avoids the details of different cases eluding reference to their dissimilarities.  
 
Conclusion  
Discourse transcends linguistic structures which interpret reality to be a construction of reality, 
and it operates according to the dominant historical and social contexts. Since the production 
of discourse is governed by the social and historical context, it is not fixed and closed system 
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of knowledge, but it is changeable and open for hybridity. This is the case of the discourses of 
terrorism which have changed influencing by various socio-political and historical contexts. In 
addition, discourse hybridity has become even more complex in the era of globalization in 
which various means of communications have structured and conveyed the discursive texts and 
complicated the intertextual and interdiscursive relations of taxes, discourses and genres.  
 
Discourse is connected to power, and it is influenced by powerful groups. Discourse is 
connected to power as it produces certain kind of knowledge which leads to certain kind of 
action. In addition, CDA scholars argue that discourse is manipulated by powerful groups, 
while Post-structuralists deny such a role. Post-structuralists argue that discourse as an entity 
is above the capacity of agency to manipulate because the socio-historical context of discourse 
is beyond the capabilities of agency to control. This research admits that discourse as an entity 
is above the capacity of agency to manipulate. However, the research argues that agency plays 
a major role in the discursive practices and constructions. That is, powerful groups influence 
both the production of discursive texts and the discursive practices. Nevertheless, agency is 
usually embodied in institutions that are ruled by elites who have the privilege to access and 
control the sources and structure of discourse. Manipulating the discursive practices and 
constructions serve dominance and power relations. Dominance is not merely imposed from 
above, but it is facilitated by the consent of the dominated. This is best practiced through the 
cognitive mechanism of ideology which influences the attitude of individuals and groups, and 
accordingly facilitates the production of discursive constructions in certain way, which in turn 
serve dominance and power relations.  
 
CDA aims at revealing the features of ideology, dominance and power relations by deciphering 
the implicit messages of text. CDA works on two levels including the micro analysis of 
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linguistic structures and the macro analysis of socio-political and historical contexts. As a 
political discourse which serves certain political messages and agenda of dominance and power 
relations, discourse of terrorism has associated with manipulation and ideology in its discursive 
practices and constructions.  For the purpose of analysing the data of this research and reveal 
their implied messages and hidden agenda in the light of CDA, the chapter provided a 
framework which aims at revealing the implied messages and agendas of the text that serve 
































































Map 2. Map of Turkey. The area coloured in light-blue is where the pro-Kurdish ‘Peoples' 
Democratic’ party (in Kurdish: Partiya Demokratîk a Gelan, and Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi (HDP): in Turkish) won the majority in the June, 2015 elections of Turkey. Source 
(Cengiz & Kirişci, June, 2015).37   
 
 
Map 3.  Map of Turkey. The provinces in blue colour have significant Kurdish population. 
Source: (Bipartisan Policy Centre, May, 2017).  
                                                          
37 In the Turkish parliament elections of June 2015, the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) got more 
than 13% of the overall votes. This was the first time in the history of Turkey that a pro-Kurdish party gets such 





The research highlights that the Turkish official discourse dislocates the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict from its historical and political context and constructs it as a phenomenon of terrorism 
perpetrated by one actor; the PKK. The research also revealed in the literature review chapter 
that the mainstream studies on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are influenced by the Turkish 
official narrative of terrorism, and they usually overlook the historical and political context of 
the conflict. This is discerned in the work of scholars of mainstream studies like Criss (1995), 
Heper (2007), Dikici (2008), Radu (2001), Cinar (2010), and Yilmaz (2011).  
 
This chapter aims at overcoming the deficiency in dealing with the historical roots of the 
conflict and the Kurdish question in the mainstream studies.  In addition, the chapter provides 
a background for the AKP opening approach, which paved the way for the peace process. The 
latter is a main subject of this research and is covered in chapter 7 and 8.  This chapter consists 
of two main sections.  
 
The first section deals with the historical background of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict since the 
era of Ottoman empire.  The section discusses the conditions that led to the rebellions of Kurds 
against Turkey and the policies of the Turkish governments against the Kurds. However, the 
section concentrates on the repressive policies and political conditions that led to the last 
Kurdish rebellion of the PKK. The chapter discusses the emergence and growth of the PKK, 
and the judicial and military measures adopted by the Turkish authorities to confront the 
rebellion. The section also discusses the abduction of the PKK leader Ocalan and the EU stance 




The second section discusses the background of the opening approach of the currently ruling 
Turkish party of Justice and Development (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP) 
regarding the Kurds. The section concentrates on the agenda of AKP, which influenced its 
approach regarding the Kurds. These include the AKP agenda regarding both the role of 
military and the Kurdish electoral support for the AKP. The first part connects the AKP 
opening approach to the struggle of AKP to limit the role of military in the political life of 
Turkey. The second part connects the opining approach to the AKP efforts to win the support 
of Kurds in the elections and changing the constitution. However, the section begins with 
introducing the AKP and its ideology. 
 
Section I: Historical background of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict  
The Kurdish homeland, Kurdistan underwent long-term domination by the Ottoman and 
Safavid empires, which were in antagonism and sporadic armed conflicts during the 16th 
century.38 39 The majority of these conflicts occurred in the Kurdish areas (see Appendix Map 
11). However, in 1639 the Ottoman and Safavid empires agreed to end the conflict and signed 
the Treaty of Zuhab, which demarcated their borders and divided Kurdistan into two parts 
between both empires (Gunter, 2011: 313; McDowall, 2007: 26). Although the Kurdish 
homeland was divided, some Kurdish principalities like Bitlis, Botan, Hakkari, Baban, and 
Ardalan maintained various degrees of autonomy under the domination of both empires 
(Gunter, 2011: 91; McDowall, 2007: 25-31). Nonetheless, the autonomy of these principalities 
                                                          
38 The name of Kurdistan was first used by Sulcus then it was documented by the Ottoman authorities (see 
Appendix Map 11. The southern and eastern areas of Ottoman Empire). Name of Kurdistan is also documented 
in the 1920 Treaty of Severs. See: Treaty of Peace with Turkey. (1920).    
39 In addition to Region of Iraqi Kurdistan, which has a federal status as part of Iraq, ‘Kurdistan’ was also the 
name of two shortly lived Kurdish states in both Iran and the Soviet Union. Mahabad was the capital of Iranian 
Kurdistan, which was announced in January 1946 and was crushed in December of the same year by the Shah 
regime of Iran (Gunter, 2008, 132). Soviet Kurdistan was called ‘the Red Kurdistan’ and was part of the Soviet 
Union (NRT, 14 February, 2017). Red Kurdistan was established in 1923 and consisted of the Kurdish populated 
region between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Lachin was its capital. However, Red Kurdistan was diminished by 
Moscow in 1929. This was followed by a campaign of repression against the Kurds of Red Kurdistan by both the 
Stalin regime and government of Azerbaijan (NRT, 14 February, 2017).  
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dwindled gradually until their demise. The last of these principalities was the princedom of 
Botan, which demised in 1847 following the failure of its rebellion against the Ottoman Empire 
(Gunter, 2008: 3). Failure was also the fate of the following Kurdish rebellions of 1880-1881 
led by Ubeydullah Nahri and 1918-1922 led by Ismail Simko, which were against the rule of 
both empires.  
 
Following the defeat of Ottoman Empire in World War I, the victorious allies divided the 
territories of the empire. The two major victorious allies, Great Britain and France got the 
largest parts of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and France demarcated the 
areas of their mandates according to the 1916 agreement of Sykes-Picot and the subsequent 
amendments of borders, which created new colonial entities (Gunter, 2011: 282-283; 
McDowall, 2007: 115-121; O’Shea, 2004: 121-145). The new colonial entities ended with the 
establishment of Syria, Iraq and other states, and the remnants of the Ottoman and Safavid 
empires were converted into the new nation-states of Turkey and Iran. Accordingly, the 
Kurdish homeland ‘Kurdistan’ dissolved mainly in the newly established nation states of 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (see Appendix Map 12). The division of Kurdistan was not only 
geographical, but it also transformed the position of Kurds as a large nation to become 
minorities in states ruled by other nations (see Map 1). Accordingly, the Kurds were 
transformed from one nation into four minorities in four countries. Gunter (2004: xxvii, 2008: 
2) estimated the numbers of Kurds in each of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and this is shown in 






Country  Estimated number   Percentage of overall country population  
Turkey  12-15 million  18-23% 
Iran 6.5 million  11% 
Iraq 4-4.5 million  17-20% 
Syria 1 million  9% 
 
The numbers that Gunter (2004, 2008) estimated in the tablet 1 above are below the current 
estimations of the Kurdish Institute of Paris (January, 2017). The latter are shown in the table 
2 below.  
 
Country Estimated numbers  Percentage of the overall country population  
Turkey  15-20 million 19-25% 
Iraq 8-8.5 million  25-27% 
Iran 10-12 million  13-17.5% 
Syria 3-3.6 million  12.5-15% 
 
However, both charts do not provide adequate, but estimated numbers because there are no 
official statistics about the numbers of Kurds in these countries.40 The charts depend on non-
                                                          
40 Although Kurdistan region of Iraq has its own statistics regarding Kurds who live in the region, but this does 
not include Kurds who live in the disputed territories outside the authority of the Kurdish regional government 
(KRG).   
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official sources.41 Nevertheless, the charts support the point that dividing Kurdistan 
transformed the Kurds from a large nation to minorities.  
 
Kurds and the establishment of Turkey  
Although the victorious allies had promised Kurds the right to have autonomy in their 
homeland, Kurdistan that could progress towards independence according to the 1920 Treaty 
of Sevres, they dishonoured their promise later.  According to Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the 
Treaty of Sevres, Kurds were given the right to autonomy growing to independence after one-
year autonomy (Yildiz, 2005: 135; Martin, 2007: 789).42 However, the Treaty of Sevres was 
nullified by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (Martin, 2007: 959; McDowall, 2007: 137-143; 
O’Shea, 2004: 141-143).43 In 1922 the Nationalist Turkish movement of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk succeeded in its campaign against the Ottoman authorities. Ataturk opposed the Treaty 
of Sevres and any kind of independence or autonomy for Kurds (McDowall, 2007: 137-143). 
The allies agreed with Ataturk and signed on 24 July, 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne which 
replaced the Treaty of Sevres. The treaty of Lausanne not only omitted what Sevres stated 
about the autonomy and independence of Kurds, but it also avoided any reference to the Kurds 
as a nation or even as minorities inside the newly established nation states (Gunter, 2011: 131; 
O’Shea, 2004: 141-143; Yildiz, 2005: 7 & 99-100).44  
 
Lausanne was a green light for the nationalist Turkish movement of Ataturk to announce the 
republic of Turkey as a nation-state out of the remnant of Ottoman Empire on 29 October 1923. 
This was followed in 1924 by the announcement of the Turkish constitution, which considered 
the Turkish identity as the sole identity of Turkey and its people and denied any reference to 
                                                          
41 See also BBC. (14 March, 2016), and Leduc, S. (22 March,2015). 
42 See also Treaty of Peace with Turkey (1920: 21).  
43 See also Treaty of Peace with Turkey (1923). 
44 See also Gunter (2008: 99) 
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the Kurdish identity and other identities (Ozcan, 2006: 15).  Article 88 of the 1924 Turkish 
constitution stated that “the people of Turkey are called ‘Turkish’ by virtue of citizenship 
irrespective of religious and racial differences” (quoted in Kadioglu, 2013: 144). The denial of 
Kurdish identity led Kurds to revolt against the rule of the nationalist Turks. However, their 
rebellions were crushed one after the other. This was accompanied with systemic prohibition 
of Kurdish language, costumes and any sign to the Kurdish identity (Ozcan, 2006: 54-72; 
Yildiz & Muller, 2008: 15). The Kurds reacted by launching a rebellion in 1925 led by Sheikh 
Said Piran. However, the Turkish authorities supported by both the Soviet Union and the 
authorities of the French mandate in Syria managed to crush the rebellion (Gunter, 2008: 4). 
This was also the fate of the 1927 rebellion of Mount Ararat led by General Ihsan Pasha and 
the 1936-1938 rebellion of Dersim province led by Seyid Riza which ended by the Dersim 
massacre against Alawi-Kurds perpetrated by the Turkish military (Gunter, 2008: 4-5; 
McDowall, 2007: 209).45 Ozcan (2006: 73-74) stated that the Turkish government responded 
to the 1937-1938 rebellion of Dersim by “indiscriminate massacres, massive deportations and 
the elimination of anything that might be associated with Kurdishness—all of these were used 
to intimidate the population into silence, submission and obedience”.46 In its statement about 
Dersim, the Turkish regime celebrated the crush of rebellion and described its response as an 
act of civilization. The statement included that “what the Republican regime has been doing in 
Tunceli is not a military operation, but the march of civilisation” (quoted in Yegen, 1999: 263). 
Tunceli is the Turkified official name of Dersim.   
 
                                                          
45 Alawi (adj) is written here as it is pronounced in its original Arabic origin. Alawites is a sect of Islam which 
claims that ‘Imam Ali’ is more spiritually profiled than the Muslims’ prophet Mohammed. Alawi in the 
international sources is transliterated as Alavi. The latter is derived from the Turkish sources which use Turkish 
letters. There is no letter ‘W’ in Turkish. Instead it has V.   




This kind of description for the repressive policies against Kurds was accompanied with 
stigmas that aimed at delegitimizing the Kurdish rebellions.  This is discerned in the terms used 
against the Kurdish rebels and rebellions by the Ottoman, Turkish authorities, and Turkish 
media. The Kurdish rebels were usually dubbed as “brigands and bandits” and the Kurdish 
rebellions were named as “banditries” (White, 2000: 63; Yegen, 1999: 564).47 48 Yegen (1999: 
564) quoted the July 1930 texts of Turkish Cumhuriyet newspaper which described the military 
action against the 1930 Kurdish rebellion that “our aircraft have heavily bombed the brigands” 
“The republic was defended by our citizens against the bandits”.  
 
The Turkish policies of repression and assimilation of Kurds  
The national sentiments of Turkishness, which dominated the political life of Turkey, were 
built on the denial of the rights and existence of other ethnic groups. In some cases, the euphoria 
of victories over the Kurdish rebellions made members of the Turkish governments express 
publicly their ultranationalist sentiments such as the statement of the 1930 Turkish minister of 
Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt.  Bozkurt stated that “we live in a country called Turkey, the 
freest in the world. As your deputy, I feel I can express my real convictions without reserve: I 
believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not 
of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves” 
(quoted in Chaliand, 1993: 56; Ozcan, 2006: 70).  
 
After the demise of the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s, the Turkish authorities 
launched a systemic campaign for changing the demography of Kurdistan and muting the 
Kurdish identity. Following the 1925 rebellion the Turkish authorities applied martial law in 
                                                          
47 The term of ‘bandits’ was also used against the PKK in its early years. See Marcus (2007: 83).  
48 See also Üngör, U. Ü. (2012). Rethinking the violence of pacification: State formation and bandits in turkey, 




Kurdistan, which granted the Turkish forces extra authority and enabled them to perpetrate 
large-scale violence against Kurds including mass killings, torture, village destruction, and 
deportation from the Kurdish region to the west of Turkey (Yildiz & Muller, 2008: 15-16).49  
 
The Turkish governments denied the Kurdish identity and used the term ‘mountain Turks’ 
instead of the term ‘Kurds’. For example, the head of the 1960 military coup Cemal Gürsel 
used such a phrase to denote Kurds while threatening them. Chaliand (1993: 65) quoted Gürsel 
statement that “if the mountain Turks do not keep quiet, the army will not hesitate to bomb 
their towns and villages into the ground. There will be such a bloodbath that they and their 
country will be washed away”. However, using the phrase of ‘mountain Turks’ to denote Kurds 
became more common in the governmental statements and media language following the coup 
of 1980 (Akyol, January, 2013). 
 
The repression of Kurdish identity and imposing the Turkish identity on Kurds became more 
systematic following the military coup of 1980.  The coup of 1980 made it worse for Kurds as 
it gave the Turkish military and security forces more authority to rule the Kurdish provinces 
under martial law (Yildiz & Muller, 2008: 16). In addition, the post-1980 Turkish governments 
prohibited any written or spoken signs for the Kurdish identity or history and punished those 
who infringed such restrictions (Meho, 1997: 9-10). The post-1980 Turkish governments even 
punished those who spook in Kurdish publicly. This policy of identity repression accompanied 
with imposing the Turkish identity on Kurds. The authorities systematically changed the 
                                                          
49 During the 1950s Turkey experienced some kind of political openness and democratization by the government 
of Adnan Menderes (Ozcan, 2006: 74). However, the Kurdish region was isolated from such openness. The 
Turkish authorities continued isolating the Kurdish region from the political developments of the country, and 
they carried out the policies of repression and denial of Kurdish identity during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In 
addition, attempts for political openness and democratization in Turkey were not successful as they were faced 
by military coups. This was the case of Menderes democratization attempts whose government was toppled by a 
military coup in 1960, and it was also the case of the later pro-democracy governments, which were toppled down 




Kurdish names of villages, towns, mountains, and other geographical entities into Turkish 
names (Yildiz & Muller, 2008: 16-17). Robert Fisk (July, 2017), an author and senior journalist 
who is specialized in the Middle Eastern issues estimated that by 1986 the Turkish authorities 
changed the names of 2,842 Kurdish villages into Turkish names.  Moreover, Kurdish names 
were not permitted for new-borns, and Kurdish surnames were changed into Turkish names 
(Aslan, 2009). Ozcan (2006: 62) argued that the Turkish policies of assimilation against the 
Kurds were extreme to the level that the Ataturk motto ‘happy is the one who calls himself a 
Turk’ was displayed not only on the public squares and the streets of towns and counties but 
also on countless rural hillsides with huge lettering made of stone and concrete”. Happy is the 
one who calls himself a Turk is the translation of the Turkish text ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene’. 
Using google-map, Turnbull (2005) shows a location where this motto is carved out near the 
city of Cizre. (click the google-map link provided by Turnbull, 2005). 50 51 
 
The emergence of the PKK  
The long-term and systemic policies of repression by the Turkish state against Kurds in 
addition to the growth of Kurdish nationalism following the military coup of 1980 laid the 
ground for the emergence of PKK. In 1978 the PKK was established in a village near the major 
Kurdish city of Diyarbakir (in Kurdish: Amed) in the south-east of Turkey (Marcus, 2007: 46-
51). The PKK ideological foundations were influenced by the Marxist-socialist revolutionary 
tendencies, which were dominant among the leftist Turkish opposition of 1960s and 1970s. 
                                                          
50 The moto of Ataturk carved on the mountainous area of Cizre. See: Turnbull, A. Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene! 
Google Sightseeing. Available at: http://googlesightseeing.com/2005/08/ne-mutlu-turkum-diyene/#comments 
[accessed: 25 June 2014]. Happy is the one who call himself a Turk is the translation of ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm 
Diyene’ 
51 Carving this motto near Cizre is also an expression for the Turkish official position against the Kurdish 
motivation of independence. This is because Cizre has a symbolic importance for the Kurds as it was the capital 
of the last semi-independent Kurdish princedom of Botan, which was toppled down in 1847 following its rebellion 
against the Ottoman empire (Gunter, 2008: 3). 
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Ozcan (2006: 73-74) argues that the majority of the uprisings and revolutions which proceeded 
the PKK revolution were led by religious figures or tribal chieftains. The growth of Kurdish 
nationalism and the secular approach of PKK movement helped its rebellion to remain active 
until the date of writing this research, unlike the previous Kurdish rebellions which were not 
able to continue for more than one year. In addition, the organizational growth of the PKK 
boasted by the increasing numbers of its recruiters who found the PKK as a refuge from the 
repressive policies of the Turkish authorities. The repressive policies exacerbated in the 1980s 
following the military coup of 1980. Post-1980 coup treatment of Kurds by the Turkish 
authorities was harsh to the extent that any activity related to expressing the Kurdish identity 
or political conditions of Kurds was an enough reason for imprisonment, torture, and extra 
judicial killing by the Turkish authorities (Marcus, 2007: 85-113).52 In such an environment of 
repression, Kurdish activists believed that they had no room to operate, and therefore, many of 
them decided to join the PKK guerrilla in the mountains.  
 
The PKK also took advantage of the antagonistic relationship between Turkey and Syria. 
Following the coup of 1980 in Turkey, the PKK leadership chaired by Abdullah Ocalan fled 
from Turkey to Syria. Certain longstanding political matters, which impacted the Syrian-
Turkish relations, encouraged the PKK leadership to believe that the Syrian regime of Hafiz 
Al-Assad would support the PKK against Turkey. The disapproval of the Syrian governments 
of annexing the province of Alexandretta (in Arabic: Iskenderun, and Hatay: in Turkish) to 
Turkey was a major political matter between Syria and Turkey. Alexandretta was part of the 
French mandate over Syria, but it was relinquished to Turkey by France in 1939 (McDowall, 
2007: 480). Another matter which crippled the Turkish-Syrian relations was related to the 
                                                          
52 Casier (2011b: 513) stated that following the 1980 military coup “hundreds of thousands of political prisoners 




Turkish policies regarding the rivers of Euphrates and Tigris, which cross Syria and have been 
major sources of irrigation and electricity. In particular, Syria was worried about the Turkey 
plans of building more dams over the rivers, which eventually deprived Syria from 
considerable amounts of the Tigris and Euphrates water (Marcus, 2007: 60; McDowall, 2007: 
480). The Syrian regime also concerned over a security matter related to the support of Turkey 
for the Syrian opposition group of Muslim Brotherhood (Marcus, 2007: 60).53  
 
Response of the Turkish governments to the PKK rebellion 
The PKK was dubbed by the Turkish authorities and media as “bunch of bandits” when it 
started its armed action on 15 August 1984 (Ozcan, 2006: 73).  As stated earlier, the label of 
‘bandits’ was used against the Kurdish rebels during the Ottoman empire and following the 
establishment of the republic of Turkey. In the early stage of conflict, the Turkish governments 
resorted to “Counter-Guerrilla” special forces in order to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the 
PKK (Ganser, 2005: 240).  The Counter-Guerrilla operations intensified gradually and became 
systemic policies of the Turkish state in the Kurdish areas. Later, the name of Counter-Guerrilla 
special forces was changed to be Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terror Unit (in 
Turkish: Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terorle Mücadele, JİTEM), which conducted its military 
actions in coordination with the Special Warfare Department (in Turkish: Özel Harp Daires, 
OHD) (Kaya, 2009: 103; Taş, 2014: 173).  The latter was replaced in 1992 with the Special 
Forces Command (Global Security, 2016c).  These special forces acted jointly with both the 
paramilitary village guards (in Turkish: Korucular) and the other divisions of Turkish Military 
(Kaya, 2009: 103; Taş, 2014: 173).  
 
                                                          
53 Other concerns of the Syrian regime were considered such as the NATO membership of Turkey, and its 
alliance with Israel.  
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Changing the name of the special forces of ‘Counter-Guerrilla’ to ‘Counter-Terror’ was 
influenced by the NATO discourse of counter-terrorism. In particular, the label ‘terrorist’ was 
mainly used by the major member of NATO, the US against certain leftist and national 
liberation movements (Blakeley, 2009: 12-24; Jackson et al., 2011: 36 & 191). The Turkish 
governments found that labelling the PKK as ‘terrorists’ instead of ‘bandits’ matches the 
NATO and US discourse of counter-terrorism and their policies. The Turkish governments and 
media also employed the counter-terrorism discourse to excuse the disproportionate usage of 
force, which has become commonplace in the Kurdish region.  
 
This resulted in crimes against humanity including acts of assassinations, extrajudicial 
executions, mass detentions, torture, and forced displacement of Kurds. Pro-Turkish sources 
have usually attributed such violations to the PKK. In many cases, the Turkish governments 
and media attributed acts of assassination and extrajudicial execution against Kurdish activists 
and civilians to unknown perpetrators or even to the PKK (Gunter, 2008: 112; MEJ, 2012: 532; 
Today’s Zaman, 23 January, 2012). However, this contradicts with the fact that the conflict has 
occurred in the Kurdish region, and accordingly, the majority of the violent acts have been 
perpetrated against Kurds although a considerable number of Turkish soldiers and security 
forces are among the casualties of conflict. The conflict also left the Kurdish rural areas of 
Turkey devastated. In addition, the cross-border operations of the Turkish army against the 
PKK damaged the rural areas of the Kurdish region of Iraq near the border of Turkey. Several 
reports by human rights organizations estimated that about 3000 villages and hamlets in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey were destroyed and evacuated by the Turkish forces (HRW 1994; 
Jongerden, 2007: xxi; Yildiz & Breau, 2010).54 Gunter (2008: 6) estimated that about 3 million 
                                                          
54 See also Jongerden (2007: 66-80), and ICG, September, 2012.  
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Kurds were forcibly evacuated by the Turkish forces from their houses and driven out of their 
villages and towns.    
 
The Turkish judicial measures against the PKK and Kurdish activists 
In addition to military measures, the Turkish governments adopted judicial measures against 
the PKK and Kurdish activists. The Turkish laws and constitutions have made barriers and 
punished the expression of Kurdish identity. Articles 14, 26, 27, and 28 of the Turkish 
constitution of 1982 considered any reference to the Kurdish identity as a threat to the national 
security of Turkey (Gunter, 2008: 99). Even using the word ‘Kurd’ was a taboo in Turkey. 
Although the Turkish constitutions and laws considered any reference to the Kurdish identity 
as a criminal act, they avoided stating the word of ‘Kurd’. Instead, they used phrases such as 
“anyone who publicly denigrates Turkishness”, which was considered as an offence according 
to article 301 of Turkish penal code of 2004 (DTF, 2008).55 This article was widely interpreted 
against any kind of verbal or written criticism of the Turkish discrimination against Kurds.56 57 
Another example of punishing the expression of Kurdish identity without reference to the term 
‘Kurd’ is article 312, which states that “provoking hatred or animosity between groups of 
different race, religion, region or social class” is punished with imprisonment (Gunter, 2008: 
6).58 In 1995 the prominent Kurdish writer, Yasar Kamal and the American Journalist of 
Reuters news agency, Aliza Marcus were charged separately according to this article because 
                                                          
55 Article 301 is referred to as article 299 in another document of the Turkish criminal code of 29 September 2004, 
which was published on 12 October, 2005. See (UNODC, 2005).  
56 . This article also targeted activists, writers, and intellectuals who expressed critical views regarding the 
violations of Ottoman or Turkish authorities against non-Turkish ethnicities and non-Sunni religious groups. This 
article was used against the Armenian activist Hrant Dink who was assassinated later, reportedly by 
ultranationalist Turks, because of his writing about the Armenian massacres by the Ottoman authorities (BBC, 17 
January, 2012; BBC Monitoring, 23 January, 2012) 
57 Dink was allegedly assassinated by by ultranationalist Turks who had previously threatened him for his writings 
about the massacres of Armenians by the Ottomans.   




of their writings about the Kurdish problem (Gunter, 2008: 97; Marcus, 2007: 351; Meho, 
1997: 206).  
 
Turkey also adopted in 1991 its anti-terror law, which targeted specifically both the 
sympathizers of the PKK and other Kurdish activists. This law was adopted as the PKK attained 
considerable military and organizational advances and created a security dilemma for Turkey 
at the beginning of 1990s (Ozcan, 2006: 175-176). This law was also used by the Turkish 
government as a tool to face the growth of the Kurdish nationalism at the beginning of 1990s, 
and to suppress any kind of Kurdish activism. Article 8 of the 1991 anti-terror law stated that 
“written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging 
the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, 
regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas behind such activities” (UNODC, 1991). 
Accordingly, any kind of expression of the Kurdish identity violated this article which was 
widely interpreted against Kurds and their sympathizers.  
 
The anti-terror law was amended in 2003, 2006 and 2010 as part of the democratic reforms of 
the AKP government.59 However, the last amendments were not enough to assure the right of 
Kurds to express their identity. The law enabled interpreting any kind of Kurdish activity as 
part of the ‘propaganda of terrorist organization’. According to the abstracted articles of law 
any idea related to Kurdish nationalism or even to protesting the disproportionate usage of 
force in the Kurdish areas might be interpreted as part of the ‘propaganda of terrorist 
organization’. This is because such ideas are also propagandized for by the PKK, which is 
considered as the main terrorist organization by the Turkish official establishments.  Gunter 
                                                          
59 See the Anti-Terror Law and its amendments named as ‘Law on Fight Against Terrorism’ on Legislationline. 
org: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/50/topic/5  [accessed: 15 June 2014]. 
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(2008: 98-99) argues that in spite of the amendments, the law remained a barrier to the freedom 
of expression, and particularly the law kept targeting Kurds and punishing the expression of 
any idea contrary to the official ideology of Turkish state regarding the Kurdish question.   
 
The abduction of Ocalan and the EU stance  
In the middle of September, 1998 Turkey massed its troops close to the Syria border threatening 
the Syrian president Al-Assad that it would launch a military operation against Syria if Al-
Assad did not expel Ocalan from Syria (Gunter, 2008: 59; Marcus, 2007: 270). Under the 
Turkish pressure the Syrian government informed Ocalan that he had to leave Syria (Marcus, 
2007: 217). On 9 October, 1998 Ocalan left seeking refuge in Europe (Marcus, 2007: 272). 
Although Ocalan entered each of Greece, Russia, and Italy seeking asylum, his request was 
refused by the governments of these countries (Gunter, 2008:60). Finally, in mysterious 
conditions Ocalan was advised by Greek officials to travel to Africa where they would help 
him to find a country to accept him, and after few days of staying in the Greek embassy in 
Kenya he was forcibly handed to the Turkish intelligence on 16 February 1999 (Gunter, 2008: 
60; Marcus, 2007: 278-279). The abduction of Ocalan led to mass demonstrations and protests 
by the Kurds in home countries and the diaspora (Ozcan, 2006: 13-14).  
 
Following the capture of Ocalan, he was sentenced to death for treason by the Turkish court 
(BBC, 29 June, 1999).60 Before and during the trial, the Turkish government treated Ocalan as 
a criminal who was responsible for the death of thousands, but not as a leader of an armed 
movement which was engaged in a conflict. The majority of references of Turkish politicians 
                                                          
60 See also: CNN. (8 June, 1999). Turkish prosecutors rest case, demand that Ocalan hang. CNN. [online]. 
Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9906/08/ocalan.01/ [access: 10 August, 2012].  
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and media regarding Ocalan made him directly responsible for the killing of 30-35 thousand 
people. The Turkish government and media avoided any description for the conditions of 
armed conflict between the Turkish forces and the PKK, which led to such number of 
casualties. The Turkish governments and media actually made no reference to the armed 
conflict, but they merely accused Ocalan and the PKK with the acts of killing this number of 
victims. This accusation was even considered as taken for granted by the Turkish court (BBC, 
17 February, 1999; CNN, 8 June, 1999). This is although the accusation was propagandized 
for by the Turkish governments and media before the abduction of Ocalan. For example, the 
Turkish prime-minister Mesut Yilmaz called in November, 1998 the Italian government to 
extradite Ocalan and accused him of the killing of 30000 people (BBC, 14 November, 1998). 
The Turkish court actually adopted the accusation without investigation and without admitting 
proper legal representation and defence for Ocalan or for the Kurdish victims. On 12 March 
2003 the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights described the trial and treatment of 
Ocalan as “unfair trial” and “inhuman treatment” and that this violated article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Clapham, 2003).61  
 
The death penalty against Ocalan was not carried out by the Turkish government and was 
changed to life imprisonment in 2002. Gunter (2008: 64: 81-84) argues that changing the 
sentence was due to the pressure of the EU who warned Turkey that it might lose its chance of 
EU membership as the death penalty contradicted with the European laws and constitution 
(Gunter, 2008: 64: 81-84). The Turkish statesmen were also worried about the potential 
domestic consequences of executing Ocalan, which could inspire more sympathy by the Kurds 
towards the PKK, and this would lead to wider Kurdish rebellious action. The PKK already 
                                                          




warned that if the Turkish authorities executed Ocalan, it would wage a “total war” against 
Turkey (quoted in Peterson, 30 June 1999). Moreover, the Turkish authorities considered that 
keeping Ocalan in prison could serve not only in avoiding such a Kurdish action but also in 
creating rifts and weakness in the PKK. This assumption was built on Ocalan’s call to the PKK 
militants to withdraw from Turkey (Balta-Paker, 2005; Strategic Comments, 2007).  In 
addition, Ocalan himself participated in creating the assumption that he would serve ending the 
rebellion.62 During his trial, Ocalan stated that “you can hang me if you like but let me solve 
the Kurdish problem first. You cannot do it without me" (quoted in BBC, 2 June 1999).  
 
During and following the trial of Ocalan, the EU encouraged Turkey to conduct reforms in the 
fields of democracy and human rights. The EU also accepted Turkey as a candidate for the 
membership in December, 1999 (Castle, 11 December, 1999). Avci (2005: 132-137) argues 
that the decision of EU paved the ground for both public support and enthusiasm of several 
Turkish statesmen. However, Turkey accession to the EU was conditioned to fulfil the 
‘Copenhagen Criteria’, which consist of certain political and economic developments 
introduced by the EU in 1993 and 1995 (Eur-Lex, 2016). To meet the political criteria Turkey 
was required to conduct certain reforms in the fields of democracy and human rights. Although 
the EU encouraged Turkey to conduct the reforms, the Turkish authorities conducted modest 
reforms related to the Kurds. Even these reforms remained inactive. In the light of the 
Copenhagen Criteria, academic and former Austrian diplomat, Hochleitner (2005) studied 
Turkey’s claimed reforms regarding the Kurds. Hochleitner (2005) argues that the claimed 
                                                          
62 See also Akinci, B. (24 June, 1999). 
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reforms remained mostly on paper and did not reflect the actual practices of Turkish 
authorities.63 64  
 
Although the EU was in the middle of encouraging Turkey to conduct reforms related to the 
Kurds, the EU Council announced on 3 May 2002 the designation of the PKK as a terrorist 
organization (Casier, 2010: 10-11; EC, 3 May 2002).  The decision of the EU Council to 
designate the PKK as a terrorist organization came when the rhetoric of insecurity that 
prevailed following the 11 September 2001 attacks of Al-Qaeda. In particular, the Bush 
doctrine of ‘War on Terror’ and the ensuing cooperative measures of security and counter-
terrorism by NATO members influenced the decision of the EU authorities to designate the 
PKK.  Yildiz and Breau (2010: 150) argue that the pressure of the US played a main role in the 
EU decision. The Bush administration was considering the importance of Turkey in the 
ongoing war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the prospected invasion of Iraq, 
which turned to a reality in 2003.  
 
The decision of the EU Council to designate the PKK as a terrorist organization had negative 
impacts on efforts of ending the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and encouraging democratic reforms 
in Turkey. The decision was taken, while the EU was demanding peaceful solution for the 
Kurdish question in Turkey as part of its commitment to empowering democracy in Turkey 
(Casier, 2010). However, the decision of the EU encouraged Turkey to continue its repressive 
policies against the Kurds (Yildiz & Breau: 2010). In addition, the decision impacted the 
perceptions of ending the Turkish-Kurdish conflict through negotiations. Casier (2010: 12-13) 
                                                          
63 Hochleitner (2005) also highlighted that the Turkish authorities continued to expose the Kurds to violations of 
human rights. 
64 Erich Hochleitner is a former Austrian diplomat, and he holds the degree Juris Doctor in Law. See more on 
Australian Institute for European and Security Policy (AID). Link: 
https://www.aies.at/english/aies/staff/hochleitner.php [accessed: 20 August, 2016].  
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argues that the decision impacted on the trust of Kurdish leadership and PKK in the EU 
intention and efforts of encouraging Turkey to conduct democratic reforms.  
 
The decision of the EU Council did not depend on adequate measures related to the 
characteristics and amount of violence perpetrated during the conflict. This is because the EU 
did not send for such a purpose any delegations to study the field of conflict and the actions of 
both parties including the PKK and the Turkish forces, but it mainly depended on the accounts 
of the Turkish authorities which represent one party of the conflict.  In 2008, the EU Court of 
First Instance (CFI) ruled against the decision of designating the PKK as a terrorist organization 
by the EU Council (Mahoney, 2008; Reuters, April 2008). The court argued that the EU 
Council did not provide proper justification for the designation. However, the EU Council 
maintained its position and continued labelling the PKK as a terrorist organization. In their 
paper at the Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Fermon et al., 
(2005: 4) argue that such designation has been used as a stigma to demonize the PKK, and that 
this had no relation to the fight against terrorism. They argue that the decision did not consider 
that the PKK character as national liberation movement which is engaged in an armed conflict 
against the Turkish government, and therefore, such a decision would not help in ending the 
conflict.  
 
Section II: Background of the AKP and its Kurdish approach65  
The recognition of the Kurdish question, and accordingly, the political characteristic of 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a political issue remained a taboo during the Ecevit government. 
However, as the AKP came to power in 2002 a different approach took place. The AKP 
approach breached the taboo and considered the conflict as a political matter, which needed a 
                                                          
65 AKP, in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, and in English: Justice and Development Party.  
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peaceful solution although the AKP authorities continued to name the conflict as ‘terrorism’ 
by the PKK.  This approach of AKP authorities was not limited to the PKK but it extended to 
other Kurdish parties including the civic Kurdish parties in Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish 
PYD and YPG. This research uses the terms ‘AKP authorities’ or ‘AKP leadership’ to indicate 
the AKP high-ranking officials of the Turkish prime-ministry and presidency. Accordingly, the 
research concentrates on the official discourse of Turkey which is produced or reproduced 
during the rule of AKP. The latter has been dominated by the doctrine of the AKP chairman 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
 
The AKP was established in 2001 and has governed Turkey since 2002 (BBC, 21 July, 2016; 
Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015). Erdogan served as the prime-minster of Turkey from 2003 
until 2014 when he was elected as the president of Turkey succeeding his fellow AKP 
leadership member Abdullah Gul (Letsch, 10 August, 2014). Erdogan was formally chairing 
AKP until he was elected as the president of Turkey. However, Erdogan continued to act as the 
chairman of AKP even during his presidency (BBC, 21 July, 2016). Following his election as 
the president of Turkey, Erdogan had to resign partisan affiliation as this is stipulated in Article 
101 of the Turkish constitution.66 Erdogan formally stepped down from chairing AKP, and 
Ahmet Davutoglu was elected as the new chairman. However, Erdogan maintained his 
powerful influence over AKP, and acted as its de-facto chairman.67  
                                                          
66 Article 101 of the Turkish constitution the states that “if the President-elect is a member of a party, his/her 
relationship with his party shall be severed and his/her membership of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
shall cease”. See: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (n.d.). Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. [online]. Available at: 
https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf  [accessed: 10 August 2014]. 
 
67 Erdogan’s desire to keep the AKP leadership and his influence over the party are discerned in many of his 
speeches and statements. For example, during the ceremonies of appointing Davutoglu as the chairman of the 
AKP, Erdogan stated that “I'm sure you see how hard it is for me to leave. I've seen the tears of brothers, sisters. 
The AK Parti is like my child" (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 August, 2014). In addition, during the campaign of 2015 
elections Erdogan propagandized for AKP although his action was a breach to the Turkish constitution. Many 
international sources described Erdogan as an authoritarian leader who admires Ottoman Sultans and who has the 
ambition to have Sultan power in Turkey (Gagnon, 5 June, 2013; Idiz, 2012; Tisdall, 24 October, 2012).  
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In addition to his action as the actual leader of AKP throughout the period that the research 
covers, Erdogan produced more detailed speeches and statements regarding the Kurds than any 
other Turkish official. In addition, Erdogan acted as the mastermind of the AKP policies 
regarding the Kurds. Therefore, the research focuses on many of his speeches and statements. 
In order to discuss the background of the opening approach of AKP authorities regarding the 
Kurdish question, it is important to put a light on the ideology of AKP.  
 
Ideology of the AKP  
AKP’s ideology grew out of the remnants of its predecessor Islamist Turkish parties including 
Welfare party (in Turkish: Refah Partisi, RP) and Virtue party (in Turkish: Fazilat Partisi, FP) 
(Hale & Ozbudun, 2010: 1-19). The RP coalition government was forced to dissolve by the 
military in 1997 and the party was banned in 1998 by the Turkish court (BBC, 2 September, 
2013). FP was also banned by the Turkish court in 2001 (BBC, 22 June, 2001). Subsequently, 
in 2001 AKP was founded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, Bulent Arınc and others 
(Erken, 2013: 183). Many of the founders of AKP were former members of RP and FP.  The 
AKP describes its ideological doctrine as ‘conservative democracy’. Some Turkish scholars 
like Hale and Ozbudun (2010:22) argue that AKP ideology is moderate and democratic, and 
they named the AKP doctrine as “passive secularism”. Hale and Ozbudun (2010) argue that 
the foundations of AKP were transformed by the modernist wing in the RP who supported the 
adoption of more moderate doctrine which accepts the secular principles of governing. They 
also highlighted that the AKP support the Free Market economy.  
 




This is although the religious leaning is more dominant in the rhetoric of AKP leadership.68 In 
particular, this has dominated the statements and speeches of Erdogan since the 1990s. Hale 
and Ozbudun (2010) overlooked such rhetoric of Erdogan although their work includes quotes 
from Erdogan statements in which he expressed his obligation to non-secular Islam. For 
example, Erdogan stated that “my reference is to Islam'; 'democracy is not an aim, but a means'; 
'the system we want to introduce cannot be contrary to God's commands'; 'human beings cannot 
be secular” (quoted in Hale & Ozbudun, 2010: 9). Erdogan was actually sued by the Turkish 
court for a religious statement, which the court considered as extreme to the extent of inciting 
public hatred (BBC, 4 November, 2002; Hurriyet Daily News, 27 March, 1999). The statement 
was part of Erdogan 1997 speech in Siirt in which he read a poem by Ziya Gokalp that “our 
minarets are our bayonets, our domes are our helmets, our mosques are our barracks” (quoted 
in Hurriyet Daily News, 27 March, 1999).69 This is although the AKP ideology is not similar 
to these of fundamental Islamist movements that call for adopting Sharia Law. Still, many 
statements of AKP officials defend Islam as the religion of society, value Ottoman legacy, and 
defend Sunni Islamist movements abroad. In particular, the AKP has supported the Islamist 
movements of Muslim brotherhood and others in Egypt, Syria, Libya and other countries.  
    
The ideology of AKP mainly glorifies the legacy of Ottoman empire. Erdogan has pioneered 
the position of defending this legacy, and he has even called for reviving it. For example, Erken 
(2013: 184) quoted Erdogan statement in 2012 that “presiding over the heritage of our 
ancestors, the Ottoman state that ruled the world for 600 years, we would revive the Ottoman 
consciousness again”. The AKP rhetoric about the Ottoman legacy shows dissatisfaction for 
the demise of empire which was replaced later by the republic of Turkey. For example, in the 
                                                          
68 Nardelli, et al., (2015) describe AKP as Islamic-conservative.   
69 See also Mays, S. (2017) about Erdogan.  
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2011 Türk ocakları conference the then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu expressed his 
sadness because of the demise of Ottoman empire which he named as “the political centre of 
ancient civilization”, that “was torn apart” and “replaced by a new republic founded in 1923 as 
a nation-state” (quoted in Erken, 2013:184).  
 
 
The AKP also established relations with many Islamist movements and Muslim Brotherhood 
parties in the majority Arab countries (Aydin-Düzgit, 2014; Yakis, 2014). Some of these 
relations were inherited from its predecessor the Welfare Party. The AKP authorities 
considered the Arab-Spring as an opportunity to impose Turkey’s regional role in the Arab 
countries. As the regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were toppled down during the uprisings 
of Arab-Spring which started in Tunisia in 2010, the AKP government tried to represent itself 
as “role model” for the new governments of these countries and supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist movements of Egypt, Syrian, Tunisia and Libya and hosted 
many of their meetings (Aydin-Düzgit, 2014; Gurpinar, 2015: 30-32; Yakis, 2014).70 To 
achieve its ambitions, the AKP government worked on reviving the spirit of Ottoman heritage 
among conservative Muslims in the Arab countries. This was through the platforms of Muslim 
Brotherhood parties and other Islamist groups that have acted as opposition parties in the Arab 
countries.    
 
This pro-Ottoman legacy and Islamist background of AKP worsened its relations with  the 
Kemalists, who supported the secular principles of Turkey.71 The disagreement and animosity 
                                                          
70 For more information on the Arab Spring events, see Blight, et al., (2012).  
71 Kemalism and Kemalists are term used to denote Turkish establishments, individuals and parties that defended 
the doctrine of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey. See more on Kemalism in Hale and Ozbudun 




between Kemalists and AKP is deep and goes beyond the era of AKP governing of Turkey to 
the era of establishing the republic of Turkey in 1923 by the nationalist movement of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk who replaced the Ottoman Islamist traditions with pro-secular traditions 
(Ackerman, 2016). During the 2002-2009, the AKP authorities avoided criticizing Ataturk. 
Later, as the AKP gained more strength, AKP politicians implied in many occasions that 
Ataturk movement was a reason for the demise of Ottoman heritage and strength. For example, 
Erdogan disapproved the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is celebrated by the Kemalists as 
this treaty settled the borders of Turkey out of the territories of divided Ottoman empire (BBC, 
30 September, 2016; Harris, 2016). Erdogan considered the treaty as a trap by the victorious 
allies in the World War One who confiscated large Ottoman territories.72 73 
 
The Kurdish opening 
As the AKP won the Turkish elections of 2002, it started a new approach regarding the Kurds 
and Kurdish question. In November 2002, the long-term state of emergency was lifted in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey (BBC, 30 November, 2002).  Yegen (2015: 5) argues that this was a 
ground for a new policy by AKP which he describes as “no repression plus slim recognition”. 
The new era opened a narrow space for civic Kurdish activities. However, the Turkish 
authorities avoided to consider the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a problem that can be solved 
peacefully until the 10th of August, 2005 when Erdogan, the then Turkish prime-minster and 
chairman of AKP acknowledged the existence of a ‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey, and that it 
should be solved through democratic reforms (BBC Monitoring, 10 August, 2005). Erdogan 
hinted at the need for a peaceful approach to the conflict and highlighting that it was not 
possible to end it through military means as he stated that “Kurdish problem is not a problem 
                                                          
72 See also how CHP Kemalist leader responded to Erdogan disapproval of Kemalists agreement of Lausanne that 
“we defend republic, they defend caliphate” (Hurriyet Daily News, 30 September, 2016).  
73 See more on the Treaty of Lausanne on Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-
Lausanne-1923  [accessed: 10 June, 2014].  
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that may be solved through violence and/or methods disrupting social peace" (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, 10 August, 2005). This was also the first time since the establishment of the 
republic of Turkey that a Turkish official referred publicly to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. 
However, Erdogan used the term ‘Kurdish problem’ to indicate the problem of the ‘armed 
conflict’ and its solution through peaceful methods and reforms, and it was not about 
recognizing the Kurdish question. This is because the Kurdish question is a reference to the 
existence of the Kurdish nation in Turkey, and this contradicts with the constitutional principle 
of ‘indivisibility’ of Turkey, which emphasized on the territorial integrity of Turkey and its 
national identity. Even during the peace process, Erdogan and the other Turkish officials denied 
the existence of the Kurdish question, and they referred instead to ‘problems of Kurds’ which 
mainly consisted of terrorism and underdevelopment. This is elaborated in chapter 7.  
 
Although the PKK welcomed Erdogan’s statement and called for negotiations, the AKP 
leadership rejected the PKK offer. The PKK leadership stated that Erdogan’s statement 
"created a positive atmosphere for a resolution" (quoted in Smith, August, 2005), then the PKK 
announced a unilateral ceasefire. Nonetheless, the Turkish authorities refused to talk to the 
PKK. This is although Erdogan and the AKP carried on propagandizing for their goal of 
conducting the democratic reforms required to join the EU (Balta-Paker, 2005). The suggested 
reforms included among others the recognition of mother tongue and limited cultural rights, 
which were related to the Kurds.  
 
Two main factors made the AKP leadership not willing to conduct negotiations with the PKK 
following the 2005 statement of Erdogan. First, the AKP was worried about the reaction of 
Turkish military led by the Kemalist military officials who showed dissatisfaction towards the 
statement of Erdogan in which he referred to the Kurdish problem.  During the August 2008 
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meeting of the Turkish National Security Council (in Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) 
the military members of MGK requested Erdogan to explain his statement about the Kurdish 
problem. They asked Erdogan “what exactly does he mean by the Kurdish problem, what kind 
of a plan does he have for its resolution, and what does he mean by a democratic republic?” 
(quoted in Ozcan, 2007: 47). In addition, the military officials insisted on including the 
Kemalist principles of the indivisibility and secular characteristics of Turkey in article 2 of the 
declaration of the MGK meeting.  Military members of MGK also warned the AKP not to take 
“extraconstitutional” actions (Rubin, 2007: 6). This implied that the military would not accept 
any action related to the recognition of the Kurds as a nation in Turkey. In addition, military 
chief of staff, General Hilmi Ozkok asserted that the Turkish military would continue fighting 
the PKK and disregarded the PKK announcement of ceasefire. Ozkok stated that “the aim of 
the Turkish armed forces is to ensure that the separatist terrorist organization bows down to the 
law and the mercy of the nation” (quoted in Balta-Paker, 2005).74  
 
Second, the AKP had the concern that it would lose its public support among the Turkish 
electors if it carried out any negotiations with the PKK before the 2007 elections. This is 
because the opposition Kemalist parties of CHP and MHP used anti-PKK nationalist discourse 
to propagandized against Erdogan and AKP.75 In particular, they used this discourse as a tool 
to both undermine the public credibility of AKP and to gain more voices in the elections 
(Kirişci, 2007: 8). This is discerned in many statements in which CHP and MHP voiced 
publicly against Erdogan’s approach regarding the Kurds. CHP and MHP even described 
Erdogan’s usage of the term ‘Kurdish problem’ as “treason” against the indivisibility and the 
                                                          
74 The term “separatist terrorist organization” is usually used in the Turkish official discourse as a reference to the 
PKK.  
75 The Republican People's Party (in Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and The Nationalist Movement 
Party (in Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP).  
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Turkish identity of Turkey (The Economist, 2005; Caldwell, 2005).76 The chairman of MHP, 
Devlet Bahceli  even went further to criticize the democratic reforms that were suggested by 
the EU as he claimed that these reforms were an indirect support to the PKK by the EU (BBC 
Monitoring, 2005, 29 August; IPR, 30 August, 2005).   
 
Under the pressure of Turkish military generals and opposition, Erdogan government 
announced in February 2008 a military operation against the PKK bases in the Qandil 
mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan (Attewill, 2008: BBC, 26 February, 2008; Kirişci, 2007: 
8).  The Turkish government announced this operation although the PKK repeated its call for 
the Turkish government to conduct negotiations. The last call was in November 2007 in which 
the PKK leadership stated that it is “open to dialogue on starting a process that would totally 
exclude weapons, based on a political project” (quoted in Edmonton Journal, 10 November, 
2007). The Turkish military generals claimed that the 2008 military operation would crush the 
PKK (BBC, 26 February, 2008; ICG, 2008: 8-10). However, the operation was not able to 
achieve its goal of crushing the PKK as the military generals promised (BBC Monitoring, 5 
March 2008, 16 October, 2008; ICG, 2008: 8-10).  
 
It was only at the end of 2008 when the Turkish government launched secret talks with the 
PKK leadership. The Turkish negotiations with the PKK were conducted by high-ranking 
officials of Turkish intelligence service (in Turkish: Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) headed by 
its undersecretary, Emre Taner who was succeeded by Hakan Fidan (Hurriyet Daily News, 13 
September, 2011; Kutschera, 2012). The MIT-PKK secret talks were conducted in two 
different places. The MIT undersecretary was in talks with Ocalan in the Turkish prison of 
                                                          
76 See: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (n.d.). Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. The Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey. [online]. Available at: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf  
[accessed: 10 August 2014]. 
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Imrali (Hess, January, 2013; Hurriyet Daily News, 13 September 2011; Kutschera, 2012). The 
MIT undersecretary was also chairing the Turkish delegation in the talks with the 
representatives of PKK in Oslo, Norway (Hurriyet Daily News, 13 September 2011; Kutschera, 
2012)77. However, these talks were disrupted in 2011 and both parties resumed armed 
hostilities (Kutschera, 2012). Two main purposes were behind limiting the secret talks with the 
PKK to the MIT institution. First, to keep the information about the talks classified by the MIT, 
which is the institution that was more capable than any other state institution to do so. Second, 
to justify the talks as part of the MIT authority of serving the security of the state against 
terrorism. This in case of leaking the information about the talks to the public. This is what 
actually Erdogan claimed when some information about the talks were leaked to the media in 
2011 (BBC Monitoring, 16 September, 2011; Hurriyet Daily News, 13 September, 2011).  
 
As the negotiations were going on secretly, Erdogan started in 2009 to pave the ground for 
attaining the public acceptance to end the conflict through negotiations. Accordingly, Erdogan 
carried on describing the conflict as a counterproductive choice that would only lead to more 
pains for the families of Turkish soldiers. Erdogan During the 30 August 2009 celebration of 
Turkish national day stated that “this pain should stop without delay.' Everyone wants the 
bloodshed and the tears to stop. Everyone wants mothers to stop crying woefully. Everyone 
wants children to stop dying and getting killed and coming back in martyrs' coffins wrapped in 
a crescent-and-star flag” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 31 August, 2009).  This kind of negative 
description for the armed action was repeated in other statements and speeches of Erdogan 
(BBC, 19 November, 2009). Erdogan also encouraged the return of PKK members to Turkey. 
For example, in 2009 a group of PKK activists who were named by the PKK as “peace 
ambassadors” returned to Turkey following the amnesty promises of Erdogan and AKP 
                                                          
77 See more in Dombey, D.  (February, 2012), Hess, J. (January, 2013), and Freedom House. (2013).  
115 
 
government (Al-Jazeera, October 2009). Erdogan described the return of this group as "very 
positive and pleasing development", and he called the other members of PKK to return to 
"return to their country without losing time" (quoted in Al-Jazeera, October 2009).  
Nevertheless, Erdogan and AKP leadership approach remained vague as they carried on 
describing the PKK as terrorist organization and considered the return of PKK members as 
surrender, while the PKK and Kurdish activists described them as ambassadors of peace.   
 
The AKP authorities also announced in 2009 its “Kurdish opening” approach or “Kurdish 
overture” (The Economist, August, 2009; Yegen, 2015: 6). This was accompanied with reforms 
related to removing the restrictions over using the Kurdish language and limited cultural 
activities. These reforms initially presented in November, 2009 to the parliament as a package 
of democratic reforms by the Turkish interior minister, Besir Atalay. During the session of the 
parliament Atalay connected the reforms to the principles of justice and equality that all Turkey 
citizens should enjoy although he avoided any reference to the terms ‘Kurd’ or ‘Kurdish 
problem’. Atalay stated that "we should never forget that behind all our problems lies injustice" 
and added that "we want everyone in this country to be treated equally" (quoted in BBC, 13 
November, 2009).  Although some of the reforms of the package were already requested by 
the EU as part of the democratic reforms, the AKP authorities considered them as part of the 
Kurdish opening (Yegen, 2015; The Turkey Analyst, October, 2009).  The reforms also 
warranted launching TRT6, which was the first Kurdish language TV channel sponsored by 
the government.  
 
The Kurdish opening approach of the AKP aimed at serving the AKP agendas regarding both 
limiting the role of military and gaining votes in the elections and changing the constitution. 
Although the ambition of joining the EU influenced certain democratic reforms, the AKP 
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leadership agendas regarding ‘the elections, new constitution and the role of military’ played 
significant role in its Kurdish opening approach.78 These agendas of the AKP are explained in 
the following two sections.  
 
The AKP agendas regarding the role of military 
Powerful role of the military in Turkey and the long-term militarization of the Kurdish problem 
constituted an important factor that encouraged the AKP to search for a non-military solution 
for the problem. Viewing the Kurdish question only as a security matter dealt with through 
military force maintained the taboo on discussing any peaceful solution.  The extensive special 
military and security measures under the conditions of marital law and state of emergency, 
which were applied in the Kurdish region since the 1925 rebellion strengthened the political 
authority of the Turkish military.79 The power of military was maintained by the state 
establishments, which were dominated by the Kemalists who considered themselves as the 
guardians of the indivisibility of Turkey and its Kemalist principles of nationalist-secularism 
(Burak, 2011: 146). Through the MGK,80 the military generals practiced a powerful role in the 
political life of Turkey (Gunter, 2008: 109-111; Özcan, 2007: 42-43). MGK, which was 
dominated by the military officials practiced its power as the body responsible for the national 
security of Turkey. Gunter (2008: 109) argues that “the MGK often served as the ultimate 
source of authority in Turkey”.  
                                                          
78 As explained earlier, the military and opposition parties were the major obstacle that prevented the AKP 
authorities from such negotiations with the PKK before the 2007 elections. However, as the AKP won the 2007 
elections and as the Turkish military failed to crush the PKK in its 2008 operation, the AKP was more confident 
to recognize the political characteristic of the conflict. On the other hand, the military and opposition parties were 
losing power although they remained the major concern of AKP leadership. To keep their strength in the 
parliament and to succeed in changing the constitution, the AKP leadership wanted to bring the Kurds to its side. 
The AKP leadership needed the Kurds to support them in their future battles against the Kemalists in both the 
elections and in any referendum or polls for changing the constitution. The AKP leadership was also considering 
any political solution for the Kurdish problem as a blow to the role of military generals and for the Kemalists who 
for long term militarized the Kurdish question. 
79 For more on martial law and state of emergency in the Kurdish region of Turkey see: Yildiz & Muller (2008: 
15-16), and Yildiz (2005: 45).  




The AKP leadership considered the powerful military generals as a threat to both its rule and 
survival. The AKP leadership was worried about any possible coup by the military and was 
searching for provisions to overcome such a possibility. The Turkish military had already 
conducted four military coups between 1960-1997 (Heavens & Yackley, July 2016). The last 
one was against the coalition government led by the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (BBC 
Monitoring, 16 April, 2012; Heavens & Yackley, July 2016).81  
 
In 2007 these fears were higher as the AKP government uncovered the clandestine network of 
‘Ergenekon’, which according to the accounts the AKP authorities was planning for a military 
coup (Hurriyet, 11 January, 2009). The information about arresting many members of the 
Ergenekon were surfaced to the media in 2007.82 The majority of those arrested were military 
officials. Hundreds of suspects including high ranking military officials were sued for alleged 
links to Ergenekon (Tavernise & Arsu, October, 2008; Ünver, 2009: 9-10).83 Among the 
suspects was the former military chief, Ilker Basbug (The Economist, 2 February, 2013).84 The 
information about the network were exposed during the tension between the AKP government 
and military following the 2007 elections as the AKP won the elections and nominated 
Abdullah Gul for the presidency of Turkey (De-Bellaigue, 2007). The then military chief of 
                                                          
81 See also: BBC Monitoring. (28 February, 2013). Top commanders of 1997 coup arrested in probe in turkey. 
BBC Monitoring European. ProQuest. [online]. Available at:  
http://search.proquest.com.brad.idm.oclc.org/docview/1312790831?accountid=17193 [accessed: 20 June 2013].  
 
82 Ünver (2009) highlighted the role of military in Ergenkon and connected it to the Turkish Deep State, which 
was established since the cold war. Ünver (2009) even returned it back to the groups that were established 
clandestinely during the two last decades of Ottoman empire. For more on Ergenkon and the Turkish Deep State 
see: Ünver, H. A. (2009). Turkey’s “Deep-State” and the Ergenekon Conundrum. The Middle East Institute: 
Policy Brief. No. 23. [online]. Available at: http://www.mei.edu/content/turkeys-deep-state-and-ergenekon-
conundrum  [accessed: 10 September, 2014]. 
 
84 See more about the Ergenekon network and Turkish Deep State on Kaya, S. (2009), Taş H. (2014), and Radikal. 
(12 August, 2008).  
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staff reacted to the AKP victory and stated that “there were secret plans being developed to 
undermine secularism in Turkey and divide up the country” (quoted in Kirişci, 2007: 30).  
 
The AKP leadership was struggling to limit the influence of military in the political life of 
Turkey. The AKP struggle to limit the power of military was underway since 2003 and was 
supported by the EU proposed democratic reforms. The Turkish ambition to join the EU, and 
the EU demanded reforms played a significant role in limiting the role of military in the 
political life of Turkey. Among other reforms, the EU required limiting the influence of 
military in the political life of Turkey (Bac, 2005, 20; Gunter, 2008: 109).   
 
The AKP reforms mainly targeted the domination of military officials in the MGK and 
minimized their influence in the judicial system. The taboo on discussing the role of military 
was already breached during the Ecevit government who made few regulations regarding the 
role of military in the MGK in 20001 (Ozcan, 2007: 43-49). Although these amendments were 
nominal, they paved the ground for the later significant adjustments by the AKP, which 
gradually changed the characteristics of MGK and considerably limited the role of military 
officials in the MGK. The major changes in the characteristics of MGK were made by the AKP 
authorities during the years 2003-2005 (Gunter, 2008: 111; Ozcan, 2007: 44). Balta-Paker 
(2005) stated that MGK was transformed from “the main institution of army influence” to 
become “a purely advisory body”. The AKP also abolished the State Security Courts in 2004, 
which were under the influence of military officials (Bac, 2005: 21 & 26).  The steps of 
abolishing these courts by the AKP authorities preceded by the Ecevit government step of 
changing the shape of the State Security Court in Ocalan trial in 1999.  State Security Courts 
had three judges including two civilian and one military. However, the Ecevit government 
replaced the military judge with a civilian judge during the trial of Ocalan (Bac, 2005: 29).   
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As part of its struggle to limit the role of military, the AKP leadership considered limiting the 
leverage of military over Kurdish problem. As discussed earlier the military power had a 
relationship with the militarization of the Kurdish question. Therefore, the AKP leadership 
considered searching for a non-military solution to end the conflict. The failure of Turkish 
military in its 2008 operation against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan created a pressure over the 
military officials to let the AKP government find a solution for the conflict (Larrabee & Tol, 
2011: 145). The AKP leadership already claimed that the problem would be solved through 
democratic reforms, dissimilarly to the Kemalist approach which considered the Kurdish 
problem as a security matter that needed to deal with only through military means. 
Furthermore, the failure of the military operation was an opportunity for the AKP leadership 
to assert its view that the military was not capable of solving the political problems of Turkey.   
 
The AKP agendas regarding the elections and changing the constitution  
As stated earlier, the AKP won the 2007 elections and gained 46.6% of the overall votes 
(Álvarez-Rivera, 2015). However, for Erdogan and the AKP this did not mean that the battle 
with Kemalists was over as Erdogan and the AKP had the ambition to rule Turkey for longer 
term. This was expressed later in the 2012 congress of AKP in which Erdogan propagandized 
for transforming Turkey to become a developed country in 2023 under the rule of AKP 
(Hayatsever, 1 October, 2012). However, this vision faced the obstacle that Erdogan would not 
be able to secure his position as prime-minister to that date as the Turkish laws would not allow 
him to run the same position for another term (Hacaoglu, 15 June 2012; Pidd, 10 June 2011).  
Therefore, Erdogan had the motivation to gain the position of the presidency of Turkey in the 
future. As the presidency position was ceremonial and the president could not exert authority 
over the government, Erdogan and the AKP propagandized for changing Turkey’s ruling 
system from parliamentary into presidential and described the Turkish system as less functional 
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because it was “multi-headed” (BYEGM, 23 March, 2015b; TCCB, 27 January, 2016; TRT, 29 
January, 2015). This is although the AKP dominated each of the parliament, the government 
and presidency.  However, to change the ruling system of Turkey, there was a need to change 
the constitution (Hayatsever, 1 October, 2012). Accordingly, the AKP leadership claimed that 
the Turkish consultation was flawed and undemocratic because it was written by the military 
junta of 1980, and that there was a need for a “civilian’’ constitution (Kirişci, 2007: 22).  The 
AKP politicians claimed that they would propose a democratic constitution, which would 
guarantee the democratic rights of all citizens of Turkey. This was fervently opposed by the 
Kemalist parties and the high-ranking officials of military.  
 
The Kurds similarly to the AKP claimed that the Turkish constitution was undemocratic and 
flawed, and they expressed their wish for the constitutional changes that would guarantee their 
national identity and demands. This is discerned in the statements of the members of the 
Kurdish legal parties. For example, Akin Birdal, deputy of the Kurdish party of Democratic 
Society (in Turkish: Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) in an interview with Radical newspaper 
stated that the new constitution would be accepted if it “calls for the coexistence of different 
cultures in equality and freedom," and if it says that "each and every citizen is a free and equal 
citizen” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 14 March, 2008). Similarly, Filiz Kocali the chairman of 
Socialist Democracy Party asserted the need for a new constitution which recognizes “the 
Kurds as free and equal partners” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 14 March, 2008).  
 
In order to secure the future support of Kurds in the 2011 elections and changing the 
constitution, The AKP leadership carried on promising to end the armed conflict through 
peaceful means and democratic reforms. The minister of interior, Besir Atalay hinted that the 
AKP had good intentions to end the conflict peacefully as he stated that “we are advancing 
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towards a solution with a good plan” (quoted in Al-Jazeera, October 2009). Some AKP 
politicians also implied that the new constitution would solve the Kurdish problem. For 
example, Sebahattin Cevheri, the AKP Sanliurfa deputy stated in an interview with Radical 
newspaper that “it is primarily necessary to prepare a truly democratic and pro-freedom 
constitution in Turkey” Which would help in removing “all the laws that restrict the rights of 
the Kurds, the Circassians, the Laz, and the other peoples” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 14 
March, 2008). 
 
The AKP leadership also used the language of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. The researcher 
used the term ‘brothering discourse’ to denote certain constructions that Erdogan and other 
AKP politicians used in their speeches and statements, which refer to the Kurds. These 
constructions are mainly built in Islamist and Ottoman contexts, which assume a positive 
relationship between the Turks and Kurds. In particular, these constructions aim at creating the 
assumption that Kurds have positive relation with the AKP. The Brothering discursive 
constructions usually include terms like ‘brothers, brotherhood and fraternity’. For example, 
Erdogan stated at the eve of the Kurdish national holiday, Newroz of 21 March, 2007 that “may 
the seeds of hatred that aim at our brotherhood burn and disappear in the fires that are being 
lit” (quoted in BBC, 21 March, 2007). 85 
 
The research argues that three main characters of the AKP encouraged many Kurds to vote for 
it in the elections including each of its democratic façade, brothering discourse, and promises 
to end the conflict through nonviolent means. The rhetoric of Erdogan and the AKP was more 
                                                          
85 Another example, during the celebration of Turkish national day in 31 August 2009, Erdogan stated that “this 
is why I say that the essence of this nation is fermented with brotherhood. This nation has lived together for 
thousands of years. It has worked hard to elevate this homeland with its Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, 
Abkhazians, Georgians, Arabs, Bosnians, and Albanians. No one, and I mean no one, has the power to spoil our 
brotherhood that has been built up over thousands of years” “you will never, never be able to shake our 
brotherhood” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 31 August, 2009). 
122 
 
attractive to the Kurds and their political representatives than those of the CHP and MHP who 
adhered to the Kemalist- nationalist doctrine, which insisted on the Turkishness of Turkey, and 
refused the Kurdish identity. Kirişci (2007: 15) described the Turkish nationalist parties of 
MHP and CHP as “hard-liners” who “have repeatedly stressed their intention to prevent any 
reforms that may undermine the unitary nature of the Turkish state and its unitary national 
identity”.  Overall, the positive environment that the Kurdish opening approach of the AKP 
created paved the ground for the peace process. The latter is discussed in chapter 7 and 8.  
 
Conclusion 
The Kurdish question in Turkey and the Turkish- Kurdish conflict are historically rooted and 
they date to era of Ottoman empire. However, the nationalist policies adopted following the 
establishment of Turkey as a nation-state exacerbated the relationship between the Kurds and 
the Turkish state. The repressive policies adopted against the Kurds led to the growth of 
contemporary Kurdish nationalism. This was shaped by the emergence of the PKK as a modern 
national movement that managed to continue its rebellion until the date of writing this research. 
At the beginning of the rebellion, the PKK rebels were named as ‘bandits’ by the Turkish 
authorities. However, the Turkish authorities later used the label of ‘terrorists’ against them. 
This matched the usage of the label of ‘terrorist’ by the US and other NATO allies against 
certain movements. Labelling the PKK as terrorist also shaped the Turkish military and judicial 
policies, which were conducted under the banner of counter-terrorism.  
 
The Islamist AKP led by Erdogan adopted a new approach regarding the Kurdish problem and 
this laid the ground for the emergence of a new narrative regarding the Kurdish question in the 
Turkish political discourse. This was mainly about limited recognition of the Kurdish identity 
through democratic reforms. However, the new approach was adopted to respond to the 
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agendas of AKP and Erdogan in two major areas. First, the new approach aimed at limiting the 
role of powerful military officials who used their approach regarding the Kurdish question as 
a tool to influence the political life in Turkey. Second, the AKP approach aimed at gaining the 
Kurdish support in the elections and in changing the constitution. The narrative used by the 
AKP leadership, which depended on democratic reforms and brotherhood stimulated the 
Kurdish support to the AKP. The major characteristics of the AKP approach towards the 
Kurdish question during the period of ‘Kurdish opening’ included secret talks with the PKK 
and limited recognition of the Kurdish identity. These characteristics distinguished the AKP 
authorities from the previous Turkish governments and other major Turkish parties, which 
denied and oppressed the Kurdish identity and rejected any negotiations with the PKK. 
However, the Kurdish opening approach was a step toward the peace process, which is 






















The core of the Turkish narrative of terrorism that this research deals with is the PKK and its 
action. This chapter reveals the main constructions and narratives that constitute the Turkish 
official narrative regarding the PKK by analysing the relevant Turkish official texts. To 
critically challenge the arguments of the Turkish official texts, the analysis depends on various 
texts, which are mainly taken from non-Turkish sources. The Turkish official texts that are 
analysed in this chapter include texts published by the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, parts 
of Turkish constitution, Turkish counter-terrorism law, and other laws in addition to parts of 
statements, speeches, and interviews of Turkish officials (see the list of the Turkish officials in 
Appendix Table 6). As explained earlier, the research usually uses the terms ‘statement’ or 
‘stated’ before quoting the parts of statements, speeches, and interviews of Turkish officials. 
However, the analysis in this chapter concentrates on the texts of the Turkish ministry of 
foreign affairs. To avoid repetition of the term ‘Turkish ministry of foreign affairs’, the research 
uses the abbreviation ‘TMFA’.  
 
This chapter deals with five main constructions and narratives regarding the PKK in the texts 
of TMFA and other official texts. These include the following:  
- The PKK is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization. 
- The PKK is a separatist organization.   
- The PKK is an ethnically motivated movement that does not represent a nation.   
- The PKK is a group of “murderers” who target civilians and civic services.  
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- The PKK is a “criminal group that is involved in the organized crime of international 
drug-trafficking”. 
 
Some of these constructions and narratives are given more space in the analysis. This is because 
they are given more space in the texts of ministry and repeated more frequently in the other 
official texts.  The analysis also introduces the other originations that are designated as terrorist 
by the Turkish authorities according to the texts of TMFA. However, before delving into the 
constructions of the PKK, the analysis provides a general comparison between the 
constructions of the PKK and two other organisations designated as terrorist by the Turkish 
authorities. These two organizations are the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (in 
Turkish: Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, DHKP-C), and the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL).  The purpose of this comparison is to put a light on the influence of ideology 
on the ways that the PKK and these two organizations are described in the texts of ministry and 
other official texts.  Omitting the full names of PKK and ISIL in the texts of TMFA and other 
official texts is discussed as a major point of this comparison. Nevertheless, the chapter begins 
with the Turkish definition of terrorism according to the Turkish Law of Fight against 
Terrorism, and the construction of separatism as terrorism in this law and other texts. This 
section highlights the construction of various types of Kurdish activism as separatist-terrorism.  
 
The Turkish definition of terrorism  
The Turkish official definition of terrorism is represented in various texts. The most important 
of these texts is the text of Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey. The text defines 
terrorism as the following:  
 “Any criminal action conducted by one or more persons belonging to an 
organisation with the aim of changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in 
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the Constitution, the political, legal, social, secular or economic system, damaging 
the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, jeopardizing the 
existence of the Turkish State and the Republic, enfeebling, destroying or seizing 
the State authority, eliminating basic rights and freedoms, damaging the internal 
and external security of the State, the public order or general health, is defined as 
terrorism” (quoted in Legislationline, 2016).  
 
Although the definition characterizes terrorism as a crime, it connects it to various ranges of 
actions. Nevertheless, the definition focuses on the actions that target ‘the Sate’, which is 
Turkey. The definition constructs terrorism, widely to include the actions that target the 
‘political, legal, social, secular or economic system’ of the state and its constitutional 
principles. This gives the judicial authorities the freedom to interpret the text, and accordingly, 
to consider various violent and non-violent actions as terrorism. Although the last two lines of 
the text refer to some domains that go beyond the state’s ‘system’ and its ‘constitutional 
attributes’ to the ‘basic rights and freedoms’ of individuals, the rest of the text highlights the 
‘State’ as the main target of terrorism. This implies that the text concentrates on the acts that 
target the state, its governing system and main constitutional principles. The text also limits the 
definition of terrorism to the acts that target Turkey and makes no reference to the acts that 
target other countries.  
 
Separatism as terrorism  
As the text highlights that terrorism is any action that targets ‘the attributes of the Republic as 
specified in the constitution’, it connects between the definition of terrorism and the main 
principles of Turkish constitution. This relationship is also inter-discursive as it connects 
various discursive constructions. However, constructing ‘separatism’ as terrorism is more 
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relevant to the subject of this research. This is because the term ‘separatism’ according to the 
Turkish official discourse usually denotes various actions of pro-Kurdish nationalism, and 
mainly the actions of the PKK and the affiliated Kurdish groups. Constructing ‘separatism’ as 
terrorism is discerned in the part of text which considers as terrorism the acts that aim at 
‘damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation’. This part of the text 
builds an interdiscursive relationship between separatism-terrorism and the Turkish 
constitutional principle of the indivisibility of Turkey (see Figure 2 below). As explained in 
chapter 3, critical discourse analysts describe interdiscursivity as the articulation of more than 
one discourse in the text (Fairclough, 2003: 218). 
 
 
Figure 2. The interdiscursive relationship of damaging the principle of state indivisibility, 
separatism and terrorism. 
 
 
The anti-separatist principles of the indivisibility of Turkey and its Turkish identity are the 
most valued principles of the Turkish constitution. The preamble of the Turkish constitution 
states that “no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, 
Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical 
and moral values of Turkishness” (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n. d: 1-2).86  Article 
3 of the Turkish constitution also states that “the State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, 
is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish” (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d.). 
The principles of indivisibility, territorial integrity, and national unity are also emphasized in 
                                                          
86 This version of Turkish constitution was first adopted in 1982. However, it was amended and republished in 
2011 by the Turkish national assembly.   
Damaging state indivisibility Separatsim Terrorism
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Articles 5, 14, 26, 28, 58, 68, 81, 103, 118, 122, and 130 of the Turkish constitution.87 This 
made various violent and non-violent actions of pro-Kurdish nationalism liable to the 
classification as acts of terrorism.  
 
Considering ‘separatism’ as terrorism indicates that the Turkish definition of terrorism, mainly 
targets the PKK and other Kurdish parties. This is discerned in the construction of the PKK as 
‘separatist-terrorist organization’ in the Turkish official texts. In particular, the term ‘separatist-
terrorist’ is repeated by Erdogan and other Turkish officials as a reference to the PKK (Asia 
News Monitor, June, 2016; FT, December, 2016). The Turkish officials also use this term 
against the PYD-YPG, and they construct them as parts of the PKK (BBC Monitoring, 22 
October, 2014). For example, Erdogan stated that “we are as determined about the PYD, the 
separatist terror organization's Syrian wing" (quoted in El-Deeb, 2016).88 Constructing the 
PKK as separatist is discussed in more details later in this chapter, and constructing the PYD-
YPG as part of the PKK is discussed in the next chapter. As the PYD-YPG are described as 
organic part of the PKK in the Turkish official discourse, the constructions and narratives 
regarding the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official texts usually involve the PKK.     
 
Constructing the Kurdish national action as ‘separatism’ and considering ‘separatism’ as 
terrorism also impacted civic Kurdish parties. This has been the case of the Kurdish legal 
parties of Turkey since the 1990s (HRW, 20 March, 2017). Human Rights Watch claimed that 
thousands of BDP and HDP members have been detained by the Turkish authorities since July 
                                                          
87 See: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (n.d.). Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. The Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey. [online]. Available at: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf  
[accessed: 10 August 2014].  
88 The research connects the acronyms PYD-YPG although the PYD is a political party, while the YPG is a 
military organization. However, the research uses these acronyms together to match the way the acronyms used 
together or interchangeably in the Turkish official texts.  
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2015 under charges of supporting terrorism (HRW, 20 March, 2017).89 This also includes 
elected Kurdish parliamentarians and mayors (AI, 4 November, 2016; HRW, 20 March, 2017). 
For example, the co-chair of HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtash and Figen Yüksekdag were 
charged of “making propaganda for a terrorist organisation”, which Amnesty International 
described as “a provision routinely used to stifle dissent on Kurdish issues in Turkey” (AI, 4 
November, 2016).  Erdogan labelled HDP as “the political extension of separatist terrorist 
organization” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 2 September, 2015) and prior to this he labelled 
BDP as “the extension of the terrorist organization” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 
2012).  
 
The Turkish authorities charge civic Kurdish activists with terrorism even if they are not 
partisans or not members of any organizations. This is although the Turkish anti-terrorism law 
considers as terrorism any separatist acts by individuals “belonging to an organisation” (quoted 
in Legislationline, 2016). This is discerned mainly in the cases of activists who criticize the 
treatment of Kurds by the Turkish authorities and those who disseminate such views in the 
media. A Turkish journalist, Murat Yaktin (13 October, 2016) stated that “if you criticize or 
report rights abuses in anti-PKK operations, you can be easily labelled by pro-government 
sources as a "helper of terrorists" or a "separatist”. Erdogan labelled those who are involved in 
expressions that criticize the Turkish polices regarding the Kurds as “supporters of terrorism”, 
or “terrorists” (quoted in Weise, March, 2016), regardless of their profession or the non-violent 
character of their action.  Erdogan stated that “their titles as an MP, an academic, an author, a 
journalist do not change the fact that they are actually terrorists” (quoted in Weise, March, 
2016). Erdogan described as ‘terrorists’ those “holding a gun or a bomb and those who use 
                                                          
89 HDP is the acronym of (Halkların Demokratik Partisi: In Turkish), Peoples’ Democratic Party. BDP is the 
acronym of (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi: in Turkish), Peace and Democracy party.   
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their position and pen to serve the aims of terrorists” (quoted in BBC, 14 March, 2016b). In 
another statement regarding the detained HDP deputes, Erdogan staid that "those who support 
terrorist organizations are not deputies, but terrorists" (quoted in Yeni Şafak, February, 2016).  
 
The Turkish authorities usually consider the expressions that criticize its repressive policies 
against the Kurds as “terror propaganda” (BBC Monitoring, 8 February, 2017), which aims at 
“disrupting the unity of the state” (HRW, 28 December, 2016; Pen International, 9 September, 
2016). For example, in 2016 writers and journalists who worked for the newspaper of Özgür 
Gündem, which usually criticized the Turkish policies against the Kurds, were charged with 
both spreading terror propaganda and disrupting the unity of the state (HRW, 28 December, 
2016; Pen International, 9 September, 2016). Those who were charged included the renowned 
writers, Necmiye Alpay, Ragip Zarakolu, and human rights lawyer Eren Keskin alongside 
others (HRW, 28 December, 2016; Pen International, 9 September, 2016).90 Dealing with the 
Kurdish legal parties and pro-Kurdish activists as ‘supporters of terrorism’ is discussed in 
chapters 7 and 8.  
 
Texts of Turkey’s ministry of foreign affairs: The terrorist organizations 
As stated earlier, in addition to other official texts, this chapter deals with texts of the Turkish 
ministry of foreign affairs (TMFA). As the texts published on the website of TMFA, they 
represent the view of Turkish authorities, and accordingly, they reflect the official Turkish 
discourse. Although the TMFA website shows 2011 as the date it was launched, the texts show 
no publishing dates. However, the texts include post-2011 issues and dates such as the 
                                                          
90 Another example, in May, 2017 special Turkish forces of anti-terrorism arrested many academics for signing a 
petition which called for peace and denounce violence perpetrated by the Turkish government and the PKK 






international campaign against ISIL and the July, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, which implies 
that the website is up to date. In order to deal with the problem of undated texts of ministry the 
research use (n. d.) to cite and refer to these texts. To distinguish every cited text and its 
reference, every text is given a letter in its citing and referencing brackets such as (MFA, n. d., 
a), and (MFA, n. d., b). These texts are referenced in the list of research references according 
to their order on the website of the ministry. The texts are also included in the appendices (See 
Appendix Texts of TMFA 1-7).  
 
TMFA designated 7 originations as terrorist organizations that target Turkey. These 
organization include the PKK, DHPK-C, ISIL, Al-Qaeda, ASALA, 17 November, and 
Fethullah Gulen movement (FETO). Although the PYD and YPG are also referred to in the 
text of ministry titled ‘PKK’, they are considered as part of the PKK. This is discussed in the 
next chapter, which deals with the discursive constructions of PYD and YPG.  The texts of 
ministry also provide no further discussion about each of Al-Qaeda, ASALA and 17 
November.91 ASALA and 17 November are currently inactive groups (TRAC, 2016, 2016b). 
ASALA is a nationalist Armenian organization influenced by Marxist-Leninism, and 17 
November is Marxist-Greek organization (The Guardian, 4 September, 2015; TRAC, 2016, 
2016b). The latter was removed from the US list of terrorist organizations in September, 2015 
(The Guardian, 4 September, 2015).  This is although the group was mainly targeting the US 
and NATO premises in Greece. 17 November claimed responsibility for the assassination of 
the Athens chief of CIA, Richard Welch in 1975 (The Guardian, 4 September, 2015).  
 
FETO is the acronym given by the Turkish authorities to the Hizmet Islamist movement of 
Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen by the Turkish authorities (BBC,18 December, 2013; BBC 
                                                          
91 See NDTV. (December, 2016) which shows no Al-Qaeda attacks during the era of AKP rule.  
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Monitoring, 21 October, 2015). Previously, the Turkish authorities used other terms to name 
the movement including “parallel structure”, “parallel origination” and “parallel state” (quoted 
in BBC Monitoring, 3 March, 2014; Hurriyet Daily News, 12 December, 2014). The term 
‘parallel’ indicates that the movement was working clandestinely inside the institutions of 
Turkish state (BBC Monitoring, 3 March, 2014).  However, following the coup attempt of 15 
July, 2016, FETO was labelled as a terrorist organization by the Turkish authorities, and it was 
added to the list of terrorist originations on the website of TMFA. The Turkish authorities 
accused FETO of the involvement in the 15 July coup attempt although its leader, Gulen denied 
any involvement (BBC, 21 July, 2016b; Beaumont, 2016). Except its alleged involvement in 
the coup attempt, the research found no evidence of armed actions by the FETO, and there is 
no record of attacks targeting Turkey by this movement. 
 
Although FETO has been considered as a main foe of the AKP authorities since the coup 
attempt of 15 July 2016, the section of terrorism in the website of the TMFA did not provide a 
text introducing the movement and its ideology (MFA, n. d., a). The website allocates FETO a 
link titled “fight against FETÖ and July 15 coup attempt” (MFA, n. d., g). However, the link 
leads to an empty page, but it includes another link leading to another page, which includes 
links of news pages about the 15 July coup attempt (MFA, n. d., h).  
 
General comparison between the constructions of DHKP-C, ISIL and PKK  
The texts of TMFA provide more reference about the PKK, DHKP-C, and ISIL than the other 
groups, which are discussed above. Each of these three organizations is allocated a separate 
text in the section of ‘terrorism’ in the website of the ministry. Yet, there are more references 
about the PKK than the other organisations. The imbalance in the references and constructions 
about the PKK, DHKP-C, and ISIL invited the researcher to conduct a general comparison 
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between the ways these three organizations presented in the texts of the ministry. This 
comparison assists in understanding the influence of ideology in the construction of these 
organizations in the texts of TMFA. Critical discourse analysts, Van Dijk (2006b: 126), Wodak 
(2001a: 10), and Fairclough, (2003: 218) emphasized the importance of deciphering the 
features of ideology in text in order to demystify its messages.  
 
Text of TMFA, which is titled ‘DHKP-C’ shows DHKP-C full name, the Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party/Front, and briefs its history, ideology, methods and field of armed 
action (MFA, n. d., f).92 The text states that DHKP-C “was originally formed in 1978 as 
Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol. It was a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation 
Party/Front. It was renamed as the DHKP-C in 1994 after factional infighting. It has a Marxist-
Leninist ideology. It aims at overthrowing the Turkish state through violence and removing the 
US and NATO presence in Turkey” (MFA, n. d., f). This description is brief and does not cover 
everything related to the ideological motivations, and methods of action of DHKP-C. However, 
this description does not contradict with the way the DHKP-C describes its ideology and 
actions. For example, following the 10 August 2015 attack on the US consulate of Istanbul the 
DHKP-C named the US as "chief enemy of people in the Middle East and in the world" (quoted 
in BBC, 10 August, 2015). The ministry’s text claimed that the DHKP-C attacked the 
diplomatic premises of the US in 2013 and 2015, and that it assassinated the Istanbul prosecutor 
in 2015. The DHKP-C declared its responsibility for these actions (BBC, 10 August, 2015; 
Orsal & Pamuk, 31 March, 2015)”  
 
                                                          
92 For more about DHKP-C, see: Hay, M. (2015). What we know about the left-wing militant group that took a 
prosecutor hostage in Turkey. Available at:  
http://www.vice.com/read/what-we-know-about-the-left-wing-militant-group-that-took-a-prosecutor-hostage-in-
turkey-402 [accessed 20 November, 2015].   
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Unlike the DHKP-C, ISIL full name and acronym are omitted in the texts of TMFA and Turkish 
official texts that the research deal with. The text titled “Turkey’s contribution to anti-Daesh 
coalition” omits both the term ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ which is the full name 
of organization and its internationally used acronyms (ISIL, IS, or ISIS) (MFA, n. d., c). TMFA 
text and the other Turkish official texts use ‘Daesh’ as an acronym of the Islamic State instead 
of ISIL. Daesh (داعش) is the Arabic acronym of ISIL. This is also discerned in the text of the 
interview of Turkish FM, Mevlut Cavusoglu (MFA, 24 September, 2016) in which he used the 
Arabic term Daesh 8 times and never used the name of Islamic State or its acronyms ‘ISIL, 
ISIS or IS’ although the interview was in English. Using Daesh as the only reference to the 
Islamic State is also discerned in the statements and speeches of the Turkish president, Erdogan 
and Turkish prime-minster (PM), Ahmet Davutoglu (AA, 5 March, 2015; BYEGM, 21 
January, 2015, 22 January, 2015; TCCB, 9 October, 2016).     
 
As it is explained earlier, the Islamist ideology of ruling AKP refuses connecting the term 
terrorism to Islam, and therefore, the AKP authorities prefer to use Daesh instead of ISIL, ISIS, 
or IS.93 CDA highlights that omitting certain details in the text has an ideological function 
(Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 2006b; Mayr, 2008). Mayr (2008: 19) states that “the powerful 
analysis does not only deal with what is stated in the texts but also what is omitted”.  In several 
statements, Erdogan disapproves the usage of the terms ‘Islam and Islamist’ to describe a 
terrorist organization by the international media and governments, and he claims that such kind 
of description is influenced by the “Islamophobia” that “emerged from the Western countries” 
(quoted in AA, 1 April, 2016). Following the January, 2015 Jihadist attack against Charlie 
Hebdo magazine in France, Erdogan stated that “we are against such wrong definitions as 
Islamic terror. No one can associate Islam with terror because Islam is the religion of peace” 
                                                          
93 See also Black, I. (21 September, 2014). 
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(quoted in BYEGM, 22 January, 2015). The AKP authorities denounced connecting Islamist 
beliefs to terrorism even when the attackers announced that they were driven by Islamist 
Jihadist ideology. For example, Davutoglu stated that “this terror attack cannot be linked with 
Islam. Any connection established between Islam and these activities is wrong” (quoted in AA, 
7 January, 2015). Erdogan even considered it as an offend to connect terrorism to extreme 
Islamist ideologies as he stated that “those who try to associate terrorism and our religion not 
only disrespect our religion but also insult us" (quoted in BYEGM, 3 February, 2015).  
 
The texts of the TMFA also do not provide details about the motivations and methods of ISIL, 
unlike the way the ministry texts deal with the DHKP-C or PKK (MFA, n. d., a).94 The Islamist 
ideology of AKP is also behind omitting any description for the Islamist ideological 
motivations and Jihadist methods of ISIL in the texts of TMFA. In particular, these are omitted 
from the text titled ‘Turkey’s contribution to anti-Daesh coalition’ (MFA, n. d., c). The text is 
limited to general references to the technical participation of Turkey in the anti-ISIL 
international coalition. Although another text of TMFA used the term “religiously motivated” 
as an attribution to Daesh and Al-Qaeda, the term has no further description in the text, and the 
text made no reference to ‘Islam’ as the religion, which is linked to the claims and motivations 
of these movements (MFA, n. d., b).    
 
The texts of TMFA omit the full name of PKK similarly to ISIL (MFA, n. d., a) (see Table 3 
below).95 However, the texts of TMFA focus on the PKK more than ISIL and DHKP-C. In 
addition, the texts of TMFA attribute certain motivations and methods of action to the PKK. 
This is although the constructions and narratives of these texts about the PKK do not match the 
                                                          
94 See Appendix Texts of TMFA 1-7; MFA, n. d., a; MFA, n. d., b; MFA, n. d., c; MFA, n. d., e; MFA, n. d., f; 
MFA, n. d., g; MFA, n. d., h; MFA, n. d., i.  
95 See the texts of TMFA of the section of terrorism in the appendices.  
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way the PKK describes itself. They also do not match the findings of this research. Unlike, the 
constructions of DHKP-C, which do not contradict both the way the DHKP-C describes itself 
and the findings of the research. Omitting the name of PKK and constructing its motivations 
and methods of action in the texts of TMFA are analysed below. In addition to the texts of 
TMFA, other official texts are included in the analysis. However, the arguments of these texts 
are mainly challenged by the findings of the research, which depend on various sources.  
 
Omitting the full name of the PKK 
The full name of PKK, which is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (in Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan) is omitted not only in the texts of the ministry but also in the other official Turkish 
texts analysed in this research.96 Instead of the full name, the Turkish authorities either use the 
acronym ‘PKK’ or the terms ‘the terrorist organization’ and ‘the separatist-terrorist 
organization’. This is discerned in the statements of Turkish officials. For example, in his 
speech of 14 January, 2016 Erdogan repeated 3 times the term “the terrorist organization” 
instead of the acronym of PKK (quoted in TCCB, 14 January, 2016). Another example, in a 
press conference on 27 January, 2016, the Turkish presidential spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, 
used the term “the terrorist organization” 17 times, and the acronym “PKK” 7 times in different 
parts of his statement (quoted in TCCB, 27 January, 2016). In both statements, Erdogan and 
Kalin did not use the full name of PKK. Other official texts neither use the full name nor the 
acronym of ‘PKK’. Instead, the terms ‘the terrorist organization’, and ‘separatist terrorist 
organization’ are used. For example, in his speech of May 2015 in Hakkari, Erdogan repeated 
4 times the term “the terrorist organization” and did not use the acronym ‘PKK’ (quoted in 
BYEGM, 26 May, 2015).   
 
                                                          
96 See Table 3.  
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Omitting the full name of the ‘Kurdistan Workers Party’ is due to that the term ‘Kurdistan’ is 
denied in the Turkish nationalist discourse and prohibited by the Turkish law.  The Turkish 
nationalist foundations deny the existence of Kurdistan. Using the term ‘Kurdistan’ indicates 
separatism and infringes the constitutional principle of the indivisibility of Turkey.97 Thus, 
using the term ‘Kurdistan’ could be considered as an act of terrorism according to the Turkish 
law of anti-terrorism as discussed earlier. In addition, article 203 of the Turkish Penal Code 
punishes using the term Kurdistan.  Paragraph 1 of article 302 of Turkish Penal Code states:  
“Any person who commits an act to place all, or part, of the territory of the State 
under the sovereignty of a foreign state or to disrupt the unity of the State or to 
weaken the independence of the State or to separate part of the territory under the 
sovereignty of the State from the State administration shall be sentenced to a 













                                                          
97 Article 3 of the Turkish constitution states that “The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an 
indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish” (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d.). 
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  Table 3. Inclusion/ exclusion of names and acronyms of the DHKP-C, ISIL and  
  PKK in the TMFA and other official texts.  
  




of not including name or 










ISIL Islamic State 





Daesh  AKP Islamist ideology 
influenced not including 
the full name and English 
acronyms. Instead the term 













discourse and Turkish law 
influenced not including 
the term Kurdistan.   
 
The ministry’s text titled ‘PKK’ constructs the PKK ideology as “revolutionary Marxism-
Leninism and separatist ethnonationalism” (MFA, n. d., e). The following sections deal with 
each of the constructions of ‘revolutionary Marxism-Leninist’, ‘separatist’ and 
‘ethnonationalist’.  
 
The PKK is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization  
The ‘revolutionary Marxist-Leninist’ characteristic is a main reason for designating certain 
movements as terrorist organizations by the US and its allies (Blakeley, 2009: 102-103; 
Jackson et al., 2011: 191). Labelling the PKK as ‘revolutionary Marxist Leninist’ in the text of 
the Turkish ministry creates the assumption that the PKK has the same doctrine as these 
organizations. This aims at maintaining the negative view of the Western governments towards 
the PKK as well as its designation as a terrorist organization. In other words, by adding the 
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term ‘revolutionary’ to the label Marxist-Leninist’, the construction implies that the PKK is 
anti-capitalist movement that has an antagonistic view towards the Western political and 
economic systems. Such construction matches the ideology and actions of DHKP-C that has 
expressed its anti-capitalist view and targeted the US premises in Turkey as discussed earlier. 
However, labelling the PKK as ‘revolutionary Marxist-Leninist’ contradicts with the rest of 
sentence which constructs the PKK as ‘separatist ethnonationalist’. The latter implies that the 
PKK aims at separating a part of Turkey for ethno-nationalist purposes, and this construction 
is at odd with the ideology of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movements who usually disregard 
ethnic and national questions and focus on the question of working class, and therefore, aim at 
toppling down the capital political and economic systems to establish communist-like systems.  
Fairclough (2003: 41, 55-60) argues that assumptions usually serve bias and ideology.  
 
The text of TMFA, which is titled ‘PKK’ describes the PKK as a Marxist although the PKK 
already abandoned Marxism. The early profile of the PKK shows that it was established as a 
national liberation movement, which was influenced by the Marxist ideology and its goal was 
to establish an independent and unified Kurdistan with a socialist system (ICG, 2012: 7-30; 
Ozcan, 2007). However, during 1990s the PKK gradually abandoned Marxism and transformed 
itself by adopting a post-modernist doctrine, which Ozcan (2007: 101) named as 
“humanization” doctrine. This has been discerned in many statements by Ocalan. For example, 
Ocalan in 1991 and 1992 stated:  
“The PKK movement, beyond being an entity of nationalization and national 
emancipation, is a humanization movement”, “you should call our movement a 
humanitarian movement—not a class movement but a movement for the freedom 




The PKK transformed its ideological position as a movement that had the goals of establishing 
a Kurdish state with a socialist system to become a movement that defends the national rights 
of Kurds in Turkey through democratic reforms. This transformation also matched the era of 
post-Cold War, which witnessed the demise of the communist bloc. The last ideological 
transformation of PKK is expressed in its goal of establishing “democratic autonomy” for the 
Kurds in Turkey (Uzun, 2014: 22-23). The new doctrine of PKK depended on the Ocalan 
concepts, which call for radical democracy through the decentralization of nation states. These 
are discussed in his books of Democratic Nation and Democratic Confederalism (Ocalan, 
2016, 2011).98 Ocalan’s new concepts are influenced by the post-modernist views that deal 
with the questions of identities, unlike the Marxist theory, which concentrates on the question 
of working class. Ocalan’s concept of ‘democratic nation’ calls for the re-establishment of 
nation-states like Turkey on the bases of decentralization and democratization of society where 
different identities are recognized and have equal rights (Ocalan, 2016: 19-22).  This concept 
of Ocalan is influenced by the Murray Bookchin’s doctrine of “social ecology” (Bookchin, 
1982; Biehl, 2012). The Bookchin doctrine called for limiting the hierarchal system of state 
that serves domination, and that this is possible by adopting systems that empower harmony 
between individuals and their natural and social milieus, admitting social dissimilarities and 
supporting the freedom and democratic rights of various identities (Bookchin, 1982).   
 
The label of ‘Marxist’ also has domestic ideological messages. The AKP officials label the 
PKK as Marxist as an indication of the atheist character of the PKK, which devalues Islam. 
This is to provoke the antagonism of the conservative Muslims in Turkey against the PKK. 
Describing the PKK as a group that devalues Islam also matches the ideology of the ruling 
AKP that shows itself as the guardian of Islam against those who want to devalue it. For 
                                                          
98 The last name of PKK leader Ocalan is pronounced ‘Ojalan’ in English.   
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example, following an attack in the majority Kurdish city of Van, the Turkish FM, 
Cavusoglu stated that the PKK militants’ basic target “is the faith of our Muslim, faithful, 
conservative Kurdish siblings. They are trying to make them Marxists and atheists. They are 
oppressing those [who they cannot change]” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 15 September, 2016). 
However, Erdogan produced statements that construct the PKK as an atheist group that 
devalues Islam more than any other AKP official. In a speech in Istanbul, Erdogan claimed that 
the PKK insulted Quran and stated that " the PKK terror group that targets the Holy Quran does 
not belong to these lands” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 12 June, 2016). Erdogan also accused the 
PKK for setting fire to mosques (Daily Sabah, 21 May, 2016).  In an earlier speech in March, 
2015 Erdogan denounced the PKK  and the  pro-Kurdish HDP party  and described them as 
atheists as he stated “marginal, atheist and nonbelieving movements disconnected to the values 
of these lands” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 26 March, 2015). 
 
Erdogan also used the label “Zoroastrians” and connected it to the label “atheists” to describe 
the PKK (quoted in Akyol, 11 June, 2016). Zoroastrianism is an ancient religion of Kurds, 
which prevailed before the emergence of Islam (Izady, 1992: 137-153).99National Kurdish 
movements like the PKK and PYD show their respect to Zoroastrianism as a part of Kurdish 
national identity. In addition, Ocalan in his writings prised Zoroastrianism as an indicator of 
Kurdish resistance against colonials and tyrants (Ocalan, 2007, 2008).100 Erdogan, on the other 
hand, denounced prising Zoroastrianism by nationalist Kurds and stated that “some say the 
Kurdish people's religion is Zoroastrianism and Islam was forcefully imposed. This is not true" 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 26 March, 2015). Erdogan also considered Zoroastrianism as a 
sign of atheism as he described the PKK militants as "atheists, and Zoroastrians” who act at 
                                                          
99 Some Zoroastrian traditions are preserved in some Kurdish religious sects of Alevism, and Yarsan and 
Yezidism (Izady, 1992: 139-152).  
100 See also Foltz, R. (2016).  
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odd with the values of the majority Muslims in Turkey (quoted in Bulut, 2017; Korkmaz, 2016; 
Svirsky, 2016).101Erdogan also used these constructions in order to create the sense of 
disapproval of the PKK among the Kurdish conservative Muslims. In a speech in the majority 
Kurdish city of Kars, Erdogan claimed that the Turkish authorities possessed “documents” 
which prove that the PKK militants who “have no relationship whatsoever with Islam”  were 
learning “Zoroastrianism in the mountains”, and added that “ my pious Kurdish brothers won’t 
get behind them” (quoted in Cheterian, 2016).  
 
The PKK is a separatist organization   
Kurdish separatism is the core of the Turkish concern and its policies regarding the PKK, and 
Kurdish question. This is because the Turkish authorities are influenced by the Turkish 
nationalist sentiments, which revolve around the constitutional principle of the indivisibility of 
Turkey. Although the AKP officials used the term ‘Kurd’ in many of their statements, they 
considered the Kurds of Turkey as part of the nation of Turkey.102 The AKP leadership used to 
emphasize the principles of territorial integrity of Turkey and its single national identity. This 
is discerned in the statement of Erdogan “we should grasp the awareness of one nation, one 
flag, one country and one state very well” (quoted in TCCB, 29 January, 2015). Erdogan carried 
on repeating this motto, and it was also repeated by other AKP officials like the Turkish prime-
minster, Binali Yildirim (Daily Sabah, 10 November, 2015; TCCB, 23 December, 2016, 11 
February, 2017; Tezcür, 2010: 188; VOA, 7 August, 2016). Yildrim was clearer in emphasizing 
this motto as a message against the PKK separatism as he stated:  
“I exempt those who want to divide the country and serve others. Terror 
organizations cannot have a place among us”, “our struggle is for four things: One 
                                                          




state, one flag, one nation and one country. This is indispensable for us” (quoted in 
AKParti, 2017).  
 
As explained earlier, that the Turkish law of Fight Against Terrorism considers separatism as 
terrorism. The Turkish official discourse constructs the Kurdish separatism as ‘separatist-
terrorism’ and the PKK as ‘the separatist-terrorist organization’. The label ‘separatist’ is 
usually used against the PKK alongside the label ‘terrorist’ in the Turkish official texts (Asia 
News Monitor, June, 2016; BBC Monitoring, 2 September, 2015; FT, December, 2016; 
Koyuncuoglu, 2016; TCCB, 9 October, 2016). The Turkish official texts also use the 
construction of ‘the separatist-terrorist organization’ as a reference to the PKK instead of the 
acronym ‘PKK’.  For example, Erdogan in his statement following the PKK attack on the 
Turkish military on 9 October 2016 repeated 3 times the term “the separatist terrorist 
organization” as a reference to the PKK, and he used only one time the acronym “PKK” (quoted 
in TCCB, 9 October, 2016).  The label of ‘separatist’ is also connected with ‘treason’. Cavusoglu 
stated that “they [PKK] are separatists and traitors”, and they "cannot divide this country” 
(quoted in Koyuncuoglu, 2016).   
 
Using the label ‘separatist’ also creates the assumptions that the PKK is chaotic movement.  
Separatism implies disintegration and chaos in the already established states. Unlike 
separatism, the term ‘independence’ is connected to the right to self-determination which is 
documented in the international law and norms. For example, articles 1 and 2 of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN, 1960) adopted by the 
UN in resolution No 1514 (XV) of 1960 states: 
“1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the 
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United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-
operation. 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”. 
 
Therefore, the term ‘independence, implies a legitimate right of the subjugated peoples who 
are governed by a colonial states or regimes. On the other hand, the term ‘separatism’ has no 
such status in the international law and norms. Unlike the claim of the Turkish texts, when the 
PKK was established it declared its goal as the independence of Kurdistan (in Kurdish: 
Serxwebun),103and this was the foundation of its nationalist discourse until 1993 when it 
changed the goal to federalism then to democratic autonomy (Ozcan, 2006: 242; ICG, 2012: 
7-30; Marcus, 2007: 1). In 1993 the PKK announced federalism as a solution to the Kurdish 
question (ICG, 2012: 7-30; Marcus, 2007: 1).  Later, in 2013 the PKK called for ‘democratic 
autonomy’ for the Kurdish region of Turkey (Bayik, 2015; Uzun, 2014). As explained earlier, 
this depends on the new concepts of Ocalan which considers the system of nation-states of the 
Middle East as dysfunctional and incapable to solve their ethnic and sectarian problems. The 
doctrine supports establishing political systems where different identities have equal rights to 
self- administration (Ocalan, 2011: 9-27). Ocalan claims that in order for the local 
administrations to function, there is a need to decentralize the governing system of state. As 
the PKK changed its goal to solve the question of Kurds through autonomy, it concentrated on 
democratic reforms in Turkey to pave the way for accepting the Kurdish autonomy (Uzun, 
2014).104 
                                                          
103 Serxwebun (in Kurdish) is pronounced Serkhwebun in English.   
104 The PKK in its publications following the 2013 peace call of Ocalan considers the democratization of Turkey 
as part of its mission (see www.PKKonline.com).  
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Abandoning the goal of independence by the PKK was not enough to ease the Turkish 
nationalist sentiments that influenced Turkey’s official discourse, which continued to describe 
the PKK as separatist, and the Kurdish nationalist demands as separatism. In an interview by 
the BBC with the PKK executive chief, Cemil Bayik (in English: Jamil Bayk) stated that 
although the PKK no more called for an independent Kurdish state, Turkey continued to label 
the PKK as separatist (BBC, 4 November, 2016). This is because separatism according to the 
Turkish constitution and laws extends beyond the acts that target the territorial integrity of 
Turkey to include the acts that target its ‘national unity’. In other words, the acts that target the 
Turkish identity of Turkey, or the ‘Turkishness’.  
 
The PKK is an ethnically motivated movement that does not represent a nation   
The TMFA construct the PKK as “ethno-nationalist” (MFA, n. d, e). The label connects the 
words ‘ethno’ and ‘nationalist’ to create the term ‘ethno-nationalist’ although this term has a 
vague meaning because it joins two words, which have different connotations. While ethnicity 
denotes the racial and cultural characteristics of certain group, nationality is usually related to  
a group of people who have a homeland or country (Anderson, 2010: 56-63; Eriksen, 2010: 
46-47). However, attributing the term “ethno” or “ethnic” to the PKK creates two assumptions 
(MFA, n. d, b; MFA, n. d, e). These assumptions are similar to these of the label ‘separatist’ as 
discussed above. 
 
First, using the terms ‘ethno’ or ’ethnic’ to label the PKK creates the assumption that the 
motivations of the PKK are built on ethnic grounds, and therefore, have no credits of legitimacy 
in the international law and norms. One of the well-established principles of international law 
is the right of ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ to self-determination. This is highlighted in articles 1 and 
2 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN, 
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1960), which is stated above.105 This is also demonstrated in paragraph 2 of article 1 of the UN 
Charter, which emphasizes the right to “self-determination” for nations (UN, 1945). These 
articles used the terms “nations”, and “peoples” (UN, 1945; UN, 1960). However, there is no 
such noticeable code in the international law that includes the term ‘ethnic group’ alongside 
the right to self-determination.  
 
Second, the term ‘ethno’ or ‘ethnic’ as a label of an armed movement creates the assumption 
that the movement is merely based on racial reactions and has no rooted political question 
related to a subjugated people. Thus, the term devalues the PKK character as a national 
liberation movement and constructs it instead as an armed movement with racial character.  
The TMFA states that “PKK wants to suppress the diversity of Turkey, prevent participation 
and integration of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish origin and intimidate the people in the region” 
(MFA, n. d., e). This implies that the PKK is anti-diversity movement, which prevent part of 
the Turkish society from enjoying the already exited political system that encourages diversity 
of citizens in Turkey.  
 
This text of TMFA that shows the PKK as ‘anti-diversity’ is inconsistent and contradicts with 
its own ‘pro-diversity’ claim (MFA, n. d., e). The text names Kurds as “Turkish citizens of 
Kurdish origins” (MFA, n. d., e). Thus, the text orders the term ‘Turkish citizens’ before the 
term ‘Kurdish origins’. The term ‘origins’ indicates secondary and earlier status, while the term 
‘citizens’ indicates the primary and contemporary status. This implies that the Kurdish origins 
are less important than the Turkish citizenship. In addition, the text used ‘Turkish citizens’ 
instead of ‘citizens of Turkey’. Thus, the text implies that Kurds are part of the ‘Turkish nation’ 
although Kurds have asserted their national identity through armed and non-armed resistance 
                                                          
105 See also UN Charter (UN, 1945).   
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against the policies of assimilation by the Turkish governments. As stated in chapter 4, some 
of the Kurdish rebellions were during the Ottoman empire even before the establishment of 
Turkey as a nation-state. Nevertheless, the Turkish official discourse constructs the Kurds as 
an element of the Turkish nation. Examples on this point were presented in the previous section 
that discusses the label of ‘separatist’. In addition, the text of TMFA considers the identity of 
Turkey to be ‘Turkish’, although it used terms like ‘diversity’ and ‘Kurd’. The text also uses 
“integration” as a euphemism for ‘the forced assimilation of Kurds’ in Turkey, which have 
taken place by the Turkish governments since the establishment of Turkey (see euphemism in 
Van Dijk, 2006). Yildiz (2005: 15-16) argues that the Kurdish identity was oppressed, and 
Kurds in Turkey underwent decades of forced assimilation into the Turkish identity. It is 
relevant to highlight that the long-term forced assimilation was one of the factors that 
encouraged the PKK and previous Kurdish rebellions (Brinlee, 2011; Ozcan, 2006: 112).     
 
The PKK is a group of “murderers” who target civilians and civic services  
The texts of TMFA and the statements of Turkish officials described the PKK action as mass 
and random killings that usually target civilians. This narrative takes place in the Turkish 
official texts about the PKK more than the other narratives that are discussed in this chapter. 
This narrative supports establishing as a reality the claim that the PKK action is terrorism, and 
this depends on the common understanding of the actions of terrorism as acts that mainly target 
civilians although there is no universal definition of terrorism. The text of TMFA, which is 
titled ‘PKK’ states that “since its foundation in 1984 more than 40 thousand people lost their 
lives because of PKK terrorism” (MFA, n. d., e).  According to this sentence, the PKK terrorism 
is the reason of the death of this number of victims. The text implies that the PKK terrorism is 
like any epidemic disease that causes mass-death. This is because the sentence is abstracted 
and does not refer to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, or the involvement of Turkish forces in the 
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armed violence.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish governments of the 1990s 
also accused the PKK for the death of 30 thousand people. This number increased to 40 
thousand in the era of AKP rule. Like the account of the TMFA text, Erdogan has repeated the 
same claim in many of his speeches and statements. Examples of Erdogan’s statements that 
support this narrative: “PKK killed more than 40 thousand of our citizens” (quoted in BYEGM, 
23 October, 2014), “we have suffered many losses due to terrorism. More than 40,000 of our 
people have unfortunately been victims of terror in these lands for 35 years” (quoted Hurriyet 
Daily News, 19 April, 2017). Berkay Mandıracı (2016), a researcher in the International Crisis 
Group argues that the original source of this death toll is the accounts of the Turkish 
government.   
 
The Turkish authorities’ narrative that blames of ‘the PKK terrorism’ for this death toll has 
been repeated by the mainstream Turkish media and dealt with as a reality. The mainstream 
Turkish media usually avoid discussing the responsibility of Turkish forces or the impact of 
the conflict on the Kurdish region. This is discerned in the outlets of the Turkish news agencies 
such as Anadolu Agency and Daily Sabah. For example, a text by Anadolu Agency (2 August, 
2013) states that “the peace process aimed at ending terrorism perpetrated by Kurdish separatist 
group PKK that has killed 40.000 people in the last thirty years”. Another text by Anadolu 
Agency states that the PKK “has waged a 33-year terror campaign against Turkey that has led 
to more than 40,000 deaths” (AA, 2 June, 2017). Likewise, a text by Daily Sabah (10 April, 
2017) states that the PKK “has waged a terror campaign against Turkey for more than 30 years, 
during which more than 40,000 people have been killed”. 
 
Although the international media agencies copied the Turkish sources regarding the death toll 
of 40.000, they usually consider the death toll as the result of the conflict between the PKK and 
149 
 
Turkish forces. Some of the international reports probe into the consequences of the conflict 
on the Kurdish region. For example, a report by BBC reporter Andrew Hosken states: 
“More than 40,000 people have died. During the conflict, which reached a peak in 
the mid-1990s, thousands of villages were destroyed in the largely Kurdish south-
east and east of Turkey, and hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to cities in other 
parts of the country” (Hosken, 2016). 
 
The text of TMFA, which is titled ‘PKK’ limits its description of the PKK military action to 
non-military targets including civilians and civic services. The text states that “PKK’s primary 
targets include police and military” (MFA, n. d., e). However, the text omits any description 
for the PKK actions against the Turkish forces.  Instead, the text named wide-range civic 
services and claims that they have been targeted by the PKK including “tourism, economic 
infrastructure, educational Institutions, teachers, hospitals, public and private enterprises 
particularly in southeast Turkey” (MFA, n. d., e).  The text added other civic services targeted 
by the PKK and the methods of targeting these services including “attacking infrastructure, 
various facilities, schools and ambulances, kidnapping nurses, customs officials to using 
cyanide to poison drinking water supplies; and engaging in unconventional tactics, 
assassination to drive-by shootings, executing uncooperative civilians, ambushes, kidnapping 
etc” (MFA, n. d., e).  The text hyperbolically attributed various criminal deeds to the PKK in 
order to create the assumption that the ‘PKK terrorism’ is simply a phenomenon of ‘targeting 
civilians and sabotaging civic services’. CDA considers hyperbole as a structure that serves 
bias and ideology in text (Van Dijk, 2006, 2006a, 2006b). There is no doubt that the PKK as 
an armed organization involved in an armed conflict has practiced armed violence and 
perpetrated violations against human rights including these perpetrated against the Turkish 
forces and civilians. However, the PKK is not the only actor in the conflict as the text implies. 
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In order to hide the violence and violations perpetrated by the Turkish forces in the Kurdish 
region, the text adds that the terrorist acts of the PKK target “particularly the southeast of 
Turkey”, which is actually the Kurdish region where the conflict has occurred. According to 
the narrative of text, the PKK mainly targets the Kurdish people whom the PKK claims that it 
represents and defends.   
 
Like the text of the TMFA, the statements of the Turkish officials usually construct the PKK 
as an organization that targets civilians, but they omit references to the violent actions of 
Turkish military. Van Dijk (107: 2001) described this as “omitting the agents of negative 
actions”, which serves the interests of text producer. Many of such texts omit any references to 
the conflict between the PKK and Turkish forces, or do not refer to the impact of the excessive 
use of force by the Turkish forces. For example, during the Turkish military operation of 2015 
against the Kurdish Units of Protecting Civilians (in Kurdish: Yekineyȇn Parastina Sivîlan, 
YPS) that are described by the Turkish authorities as the urban branch of PKK, Davutoglu 
accused the PKK of using children schools in the Kurdish areas as “weapon warehouses”, and 
added that “how will children go there and study?” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 17 December, 
2015).  Davutoglu also stated: 
"One cannot leave these places to their [PKK] justice and mercy. The barbarians 
and tyrants caused damage both in historic and humanitarian ways. We are doing 
our best to take humanitarian measures" (quoted in Daily Sabah, 17 December, 
2015).  
 
Davutoglu used certain lexicons to describe the PKK negatively and the Turkish authorities 
and forces positively. He described the PKK as ‘barbarians and tyrants’ that caused historical 
damages, while he described the Turkish authorities and forces as ‘humanitarian’ who conduct 
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‘humanitarian measures’. This is described by Van Dijk (2001: 108) as the positive self- 
presentation and negative presentation of the other.  
 
Other texts describe civilians as the primary target of the PKK and the Turkish forces as their 
secondary target. Abdurrahman Büyükelçi (2016) the Turkish ambassador in UK stated that 
the PKK “continues its bloody acts of terror in Turkey, targeting civilians as well as security 
forces”. Other statements show the Turkish forces as the guarantor of for the safety of civilians 
and civic services. For example, presidential spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin stated that “Turkish 
security forces have expended great effort toward ensuring the security of every region in the 
country and thwarting PKK attacks against security officers, public institutions and civilians” 
(quoted in Daily Sabah, 15 September, 2015) 
 
The statements of Turkish officials use lexicons and structures that criminalize the PKK. CDA 
highlights the importance of revealing such lexicons and structures and the implications that 
they serve (Van Dijk, 2006). Such lexicons and structures are discerned in the statements that 
attribute criminal deeds to the PKK such as kidnaping children and murdering civilians. For 
example, Nurettin Canikli, Turkey’s deputy prime minister described the PKK as a group that 
"massacred civilians for many years" (quoted in AA, 14 July, 2016). Erdogan in his October, 
2015 speech in the parliament used more structures against the PKK as he in described it as a 
group that killed innocent people and massacred children. Erdogan stated:  
 “We have seen that this structure that killed scores of innocent people without 
blinking an eye for the sake of their own objectives, still insists on the same 
methods and we shivered”, “This mentality that has massacred Elif Şimşek, Yasin 
Börü and Fırat Simpil and moreover despitefully conducts perception operations 
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over dead bodies of children can have nothing in common with my Kurdish 
brothers” (quoted in TCCB, 1 October, 2015). 
 In this part of Erdogan speech, he used the lexicons and structures ‘killed innocent people’, 
‘massacred children’, and that the PKK has continued with such ‘methods’, that ‘shivered’ the 
Turkish authorities. In another statement, Erdogan uses the metaphor “blood sucking vampires” 
to refer to the PKK (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 2014). Van Dijk (2006) and Bhatia  
(2009) argue that metaphor has an ideological function as it aims at influencing the cognition 
of audience in order to accept the message of text.  
 
The narrative of Turkish official texts, which limits the acts of killings and armed violence (or 
‘terrorism’) against civilians to the PKK is challenged by many sources, which blame the 
Turkish authorities for large-scale violations against human rights in the Kurdish region. 
Uncovering the clandestine network of Ergenekon that allegedly plotted against the AKP 
authorities in 2007, led Erdogan to admit the existence of a deep-state in Turkey in which the 
Turkish Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terror Unit (JITEM) played a powerful role 
(Kaya, 2009: 103; Taş, 2014: 173; Ünver, 2009).106 The AKP campaign against the Ergenekon 
affiliated military officials led also to uncovering important details about the relationship 
between JITEM and the cases of “unresolved murders” which denote the extrajudicial killings 
of thousands of Kurdish activists and civilians during the 1980s and 1990s whose perpetrators 
remained unknown to the public (Avşar, et al., 2013; Bayramoglu, 2017; Laizer, 2017; Seibert, 
2010).107 However, ‘unsolved murders’ were described by a retired Turkish admiral 
Atilla Kıyat as “state policy” and blamed the responsibility about these crimes to JITEM and 
                                                          
106 Ergenekon network is also discussed in chapter 4.  
In Turkish: Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terorle Mücadele, JITM.  
107 Laizer, S. (2017) provides detailed report which discusses testimonies and events and claimed the involvement 
of high Turkish officials in some cases of extrajudicial killings of Kurdish businessmen by special Turkish agents.  
Laizer (2017) also argues that the current Turkish authorities of AKP have also prepared lists of political enemies 
including Kurdish activists and Gulen movement (FETO) members who live in Europe.  
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the head of Turkish governments of the 1990s (Hurriyet Daily News, 8 August, 2010; Seibert, 
2010). Daniel Steinvorth (2009, 2009b) in his reports revealed clues to the practices of 
disappearance, torture, and killing of PKK suspected sympathisers by JITEM.  Steinvorth 
(2009) stated that “throughout the 1980s and 1990s, thousands of civil rights activists, 
politicians and businesspeople suspected of having ties with the PKK were kidnapped and 
murdered”. Steinvorth (2009, 2009b) interviewed eyewitnesses and former JITEM members 
who fled to the Western countries. Abdülkadir Aygan, one of the former members JITEM 
stated: 
"We used to murder people at night during the long hours when the soldiers weren't 
around", and that JITEM tortured victims to the point of death as he stated “no one 
survived an interrogation by JITEM people" (quoted in Steinvorth, 2009b).  
 
An example of the human rights reports of the 1990s that blame the Turkish forces for large-
scale violations against civilian Kurds is the 1993 report of Helsinki Watch, which is a branch 
of Human Rights Watch. The report unveils details about many cases of violations against 
human rights perpetrated by the Turkish forces and PKK during the conflict in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey (Helsinki Watch, 1993). The report revealed to acts of killing by the PKK 
against the Turkish forces and those who assisted the Turkish forces. However, the report 
highlights cases of killing large numbers of civilians by the Turkish forces (Helsinki 
Watch,1993: 6). The report also reveals that in some cases the Turkish forces opened fire on 
Kurdish civilians as retaliation for the loses of military in the clashes with PKK (Helsinki 
Watch,1993: 6-11). For instance, following a clash between the PKK and Turkish forces in the 
town of Kulp in 1992, which left casualties among the Turkish soldiers, the Turkish forces 
randomly opened fire on “houses, shops and vehicles until nightfall” causing deaths and 
injuries among civilians.   
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The recent reports of human rights organizations also blame the current Turkish authorities of 
AKP for grave violations against Kurds. Following the collapse of peace process between the 
PKK and AKP authorities in 2015, the Kurdish region of Turkey underwent another episode 
of large-scale violations against human rights including killing, torture, forceful displacement 
and demolishing of properties (AI, 2016a, January, 2016, December, 2016; Corporate Watch, 
2016; HRW, July 2016; OHCHR, 2017, 2018). This is more detailed in chapter 8.   
 
The PKK is a “criminal group that is involved in the organized crime of international 
drug-trafficking”. 
The text of TMFA titled ‘PKK’ constructs the PKK as an organization that practices organized 
crime, and that its crimes are threat to the international community (MFA, n.d., e). The text 
also suggests that the PKK sympathizers in Europe are involved in criminal acts, and it urges 
the European authorities to take tough measures against them. The text uses terms like 
“subsidiaries” who “exploit” “the democratic rights and freedoms” in the European countries 
to describe the PKK sympathisers, and it describes their actions as “unlawful acts” (MFA, n. 
d., e). In its second paragraph, the text states that the “PKK is also involved in extortion, arms 
smuggling, and drug-trafficking” (MFA, n. d., e). The text also states that “in a number of 
European countries there are ongoing investigations and court cases related to financing of 
PKK terrorism” and that “in a major European country, the number of court files related to 
PKK related illegal activities exceeded five thousand” (MFA, n. d., e). The text does not 
provide any reference to the name of country or type of ‘illegal activities’ that are investigated. 
The text avoids referring to that the PKK as a political party is banned in many EU countries, 
and accordingly, any activity of supporting the PKK is ‘illegal’.  The illegal activities of the 
PKK could mean any activity such as public meetings and fundraising. However, the text 
implicitly establishes connection between these ‘illegal activities’ and the acts of organized 
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crime. This is as the term ‘illegal activities’ is situated in the context of constructions of 
organized crime in the text (MFA, n. d., e).  
 
The text mainly constructs the PKK as a group that is involved in ‘international drug-
trafficking’. This implies that the crime of ‘drug trafficking’ is the funding source of the ‘PKK 
terrorism’. As evidence for its claim, the text refers to two texts by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, which were produced in 2009 and 2011. These two texts accuse major figures of the 
leaderships of the PKK and Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) of drug-trafficking (US 
Department of the Treasury, 2009, 2011). The American texts do not refer to KNK but consider 
all the named persons accused of drug-trafficking as members of PKK. KNK is a civic political 
organization affiliated with the PKK and its leadership is based in Europe (Gunter, 2013b: 82-
84; Uzun, 2014: 23).108Although the text TMFA alleges that there are thousands of legal files 
against the PKK in a single unidentified European country, it refers only to two American texts 
as evidence for this claim.  The two American texts are not detailed reports but one-page press 
statements. The American texts abstractly accuse the leadership members of KNK and PKK of 
drug-trafficking, and they announce bans on all financial transactions related to the PKK. In 
addition, both texts have no reference to a particular case of drug-trafficking inside or outside 
the US (US Department of the Treasury, 2009, 2011). The research also did not find any such 
an American case of drug-trafficking related to the PKK. Furthermore, the research found no 
record for financial or investment activities related to the PKK in the US. Therefore, the 
American texts are not related to actual cases of drug-trafficking investigated by law 
enforcement institutions in the US.   
 
                                                          
108 See also KNK. (2017). Kurdistan National Congress. Kongreya Neteweyî ya Kurdistanê (KNK). [online]. 




The two American texts were produced as part of the policy of US administration of to support 
Turkey in its anti-terrorism measures. The texts merely depend in their accounts on the claims 
of Turkish authorities with whom the agencies of the US administration coordinated in the 
counter-terrorism policy. Therefore, the information of the Turkish government and agencies 
have been treated by the US agencies as part of evidence against the PKK.  One of the sources 
of information about financing terrorist groups that the US agencies rely on is the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) in which Turkey is a member. The Turkish membership of FATF 
is also stated in the text of TMFA, which is titled ‘Turkey’s contributions to international 
community’s efforts to fight terrorism’ (MFA, n. d., b). The research found only one reference 
to the PKK in the website of FATF. This reference is found in the 2007 FATF report about 
Turkey (FATF, 2007: 5). The report is 231 pages and claimed that drug-trafficking constituted 
42% of predicate offences in Turkey (FATF, 2007: 3). However, in its 5th page, the report 
referred to the PKK as drug trafficker, and this reference depends on a claim by the Turkish 
General Directorate of Security’s Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime (FATF, 
2007: 5). The American text of 2009 claims that there are cases related to drug-trafficking 
against PKK members in Germany, which is the country that has the largest and most active 
Kurdish community in Europe (Casier & Jongerden, 2011: 19-20).109  
 
This claim of the American text was disapproved by the 2011annual report of the Protection of 
the Constitution by the intelligence service of Germany who denied any involvement of the 
PKK leadership in drug-trafficking (BfV, 2011: 342). Two KNK figures whom the American 
texts accused of drug-trafficking ‘Remzi Kartal and Zübeyir Aydar’ live in Europe as leading 
Kurdish activists, and if such allegations have any foundations they would be sued as suspects 
of drug-trafficking (Gunes, 2016; Kutschera, 2012). Remzi Kartal refused such accusations 
                                                          
109 See also Galip, O. (2014).  
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and stated that "how can we have anything to do with drug-trafficking; these are all slander", 
"were they able to present a single evidence to prove that we were involved in drug-
trafficking?" (quoted in BBC Mentoring, 27 June 2013).110  
 
The research suggests that the American texts of 2009 and 2011 were produced at the request 
of the Turkish government in order to practice more pressure on the PKK and the Kurdish 
negotiating team during the 2009-2011 peace talks between the PKK and Turkey. Remzi 
Kartal, Zübeyir Aydar, Sabri Ok and Adem Uzun who were described in the American texts as 
drug traffickers, were the members of the Kurdish team for peace negotiations which began in 
2009 in Oslo (BBC Monitoring, 27 June, 2013; Kutschera, 2012; Hurriyet Daily News, 26 
September, 2012; Peace in Kurdistan, 2013). It is important to notice the dates of publishing 
the American texts in 2009 and 2011 (US Department of the Treasury, 2009, 2011). 2009-2011 
are also the dates in which the negotiations between the Turkish authorities and the PKK began 
and stopped (Kutschera, 2012).  
 
Text of TMFA, which is titled “Turkey’s contributions in the fight Against drug-trafficking” 
serves the same implied messages and agenda of the text titled ‘PKK’ (MFA, n. d., d). Although 
drug-trafficking and terrorism are different subjects, this text is located in the section of 
terrorism and under the general title of ‘terrorism’ in the website of the Turkish ministry of 
foreign affairs (MFA, n. d., a). Drug-trafficking is part of organized crime, and the website has 
a separate section titled “Combating organized crime”, which briefs the subject of drug-
                                                          
110 Leading pro-PKK activists who live in Europe usually face different kind of accusation presented to the Interpol 
and EU institution by the Turkish authorities (AA, 20 March, 2016). Remzi Kartal, Zubeyir Aydar and Adem 
Uzun were sued for membership in the PKK by Belgian Federal prosecutor and their cases were in front of the 
court between 2006-2016 (Kurdish Question, November, 2016).  However, the court decided in November 2016 





trafficking in few sentences (MFA, n. d., i). Locating a text about drug-trafficking in the section 
of terrorism, which shows the PKK as the only international drug-trafficking group has a 
message, which aims at delegitimizing and criminalizing the PKK and its sympathizers in 
Europe, and this is the same implied message of the text titled ‘PKK’. The text creates the 
assumption that the Turkish policies against the PKK and its sympathizers are to protect Europe 
from organized crime. The text referred only to the PKK as an international drug-trafficking 
organization, which operates between Turkey and Europe as it states that “PKK/KCK terrorist 
organization is considered to be an important player in the international drug smuggling 
network due to its widespread connections in Turkey and Europe” (MFA, n. d., d). The term 
‘connections’ implies the sympathisers and supporters of PKK.  This is because the PKK is 
banned and has no official or permitted offices or ‘connections’ in Europe, but it has a large 
Kurdish community of sympathisers and supporters there (see Reuters, 18 March, 2017).  
 
The text describes Turkey as a global hub of drug-trafficking, which has played a principal role 
in the war on drug-trafficking. However, the text implies drug-trafficking as non-Turkish 
phenomenon. As highlighted above, the text referred only to the PKK as the international 
organization of drug-trafficking, and it omits any reference to the names or details of Turkish 
individuals and gangs involved in drug-trafficking inside Turkey or abroad. It is relevant to 
invoke the 1996 Susruluk scandal which exposed the involvement of some high-profile Turkish 
personnel in organized crime and international drug-trafficking, and was quickly covered up 
by the then Turkish government (Gunter, 2008:117-118; Jongerden, 2007: 55-56 & 65; Kinzer, 
31 December, 1996). However, the following investigations revealed more details about the 
scandal (Hurriyet Daily News, 28 October, 2001, Paoli et al., 2009: 287-288). The information 
revealed that several Turkish officials who were involved in drug-trafficking and other crimes 
were also part of counter-terrorism operations, which mainly targeted the PKK and Kurds. 
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Michael Gunter (2008: 66) argues that as part of its counter-terrorism measures against the 
PKK, the Turkish authorities “hired right-wing criminals on the lam to murder hundreds of 
perceived civilian enemies of the state in return for turning a blind eye to their drug-
trafficking”. As the text of TMFA omits certain agent who is responsible for a negative action, 
it serves certain ideological considerations (Van Dijk, 2001: 107).   
 
Like the text of TMFA titled ‘PKK’, the text of TMFA titled ‘Turkey’s contributions in the 
fight against drug-trafficking’ provides no concrete evidence for its narrative regarding the 
involvement of PKK in international drug-trafficking (MFA, n. d., d; MFA, n. d., e). Although 
the text claims that the investigation in the cases of drug-trafficking related to the PKK is one 
of three pillars of the Turkish counter-narcotics policy, it allocated only 5 abstracted lines out 
of its 69 lines to describe the PKK involvement in drug-trafficking (MFA, n. d., d). As an 
evidence to its claim, the text states that “details of statistics and related analysis may be 
accessed through www.kom.pol.tr” (MFA, n. d., d). The text used the terms ‘details, statistics, 
and analysis’ in order to create a sense of credibility to the reader. However, the website-
address, which the text used as an evidence to support its claim is run by the Turkish authorities 
and in Turkish language. Accordingly, using such a website as an evidence is because the 
producer of the ministry’s text could not provide evidence in English language from non-
Turkish source other than the two texts of US Department of Treasury which are discussed 
above.  
 
The narrative that the PKK is a drug-trafficking organization, which constitute a major threat 
to Europe is also discerned in the statements of the AKP officials. For example, during a visit 
to UK, the Turkish prime-minster, Binali Yildirim claimed that the EU supports the PKK as a 
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punishment against Turkey although the PKK is involved in drug-trafficking in Europe. 
Yildirim stated:  
“The PKK deals in drugs: it peddles heroin and cocaine to the European youth –
that’s how they make money”, “yet the European Union still supports this 
organisation. If they are doing this to punish Turkey, they should think about the 
health of their future generations” (quoted in Sengupta, 2017). 
 
The construction of PKK as drug trafficker is also employed in creating the sense of legitimacy 
regarding the Turkish military operations and excessive use of force in the Kurdish region. This 
is discerned in the statement of Turkish minister of interior, which constructs the military 
operation of 2015-2016 in the Kurdish region as an operation to destroy drug production. This 
is although the military operation has resulted in flagrant violations of human rights, which 
were referred to in a previous part of this chapter. The Turkish interior minister claimed that 
the Turkish forces managed to destroy a large cannabis filed of the PKK in the south-east of 
Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, June 2016). In another part of his statement, the minister 
considered the armed campaign as a provision to deal with the threat of establishing autonomy 
by PKK in Turkey and he claimed that the PKK has already established the Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy as he stated:  
“They have tried to declare ‘cantons’ inside Turkey after they did the same in Syria. 
They launched these efforts in 12 different provinces in Turkey. But they now 
realize that Turkey is not Syria and they have all been cleared from these 






Table 4. Summary of the major constructions and narratives regarding the PKK in the 
Turkish official texts. The table also states the assumptions that these constructions and 
narratives create, their expected outcomes and challenging arguments. CDA highlights that  
assumptions serve bias and ideological implications (Fairclough, 1995; 2003).  
 
                 Constructions and narratives Expected 
outcomes  
Research arguments 
and findings  







Atheist   
Has the same doctrine 
because of which certain 
movements are designated 
as terrorist organizations by 
the US and its allies. 
-  Anti-capitalist 
-  Devalues Islam   
- Negative Western 




- Antagonism of 
Turkey’s Muslims.  
- Had Marxist 
foundations.  
- No more supporting the 
working-class question of 
Marxism, but the question 
of identities, which is 
post-modern doctrine.  
  
Separatist  -Its action is considered as 
‘separatist-terrorism’ 
according to the Turkish law 
of anti-terrorism.   
- It is against the national 
unity of Turkey = against 
Turkishness identity.  
- Chaotic movement that 
aims at disintegration and 
instability of Turkey.  
- Its goal is not supported by 
the international law.  
 
- To delegitimate 
the goal of PKK.  
 
- PKK was calling for the 
independence of 
Kurdistan.  
- PKK no more calls for 
independence, but for the 
autonomy of Kurdistan.   
Ethno-nationalist  - Ethnically motivated 
armed movement = racist.  
- Its motivations are not 
supported by the 
international law. 
 
- To delegitimate 
the motivations of 
PKK.  
- PKK is a movement of 
Kurds who are a nation 










- Terrorist  
- Criminal 
-Perpetrator of sabotage 
actions.   
 
- To consider as 
reality the narrative 
that the action of 
PKK is terrorism.  
- To delegitimate 
the PKK and 
condemn its 
actions.  
- To hide the 
violent role of the 
Turkish forces.  
 
-The violence of the PKK 
is part of an armed 
conflict, which involves 
both the Turkish forces 
and the PKK.  
- Turkish forces were 
involved in large-scale 
violations against the 
Kurds.   




- Criminal  
-Its terrorism is founded by 
drug-trafficking.  
- It is a threat to the 
international community.   
- To delegitimate 
the PKK and to 
condemn its 
actions.  
- To persuade the 
EU countries to 
take measures 
against the PKK 
sympathisers in 
Europe.   
- To legitimate the 
excessive use of 
force against the 
Kurds by the 
Turkish authorities.  
 
- No concrete evidence 
provided in the Turkish 
texts.  
 
- The claim was refused 
by the leading Kurdish 
activists who live in 
Europe, and it was also 






The Turkish definition of terrorism is interdiscursively connected to both the constitutional 
principle of indivisibility and separatism. This interdiscursive relationship constructed 
‘separatist-terrorism’, which is considered as a main form of terrorism and is given a large 
space in the Turkish official discourse. Separatist-terrorism is not limited to the violent action 
of the PKK, but it is also applied against various non-violent actions of pro-Kurdish nationalism 
by other groups and individuals. The mutual characteristic of such violent and non-violent 
actions is that they all infringe the constitutional principle of the ‘indivisibility’ of Turkey.    
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The analysis of Turkish official texts in this chapter reveals that the full name of Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party is omitted in the texts of TMFA and other official texts. This is mainly due to 
that the term ‘Kurdistan’ is denied in the Turkish nationalist discourse and forbidden by the 
Turkish law. The analysis also reveals that 5 main constructions and narratives are formed in 
the context of the dominant narrative of terrorism that targets the PKK. These include the 
construction of the PKK as revolutionary Marxist-Leninist, separatist, ethnically motivated, 
and group of ‘murderers' who targets civilians and civic services, and a criminal group who is 
involved in international drug trafficking.  Some of these narratives and constructions are 
taking more space than the others in the Turkish official texts. However, the narrative that PKK 
targets civilians and civic services is more dominant than all other narratives in the Turkish 
official texts. The analysis revealed that these constructions and narratives have certain implied 
messages and hidden agendas.  The analysis highlights that the major messages behind these 
constructions and narratives is to delegitimize the PKK, and to legitimize the action of the 
Turkish authorities against the PKK and Kurds.   
 
The Turkish official texts continue to construct the PKK as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist 
organizations although the PKK abandoned Marxism since the 1990s. The analysis revealed 
that the construction of the PKK as revolutionary Marxist-Leninist creates two assumption that 
serve certain agenda. First, the construction creates the assumption that the PKK has the same 
doctrine of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movements that are designated as terrorist 
organizations by the US and its allies. This construction creates the assumption that the PKK 
is anti-capitalist movement, and this assumption aims at maintaining both the negative view of 
the Western countries and their designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Second, the 
label Marxist creates the assumption that the PKK is an organization that devalues Islam, which 
is the main religion in Turkey, and this incites the antagonism of conservative Muslims against 
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the PKK. To support the assumption that the PKK devalues Islam, the Turkish officials also 
construct the PKK militants as Zoroastrians and atheists. On the other hand, the AKP officials 
show the AKP as the guardian of Islam in Turkey.  
 
Turkish official texts also continue to construct the PKK as ‘separatist’ although it already 
abandoned independence and it has called for the autonomy for Kurds in Turkey. However, 
separatism, which is considered as a form of terrorism in the Turkish law and official discourse 
extends the acts of infringing the territorial integrity of Turkey to include disrupting the 
national unity of Turkey or degrading its Turkish identity. The term of ‘separatist’ also creates 
the assumption that the PKK is chaotic movement that aims at the disintegration and instability 
of Turkey.  Like the construction ‘separatist’, the construction “ethno-nationalist” creates the 
assumption that the PKK is an armed group that has ethnic motivations, which are not 
supported by the international law and norms.  The construction of the PKK as ‘separatist 
group’ that has ‘ethnic’ motivations is interacted with the implications of denial of the Kurdish 
nation in the Turkish official discourse, which constructs the Kurds as a part of the nation of 
Turkey.  
 
The Turkish official texts construct the PKK as a group of murderers who target civilians and 
civic services. This narrative supports the establishment as reality the narrative that the PKK 
action is terrorism. This depends on the common understanding of terrorism as the armed 
violence that target civilians. This construction is reinforced by the widely repeated narrative 
that the PKK terrorism resulted in the death of 40 thousand people.  However, the Turkish 
official texts omit and background references to the armed conflict and the involvement of 
Turkish forces in the violence. Several reports of international organizations of human rights 
challenge the narrative of the Turkish authorities and accuse the Turkish forces of large-scale 
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violations of human rights perpetrated in the Kurdish region. The reports disclose that these 
violations were not only during the rule of previous governments but also during the rule of the 
current government of AKP.   
 
The Turkish official texts also construct the PKK as a criminal group that is involved in 
international drug-trafficking to fund its terrorism. The findings of the research challenged the 
claims of the Turkish texts about the involvement of PKK in international drug-trafficking and 
revealed that these claims are not based on concrete evidence. The analysis highlights that this 
narrative creates the assumption that that the PKK constitutes a criminal threat against the 
international community.  In addition, constructing the PKK as drug-trafficking group in the 
Turkish official texts, which mainly targets the sympathisers of PKK in Europe, aims at 
persuading the European authorities to conduct tough measures against them.  Constructing the 
PKK as drug trafficker also serves legitimating the excessive use of force and repressive 





















The Turkish official discourse constructs the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (in 
Kurdish: Party Yekitiy Democrat, PYD), and the People’s Protection Units (in Kurdish: 
Yekineyen Parastina Gel, YPG) as organic parts of the PKK. Although the Units for Protecting 
Women (in Kurdish: Yekineyen Parastina Jin, YPJ) operate alongside the YPG, they share the 
same central command of the YPG (YPGRojava.org, n. d; YPGRojava.org, January, 2017).111  
In addition, the Turkish official texts usually do not refer to the YPJ, and instead they refer to 
the YPG. Therefore, the research uses the acronym of YPG as a reference to both YPG and 
YPJ. As stated earlier, the Turkish official texts use the acronyms ‘PYD or YPG’ as reference 
to both organizations although the PYD is political party, while the YPG is the armed force of 
Rojava semi-autonomous administration (see Map 4).112 Therefore, the researcher frequently 
uses PYD-YPG instead of PYD and YPG.  
 
The construction of PYD-YPG as part of the PKK implies that the same constructions and 
narratives of the Turkish official discourse regarding the PKK are applied to the PYD-YPG.113 
However, certain narratives and constructions are mainly used against the PYD-YPG in the 
context of the Turkish narrative of terrorism. This is although these constructions and narratives 
                                                          
111 The source: YPGRojava.org has no publishing date. Therefore, (n. d.) is used. 
112 During the years 2012-2016 the de-facto Rojava semi-autonomous administration was formed, and in July 
2016 its legislative council adopted federalism as a system of governance and relationship with the rest of Syria 
(Sary, 2016: 11). This is although the Syrian government does not recognize the Rojava administration. Rojava is 
ruled by the PYD and other parties, and it consists of three main administrative cantons including Jazira, Kobani, 
and Afrin (see Map 4). 
113 The research frequently uses PYD-YPG instead of PYD and YPG.  
167 
 
usually involve the PKK. The constructions and narratives about the PYD and YPG in the 
Turkish official texts are formed according to three main dimensions. These dimensions are 
the following:  a). The PYD-YPG constitute a threat against Turkey, b). They constitute a threat 
against Syria, c). They constitute a threat against the international community. However, these 
constructions and narratives are ordered in the chapter as the following:  
- The PYD and YPG are organic parts of the PKK. 
-  They constitute a threat to the national security of Turkey. 
- They are involved in attacks inside Turkey. 
- They are proxies used by other countries against Turkey.  
- As separatist organizations they constitute threats to both the territorial integrity of 
Syria and national security of Turkey.  
- They constitute a security threat against the international community. 
- They are criminal organizations that are involved in acts of ethnic cleansing in Syria. 
 
The analysis reveals the implied messages of these constructions and narratives, which serve 
certain agenda and policies of the Turkish authorise. The analysis also highlights the 
relationship between ideological considerations of the Turkish authorities and their anti-PYD-
YPG policy.  
 
The PYD and YPG as organic parts of the PKK 
Majority of the texts that reflect the Turkish official view about the PYD and YPG construct 
an organic relationship between the PYD-YPG and PKK. Unlike the PKK who is allocated a 
text titled ‘PKK’ in the website of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, the PYD and YPG 
are not allocated a separate text. However, the ministry’s text, which is titled ‘PKK’ constructs 
the PYD-YPG as organic branches of the PKK. The text states: 
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“PYD/YPG’s affiliation with PKK is clear. PYD/YPG was set up under the control  
 of PKK terrorist organization in 2003. They share the same leadership cadres, 
organizational structure, strategies and tactics, military structure, propaganda tools, 
financial resources and training camps” (MFA, n. d., e). 114 
 
Constructing the PYD and YPG as organic parts of the PKK is also discerned in the statements 
of Turkish officials. For example, Ibrahim Kalin, spokesman of the Turkish presidency 
described the YPG as “an organic extension of the PKK” (quoted in AA, 12 July, 2016). The 
Turkish officials even describe the PYD-YPG to be the PKK itself, but in other names. For 
example, Davutoglu claimed that the YPG “receives instructions from the PKK” and that “the 
PKK and PYD are the same” (quoted in Daily Sabah, February, 2016). Likewise, Erdogan 
stated that “YPG and PYD are the offshoots of the PKK. They are together. They are the same” 
(quoted in MFA, 28 September, 2016). Erdogan also claimed that because the PKK is classified 
as a terrorist organization, it tries "to deceive the international community and win legitimacy 
by operating under the name of PYD in Syria” (quoted in Pamuk & Tattersall, 22 October, 
2015). Likewise, the Turkish prime-minister (PM), Binali Yildirim stated that “the PYD as 
well as the YPG are the same as the PKK” (quoted in Anadolu Agency, 4 October, 2016b). 
Yildirim claimed that the PKK uses the names YPG and (Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) as 
he stated that “the PKK takes different initials like YPG and SDF. But they are all the same” 
(quoted in Sengupta, 2017).115 SDF was established in October, 2015 as an umbrella that joins 
YPG, YPJ, and Arab and Syriac groups, and it constitutes the main ground-force of the US-led 
coalition against ISIL (Al-Khalidi & Perry, October, 2015; Casagrande, November, 2016). 
                                                          
114 The text of Turkish ministry of foreign affairs has no date of publish. Therefore, the research uses (n. d., e).  
115 SDF is the acronym of Syrian Democratic Forces. (in Kurdish: Hêzên Sûriya Demokratîk, HSD), 
 (in Arabic: قوات سوريا الديمقراطية). The YPG constituted the majority of SDF. Liz Sly (2016) in her report published 
on the Washington Post estimated that 45000 out of 60000 militants of SDF were YPG members.  See more on 
SDF in Casagrande, G. (November, 2016).  
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SDF is currently considered as the force of north and north-east region of Syria (see Appendix 
Map 13).  
 
The PYD-YPG have been in relationship with the PKK. However, this relationship is not 
organic as the text of Turkish ministry and other official texts claim. In particular, constructing 
the PYD-YPG as organic parts of the PKK after 2011 is misleading description, which 
overlooks each of the historical evolvement of PYD and YPG, the geopolitical conditions, and 
motivations that govern their organizational structures and action. The text of Turkish foreign 
ministry refers to certain domains where the PYD-YPG and PKK share organic connections. 
This is although the reference to these domains in the text does not include elaborating details. 
These domains include the following:  
1. Leadership, organizational structure, military structure, 2. Propaganda tools.  
3. Strategies, tactics, and training camps, 4. Financial or funding resources.   
 
The text of ministry overlooks that the post-2011 conditions of Syria made the PYD more 
powerful, less dependent on the PKK, and more assertive of its Syrian identity. Following its 
establishment in 2003, the PYD was oppressed by the Syrian regime and many of its members 
were imprisoned and mistreated (HRW, 2009; KNK, 2014: 9; US Department of State, 2009). 
The PYD was acting clandestinely and was more dependent on the PKK protection and support 
(Jenkins, 2016). However, the PYD hardship eased following the Syrian crisis of 2011 when 
the Syrian regime ceased its repressive policy against the Syrian Kurds and released many 
detained members of PYD (BBC, 7 April, 2011; Oweis, 2013). This in addition to the 
withdrawal of the forces of the regime from the main Kurdish areas in 2012 reflected positively 
on the publicity of the PYD and its organizational capabilities (Ates, 2012; BBC, 17 October, 
2013; Petrocco, 2012). Although the PYD continued its affiliation with the PKK, it began to 
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emphasize its Syrian identity (Jenkins, 2016). In 2011 the Movement of Democratic Society 
(TEV-DEM) was established, and the PYD was considered as the major component of TEV-
DEM, which currently gathers the PYD and its affiliated Syrian Kurdish political bodies (Sary, 
2016:7), (see Figure 3).  
 
The post-2011 statements of PYD and TEV-DEM leaderships repeatedly denied describing the 
PYD-YPG as branches of the PKK. For example, the PYD co-chair, Salih Muslim denied that 
the PYD is organically connected to the PKK and stated that “we have no organizational 
relations with the PKK” (quoted in Lund, 2014). In another statement, Muslim disapproved the 
claims of Turkish authorities that the PYD and YPG act according to the instructions of the 
PKK, and he emphasized that the PKK field of action is different from that of the PYD as he 
stated that the PKK is “Turkey's domestic business” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 7 March, 
2016).  Likewise, the co-chair of TEV-DEM, Aldar Khalil stated that “it is important to set the 
record straight. We are not the PKK, no matter how much Erdogan wishes it were so, and it is 
not difficult to explain why” (Khalil, 2017). Thus, Khalil claimed that the Turkish authorities 
construct them as part of the PKK although they deny this, and that this construction by the 
Turkish authorities has certain agendas.  
 
The PYD and TEV-DEM leaderships admitted that the PYD has ideological connections with 
the PKK (BBC Monitoring, 7 March, 2016). The PYD-PKK ideological affiliations evolve 
around the Ocalan doctrine of democratic autonomy.  Although TEV-DEM co-chair admitted 
that the PYD adopted Ocalan doctrine like the PKK, he stated that the PYD “implemented 
Ocalan’s ideas differently and pursued different aims” (Khalil, 2017).  PYD has recently altered 
its doctrine to adopt the federation of Rojava and northern Syria, which joins Kurds, Arabs, 
Syriacs and other ethnic and religious groups, as a future system of governance and relationship 
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with the rest of Syria (Barfi, 2016: 32), unlike the PKK who has not involved in such system 
of governance because it has no such level of territorial control inside Turkey. Furthermore, 
Khalil (2017) highlighted that the PYD and YPG interact with geopolitical players who are 
different from those with whom the PKK interact. This is as the PYD and YPG have established 
certain types of relations with each of the US, some European countries, and Russia as the YPG 
has been involved in the international coalition against ISIL, and has been in conflicts with 
other Jihadist groups (Khalaf, 2016: 21; Tastekin, 22 April, 2016). The YPG has also clashed 
occasionally with the forces of the Syrian regime (BBC, 18 August, 2016; Barnard, 2016; 
Perry, 2016). Most important, the YPG is considered as the key ally of the US in the war against 
ISIL in Syria (Kirby, 8 February, 2016; Toner, 27 May, 2016, 15 March, 2017). On the other 
hand, the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and NATO members, and 
has no official relations with its governments (BBC, 23 August, 2016). In addition, the PKK is 
mainly in conflict with the Turkish forces although it actively contributed in the Kurdish 
resistance against ISIL in the Iraqi Kurdish areas (BBC, 23 August, 2016; Blaser, & Stein, 
2016; Plakoudas, 2015). However, both the YPG and PKK cooperated against ISIL in the 
operation of rescuing Yezidi Kurds in Sinjar mountainous area in Iraq, which is adjacent to the 
Syrian border (in Kurdish: Şingal) (Moroz, 11 September, 2015; Salih & Civiroglu, 2014; 




Figure 3. Organizational structure of TEV-DEM. PYD operates as part of TEV-DEM.  
 
The post-2011 evolvement of the status of PYD accompanied with the evolvement of the 
YPG.116 Although the YPG was formed clandestinely in 2004 as the military wing of PYD, 
it was reorganized in 2011, and was announced as the force of protecting the people of 
Rojava in 2012 (Jenkins, 2016; YPGRojava.org, n. d.), (see Figure 4). Before 2011 the YPG 
was almost inactive and insignificant militia that had no capabilities to operate in Syria 
(Jenkins, 2016). This is challenging the claim of the text of the Turkish ministry that the 
YPG was established as a branch of the PKK in 2003. However, since 2011 the YPG has 
rapidly grown in number, and has controlled large territories inside Syria.  As the YPG 
gained more strength and control over Syrian Kurdish and non-Kurdish areas, its Syrian 
identity has dominated its ideology and agendas. The YPG rules of procedure show it as a 
Syrian military organization whose agendas are limited to Syria (Global Security, 2016a; 
HRW, June 2014; YPGRojava.org, n. d.).117 As stated earlier, the YPG currently operates 
under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The latter joins the forces of 
                                                          
116 This is also applied to the Units of Protecting the Women (YPJ).  
117 The source: YPGRojava.org has no publishing date. Therefore, (n. d.) is used.  
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YPG-YPJ and the armed groups of Arabs, Syriacs and other minorities who share the goal 
of defeating ISIL and protecting the project of Rojava-Northern-Syria Federation (Barfi, 
2016: 32; Casagrande, November, 2016; YPGRojava.org, n. d.) (see Figure 5).118 The YPG 
defines itself as the following:  
“The YPG is a people’s army set up and formed of volunteers. People from all the 
different nations, religions and spiritual groups of Rojava can join the YPG. Arabs, 
Assyrians, Turkmens, Armenians, Kurds and many other groups living in Rojava-
Northern Syria are working united in the YPG” (YPGRojava.org, n. d.). 119 
 
 
Figure 4. YPG as an armed force of Rojava administration.  
 
Figure 5. YPG as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  
 
                                                          
118 The YPG has also included a smaller number of individuals from the Western countries. 
119 See the footnote above.  
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The claim of the text of Turkish ministry that the strategies, tactics and training camps of YPG 
are the same of those of the PKK is also contested. The terms ‘strategies and tactics’ denote 
military actions. The ministry’s text connected these terms to the PYD although the PYD is a 
political party and not a military organization. Therefore, these terms are applicable to the YPG, 
but not to the PYD. The military strategies and tactics of PKK and YPG are different. The PKK 
mainly targets the Turkish military and police inside Turkey. The PKK usually uses light 
weapons in its guerrilla attacks of hit-and-run (Blaser, & Stein, 2016; Plakoudas, 2015). This 
is mostly because the PKK has no considerable territorial control, and it usually shelters its 
militants in camps in the mountainous areas between Turkey, Iraq and Iran (Stratfor, March, 
2013), (see Map 5). Whereas, the YPG has grown from small militia to semi-regular army that 
conducts wider military operations and uses light and medium size weapons (Kube, 2017; 
Perry, 2017). In addition, the YPG is supported by air-force of the US-led coalition against 
ISIL (DW, 19 August, 2016; Perry, 2 February, 2015). Unlike the PKK, the YPG has controlled 
large territories in the north and north east of Syria (see Map 4) The YPG also get training 
support from the US and other countries of anti-ISIL coalition in their training centres in Syria 
(Blake, 2016; DW, November, 2015; MacAskill, 2016; Sisk, 2016; Yildiz, 2015). This 
challenges the Turkish official claim that the YPG use the same training camps of the PKK. 
However, constructing the YPG and PKK training camps to be the same of the PKK implies 
the YPG are involved in military actions inside Turkey (AA, 20 October, 2016; Sanchez, 2017). 
The claim of Turkish officials that the YPG are involved in attacks inside Turkey is explained 







Map 4. Military control map of Syria. The yellow coloured area in the north of Syria was 
under the control of YPG and SDF before invading the canton of Afrin in the north-west by 
the Turkish military and Islamist factions of FSA in March 2018 (see Appendix Map 13). 
Source: World in War (February, 2017). The researcher added to Map 4 the names of the 
cantons of Rojava administration, and the names of the two other regions of north Syria, which 
are governed by the groups of FSA and Al-Nusrah.  
 
 
Map 5. Locations and names of the PKK camps attacked by the Turkish warplanes. These 
camps are located in the Kurdish mountainous area between Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Source: 





The claim of the text of the Turkish ministry that the PYD-YPG and PKK use the same tools 
for their propaganda is also disputed. Although the PYD-YPG and PKK support each other in 
their media outlets, they are not using the same media tools. The PYD-YPG and PKK official 
texts are usually published in official newspapers, magazines, internet websites, TV and radio 
channels. However, the PYD-YPG newspapers, magazines, internet websites, TV and radio 
channels are not the same of these of the PKK. For example, Ronahi TV channel is pro- PYD 
(Ronahi TV website: http://ronahitv.com/, see also http://karwan.tv/ronahi-tv.html), while 
Med-Nuce TV channel is pro-PKK (Med-Nuce TV website: http://mednuce.tv/). Another 
example, the PYD and YPG official websites are http://pydrojava.net/english/, 
https://www.ypgrojava.org/english, while the PKK official website is 
https://www.pkkonline.com/en/. Furthermore, the PYD-YPG usually publish their texts in 
Arabic and Kurdish, while the PKK usually publish its texts in Turkish and Kurdish. However, 
as part of their propaganda, the PYD-YPG consider the PKK leader Ocalan as their spiritual 
leader. The view of PYD and TEV-DEM regarding Ocalan are discussed earlier. In addition, 
PYD-YPG radio channels considerably cover the news of Kurds in Turkey and their political 
activities and militant actions. For example, Ronahi TV allocates a space for the news of the 
Kurdish region of Turkey and quotes the statements of PKK, HDP and their leaderships 
(Ronahi TV). Likewise, the pro-PKK TVs allocate a considerable space to the news about 
Syrian Kurds and quote the statements of PYD-YPG leaderships. However, the official 
websites of PYD and YPG concentrates on Syria and Syrian Kurds, and similarly the PKK 
website focusses on the issues related to the Kurds in Turkey (to see these websites, click the 
above links).    
 
The claim of the text of Turkish foreign ministry that the PYD-YPG and PKK have the same 
finance or funding resources is also challenged. The funding resources of PYD-YPG, mainly 
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depend on the revenues of oil, agriculture, and tax generated in the areas governed by Rojava 
administration in the north of Syria (Kajjo, July, 2016; Sary, 2016: 15). The YPG also gets 
weaponry and other types of military support from the US and other anti-ISIL coalition 
members (Allen, 2017; Snow, 2017). As explained earlier, the PKK who has no such territorial 
control and international support, therefore, it does not have such funding and weaponry 
sources. Instead, the PKK depends on limited financial resources. One of the major funding 
resource of the PKK is the donations by the Kurds inside Turkey and in the diaspora (Dirik, 
2015; ICG, 2017).  However, constructing the PYD-YPG funding sources to be the same of 
these of the PKK implies that the PYD-YPG are funded by drug-trafficking money. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the Turkish official discourse claims that the PKK as is 
international drug-trafficker although this claim is not based on concrete evidence (see MFA, 
n. d., d; MFA, n. d., e). 
 
Although the text of Turkish ministry constructs the PYD and YPG to be merely parts of the 
PKK, the text omits any reference to the political goals of PYD-YPG. As stated earlier, 
omitting certain information from text is a feature that serves bias and ideology (Van Dijk, 
2001; Mayr, 2008).  As the goals of PYD-YPG are different from those of the PKK, this implies 
that the producer of the text intended to hide this dissimilarity between the PYD-YPG and 
PKK. While the goals of PYD-YPG are limited to the Kurdish rights inside Syria and to the 
protection of the de-facto Rojava administration (Global Security. 2016a, 2016b; 
PYDRojava.net; YPGRojava.org), the PKK main goal is to find a solution for the Kurdish 
question in Turkey (BBC, 4 November, 2016; PKKonline.com; Uzun, 2014). However, the 
Turkish official discourse constructs the PYD-YPG as part of Turkey’s security matters, and 




The construction of PYD-YPG as part of the PKK indicates that the PYD and YPG constitute 
a threat to the national security of Turkey. The construction also builds the implication that all 
the constructions of the PKK in the Turkish official discourse apply to the PYD-YPG. These 
include constructing the PKK as terrorist, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist, separatist, racial, and 
criminal organization. In addition to the construction of the PYD-YPG as organic parts of the 
PKK, there are other dominant discursive constructions and narratives in the Turkish official 
discourse about the PYD and YPG. These constructions and narratives are repeated in the 
statements of Turkish officials, which are discussed in the coming sections.  
 
The PYD-YPG as a threat to the national security of Turkey  
As stated earlier, the construction of the PYD and YPG as organic parts of the PKK suggests 
that they constitute a threat against the national security of Turkey like the PKK. Erdogan stated 
that the PYD and YPG “pose a threat to our country” because they are part of the PKK (quoted 
in MFA, 28 September, 2016).  In addition to the construction of the PYD-YPG as organic 
parts of the PKK, three other narratives of the Turkish official discourse construct the PYD-
YPG as a threat to the Turkish national security. These include the following:  
- The PYD-YPG are involved in attacks inside Turkey. 
- The PYD-YPG as proxies used by other countries against Turkey.  
- As separatist organizations, the PYD-YPG constitute a threat to the national security 
of Turkey. This narrative interdiscursively connects both the territorial integrity of 







The PYD-YPG are involved in attacks inside Turkey 
This narrative consists of two forms, which either come in separate statements or come together 
interdiscursively in one statement. That is, both forms of narrative might come together in one 
statement. As discussed in chapter 3, interdiscursivity occurs when the text includes the 
constructions of more than one discourse (Fairclough, 2003: 3).  
 
The first form of narrative is that the PYD-YPG are involved in attacks inside Turkey. The 
Turkish FM, Cavusoglu claimed that PYD-YPG "trained terrorists in its camps” and sent them 
to "conduct attacks on Turkey” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 7 June, 2016).  In another 
statement Cavusoglu stated that "the PKK terrorists who are responsible for the last terrorist 
attacks, suicide bomb attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, all came from YPG camps in Syria,", and he 
added that the YPG is "just an extension" of the PKK (quoted in AA, 22 March, 2017). 
  
The Turkish authorities accused the PYD-YPG of explosive attacks inside Turkey although 
other organizations claimed responsibility, while the PYD-YPG denied any involvement. For 
example, following the attack of 17 February, 2016 against the Turkish police in Ankara, the 
Turkish authorities were quick to accuse the PYD-YPG. Although The Kurdistan Freedom 
Hawks (TAK) announced later its responsibility for the attack, the Turkish officials including 
the president, the prime-minster (PM) and the minister of foreign affairs (FM) continued 
accusing the PYD-YPG of the attack  (Daily Sabah, February, 2016; Letch, 19 February, 2016; 
Toksabay , February, 2016). The day following the attack, Turkish PM, Davutoglu claimed 
that the Turkish intelligence service managed to recognize the perpetrator’s identity and that 
he was member of YPG. Davutoglu stated that “the perpetrators have been fully identified. The 
attack was carried out by YPG member Salih Necer, who came in from Syria” (quoted in 
Letsch, 18 February 2016). Davutoglu claimed that the YPG was instructed by the PKK to 
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conduct the attack. Later, TAK announced its responsibility for the attack. However, Davutoglu 
considered the announcement of the TAK as a “montage” to "exonerate" the YPG (quoted in 
Daily Sabah, February, 2016).  This is although the YPG leaderships denied any responsibility 
for the attack and emphasized that it had no interests to act against Turkey (Peace in Kurdistan, 
18 February, 2016). PYD leadership also claimed that the accusations against the YPG were 
used as an excuse for a Turkish military intervention in Syria (Letsch, 18 February 2016).  
 
The second form of narrative, which takes more space in the statements of Turkish officials 
connects between the PYD-YPG threat to Turkey and the US weaponry support to the YPG. 
The US weaponry support of the YPG has been a major concern of the Turkish authorities, and 
therefore, the Turkish officials have repeatedly denounced the US support of the YPG. Turkish 
officials claim that these weapons end in the hand of PKK (AA, 8 November, 2016; Daily 
Sabah, 27 April, 2017). For example, following the ISIL invasion of the Rojava canton of 
Kobani in 2014, Erdogan criticized the US weaponry support of YPG and stated that “any 
support to PYD amounts to support for PKK”, “Turkey would have to fight against any such 
support to PKK” (quoted in BYEGM, 22 October, 2014). In another statement, Erdogan said 
that “by giving weapons to these terrorist organizations, you are strengthening sources of threat 
to our future” (quoted in MFA, 28 September, 2016). Likewise, Turkish PM stated that "what 
the U.S. does against terror is arming the terrorist YPG in Syria and this directly causes a rise 
in terrorist attacks against Turkey” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 3 January, 2017).  
 
Turkish officials also constructed a direct connection between the US weapons that are given 
to the YPG and attacks that occurred inside Turkey. Cavusoglu stated that the US is “cooperating 
with a terrorist organization that is also attacking Turkey” (quoted in MFA, 24 September, 
2016). Cavusoglu claimed that attacks were conducted by terrorists who were trained in YPG 
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camps inside Syria, and who received weapons from the US (Hurriyet Daily News, 7 June, 
2016; MFA, 24 September, 2016). Likewise, Davutoglu connected between the US weaponry 
support of the YPG and the Ankara attack of February, 2016, which was by TAK as explained 
earlier. Davutoglu stated that “we can’t excuse any NATO ally, including the U.S.” of having 
“links with a terrorist organization that strikes us in the heart of Turkey” (quoted in Koren, 
2016). Erdogan claimed that the US weapons were used by the YPG in attacks “against 
civilians” inside Turkey and that these weapons caused “their deaths” (quoted in Toksabay, 
February, 2016).  Erdogan used in his statement the generalization structure ‘attacks against 
civilians’, which builds the assumption that the US weapons are only used against Turkish 
civilians and inside Turkey.  
 
This is although the US administration and YPG emphasized that the weapons that the US has 
given the YPG have been used inside Syria. The US administration emphasized that  it 
supported the YPG with weapons as part of the campaign against ISIL in Syria, and that these 
weapons have been used for this purpose (Cook, 31 August, 2016; Dombey & Srivastava, May, 
2017; McKernan, 2017; Rudaw, 14 May, 2017).  The US spokesperson of anti-ISIL coalition 
forces stated that they "carefully monitor” the weapons they have given the YPG, and that they 
have made sure that these weapons have been used in the campaign against ISIL (quoted in 
McKernan, 2017).  Likewise, the YPG leadership emphasized that the weapons they receive 
from the US and other members of anti-ISIL coalition are used inside Syria and only for the 
purposes of fighting against ISIL and protecting Rojava and northern Syria from military 
aggressions (Ara News, July, 2017; Rudaw, 14 May, 2017).  
 
The claims of Turkish officials that the YPG was involved in explosive attacks inside Turkey, 
and that YPG supported the PKK with weapons are denied by the US administration. In a press 
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briefing by US department of defence, Stephen Townsend, the US commander of anti-ISIL 
operation stated that they observed and worked with the YPG in the anti-ISIL operations, and 
that they found that the YPG has no interest in attacking Turkey. He stated that “I have seen 
absolutely zero evidence that they have been a threat to or supported any attacks on Turkey 
from northern Syria over the last two years” (Townsend, 1 March, 2017). Townsend added that 
the YPG leadership, on the contrary to the Turkish claims, desires “to have a good working 
relationship with Turkey” (Townsend, 1 March, 2017).  The US administration also repeatedly 
denied the claim of Turkey that the YPG is part of the PKK (Kirby, 21 September, 2015; Toner, 
27 May, 2016, 8 March, 2017). The spokesperson of US department of state stated that “YPG 
is a separate entity from the PKK” (Toner, 27 May, 2016).  
 
The PYD-YPG leaderships have repeatedly expressed that they want good neighbourhood 
relations with Turkey and denied that the PYD-YPG have constituted any threat against Turkey 
(Ballout, July, 2013; Bozarslan, May, 2017; Centre for Kurdish Progress, 2016; Olson, 
February, 2016).  In an answer to a question about the PYD relations with Turkey, PYD co-
chair, Salih Muslim claimed that the Turkish ruling AK party is the source of problems and 
that the PYD wants good relations with Turkey. Muslim stated:  
“We would like to have good relations with Turkey. We have no problem with the 
Turkish people. It is the AKP that has a problem with us. The AKP has a problem 
with all the Kurds, including their own. ...The PYD has never been a threat to 
Turkey. The PYD only wants to establish rights in Syria” (quoted in Centre for 
Kurdish Progress, 2016). 
The PYD-YPG as proxies used by other countries against Turkey  
Turkish officials labelled the PYD and YPG as proxies used by other countries against the 
national security of Turkey (see Daily Sabah, 3 April, 2017; Trend News, 2017). Many 
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statements of the Turkish officials use the term ‘pawns’ to describe the PYD and YPG as 
proxies used by other countries against Turkey. This is mainly repeated in the statements of 
Erdogan (BBC Monitoring, 20 October, 2016; Intellinews - Turkey Today, 2016). For example, 
Erdogan claimed that ISIL and the PYD-YPG "are pawns that serve the same purpose and are 
supported by the same powers" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 20 October, 2016).  Other Turkish 
officials like the prime-minster and foreign minister also used the same term and narrative 
against the PYD-YPG (Daily Sabah, February, 2016, 3 April, 2017; Guler & Srivastava, 2016).  
However, the construction of the PYD-YPG as ‘pawns’ and the associated narrative also 
involve the PKK.  That is, the three organizations are labelled as “pawn organizations” that act 
together against Turkey (quoted in Daily Sabah, February, 2016).  
 
Constructing the PYD-YPG as proxies used by the other countries against Turkey is usually 
formed in two narratives. One narrative, which is less dominant, constructs the PYD-YPG and 
PKK as proxies used against Turkey by both Russia and the Syrian regime. For example, 
Erdogan stated that “both the PYD and the YPG are the organizations of the Assad regime” 
(AA, 16 February, 2016). Davutoglu also accused the Syrian regime of using the YPG against 
Turkey and stated that “the YPG is a pawn of the Syrian regime” (quoted in Guler & 
Srivastava, 2016). In another statement, Davutoglu constructs the PYD-YPG as proxies of both 
Russia and Al-Assad regime, and that they used them against Turkey (BBC Monitoring, 16 
February, 2016). Davutoglu used certain terms and structures, which invite condemnation for 
the relationship between PYD-YPG, Russia and Al-Assad such as “puppets of Russia and 
subcontracted organizations used by the blood-shedder Assad regime and Russia", and as 
“legionnaires [and] hired soldiers of Russia" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 16 February, 2016).  
This narrative was challenged, later as Turkey renewed its relations with Russia and changed 
its approach regarding Al-Assad regime. The Turkish-Russian agreement was incited by the 
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consolidation of US-YPG partnership in Syria (Cockburn, 2016). Turkey even offered a 
military cooperation with Russia and Al-Assad regime against the YPG (Hurriyet Daily News, 
10 March, 2017; Tastekin, 2 July, 2017). The Turkish-Russian cooperation  led to the Russian 
permission for a limited intervention by the Turkish military in Syria under the name the 
Operation of Euphrates Shield, which aimed at stopping the progress of YPG and SDF in 
connecting Afrin canton to the other Rojava cantons of northern Syria (Cockburn, 2016). About 
one month before the Euphrates Shield operation, the Turkish authorities used a cooperative 
language while addressing the Syrian regime (BBC, 13 July, 2016). This was expressed by 
Turkish PM who hinted to retrieve relations with Al-Assad regime as he stated that “I am sure 
that we will return [our] ties with Syria to normal” and added “we need it. We normalised our 
relations with Israel and Russia. I’m sure we will go back to normal relations with Syria as 
well” (quoted in Shaheen  & Chulov, 2016). The Turkish authorities have even worked on 
facilitating the negotiations between the Syrian regime and the Arab groups of Syrian 
opposition in Astana, Kazakhstan (Tastekin, 2 July, 2017).  Russia also allowed Turkey and its 
allied Islamist groups of Free Syrian Armey (FSA) to invade Afrin canton itself in March 2018 
(Khalidi, 31 March, 2018; Rasmussen & Aydin, 18 March, 2018). The invasion of Afrin canton 
is not fully covered in this research as it occurred when the data analysis was finished. In 
addition, the research has no enough space to add an extra section about the invasion of Afrin 
(see Appendix Map 13). 
 
The other and more dominant narrative constructs the PYD-YPG in affiliation with the PKK 
as proxies and part of the Western conspiracy against Turkey.  This narrative delegitimates the 
Western support of the YPG. Erdogan has pioneered the AKP officials in this narrative. 
Erdogan denounced the Western support of YPG and considered this kind of support as part of 
the indirect Western support for the PKK (World Bulletin, February, 2016). Erdogan described 
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the Western countries as “hypocritical, two-faced” that have “insincere attitude in the face 
of terror organizations” denoting the PYD, YPG and PKK (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 18 
March, 2016). According to Erdogan, the inaction of the western countries against the pro-
PYD-YPG demonstrations and other civic activities in Europe is a type of indirect support to 
the PKK. Erdogan referred to PYD-YPG and stated that in the European countries “the 
separatist terror organization [PKK] is operating freely under various names"(quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, 18 March, 2016). Erdogan even accused the Western countries of supporting the 
PYD and PKK by ethnically cleansing the Syrian Arabs and Turkmans as he stated that “the 
West is hitting Arabs and Turkmens with their airplanes and settling the terror organizations 
PYD and PKK in their places” (quoted in Calislar, 2015).120 121This chapter deals later with the 
Turkish official narrative, which constructs the PYD-YPG as criminal organizations that are 
ethnically cleansing Arabs and Turkmans in Syria.  
 
The Turkish officials considered the support of some EU politicians for the PYD and YPG 
resistance of ISIL as a conspiracy against Turkey. For example, as a photographic exhibition 
by Austrian anthropologist Thomas Schmidinger on Rojava and the YPG resistance against 
ISIL took place in the premises of EU parliament in July, 2016 (Sharkov, 2016), the Turkish 
officials were quick to criticise the EU and claimed that the exhibition was part of the 
propaganda of the PKK.  Cavusoglu who claimed that the exhibition aimed at supporting the 
PKK, stated that the EU has "double standards” (quoted in MFA, 12 July, 2016). Cavusoglu 
stated that the EU parliament was used as “a tool of the propaganda of a bloody terrorist 
organization that takes the lives of innocent people almost every day and thereby has been 
                                                          
120 See also  Karadeniz, T & Gumrukcu, T. (2015). 
 
121 Turkmans are an ethnic group close to Turks. Many international sources incorrectly write the 
plural of Turkam as Turkmen. The latter indicate plural of the term ‘man’.  The research added ‘s’ to 
the plural to be Turkmans. 
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involved in promoting terrorism” (quoted in MFA, 12 July, 2016). Accordingly, Cavusoglu 
accused the EU of supporting the PKK ‘terrorism’, which Turkey has suffered from. To support 
his claim, Cavusoglu used the word ‘bloody’, which invites condemnation, and terms ‘innocent 
people’, which invites sympathy, and ‘every day’, which implies that the type of PKK-YPG-
PYD terrorism that the narrative refers to is seriously harmful and limited to civilians. 
However, the statement omits any reference to the conflict between the Turkish forces and 
PKK in the Kurdish region of Turkey.  
 
Likewise, the spokesman of the Turkish presidency, Kalin connected the exhibition to the 
attacks against ‘Turkish citizens’ inside Turkey (Daily Sabah, 13 July, 2016). Kalin criticized 
the EU parliament and considered the exhibition as part of the propaganda of a terrorist 
organization ‘the PKK’, as he stated:  
"It is unacceptable to see daily propaganda of a terrorist organization targeting 
Turkish citizens under the roof of European Parliament. We cannot comprehend 
what the European parliament aims for by glorifying an organic extension of the 
PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by European Union” (quoted 
in Daily Sabah, 13 July, 2016).122 
 
This narrative also considers the Rojava administration as a conspiracy project supported by 
the Western powers against Turkey.123 Turkish officials constructed the Western support of 
YPG as a threat to the indivisibility of Turkey. For example, Turkey’s deputy PM, Nurettin 
Canikli, claimed that the Western support of the YPG is part of a “global project" that aims at 
dividing Turkey (quoted in AA, 14 July, 2016). However, the narrative constructs the US as 
                                                          
122 See also AA. (12 July, 2016).  




the main Western player of the conspiracy. This is as the US has supported the YPG in its 
armed campaign against ISIL. The construction of the US as part of the conspiracy narrative is 
discerned mainly in Erdogan statements who claims that the YPG fighting against ISIL is a 
pretext used for the creation of a separate entity in northern Syrian (Daily Sabah, 12 June, 2016; 
TCCB, 29 January, 2015; Yeni Safak, February, 2016). Erdogan stated that "saying that 
PYD/YPG is fighting against Daesh is a big lie” (quoted in Yeni Safak, February, 2016).  In 
another statement, Erdogan said that “you have to be blind to not see the ulterior motives behind 
the plots staged under the excuse of Daesh” (quoted in TCCB, 26 March, 2016). Erdogan 
claimed that there was “a serious project” with “insidious aims” by “those who appear as 
friends”, “implemented in northern Syria” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 12 June, 2016). Although 
the last statement does not clarify the parties involved in the project, it criticizes the US 
supports of YPG. Erdogan also used the terms ‘serious’ and insidious’ to imply that this 
‘project’ is harmful to Turkey. The statement also refers to northern Syria as the place of this 
project, which is the area controlled by the Rojava administration.  
 
This is although none of the western countries approved the Rojava administration, and the US 
administration repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria 
(Yeranian & Babb, 2016). The US stance is discerned in the relevant statements of US 
department of state. For example, the spokesperson of the department stated that “I would just 
say we’ve been very clear that we won’t recognize any kind of self-autonomous – or self-rule, 
semi-autonomous zones in Syria”, “we’re committed to the unity and territorial integrity of 
Syria” (Toner, 16 March, 2016),  and he repeated this stance in the department’s press briefing  
of  23 May 2016 as he stated that  “we’ve also made it clear to these Kurdish forces as well 
that they should not seek to create autonomous, semiautonomous zones” (Toner, 23 May, 
2016).   
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The narrative that constructs the Syrian Kurdish self-governance as a conspiracy by the 
Western powers is also connected to the construction of the PYD-YPG as separatist 
organizations that constitute threats against both the territorial integrity of Syria and the 
national security of Turkey. The latter construction is explained below.  
 
PYD-YPG as separatist organizations that constitute threats to both the territorial 
integrity of Syria and the national security of Turkey.  
The statements of Turkish officials construct the PYD and YPG as a threat to the territorial 
integrity of Syria because they are separatist organizations that aim at establishing a Kurdish 
entity or a state in the north of Syria (BYEGM, 1 April, 2016; Hurriyet Daily News, 7 June, 
2016; MFA, 21 September, 2015; MFA, 24 September, 2016; Pamuk, 24 October, 2015). For 
example, Cavusoglu stated that “PYD’s agenda and motives will threaten the territorial 
integrity and political unity of Syria” (quoted MFA, 21 September, 2015).  In another statement 
Cavusoglu described the PYD-YPG as a “major threat to the territorial integrity of Syria” 
(quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 7 June, 2016). This is because the PYD and YPG want “to 
seize northern Syria entirely" as Erdogan insisted (quoted in Pamuk, 24 October, 2015).  
 
In their statements, the Turkish officials repeated their commitment to defend the territorial 
integrity of Syria from the separatist threat of the PYD and YPG. The Turkish officials 
constructed Rojava either as another state or a separatist entity to which they expressed their 
rejection and antagonism.  The Turkish MP  stated that “we will never allow the formation of 
an artificial state in the north of Syria”  (quoted in Istanbullu, September, 2016). Such anti-
Rojava statements accompanied with the emphasis on the importance of the territorial integrity 
of Syria. This is discerned in the statement of Erdogan who threatened to conduct a military 
intervention against Rojava to protect the territorial integrity of Syria. Erdogan stated that “if 
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needed, Turkey is determined to actively intervene to protect Syria’s territorial integrity” and 
added that “Turkey won’t allow a fait accompli in Syria” (quoted in Ant & Abdu-Nasr, 2016).  
Likewise, The Turkish FM denounced the Rojava administration and considered the territorial 
integrity of Syria as an important matter of Turkey as he stated that "Syria's national unity and 
territorial integrity is fundamental for us” (quoted in Pamuk, 24 October, 2015).   
 
The narrative interdiscursively connects the territorial integrity of Syria to the national security 
of Turkey, and the threat to both by the Rojava administration and the PYD-YPG. For example, 
Erdogan denounced the Kurdish administration, and said that "we will under no circumstances 
allow northern Syria to become a victim of their scheming. Because this constitutes a threat for 
us, and it is not possible for us as Turkey to say 'yes' to this threat" (quoted in Pamuk, 24 
October, 2015).  In another statement, Erdogan urged the US and the other countries to “work 
together for the protection of the territorial integrity of Syria” (quoted in BYEGM, 1 April, 
2016). Erdogan referred to the PYD-YPG and stated that “I’m not in the position to allow the 
handing over of some parts of Syria to some terrorist organizations” (quoted in BYEGM, 1 
April, 2016).   
 
To emphasize the threat that Rojava constitutes to the national security of Turkey, The Turkish 
officials construct the Rojava cantons as a source of terrorism that targets Turkey. This is 
discerned in the usage of terms like “terror cantons” (Hurriyet Daily News, 29 December, 
2016), “terror camps” (Barfi, 2016: 6; Hurriyet Daily News, 7 June, 2016; Israeli, 2013: 93), 
and “terror corridor” (AA, 2 September, 2016; Hurriyet Daily News, 28 April, 2017) to 
describe the Rojava cantons. Such terms are repeated in the statements of Erdogan and other 
Turkish officials (AA, 2 September, 2016, 9 January, 2017; Barfi, 2016: 6; BYEGM, 1 April, 
2016; Hurriyet Daily News, 29 December, 2016; Istanbullu, September, 2016; Pamuk, 24 
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October, 2015).  For example, Erdogan stated that “nobody should expect that we’ll agree to 
the establishment of a ‘terror corridor’ along our southern border in northern Syria” (quoted in 
Hurriyet Daily News, 2 September, 2016). 
 
The connection between the Syrian territorial integrity and the national security of Turkey in 
the Turkish official discourse is limited to the narratives about Rojava and the Kurdish self-
governance. The Turkish officials did not show similar stance regarding other regions in the 
north of Syria alongside the Turkish border, which have been controlled and governed by 
Jihadist groups including ISIL, Jabhat Al-Nusrah, Ahrar Al-Sham and others. Moreover, 
Turkey has been in trade and military relations with these regions and groups (Bertrand, 28 
July 2015; Di- Giovanni et al., 2014; Graeber, 18 November, 2015; Spencer & Sanchez, 2014; 
Taub, 2015; Uslu, 2015: 787-788; Weiss, n.d.; Zeldin, September, 2015) (see Map 6). Uslu 
(2015: 787-788) described Turkey as “Jihadist Highway” through which military and other 
kind of support passed towards the Syrian areas controlled by ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliated 
Jihadists. A journalist report by Erkus (September, 2014) provides details about the trade 
business between Turkey and the Syrian entities governed by ISIL and other Jihadist groups 
between 2013-2014. Erkus (September, 2014) argues that the 2014 ISIL exports from Turkey 
increased 57% of the overall Turkey exports to Syria, and that some of these items were used 
for the military purposes. The report claims that the remaining 43% of Turkish exports to Syria 
went to the areas controlled by Jabhat Al-Nusrah and other Jihadists.124 Erkus (September, 
2014) estimated the increase of the Turkish trade with the Jihadist areas from $574 million in 
2013 to $903 million in the first 8 months of 2014.125  The trade between Turkey and Jihadist 
                                                          
124 Jabhat Al-Nusrah lately changed its name to Hayat Tahrir Al sham (HTS).  
125 See also Di- Giovanni et al., (2016), and Taub (2015) on the oil trade of ISIL through Turkey, and the 
involvement of Turkish officials in the oil trade.  
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groups was also claimed by a German court in its November 2016 hearing.126 The court claimed 
that between 2011-2014 Turkey provided medical and logistical support to Al-Qaeda and ISIL 
groups who acted inside Syria (Winter, 26 November, 2016). Russian Ambassador to the UN, 
Vitaly Churkin also accused Turkey of supporting ISIL and stated that “the main supplier of 
weapons and military equipment to ISIL fighters is Turkey, which is doing so through 
nongovernmental organizations” (quoted in Tomkiw, 2016). Likewise, Francis Ricciardone, 
the former US ambassador to Turkey, stated that “the Turks frankly worked with groups for a 
period, including al-Nusra” (quoted in Spencer, & Sanchez, 2014).  
 
On the contrary to the claims of Turkish officials that emphasized defending the territorial 
integrity of Syria, the Turkish military involved directly in infringing the territorial integrity of 
Syria, and occupied part of the Syrian territory. In August, 2016 Turkish military and Jihadist 
groups of Ahrar Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusrah, Sultan Murad and others who acted under the 
umbrella of Free Syrian Armey (FSA) conducted a military intervention of the Operation of 
Euphrates Shield in northern Syria (Tax, 2016). The Turkish military and Jihadists expelled 
ISIL from the northern Aleppo areas on the Turkish border (Lund, August, 2016; Pamuk & 
Bektas, August, 2016). However, the operation created another region administered by these 
Jihadist groups, and Turkey carried on sponsoring the governance of this region by the Jihadists 
(see Maps 4, 6 and 7).   
 
Turkey has also continued its support and trade relations with the region of Idlib, which is 
located in the north west of Syria and governed by Jabhat Al-Nusrah and other Jihadist groups 
(Graeber, 18 November, 2015; Stutzriem & Cornell, 2017; Tastekin, 30 July, 2017; Tax, 2016) 
                                                          




(see Maps 4, 6, and 7). Jabhat Al-Nusrah changed its name recently to  Hayat Tahrir Al-
Sham (HTS) (Tastekin, 30 July, 2017). Brett McGurk, the US special envoy for the Anti-ISIL 
coalition described the Idlib region as a serious international security dilemma as he stated that 
“Idlib province is a serious problem. It is a haven now for al-Qaida” (McGurk, 2017).127  
 
 
Map 6. Syrian-Turkish border crossings of the regions controlled by ISIL and other Jihadists of 
FSA in 2016. Source: Solomon et al., (2016).   
 
Map 7. Turkey-Syria border-crossings. The map shows both the active border crossings of Bab Al-
Hawa, which is administered by Jabhat Al-Nusrah and Bab Al-Salamah, which is administered by Ahrar 
Al-Sham and other groups. The map also shows that the Turkish border with Rojava administration is 
closed. Source: Balanche (2017).  
                                                          




Table 5. Status of Turkey-Syria border-crossings. The table shows (in green colour) the 
following Syrian active border crossings with Turkey: 1. Bab Al-Hawa, which is administered 
by Jabhat Al-Nusrah. 2. Bab Al-Salamah and, 3. Jarabulus, which are administered by Ahrar 
Al-Sham and Sultan Murad Jihadist groups. The table also shows (in red colour) that the 
Turkish-Syrian (Rojava cantons) border-crossings are closed. This include the following 
crossing centres of Rojava: 1. Ain Diwar, 2. Qamishly, 3. Derbesiyah, 4. Ras Al-Ayn, 5. Ain 
Al-Arab, and Maydan Akbis. Source: UNOCHA. (2017).  
 
PYD and YPG as a security threat against the international community 
The construction of the PYD-YPG as a threat to the international community also involves the 
PKK. The construction of PYD-YPG as a threat to the other countries, or to the international 
community is resembled in the sentence that the PYD-YPG are a threat against ‘the others’. 
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However, the Turkish official discourse construction of the PYD-YPG as a threat to the others 
does not match its construction of the PYD-YPG as proxies used by the same others against 
Turkey. That is, the Turkish official discourse constructs the PYD-YPG as proxies used by the 
US and other anti-ISIL coalition members, and in contrast, the discourse constructs the PYD-
YPG as a threat to the same countries that support them.  In other words, the Turkish official 
discourse constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat from the others, and at the same time as a threat 
to the same others (see Figure 6).   
 
The There are two forms for the narrative that constructs the PYD-YPG as a terrorist threat to 
the international community. The first form aims at building the assumption that the PYD and 
YPG are internationally designated terrorist organisations although they are not. CDA 
considers assumption as a feature that serves bias and ideological considerations (Fairclough, 
1995, 2003; Locke, 2004). However, the first narrative is usually connected to the second and 
more dominant form of narrative, which compares the PYD-YPG and PKK to the Jihadist 
organizations that conducted violent attacks in several countries. In particular, it compares the 
PYD-YPG and PKK to ISIL.  
 
The first form of narrative that builds the PYD-YPG as a threat to the others aims at building 
the assumption that the PYD and YPG are labelled internationally as ‘terrorists’. This is by 
using the terms and structures like ‘good terrorists’ as a reference to the PYD-YPG and ‘bad 
terrorists’ as a reference to ISIL and attributing these references to the way that the US and its 
Western allies view the PYD-YPG and ISIL although the US and its allies do not use such 
references and dichotomy to describe the PYD-YPG and ISIL.  However, this dichotomy and 
such terms are repeated in the statements of Turkish officials.  For example, Erdogan stated 
that "the West still has the mentality of my terrorist is good, yours is bad” (quoted in Hurriyet 
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Daily News, 29 October, 2015). Likewise, Cavusoglu claimed that the international community 
understands terrorists mistakenly as “good terrorist, bad terrorist, secular one, radical one” 
(quoted in BYEGM, 29 March, 2016). In an earlier statement Cavusoglu referred to the PYD 
and YPG and expressed the dissatisfaction of Turkey concerning the alleged international 
discrimination between terrorist groups and stated that “there is no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ terrorist for 
us” (quoted in MFA, 11 January, 2016). Likewise, Erdogan claimed that Turkey does not 
discriminate between a “good” and an “evil” terrorist organization, but all terrorist 
organizations are “evil and none of them should be allowed” (quoted in AA, 1 April, 2016). 
Erdogan repeatedly criticized the support of the US and its allies to the PYD-YPG against ISIL 
(BB, 17 May, 2017; Hurriyet Daily News, 29 December, 2016; The Guardian, 19 October, 
2014). Erdogan stated that “you can't finish off Daesh with PYD/YPG, because they 
themselves are terrorists”, "can there be good and bad terrorists? All of them are terrorists and 
all of them are bad” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 23 September, 2016).  
 
This narrative is challenged as the US and its Western allies do not consider the PYD and YPG 
terrorist organizations. On the contrary, the US and its Western allies consider the PYD and 
YPG as allies of anti-ISIL campaign. The EU countries tolerated  certain levels of civic 
activities that aim at raising awareness and solidarity by the supporters of PYD and YPG such 
as demonstrations and seminars (Tastekin, 22 April, 2016). Furthermore, some EU 
governments and institutions conducted meetings with PYD and YPG representatives.  On 8 
February, 2015, the YPG and PYD representatives were received and appreciated by the French 
president, Francois Holland in the Elysee Palace (Tastekin, February, 2015). In addition, the 
Rojava administration in affiliation with the PYD and YPG managed to open offices in some 
major European capitals (Khalaf, 2016: 21; Tastekin, 22 April, 2016). Furthermore, the US did 
not change its supportive stance regarding the YPG although this caused tension with the 
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Turkish authorities. The US administration repeated many times that it did not consider the 
YPG as a terrorist organization. For example, the spokesperson of US department of state, John 
Kirby stated that “we don’t consider the YPG a terrorist organization” (Kirby, 21 September, 
2015).128 The US administration even prised its partnership with the YPG in the anti-ISIL 
military campaign. This is discerned in the relevant statements of the US department of state 
and US department of defence, which describe the YPG as an ‘effective’ and ‘reliable partner’ 
who managed to defeat ISIL in many areas in Syria (Cook, 9 May, 2016; Killea, September, 
2015; Kirby, 8 February, 2016; Toner, 27 May, 2016, 15 March, 2017).129 
 
The second and more dominant form of narrative that constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat to 
the international community compares the PYD, YPG and PKK to ISIL and other Jihadist 
organizations, and has two types of statements. These statements are by Erdogan and other 
Turkish officials who called or implicitly requested the international community to consider 
the PYD and YPG as terrorist organizations (AA, 16 February, 2016; BBC Monitoring, 23 
September, 2016; BYEGM, 27 March, 2016; TCCB, 24 October, 2015).   
 
One type of the statements of this narrative is limited to comparing the PYD, YPG and PKK 
to ISIL and other organizations that are internationally designated as terrorists. For example, 
Erdogan stated that "the PKK, the PYD, the YPG, Daesh [Islamic State], there is no difference. 
They are all terrorists," (quoted in Middle East Eye, 28 May, 2016).130 Likewise, Cavusoglu 
                                                          
128 The US ambassador in Turkey, John Bass also stated that “just like [officials] in Washington have said 
previously, the U.S. does not regard the PYD a terrorist organization” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 24 June 
2016). 
129 This is also repeated in the statements of US department of state. See:  
Toner. M. C. (5 August, 2015). 
Toner, M. C. (8 March, 2017). 
Toner, M. C. (16 March, 2016). 
Toner, M. C. (23 May, 2016). 
Kirby, J. (9 February, 2016). 
 
130 Erdogan used Daesh and the translator added [Islamic State] to elaborate the acronym used by Erdogan. 
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stated that “the PYD/YPG and DAESH are the same as the PKK” (quoted in MFA, 11 January, 
2016). In other statements, Erdogan compares the PYD-YPG and PKK to ISIL and Al-Qaeda 
and uses terms that suggest condemnation in describing them such as “murderers” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, 10 November, 2014), and as “enemies of humanity, democracy and freedom” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 2016). Likewise, the Turkish presidency spokesman, 
Kalin stated that “we see no difference between DAESH, the PYD, PKK or al-Nusra Front, as 
all of them kill innocent people” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 13 July, 2016).  Cavusoglu used ‘us’ 
and ‘ours’ to denote Turkey and the whole international community whose security and values 
are threatened by the PYD, PKK, and other Jihadist and non-Jihadist ‘terrorist’ organizations 
and stated that “there is no difference between these organizations. They pose a common threat 
to all of us and our values” (quoted in MFA, 26 April, 2016). 
 
The other type of statements refers to the Jihadist attacks that were conducted in some Western 
countries and considers these attacks as part of the entity of terrorism, which also encompasses 
the PYD-YPG-PKK. In addition to the construction of PYD-YPG as terrorist organizations, 
some of the contents of these statements imply overgeneralizations and they mix between the 
Jihadist attacks in the Western countries and other attacks in Turkey. For example, Cavusoglu 
stated that “there is no difference between the terrorist attacks of New York, Orlando, Brussels, 
Paris or Ankara. Whether it is DAESH, the PKK/YPG or al Qaida, we have to show equal 
determination in fighting them” (Cavusoglu, September, 2016). Cavusoglu statement renders 
the responsibility of all these attacks to ‘terrorism’, which join all the groups that Turkey 
considers as terrorists. This construction is abstracted further in the statement of the Turkish 
minster of EU affairs, Volkan Bozkir who considered the Turkish label of ‘terrorist’ to be an 
enough evidence for blaming the PYD and PKK for attacks by other organizations, and implied 
that the other countries should support Turkey in its counter-terrorism policy.  Bozkir stated 
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that “[After Brussels attacks], we have learnt that all terrorist organizations need to be put in 
the same category, we cannot discriminate among them. We have to work together” (quoted in 
AA, 23 March, 2016). 
 
The statements of Turkish officials that blame the PYD-YPG and PKK for the international 
Jihadist action, are also formed as ‘warnings of imminent or foreseeable attacks’ by the PYD-
YPG and PKK. The statements of Turkish officials imply that the PYD-YPG-PKK attacks 
would target the very countries that support the PYD and YPG and the countries that abstained 
from designating them as terrorist organizations.  This kind of narrative is mainly discerned in 
the statements of Erdogan (BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 2016, 18 March, 2016; Tastekin, 22 
April, 2016). For example, Erdogan stated that “I am calling on countries supporting the PYD: 
If you have a conflict with them, these people will come and attack you with bombs like [IS]” 
(quoted in Tastekin, 22 April, 2016).131 In another statement Erdogan claimed that Russia and 
Belgium supported the PYD and PKK and warned Russia and Belgium that they would be the 
victims of their misunderstanding of the PYD and PKK terrorism (BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 
2016). Erdogan used the metaphorical structure that “the snake you feed can bite you too” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 2016). Describing the PYD and PKK as ‘a snake’ that 
‘can bite’ invites the feeling that these organizations are not reliable and are imminent threats.   
 
Erdogan widened the scope of the PYD-YPG-PKK threat to cover Europe and US as he 
claimed that the misunderstanding of the EU, Russia and US of the terrorist character of PYD 
and PKK will make them liable for foreseeable terrorist attacks by these organizations similar 
to the terrorist attacks of ISIL in Belgium. Erdogan stated: 
                                                          
131 The acronym of IS used by the translator. Erdogan and other Turkish officials usually use the term ‘Daesh’ 
instead of ISIL or IS as explained in chapter 5.   
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 "I make the same warning to all countries that are being stubborn about [saying], 
'The PYD is not a terrorist organization.' Nobody should be fooled by the fact that 
the suicide bombers that carried out attacks in Belgium are members of Daesh. 
"When a conflict of interest occurs, anybody that belongs to the separatist 
organization's [PKK] structure that expresses itself with different letters can 
conduct a similar attack in any city of Europe, America, or Russia." (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, 27 March, 2016). 
 
PYD and YPG as criminal organizations involved in acts of ethnic cleansing against 
Syrians. 
 
As explained earlier, the Turkish official discourse considers the PYD-YPG as part of the PKK. 
This implies that the Turkish official narrative, which constructs the PKK as an organization 
involved in international drug-trafficking and other crimes is also applied to the PYD and YPG.  
However, the research found no texts by the Turkish authorities, which attribute drug 
trafficking to the PYD and YPG. Instead, the Turkish officials attributed other criminal acts to 
the PYD and YPG such as child and women kidnapping for forced conscription in the YPG 
ranks. For example, Turkey representative to the UN claimed that PYD and PKK were involved 
in forced recruitment of children and women in their military ranks. This claim by the Turkish 
representative was posed during an international meeting which was under the title of 
‘Trafficking in persons in conflict situations: Forced labour, slavery and other similar practices’ 
(MFA, 14 March, 2017).  In addition, Turkey’s representative compared PYD and PKK actions 
to these of ISIL and Jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda as he stated:  
“Speakers before me recalled how terrorist organizations like DAESH, Boko 
Haram and El Shabab resort to human trafficking for forced labour and slavery. 
Similarly, it is important to emphasize that terrorist organization PKK/PYD also 
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widely employs methods aimed at exploiting human beings, in particular through 
forced recruitment of children and young women” (quoted in MFA, 14 March, 
2017). 
 
Human Rights Watch documented that the YPG joined members who were under 18 years old 
(HRW, 2014, July, 2015).  However, the Turkish official narrative that the YPG ‘kidnapped’ 
children and women for ‘forced recruitment’ is not based on evidence. The YPG leadership 
admitted that there were cases of child recruitment on voluntary bases in June 2014 (Geneva 
Call, 2014; HRW, July, 2015). The YPG leadership followed this by signing the ‘Geneva 
Call’s Deed of Commitment’, which requires non-state actor to adhere to certain humanitarian 
norms (Geneva Call, 2014). One of these norms aims at protecting children from the impacts 
of armed conflicts, and the prohibition of the recruitment of children in the armed force 
(Geneva Call, 2014). As the YPG signed the Geneva Call it demobilized 149 children from its 
ranks and promised to stop recruiting children under 18 years (HRW, July, 2015). This was 
followed by the enactment of the Law of Self-Defence Duty in the Democratic Autonomous 
Areas by the Rojava administration. Article 3 of the law states that conscription “apply to all 
males aged between 18 and 30, but women can commit themselves voluntarily” (Danish 
Immigration Service, 2015: 25).  Accordingly, although there are documented cases of child 
recruitment in the YPG on voluntarily bases, there is no documented case of kidnapping 
children and women for forced recruitment. 
 
Nevertheless, the construction of the PYD-YPG as criminal organization has a dominant 
narrative, which is that they are involved in acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Arabs and Turkams in 
northern Syria. This narrative is repeated  in the statements of Erdogan and other Turkish 
officials (Hurriyet Daily News, 29 October, 2015, 7 June, 2016, 28 April, 2017; MFA, 21 
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September, 2015; Tastekin, 29 October, 2015; Uras, 2016; World Bulletin, February, 2016).  
For example, Erdogan stated that “the PYD is committing ethnic cleansing here (of) Arabs and 
Turkmen" (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 29 October, 2015). Turkish deputy PM, Bulent 
Arinc claimed that the PYD has perpetrated ethnic cleansing in order to connect its cantons in 
reference to the cantons of Rojava.  Arinc also claimed that the PYD and YPG have perpetrated 
their ethnic cleansing acts in collaboration with ISIL. Arinc stated: 
"We are seeing signs of a work that is underway on a formula to bring together the 
cantons”, “This time people of the bombed places were ethnically cleansed by the 
PYD and YGP, as well as Daesh, these are strange relationships and alliances [...]” 
(quoted in AA, 16 June, 2015).  
 
Turkey representative to the UN mission in Geneva claimed that the PYD used the pretext of 
fighting against ISIL to perpetrate violations of human rights and change the demography of 
northern Syria (UN, 21 September, 2015). The representative of Turkey criticized the August, 
2015 report by UN commission of enquiry regarding Syria, which was released in September, 
2015 (UN, 13 August, 2015, 21 September, 2015).132 The UN report highlighted the role of 
YPG in resisting ISIL (UN, 13 August, 2015: 5). The UN report underlined that the 
“operational performance” of ISIL was weakened only when the international coalition against 
ISIL “conducted alongside YPG ground operations” (UN, 13 August, 2015: 5). However, the 
representative of Turkey disapproved the assessment of report for the role of the YPG in the 
fight against ISIL as he stated:   
“Regarding the fight against DEASH, the report touches in a rather misleading 
manner upon the role of PYD. Its fight against DEASH as a tactical measure cannot 
hide widespread human rights violations committed by PYD. Crucially, it plays 
                                                          
132  The report is dated 13 August, 2015.   
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with local demographics, taking advantage of the situation on the ground” (quoted 
in MFA, 21 September, 2015; UN, 21 September, 2015). 
 
Cavusoglu went further as he claimed that the ethnic cleansing was against those who were not 
ideologically loyal to the PYD-YPG. Cavusoglu stated that “PYD-YPG conduct ethnic 
cleansing” against groups who were not “Marxists, Leninists and atheists" (quoted in Hurriyet 
Daily News, 7 June, 2016). Constructing the PYD and YPG as Marxist-Leninist and atheists is 
driven from the same constructions of the PKK in the Turkish official discourse, which are 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
The UN commission of enquiry regarding Syria in its report of 10 March, 2017 denied the 
allegations that the YPG perpetrated ‘ethnic cleansing’ although it referred to cases of 
displacement of civilians.  The report described the displacement of civilians from certain areas 
of conflict by the YPG and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as security provisions and to clear 
the areas from the explosives left by ISIL. The report also referred to that the SDF permitted 
civilians to return to certain secured areas. However, the reports blamed the SDF for not 
providing adequate humanitarian aid to the displaced civilians (UN, 10 March, 2017: 19-20: 
24). The report stated:  
“Though allegations of “ethnic cleansing” continued to be received during the 
period under review, the Commission found no evidence to substantiate claims that 
YPG or SDF forces ever targeted Arab communities on the basis of ethnicity, nor 
that YPG cantonal authorities systematically sought to change the demographic 
composition of territories under their control through the commission of violations 




Human rights organizations documented certain violations of human rights perpetrated by the 
YPG and Rojava security forces during their conflicts with ISIL, Jabhat Al-Nusrah and other 
armed groups. Both Amnesty International (2015) and Human Rights Watch (2014) conducted 
research in the areas under the control of YPG and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  Both 
organizations admitted that the authorities of Rojava gave them unrestricted freedom to meet 
victims and to conduct interviews with those who disagree with Rojava administration (AI, 
2015: 7; HRW, 2014: 9). Amnesty International described the displacement of civilians and 
demolition of houses as “war crimes”, while Human Rights Watch claimed that although the 
violations of YPG and Rojava security forces are “far less egregious and widespread, they are 
nonetheless serious” (AI, 2015: 6; HRW, 2014: 3).  
 
Amnesty International (2015: 6 & 32) report accused the PYD of displacing civilians and 
demolishing properties in certain cases. Amnesty report depends on the claims of some 
displaced people (AI, 2015). However, Amnesty report indicated that the displacement also 
targeted civilian Kurds who lived in the areas of conflict (AI, 2015: 6 & 18). The report also 
referred to that the YPG militants who ordered civilians to leave their villages were Kurds and 
Arabs (AI, 2015: 6: 18). In addition, the report admitted that the YPG militants warned civilians 
to leave few days before the displacement, and that the acts of displacement did not involve 
armed attacks against civilians (AI, 2015: 13-22). The report also documented that before 
evacuating civilians, the YPG warned civilians that the areas of evacuation were either 
‘military zones or not safe to stay’ (AI, 2015: 15-22 & 28). Although the YPG described the 
acts displacement as part of security necessity, Amnesty report considered that the 
displacements in some cases were unnecessary and constituted war crimes (AI, 2015). 133 
                                                          
133 Michael Gunter, an American author specialized in Kurdish issues stated that “I'm very disappointed in 
Amnesty International. In general, it is an NGO that plays a very important role in protecting the rights of the 
individual against government suppression. But the Amnesty report released on Oct. 12 alleges forced PYD 
displacement and home demolitions, which is very partial and distorted. It does not do justice to the PYD's efforts 
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There is no doubt that the YPG perpetrated violations of human rights during the conflict and 
in the areas under its control. However, the narrative of ‘ethnic cleansing’ dose not match the 
findings of the research. In particular, this narrative is declined by the report of the UN 
commission, and was not supported by the international organizations of human rights, as 
explained earlier.  Moreover, the narrative of ethnic cleansing has been propagandized for by 
the Turkish officials and the Syrian armed groups that are allied with Turkey and have been 
involved in armed conflicts against the YPG (Dettmer, 7 July, 2015; Loveluck & Samaan, 
2015; The New Arab, 15 June, 2015; Uras, 2016).134 The narrative was also propagandized for 
by the Turkish officials even when there were no actual acts of displacement. For example, 
before that the YPG and its allies enter Tell Abyad  town, which was under the control of ISIL, 
Erdogan stated that “there is a feeling that Arabs and Turkmens are targeted at Tell Abyad ” 
(quoted in Tastekin, 2 July, 2015). On the other hand, the Turkish officials made no such 
statement about the larger scale attacks of ISIL and other Jihadist groups on the Syrian Kurdish 
populated areas and the displacement of civilian Kurds. The Turkish officials made no such 
statement when ISIL attacked Kobani in 2014 causing the displacement of its Kurdish 
population (Chulov, 2014; Carter et al., 2014). This is also discerned in the case of the 
displacement of Kurds from the city of Sere Kani (in Arabic: Ras Al-Ayn) by Jabhat Al-Nusrah 
and other Jihadist groups who entered and attacked the Syrian Kurdish city in 2013 directly 




                                                          
to protect not only Kurds but also Arabs against the depredations of ISIS. Of course, if you're fighting ISIS there 
is going to be some collateral damage, but the PYD and its YPG fighting units have gone out of their way not to 
kill or displace the population” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily New, 24 October, 2015).  
134 The narrative of ethnic cleansing was supported and propagandized for by the Syrian rebel groups allies with 
Turkey, particularly Jihadist groups of Ahrar Al-Sham and Jaish Al-Islam (The New Arab, 15 June, 2015). 
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Relationship between the constructions, agendas and policies of Turkish authorities  
The constructions and narratives regarding the PYD-YPG that have been discussed in this 
chapter serve certain implied messages that serve certain agendas and policies of the Turkish 
authorities. The research classifies the constructions and narratives in two categories according 
to the agendas and policies, which they serve. The first category includes the constructions and 
narratives that serve the agenda of delegitimizing the PYD -YPG, and the second category 
includes the constructions and narratives that serve legitimizing the policies of Turkish military 
against the YPG (see Figure 6).  The two categories are discussed below.  
 
Delegitimizing the PYD and YPG 
The constructions of the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official texts serve inciting the other 
countries to label the PYD and YPG as terrorist organizations.  The constructions that mostly 
go with this type of agendas include the PYD and YPG as a threat to the international 
community, and as criminal organizations involved in ethnic cleansing. However, this also 
involves the construction of PYD-YPG as organic parts of the PKK.  The Turkish deputy PM, 
Lutfi Elvan demanded the international designation of the PYD-YPG as terrorist organizations 
(AA, 1 March, 2016). He even called the UN to designate the PYD-YPG and PKK as terrorist 
organizations. Elvan stated that “we called on the UN to recognize the PKK and the PYD as 
terrorist organizations” (quoted in AA, 1 March, 2016).135 Nevertheless, the narratives of the 
Turkish officials were not successful in convincing the international community of their claim 
that the PYD-YPG constitute a threat to the international community. In particular, the Turkish 
authorities were not able to convince the Western countries that the PYD-YPG constitute a 
threat against them. In contrast to the demands of the Turkish authorities to label the PYD-
                                                          
135 Although the EU and US designated the PKK as terrorist organization, the UN did not designate it.   
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YPG as terrorist originations, the US and its Western allies continued to support the YPG in 
the anti-ISL campaign as explained earlier.  
 
However, limited anti-PYD-YPG measures were taken in some EU countries, and by the 
international companies of media-broadcasting. One of the measures that has been practiced 
by certain media companies is the occasional suspension of the PYD-YPG affiliated TV station 
of Ronahi and the censorship and suspension of pro-PYD-YPG social-media accounts (Briel, 
2017; Kurdish Question, 28 June, 2016; YPGRojava, 23 August, 2017). These measures are 
usually influenced by the narrative that the PYD-YPG are branches of the PKK. This was the 
case of the suspension of the broadcast of Ronahi TV in April, 2017 by the French satellite 
company of Eutelsat (Briel, 2017). The measure was taken by Eutelsat under pressure and 
repeated requests of the Turkish authorities who claimed that Ronahi TV served the ‘terrorist’ 
propaganda of the PKK who is considered as an illegal organization in the EU (Briel, 2017).136 
The pro-PKK TV channels that usually operate in the EU countries have underwent similar 
restrictions and closers due to the pressure of the Turkish authorities (Dick, 2016). In addition, 
some pro-PYD-YPG social-media accounts of Facebook and YouTube, which publish video 
and other posts about Kurds and the YPG have been censured and suspended occasionally 
without enough explanation from the YouTube and Facebook managements (Kurdish 
Question, 28 June, 2016; YPGRojava, 23 August, 2017). The managements of Facebook and 
YoutTube have usually claim that the suspensions of such accounts were for violating their 
rules of publishing. However, Kurdish activists render the censorship and suspension of pro-
PYD and YPG accounts to the pressure exerted by the Turkish authorities who use the claim 
that these accounts serve the propaganda of the PKK.   
 
                                                          
136 Ronahi TV was suspended by Eutelsat alongside two pro-PKK TVs of Med-Nuce and Sterk (Briel, 2017). 
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Another measure, which has been conducted in individual cases by the authorities of some EU 
countries is interrogating some of their citizens who joined the YPG. The cases of interrogation 
have been conducted by the police and counterterrorism branches of Germany, UK, and 
Denmark against several citizens of these countries who voluntarily joined the YPG to fight 
against ISIL, and in few cases these individuals faced legal prosecution (Dearden, 2016; 
McKay, 2017; Tuck, 2017). Such individual cases built the implication that although the 
Western governments support the YPG in the campaign of anti-ISL, they discourage their 
citizens to join the YPG. However, this policy is more related to banning citizens from travel 
to areas of armed conflicts and to prevent their involvement in such conflicts without being 
members of military missions authorised by governments. This is discerned in the statements 
of the Western authorities and officials who warned their citizens not to travel to Syria and not 
to involve in unauthorized military service there (BBC, 3 September, 2014; Tuck, 2017).  For 
example, although UK prime-minster David Cameron admitted that there was "fundamental 
difference" between joining the Kurds to fight against ISIL and joining ISIL, he urged UK 
citizens not to travel to Iraq and Syria (quoted in BBC, 3 September, 2014). The UK Home 
Office considered the unauthorized involvement in armed conflicts as an offence according to 
criminal and anti-terror laws (BBC, 3 September, 2014).137 Although such rules have been 
quite strict regarding those who join ISIL and other Jihadist groups, they remain loose 
regarding the YPG volunteers as the actions of the latter were less seen as offences, and they 
rarely faced legal charges (Moor, 2016).  
 
The authorities of some Western countries have not taken such measures against their citizens 
who have joined the YPG. For example, the Canadian authorities has not adopted such 
provisions against Canadians volunteers who joined the YPG (Hipolito, 2015), Canadian 




authorities advised Canadians who wanted to participate in the military campaign against ISIL 
to join the Canadian military, and to avoid travelling to Syria or volunteering in the YPG 
against ISIL (Hipolito, 2015).  Nevertheless, Canadian members of YPG who returned to 
Canada have not faced arrest or interrogation. The research also found no case of arrest and 
interrogation against American volunteers in the YPG by the US authorities. This is although 
the US department of state discouraged American citizens from travel to Syria and considered 
the unauthorised involvement in an armed conflict as a criminal offence (US Department of 
State, March, 2017).  
 
The narrative of the Turkish officials that constructed the PYD-YPG as criminal organizations 
who perpetrated ethnic cleansing against Arabs and Turkmans in Syria was also not successful 
to convince the international community to view the PYD-YPG as criminal groups, and 
accordingly, the narrative was unable to persuade the other countries to designate the PYD-
YPG as terrorist organizations. As explained earlier the narrative was declined by the report of 
UN special commission on Syria and it was not supported by the reports of human rights 
organizations. The narrative even has not received credit by the Arab countries. This is 
although the Turkish authorities tried to incite Arab countries against the PYD and YPG 
through this narrative. The attempt of Turkish authorities to incite Arab countries against the 
PYD-YPG using this narrative is discerned in the statement of Turkish Ambassador in Bahrain, 
Hatun Demirer who claimed that the YPG razed the houses of Syrian Arab families, and that 
she was surprised for the inaction of Arab countries regarding the YPG violations (MFA, 1 






Legitimizing the military policies of Turkey against the YPG 
The Turkish military repeatedly attacked the YPG positions in Syria, and in August, 2016 the 
Turkish military conducted a military intervention in Syria seizing part of the Syrian territory 
(see Maps 4 and 13). The construction and narrative that have served the Turkish military 
policies in Syria include the following: The PYD-YPG as parts of the PKK, as a threat to each 
of the national security of Turkey and as a threat to territorial integrity of Syria, and as 
perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. The narratives about the threat of PYD-YPG to the national 
security of Turkey and the territorial integrity of Syria were repeated before and during the 
Turkish military intervention of Operation of Euphrates Shield in August, 2016 in Syria (Ant 
& Abdu-Nasr, 2016; Lund, August, 2016; Pamuk & Bektas, August, 2016). For example, 
Turkish PM claimed that Turkey aimed at preventing Syria from being “divided along ethnic 
lines” and “preserving the territorial integrity of Syria” (quoted in Lund, August, 2016).  
Erdogan made it clear that the operation mainly aimed at preventing the YPG form seizing the 
ISIL controlled territory and connecting the Rojava cantons (Pamuk & Bektas, August, 2016), 
(see Map 4).138 During the military operation, Erdogan stated that “we will not allow the 
[Democratic Union Party] PYD/YPG to be at our borders. We will not allow the PYD to 
establish a state there [in Syria]. Everyone has to know that” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 13 April, 
2017).  Likewise, the Turkish interior minister asserted that the YPG should not take the place 
of retreating ISIL militants (Pamuk & Bektas, August, 2016).  
 
The narrative of ethnic cleansing was also used by the Turkish official as an excuse for the 
attacks against YPG positions and before and during the Operation of Euphrates Shield. For 
example, following the capture of Manbij area, which was one of the main ISIL strongholds 
                                                          
138 The area under the control of Euphrates Shield Operation prevents the connection of Afrin canton of Rojava 
to the other cantons.   
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by the YPG, the Turkish authorities refused the YPG progress and accused the YPG of ethnic 
cleansing of Sunni Arabs (AFP, 29 August, 2016; Euronews, 29 August, 2016). During the 
YPG operation of Manbij, Erdogan said that it is a crime against humanity to remain silent to 
the ongoing ethnic cleansing by the PKK and YPG (Hurriyet Daily News, 28 April, 2017). 
Such statements accompanied with intensive attacks on the YPG positions by the Turkish 
forces and its allied Syrian Jihadist militants of FSA (AFP, 29 August, 2016). Statements of 
the Turkish officials also made direct connection between the Operation of Euphrates Shield 
and the prevention of ethnic cleansing by the PYD-YPG. Deputy chairman of the ruling AK 
party, Aktay claimed that a safe zone by Turkey and its allies inside Syria would prevent the 
ongoing ethnic cleansing by the PYD as he stated that “the safe zone would keep the refugees 
inside Syria and prevent ethnic cleansing there. These are the reasons why we want safe zones” 
(quoted in Uras, 2016).  
 
The ideological considerations that influenced Turkish anti-PYD-YPG policy   
Two main ideological considerations have influenced the anti-PYD-YPG policy of Turkish 
authorities. The first consideration is related to the de-facto Syrian Kurdish autonomy as a 
factor that encouraged further nationalist action by the Kurds in Turkey. In particular, the 
Syrian Kurdish autonomy alongside other factors encouraged the Kurds in Turkey to declare 
their autonomy in December, 2015 (Reuters, 27 December, 2015; BBC, 27 October, 2015; 
Beauchamp, 2016). The declaration of autonomy by the Kurds of Turkey is explained in 
chapter 8. The Turkish deputy PM, Nurettin Canikli, constructed Rojava as a conspiracy, which 
aims at dividing Turkey (AA, 14 July, 2016). Several sources highlighted that the aspiration of 
Kurds in Turkey for the achievement of self-governance of Kurds in Syria has become a major 
concern for the Turkish authorities (AFP, July, 2017; Butler, February, 2016; Idiz, 2015; Jones, 
July, 2015; Kingsley, 2017). As highlighted earlier, the Turkish officials expressed repeatedly 
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that they would not allow a Kurdish governed entity in Syria (Ant & Abdu-Nasr, 
2016;  Istanbullu, September, 2016; Pamuk, 24 October, 2015). For example, Turkish Defence 
Minister Fikri Isik stated that "Turkey will prevent the unity of the PYD [Syrian Kurdish] 
cantons at all costs. We will continue our struggle" (quoted in Jones, March, 2017). The Turkish 
officials usually omit reference to the nationalist action of Kurds in Turkey. Instead, they 
describe it as terrorism. Accordingly, the Turkish officials construct the Rojava cantons as both 
a source of terrorism that targets Turkey and a threat to the territorial integrity of Syria as 
explained earlier in this chapter. The terrorism narrative that the Turkish authorities used 
against Rojava autonomy is also discussed in chapter 8.  
 
To prevent the geographical interaction between the Kurds in Rojava cantons and in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey, the Turkish authorities adopted certain measures. One of the main 
measures is the closure of the crossing centres of the border between Turkey and Rojava 
cantons (Coskun & Butler, September, 2016; Letsch, November, 2013). On the other hand, the 
Turkish authorities kept open the crossing-centres between Turkey and the Syrian entities 
governed by Islamist groups of FSA as explained earlier (see Map 7, and Table 5). Turkish 
military also intensified its presence alongside the border. The Turkish military in many 
occasions used gunfire against civilians of Rojava cantons who tried to cross illegally the 
Turkish border (Adel, 2016; Ara News, March, 2017; Dearden , April, 2016; McKernan, 
August, 2017).  In addition, the Turkish military sporadically attacked the YPG positions and 
Kurdish inhabited areas in Syria as explained earlier (BBC, 27 October, 2015; Coles & 
Davison, April, 2017; Toksabay & McDowall, October, 2016).  
 
The second ideological consideration is related to the pro-political Islam ideology of the AKP, 
which contradicts with the enthusiastically-secular ideologies of PYD-YPG and Rojava 
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administration. As highlighted in chapter 4, the AKP has showed itself as the role-model of 
Muslim Brotherhood parties of Arab countries (Aydin-Düzgit, 2014; Gurpinar, 2015: 30-32; 
Yakis, 2014). In addition, the AKP authorities have the ambition to exert stronger regional role 
in the Arab countries through the Sunni Islamist movements. In the case of Syria, the AKP 
supported the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist armed movements of FSA to practice 
influence inside Syria (Mroue, 2015; Gurpinar, 2015: 30-32; Nakhoul, October, 2014; O’Bagy, 
12 April, 2012: 27-28; Yakis, 2014; Zaman, 18 November, 2013).139 
 
The AKP Syrian policy to practice such influence through its border in the north of Syrian was 
challenged by both the Rojava pro-secularism administration, and the resistance of YPG for 
the armed Islamist movements of FSA. The Rojava Charter of Social Contract (constitution) 
asserts secularism and separates religion form governance (Peace in Kurdistan, 2014). The 
charter made no reference to Islam, but it considered all religions practiced in Syria to be equal 
(Peace in Kurdistan, 2014). In addition, the YPG resisted and managed to defeat the Jihadist 
movements of ISIL, Jabhat Al-Nusrah, Ahrar Al-Sham, Ghurba’a Al-Sham and others in 
several conflicts starting from 2012 until the date of writing this research (Abdelaziz, 2017; 
Ahramonline, 2013; Global Security, 2016a; Perry, June, 2015). AKP indirectly expressed its 
anger for the action of PYD-YPG against its Syrian policy. Erdogan described the PYD-YPG 
and PKK as “atheists” who have waged war on Islam (quoted in Svirsky, 2016), and “enemies 
of Islam” (quoted in TCCB, 14 April, 2016). Whereas, Yasin Aktay, the spokesman of the 
ruling AK party claims that the YPG include in its ranks Westerners who are either “crusaders”, 
or “Western intelligence agents” and whose aim is to create a “secular pro-Western Kurdish 
statelet in the heart of Islamic lands” (quoted in Sharma & MacDonald, 2016).  This is although 
                                                          
139 See also Oxford Analytica, 19 September, 2013; Stanford University, 2017.  
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the AKP authorities avoided to openly express that their anger was for the resistance of YPG 
to the Islamist groups, which hampered the AKP policy in Syria.   
 
Figure 6. PYD-YPG as a threat to Turkey; as proxies used by ‘the others’ (1), and as a 
threat to the ‘others’ (2). The construction of PYD-YPG as parts of the PKK serve both the 
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The construction of the PYD and YPG in the Turkish official texts has three dimensions (see 
Figure 6). The first dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat to Turkey. This dimension 
includes the following narratives about the PYD-YPG:    
- They are organic parts of the PKK. 
- They are involved in attacks inside Turkey.  
- They are proxies used by the other countries against Turkey.  
- Their separatist action in Syria, constitute a threat against Turkey.      
The second dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a security threat against international 
community. In particular, the PYD-YPG are constructed as a terrorist threat against the US and 
European countries. The latter have actually supported the YPG in the anti-ISIL campaign. 
The third dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat to Syria and Syrians. This dimension 
has the following two main narrative:    
- The PYD-YPG separatism constitutes a threat to the territorial integrity of Syria.  
- The PYD-YPG are criminal groups that perpetrated ethnic cleansing against Syrians. 
 
Thus, the Turkish official discourse constructs the PYD and YPG to be proxies used by the 
other countries against Turkey, and it constructs them as a threat to the same countries that 
have supported them. In other words, they are used by the others against Turkey, but they are 
also a threat against the same others. The term the ‘others’ mainly implies the US and its allies 
in the campaign against ISIL who have supported the YPG.  
 
The constructions and narratives regarding the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official discourse are 
challenged by the findings of the research. The research argues that these constructions and 
narratives, which are formed in the context of the Turkish official narrative of terrorism have 
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certain implied messages that serve certain agendas and policies of the Turkish authorities (see 
Figure 6). These are categorised in the constructions that serve delegitimizing the PYD-YPG 
and those serve legitimizing certain Turkish polices against the YPG.   
 
Although the Turkish authorities used its constructions and narratives to legitimize the attacks 
of its military against Rojava and its military intervention in Syria, these constructions and 
narratives could not achieve their goal of delegitimizing the PYD-YPG internationally. This is 
because they are not based on concrete grounds. Nevertheless, occasional measures were taken 
against some Western YPG volunteers by the authorities of their countries, and against pro-
PYD-YPG TV channel and internet accounts by international media companies.   
 
The research found that the PYD-YPG have certain level of relationship with the PKK. 
However, the PYD-YPG are not organic parts of the PKK, and they do not act according to the 
instructions of the PKK against Turkey as the Turkish official discourse claims. The PYD-YPG 
have certain characteristics that are driven from their Syrian Kurdish identities and geopolitical 
interactions and goals, which are dissimilar to these of the PKK.   
 
The research argues that the anti-PYD-YPG policy of Turkish authorities is influenced by two 
main ideological considerations. The first consideration is related to the influence of Rojava 
autonomy over the nationalist action of Kurds in Turkey, and their aspiration for autonomy. 
The second consideration is related to the pro-political Islam ambition of AKP in Syria, which 
have been challenged by the secular ideologies of PYD-YPG and Rojava who managed to resist 
political-Islam and Islamist armed groups in the north of Syria.  However, the Turkish officials 
omit reference to these ideological considerations. Instead, they construct Rojava as a source 
of terrorism that targets Turkey.  
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Chapter 7: The approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question during the 





This chapter deals with the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question 
during the peace process. The term approach is used to refer to the constructions and policies 
that Turkish authorities adopted regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question.  The chapter covers 
the period of the pace process from September 2012 to June 2015.  The chapter argues that the 
peace process started in the 4th congress of AKP in the 30th of September, 2012 when Erdogan 
called for a peaceful approach for the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The research also argues that 
the peace process failed following the June, 2015 elections when the Turkish military launched 
a military campaign against the PKK. This is although Erdogan announced the failure of the 
peace process in the 28th of July 2015 (DW, 28 July, 2015).  
 
The analysis of various texts by the Turkish officials reveals that Erdogan statements regarding 
the peace process and Kurdish issue were the dominant.140 Therefore, the data generation of 
the research resulted in more statements by Erdogan. The relevant statements of Erdogan are 
analysed in this chapter alongside the statements of other Turkish officials. Erdogan is a main 
funder of the AKP and he acted as its chairman when he was the prime-minster of Turkey. As 
stated in chapter 4, although Erdogan formally resigned the leadership of AKP when he was 
elected in the 28th of August, 2014 as the president of Turkey he carried out acting as the actual 
chairman of the AKP during his presidency.  
 
                                                          
140 See Appendix Table 6 of the list of main Turkish officials. The list is included to avoid repetition of stating 
their positions in the chapters of analysis.  
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The chapter begins with analysing the constructions of the pro-peace and non-military 
approach of the Turkish officials during the peace process. In the context of dealing with the 
language and policy of the Turkish authorities regarding the peace process, the chapter also 
reveals the attitude of the PKK and legal Kurdish parties of BDP and HDP regarding the peace 
process. One type of constructions that this chapter deals with are the constructions of the 
‘brothering’ discourse, which were repeated in the statements of Turkish officials regarding 
the Kurds during the peace process. As stated in chapter 4, such constructions are more 
discernible in the relevant statements of Erdogan.  
 
In the next sections, the chapter deals with the constructions of the Kurdish question and its 
solution in the Turkish official discourse, which dominated during the peace process. The 
analysis reveals the ways that the Kurdish question was constructed as problems of terrorism 
and underdevelopment in the Turkish official discourse. The chapter also deals with the 
expectations of the Turkish authorities regarding the peace process. The analysis reveals the 
outcomes that the Turkish authorities wanted from the peace process. The analysis deals with 
the constructions of the Turkish officials that called for the disarmament of the PKK, which 
was the main outcome that the Turkish authorities wanted from the peace process. The analysis 
also deals with the constructions that formed the refusal of the Turkish officials to the Kurdish 
demand of autonomy.  In addition, the analysis deals with the term of ‘democratic reforms’, 
which was used by the Turkish officials to construct their response to the Kurdish demands.  
The analysis reveals the types of democratic reforms, which were adopted by the Turkish 






The initiative of peace and the non-military approach  
At the Kurdish national holiday of Newroz on the 21st of March, 2013 the imprisoned PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan called for ceasing the armed action of the PKK in order to engage in a 
peaceful approach through the peace negotiations with the Turkish authorities.141 The call of 
Ocalan was written as a letter, which was read out by the deputy of Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP), Pervin Buden. The call demanded the PKK to adopt a ceasefire and to withdraw its 
militants outside the territory of Turkey. The call stated:  
“We have reached the point where weapons can fall silent and ideas and democratic 
politics will have the chance to speak”, “I say a new era is beginning. Politics gain 
prominence over weapons. We have now come to the stage of the withdrawal of 
our armed forces outside the borders…” (Ocalan, 24 March, 2013).  
 
The PKK and BDP supported the call of Ocalan, which was also celebrated by the Kurds as 
the beginning of the era of peace (BBC, 21 March, 2013).  On 23 March, 2013, Murat 
Karayilan, the executive leader of the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and described 
Ocalan’s call as “historic, correct and very important” and as “the start of a new period” (quoted 
in Reuters, 23 March, 2013). Later, the PKK started to withdraw the first batch of its militants 
from inside Turkey to its camps in the Qandil mountainous areas in Iraqi Kurdistan (BBC, 25 
April, 2013, Letsch, 8 May, 213).142    
 
The new phase of the peace negotiations was already initiated by the Turkish authorities before 
the call of Ocalan. As stated in chapter 4, the AKP opening approach laid the ground for the 
                                                          
141 Newroz or Newruz: in Kurdish and Persian means ‘the new-day’ in English, and it is an ancient holiday 
celebrated, mainly by Kurds, Persians and other peoples. It is also the first day of the Persian and Kurdish 
calendars. However, Kurds have considered Newroz as part of their national identity and struggle for the right to 
self-determination. 
142 Qandil is also transliterated as Kandel or Kandil in some sources.  
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peace process. Chapter 4 also referred to the secret talks between the PKK and Turkish 
intelligence service (MIT), which were interrupted in 2011 (Kutschera, 2012). Unlike the secret 
talks of Oslo, the peace process and its negotiations were declared by the AKP leadership. As 
stated earlier, the research considers the speech of Erdogan of the 30th of September 2012 as a 
declaration of the peace process. In his speech, Erdogan stated that “starting today, we want to 
open a new page”, “we want to protect that clean page from violence and we want to make it a 
page of peace and brotherhood” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Likewise, the 
then Turkish president, Abdullah Gul who is also one of the founders of AKP made a pro-peace 
statement on 20 March, 2013, while Kurds were celebrating the eve of their national holiday 
(Newroz).143 Gul stated that “the Nevruz holiday is being celebrated in a period during which 
positive developments are taking place and hopes for reaching a better future are refreshed” 
(quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 21 March, 2013). In an earlier statement on 11 March, 2013, 
Gul said that the peace efforts were supported by the people of Turkey as he stated that “a 
substantial majority of our people support these endeavours” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 
11 March, 2013).  
 
However, the Turkish officials did not use the term ‘peace process’. Instead, the used terms 
such as “resolution process”, “solution process”, “settlement process” to name the process 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 14 November, 2014; BYEGM, 31 December, 2014; Hurriyet 
Daily News, 9 April, 2013, 27 April, 2013; TCCB, 29 January, 2015). The Turkish authorities 
avoided using the term ‘peace process’ because this would imply that the process was political 
process between two political partners including the Turkish officials and representatives of 
Kurds. Although the Turkish authorities emphasized the need for a peaceful solution, they 
                                                          
143 See the earlier footnote about Newroz.  
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constructed the main goal of the peace process to be solving the terrorism problem.  This is 
explained in this chapter and in chapter 8.   
 
Erdogan expressed commitment to the peace process despite the actions of provocation by 
actors who opposed the peace process. Just two days before the call of Ocalan both the 
headquarter of AKP and the Turkish ministry of justice were targeted by two explosive attacks. 
According to the Turkish media, the attacks were by Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party 
(DHKP-C).144 However, both Erdogan and his deputy Bulent Arinc claimed that these attacks 
aimed at sabotaging the peace process (Hurriyet Daily News, 19 March, 2013). Erdogan stated 
that these attacks targeted “democracy, the resolution process, our national will, as well as our 
fraternity” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 19 March, 2013). In his statement, Erdogan 
considered the peace process as a vital project for the future of Turkey, and that it was closely 
connected to its democracy and national interests. Erdogan also claimed that such attacks 
would not force the AKP authorities to retreat from the process as he stated that “we won't be 
discouraged by these attacks”, “we will never give up the process and never leave it to some 
tactless jobbers” (quoted in AA, 20 March, 2013).  
 
The statements of Turkish officials that dominated the era of peace process described the 
military approach against the PKK as counterproductive and painful option. This is discerned 
in the statements of Turkish president, prime-minster, and advisors of prime-minster (BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012, October, 2012b, 19 December, 2014; Hurriyet Daily News, 27 
February, 2013, 21 March, 2013). In an interview with CNN-Turk TV, Gul stated that “violence 
                                                          
144 For more about DHKP/C, see chapter 5. Also see:  Hay, M. (2015). What we know about the left-wing 
militant group that took a prosecutor hostage in Turkey. Vice. [online]. Available at: 
http://www.vice.com/read/what-we-know-about-the-left-wing-militant-group-that-took-a-prosecutor-hostage-in-
turkey-402 [accessed 20 November, 2015].   
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is no longer beneficial”, “the pains it caused are evident” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 27 
February, 2013). Likewise, Erdogan described the solution to be the peace project of AKP and 
insisted that the military approach against the PKK was not the right policy and described the 
armed confrontation as “ruthless” action because its main victims were the Turkish “soldiers 
and police” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012).  Likewise, advisor of the prime-
minster, Hatem Ete emphasized the importance of the peace process as he stated that “both the 
state and the organization understood that they are not able to achieve results with the security-
based struggle method in which they had engaged for 30 years” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
19 December, 2014). Ete used ‘the organization’ to denote the PKK. 
 
The Turkish officials also constructed this narrative in emotional contexts by using emotional 
terms and structures. For example, Erdogan referred to the casualties among the Turkish 
military and police and stated that “we do not want to see mothers and fathers with tears in 
their eyes”, "stop the tears of mothers and fathers” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). 
Likewise, Turkish army chief, Necdet Ozel stated that “we do not want the mothers to cry 
anymore" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 1 September, 2014). Erdogan also repeated the word 
“children” and other words that incite emotions as he described the casualties of police and 
military in his statement that “nobody would like to see their children die at a young age. May 
God protect us from experiencing such grief. No mother, no father should ever experience the 
pain and agony of losing their children” (quoted in BYEGM,1 October, 2014). On the other 
hand, Erdogan described the non-military approach as a relief for the families of police and 
soldiers who were under stress and fear because of the military operations against the PKK 
(BBC Monitoring, October, 2012; BYEGM,1 October, 2014).  In his 2013 speech at the 
Brookings institution in Washington, Erdogan described the previous 30 years as the source of 
bad news about death caused by the PKK ‘separatist terrorism’ and that after launching the 
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peace process there were no more cases of death as he stated that “for the last 30 years, we've 
always been hearing bad news every day because of separatist terrorism, but in the last 4 
months, we have not had any incidents, and there has not been any loss of life” (quoted in 
Brookings, 17 May, 2013).  
 
The analysis of texts that include the statements of the Turkish president, Gul and foreign 
minister (FM), Davutoglu, which were produced during the era of peace process, revealed that 
they avoided constructions that encouraged military confrontation. The analysis also found that 
the dominant narratives of the statements of Gul and Davutoglu during the peace process 
concentrated on democracy, corporation, economic development and peace (BYEGM, 
December, 2013, February, 2014, March, 2014; Dews, 19 November, 2013; MFA, April, 
2014). For example, Gul stated that “in our country, significant steps were taken to provide for 
the atmosphere of peace and security, and considerable advancements were achieved in the 
area of democracy and economy” (quoted in BYEGM, December, 2013). Likewise, Davutoglu 
emphasized the importance of peace for Turkey as he stated that “without peace, stability, rule 
of law and good governance we cannot provide prosperity for our people” and he also stressed 
the relationship between development and peace as he stated that “there is no peace without 
sustainable development and there is no sustainable development without peace” (quoted in 
MFA, April, 2014). However, the constructions of pro-peace and non-military approach are 
inter-discursively connected to the other constructions, which are discussed in the rest of this 
chapter.   
 
The brothering discourse   
As stated earlier, the constructions and narratives that the research named as the ‘brothering 
discourse’ are discerned in the texts of AKP officials. During the peace process, the 
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constructions of brothering discourse dominated the relevant statements of Turkish officials. 
In particular, they dominated major parts of Erdogan statements about the Kurds. In the 
statements of Turkish officials, which include the narratives of brothering discourse certain 
terms are repeated such as “fraternity”, “brotherhood”, “brothers”, and “embrace” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, October, 2012, October, 2012b; BYEGM, 12 October, 2014, 29 October, 
2014, 31 December, 2014, 23 March, 2015; Hurriyet Daily News, 22 March, 2013). For 
example, Davutoglu used the brothering structures in his statements such as "Kurdish sisters 
and brothers" (quoted in Bekdil, 2014), “our brothers -citizens of  Kurdish origin” (BBC 
Monitoring, 9 October, 2014), and “my Kurdish siblings” (quoted in BYEGM, 9 October, 
2014). As stated earlier in chapter 4, the brothering discourse has ideological considerations, 
which construct Islam and the Ottoman heritage as umbrellas that joins Turks, Kurds and 
others. This is discerned in the constructions made by Erdogan in his speech during the 2012 
AKP congress such as "we all turn the same way when we pray”, and “we are brothers” (quoted 
in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Erdogan also referred to Islamist historical figures who 
were of Kurdish origins like Saladin Ayubi as he stated that “my Kurdish brother is the 
descendant of Saladin Ayubi, the beloved ruler of the East and the conqueror of Jerusalem” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Likewise, Davutoglu used structures that prised 
the Kurdish figures of the Ottoman era as he stated that “there is no difference between Feqiye 
Teyran's beautiful Kurdish and Yunus Emre's pleasing Turkish for us" (quoted in BYEGM, 10 
December, 2014). Both Feqiye Teyran and Yunus Emre's were famous poets during the era of 
Ottoman empire.   
 
During the peace process, the constructions of brothering discourse were interdiscursively 
connected to those of pro-peace and non-military approach. For example, Erdogan stated that 
"resolution process is the biggest brotherhood project of Turkey" (quoted in BYEGM, 31 
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December, 2014). Accordingly, the peace process was also named by Erdogan as ‘brotherhood 
project’. In another statement Erdogan said that “we want to promote brotherhood in this 
country together with our Kurdish brothers” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). 
Erdogan added that “our path is the path of love, fraternity, kindness, embrace and unification” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Likewise, the Turkish president, Gul referred to 
the peace process and stated that “I hope that this process serves as a means for the beginning 
of an era in which our fraternity consolidates again. Everybody in Turkey lives in peace and 
serenity and prosperity is sovereign” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 22 March, 2013). 
Similarly, the advisor of prime-minster and former minister of interior, Basir Atalay stated that 
“no more loss of life. Just let there be fraternity” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b).  
 
The constructions of the brothering discourse, however, consider those who are pro-AKP as 
insiders and those who are not pro-AKP as outsiders. Accordingly, the brothering discourse is 
in relationship with the AKP constructions of the ‘othering’ discourse as the constructions of 
the brothering discourse explicitly or implicitly use the pronouns ‘they’ and ‘them’ and their 
associated terms and structures to denote the outsiders who are outside the group of insider that 
joins the AKP and its supporters, and this is discerned in using the pronouns of ‘we’ and ‘us’ 
and their associated terms and structures. Van Dijk (2006b) highlights the ideological function 
of using terms and pronounces that form a dichotomy between the ‘we’ in-group vs. the out-
group or ‘they’. However, the insiders’ group has also several sub-groups. The core of the 
insiders’ group is the AKP and its authorities, and the others are sub-groups who have various 
levels of proximity to the core of the insiders’ group according to their relationship to the AKP 
and its ideology (see Figure 7 below). This is discerned through the study of the texts of 
Erdogan and AKP officials. For example, throughout his speech in the 2012 congress of AKP, 
Erdogan used the pronouns ‘we and us’ and their associated terms to denote the AKP 
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authorities and supporters, citizens of Turkey, and Muslims in general (BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012).  On the other hand, Erdogan used the pronouns of ‘they and them’ and their 
associated terms and structures to denote those who oppose the AKP and its policy. The latter 
include Turkey’s opposition parties and groups, and governments of other countries who were 
at odds with the AKP policies or ideology (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). The brothering 
constructions are also interdiscursively connected to those of terrorism. This is discussed later 
in this chapter.  
 
The figures below show how the AKP officials constructed the insider group and outsider 
group. Figure 7 shows that the inner circle of the brothering discourse joins the AKP party and 
authorities and is followed by the others circles according to their proximity to the ideology of 
the AKP. Figure 8 shows that the outsiders as the opponents of AKP or those who were at odd 
with the AKP ideology and policy. This include the PKK, PYD-YPG, BDP, HDP, the Turkish 
opposition parties, critical journalists and other individuals in addition to the governments of 
other countries that were at odd with the policies or ideology of AKP. 145 These were also 
constructed as ‘supporter of terrorism’.  This is discussed in this chapter under the title of 
constructing the Kurdish question as terrorism.   
 
                                                          
145 Following the coup attempt of July 2016, the Fethullah Gulen Movement (FETO) was added to the outsiders 





Figure 7. The insider group ‘we’ of the brothering discourse. This shape is approximate 
and depends on the analysis of the speech of Erdogan in the 2012 congress of AKP (see BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012) in addition to other texts by Erdogan and AKP officials. ‘We’ 
has an ideological function as it indicates the in-group vs. the out-group or ‘they’, which is 
presented in the figure below (Van Dijk, 2006b: 126). 
 
 
Figure 8. The outsider group ‘they’ of the brothering discourse. This figure is shaped 
depending on the analysis of various statements by the AKP officials.   
'We' Muslims

















that were at odd 







Constructing the Kurdish question and its solution  
Although the Turkish authorities entered peace negotiations with the PKK, the Turkish officials 
denied and avoided using the term ‘Kurdish question’. This is because the Kurdish question 
has been considered as a taboo in the Turkish nationalist discourse, which insists on the 
indivisibility of Turkey and its nation as discussed earlier in this research.  In other words, the 
statements of Turkish officials reflected the Turkish nationalist discourse, which denied the 
existence of a nation other than the Turkish in Turkey. In particular, the term ‘Kurdish question’ 
has been considered as a threat to the indivisibility of Turkey because it implies the Kurdish 
national demands of self-determination or self-governance. Accordingly, the Turkish official 
discourse denied the existence of the Kurdish question as a political question of a nation, 
Instead, it constructed it as certain problems connected to the Kurds who were constructed as 
an element of the nation of Turkey. The Turkish officials including the president, prime-minster 
(PM), and minister of foreign affairs (FM) usually avoided to refer or denied the existence of 
a Kurdish question in Turkey (Aktan, 2015; BBC Monitoring, October, 2012; Brookings, 18 
November 2013; BYEGM, 23 September, 2014; Hurriyet Daily News, 22 March, 2013). 
However, the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question in Turkey was more emphasized 
by Erdogan. For example, Erdogan used the term “Kurdism” instead of ‘the Kurdish question’, 
which he denied as he stated that “I do not recognize the existence of a Kurdish problem. I say 
yes to the problems of my Kurdish brethern but no to Kurdism! I love my Kurdish brothers, 
but I reject Kurdism” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 7 February 2013). Interdiscursive 
connection between the denial of Kurdish question and brothering discourse is repeated in the 





Erdogan also claimed that admitting the existence of Kurdish question is to accept separatism 
as he stated that “saying ‘there is a Kurdish question’ constitutes, from this point on, 
separatism. The Kurdish question is caused precisely by those who say that there is a Kurdish 
question” (quoted in Aktan, 2015).   
 
Instead of using the term “Kurdish question”, the AKP officials usually used the term ‘Kurdish 
problems’ or ‘problems of the Kurds’. 146 The AKP manifesto states that “the event, which 
some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the Terror problem, is unfortunately 
a reality in Turkey” (AK Parti, n.d.).  However, the usage of the term ‘problems of Kurds’ is 
mainly discerned in the statements of Erdogan.  For example, Erdogan stated that “the AKP 
has taken very resolute and sincere steps for the solution of the problems of my Kurdish 
brothers” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012).  Erdogan repeated this as he addressed 
the Kurds and stated that “let us solve these problems together. Let us solve these problems 
through politics without surrendering to violence” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). 
The Turkish official discourse usually constructed these problems as terrorism and 
underdevelopment. Nevertheless, the construction of the conflict and Kurdish question as a 
problem of terrorism was more dominant. This is discerned in the AKP manifesto that 
constructs the Kurdish question to be mainly a problem of terrorism, which has been in 
interaction with the underdevelopment of the east and south east of Turkey (AK Parti, n.d.).  
The Turkish official texts usually use the terms ‘east and southeast of Turkey’, and they more 
frequently use ‘the southeast’ a reference to the Kurdish region of Turkey. 147 
 
                                                          
146 As stated in chapter 4, Erdogan used the term ‘Kurdish problem’ for the first time in 2005 as he called for the 
need to a peaceful approach to end the conflict (BBC Monitoring, 10 August, 2005). 
147 The Turkish official texts usually use the term ‘the southeast’ a reference to the Kurdish region of Turkey, and 
less frequently ‘east and southeast of Turkey’. 
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Although the AKP was the first ruling Turkish party to acknowledge discriminative policies 
that were adopted against the Kurds, the AKP officials usually rendered these policies to the 
governments of Turkey that preceded the AKP government. This is discerned in the 2013 
speech of Erdogan in the Brookings institution (Brookings, 17 May, 2013). Erdogan claimed 
that Kurds suffered from the policies of “discrimination, denial, and assimilation”, which were 
adopted by the previous governments (quoted in Brookings, 17 May, 2013). Likewise, Atalay 
admitted the repressive policies of previous Turkish governments against Kurds, which were 
ruled by the Kemalist parties (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b).   
 
The Turkish officials also claimed that the AKP conducted democratic reforms that already 
ended such polices of discrimination against the Kurds.  For example, Erdogan stated that “the 
AKP has brought to an end the policies of rejection, denial, and assimilation practiced against 
Kurds in this country for decades” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012).  In another 
statement, Erdogan claimed that the polices of discrimination against the Kurds were ended 
through the “democratic reforms”, which were adopted by the AKP authorities (quoted in 
Brookings, 17 May, 2013). Other officials like Hatem Ete, Advisor of PM claimed that there 
was a “democratic progress under AKP rule”, and that this would guarantee solving the 
problems of Kurds, and therefore, the PKK should lay down its arms and engage in “political 
democratic struggle” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 19 December, 2014). The term ‘democratic 
reforms’ that the Turkish officials repeated during the peace process is discussed in a coming 
section in this chapter. However, the next section discusses the constructions of ‘terrorism and 






Constructing the conflict and Kurdish question as a problem of terrorism  
 As explained earlier in this research, the dominant narrative of Turkish official discourse 
regarding the Turkish-Kurdish conflict constructs the conflict as ‘terrorism perpetrated by the 
PKK’. This was also the case during the peace process.  Although Erdogan in his speech during 
the AKP congress of 2012 called for finding a solution for the conflict through peaceful 
dialogue, he described the conflict as terrorism by the PKK as he stated that “the violence 
perpetrated by the terrorist organization for 30 years has not brought anything but harm to 
Turkey” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Erdogan repeated this narrative in his 
2013 speech in the Brookings Institution as he stated that “Turkey has suffered terrorism in the 
last 30 years. Separatist terrorism..” (quoted in Brookings, 17 May, 2013), and later in 
September, 2014 as he stated that “Turkey, a country that has fought terrorism for many years, 
that has paid a heavy price due to terrorism” (quoted in BYEGM, 23 September, 2014). 
Erdogan and other Turkish officials used constructions that support the assumption that the 
PKK action of terrorism were violent crimes that mainly targeted venerable civilians and civic 
services. For example, Erdogan stated that the PKK “slaughter Kurdish women and girls”, 
“expose Kurdish children to death”, “abduct Kurdish youth and children by force”, “kidnaped 
contractors and engineers”, and “burned down construction equipment” (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012). 
 
The narrative of Turkish officials omits the violent role of the Turkish forces and usually 
constructs the conflict as an action by only one actor; the PKK. Omitting the ‘negative’ role of  
the Turkish forces in the Turkish official narrative is an aspect that serves bias and ideological 
implications (see Van Dijk (2001: 107) .  In addition, this narrative constructs the Turkish 
forces as victims of the PKK terrorism. For example, Erdogan used certain sentences to 
describe the action of the PKK against the Turkish forces as violet crimes, which were 
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perpetrated with treachery as he stated that the PKK “martyr Turkish soldiers and police, 
“shoot a policeman treacherously, ignominiously, and despicably from the back” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Erdogan also used certain lexicons to describe the PKK, 
which invite condemnation such as “murderers”, “lowlifes”, “bloodstained”, “bestial”, 
“treacherous”, “repressive”, “authoritarian”, and “fascistic” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012).  Likewise, Atalay stated that the PKK militants “want more deaths, more 
funerals; they want society and the region to be terrorized” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012b). Such lexicons and structures aim at the negative presentation of the PKK, and 
this serves the ideological considerations of the Turkish authorities (Van Dijk, 2006: 126).  
 
As the Turkish officials described ‘the PKK terrorism’ as the main source of the Kurdish 
problem, they claimed that the main goal of the peace process was to end terrorism.  
Accordingly, the narrative of peace process was interdiscursively connected to that of PKK 
terrorism. This is discerned mainly in the statements of Erdogan (BBC Monitoring, October, 
2012; Brookings, 17 May, 2013).  Erdogan emphasized that terrorism was the main problem 
that needed a solution through non-military approach and described ending terrorism as the 
main subject of the peace process (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012; Brookings, 17 May, 
2013). Erdogan stated that “the war against terrorism cannot be waged through only the security 
forces” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). Erdogan even named the peace process 
as the “process of solving the terrorism problem”, which he considered as “a very vital, 
important process” (quoted in Brookings, 17 May, 2013).  Describing the Kurdish problem as 
a problem of terrorism, which was the main subject of peace process is also discerned in the 
statements of PM advisors Atalay and Akdogan. For example, Atalay stated that “let us sit 
down and talk about terrorism, about the problem, and let us fix it together”, and he added “first 
and foremost to discuss the terrorism angle of the matter” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 
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2012b). In another statement Atalay repeated that “our goal is to end terrorism” (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, 18 December, 2012). Likewise, Akdogan, the advisor of Turkish PM for the file 
of peace process made similar claim and limited the goal of the peace process to ending ‘the 
PKK terrorism’ (Yinanç, 14 January, 2013).  
 
During the peace process, the Turkish officials also constructed various groups and powers as 
‘supporters of terrorism’. The label usually targeted those who were at odd with the AKP 
regardless of their dissimilar agendas and political views. The label of ‘supporter of terrorism’ 
mainly targeted the legal Kurdish parties of BDP and HDP. However, during the peace process, 
the Turkish officials also made an interdiscursive relationship between the constructions of 
‘supporting of terrorism’ and the peace process as they claimed that there were groups and 
powers that aimed at sabotaging the peace process because they are advantaged by terrorism, 
and therefore, these groups and powers continued supporting terrorism. For example, Erdogan 
claimed that there were “lobbyists” who were “feeding on blood”, and therefore, they were 
uncomfortable with the peace process, and they made efforts to sabotage it by supporting 
terrorism (quoted in BYEGM,1 October, 2014). Thus, Erdogan claimed that these groups and 
powers advantaged by the continuation of PKK terrorism in Turkey.  In his speech of 30 
September, 2012, Erdogan used similar narrative and identified those who got advantages from 
supporting the PKK terrorism as internal groups and external powers as he stated that “sadly, 
terrorism receives support not only from outside, from circles that are hostile to Turkey, but, I 
am sorry to say, domestic groups that profit from this bloody market” (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012). In another statement, Erdogan claimed that these groups and 
powers “earned big sums of money” and “gained strength from terrorism” (quoted Hurriyet 
Daily News, 4 May, 2013). The following paragraphs put a light on what did Erdogan meant 
by internal groups and external powers.  
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The term of ‘internal groups’ mainly referred to the Turkish Deep State, the main opposition 
party CHP, politicians, media agencies, and journalists who were at odd with the AKP and its 
Kurdish policy.148 The Turkish Deep State is a clandestine network of Turkish elites who 
consider their grouping and activities above the law (Ganser, 2005; Kanli, 2007; Kaya, 2008; 
Taş, 2014). This is because they believe that their actions are dedicated for maintenance of 
Turkey’s ideological foundations determined by Ataturk, the founder of Turkey. Turkish 
officials usually used other terms to name the internal groups that support terrorism in order to 
sabotage the peace process. For example, Erdogan named them as “dark spots”, and “black 
holes” (quoted Hurriyet Daily News, 4 May, 2013). Likewise, Akdogan named them as “dark 
forces” (quoted in Yinanç, 14 January, 2013). However, in other statements Erdogan refers to 
the identity of these ‘internals’ either explicitly or implicitly. For example, Erdogan referred to 
the CHP as a supporter of terrorism as he started that “as you can see, the main opposition party 
of this country speaks with the language and tone of the terrorist organization” (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012). In another statement, Erdogan claimed that opposition and the 
Deep State apparatus were at odd with the peace process because they advantaged from 
terrorism (Hurriyet Daily News, 4 May, 2013). Erdogan also referred to these ‘internals’ as 
“certain politicians, “certain media”, and “certain circles” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012).  Although Erdogan did not name these ‘certains’, and this implies that the term 
itself is broad and encompasses all those who were at odd with the AKP ideology and its policy 
including politicians, journalists, and media agencies.  
 
The term of ‘external powers’ that were constructed as supporters of terrorism and aimed at 
sabotaging the peace process referred mainly to the governments of other countries who were 
at odd with the policies of the Turkish authorities. In particular, the governments of certain 
                                                          
148 For more details on the Turkish Deep State, see chapter 4.  
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Western countries. For example, Erdogan accused that the Western governments of 
conspiracy against the peace process, and he named Germany and France as he stated that 
"westerners do not want us to solve this problem, I say clearly, Germany does not want it, 
France does not want it and they do not help us on this issue"(quoted in France 24, 10 January, 
2013). Likewise, Atalay accused the European countries of conspiracy against both the peace 
process and the development of Turkey by using the PKK as a “catspaw” against Turkey 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b). The term ‘catspaw’ is a metaphor, and in this 
case it aims at creating negative implications regarding the PKK (Bhatia, 2009; Van Dijk, 
2006). Whereas, Akdogan blamed the European countries and claimed that they were not doing 
enough in supporting Turkey against “the terror organization who is doing very serious work 
in Europe” (quoted in Yinanç, 14 January, 2013). The ‘very serious work’ that Akdogan named 
was a reference to the pro-PKK demonstrations and making-awareness activities, which were 
conducted by the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.  
 
However, and as stated earlier, the term ‘supporter of terrorism’ mainly targeted the legal 
Kurdish parties BDP and HDP. To emphasize that the BDP and HDP supported terrorism, 
Turkish officials constructed them as extensions of the PKK ‘terrorist organization’. For 
example, the BDP was described by Erdogan as “puppet of the terrorist organization”, and 
“extension of the terrorist organization”, and that “its members of parliament only use the 
language of anger, violence, and discrimination” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012). 
In another statement, Erdogan accused the HDP and BDP of direct involvement in ‘terrorist’ 
actions as he stated that they were "waiting in ambush" to return to the old days of terror and 
bloodshed” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 2014b). Likewise, Atalay claimed that the 
BDP supported PKK terrorism as he stated that “they are doing politics in the shadow of 
terrorism. They embrace terrorism. They bless terrorism” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
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October, 2012b). Turkish officials also used emotional structures that invite condemnation 
against the BDP and HDP because they did not stand against the PKK. For example, Erdogan 
claimed that the PKK perpetrated crimes, while the HDP kept silent as he stated that the HDP 
“turn a blind eye to murders, kill and leave mothers without their kids, make children into 
orphans and always cultivate fear” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 2014).  
 
This is although the BDP and HDP were part of the peace process and their role in the peace 
process was admitted and acknowledged by the Turkish officials. Thus, using the label of 
supporter of terrorism against the BDP and HDP contradicted with that they actually involved 
in the peace process. The BDP and later HDP played a major role in facilitating and conveying 
the messages related to the peace process between each of the Turkish authorities, Ocalan, the 
PKK leadership in Qandil mountainous, and the Kurdish public (Akbaba, 2014; Butler, 4 
April, 2013; Daily Sabah, 27 April, 2014; Kurban, 2013: 183-185; World Bulletin: 4 June, 
2014).  Akdogan highlighted the role of BDP regarding the peace process (Yinanç, 14 January, 
2013).  Likewise, Atalay referred to this role of the BDP as he stated that “we all spoke with 
the BDP. We said let politics fix this” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b). The HDP 
was established in October, 2013, and it engaged more actively in the peace process (Fildes, 
2015; Gisselbrecht, 2014: 2-6; Peoples Democratic Party, n. d.). Akdogan, the then Turkish 
PM deputy admitted the role of HDP in the peace process as he stated that "we care about the 
HDP. It is the political talking partner in the process” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 23 October, 
2014). Likewise, Hatem Ete stated that “Ocalan is able to talk to the organization by means of 
the HDP” (BBC Monitoring, 19 December, 2014).  Ete used the term ‘the organization’ to 




Accordingly, the term ‘supporter of terrorism’, which was used by the Turkish officials against 
different actors during the peace process is problematic as it was not limited to those who were 
considered by the AKP authorities as opponents of the peace process, but it also included those 
who actually supported it and were part of it. The narrative that targeted the Kurdish parties 
who were engaged in the peace process was even more dominant in the Turkish official 
discourse. Using the label of supporter of terrorism against HDP is discussed with more details 
in chapter 8. However, all those actors who were constructed as ‘supporters of terrorism’ were 
also constructed as outsiders or the “others”, and this include both those who were considered 
as opponent of the peace process and those who supported the peace process. In other words, 
‘supporters of terrorism’ including the external powers, internal groups, and legal Kurdish 
parties were considered as outsiders in the ‘othering discourse’ of Erdogan and AKP (see 
Figure 8).  As explained earlier, the ideological function of the ‘othering constructions’ is 
underlined by the scholars of CDA (Van Dijk, 2006; Hansen, 2006; Bartilucci, 2010) 
 
The statements of Turkish officials also interdiscursively connected the constructions of the 
brothering discourse to those of terrorism.  This is mainly discerned in the statements of 
Erdogan. For example, Erdogan referred to the PKK and stated that “my Kurdish brother has 
nothing in common with this bloodstained terrorist organization”, “we ask our Kurdish brothers 
to have the courage to raise their voices against terrorism” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012).  In another statement that connected the brothering constructions to those of 
terrorism, Erdogan described the PKK as a ‘vampire’ that was loathed by Kurds whom he 
described as brothers as he stated that “my Kurdish brethren will cry out against these blood 
sucking vampires” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 2014). Erdogan also interdiscursively 
connected the construction of supporter of terrorism to those of the brothering discourse. For 
example, Erdogan constructed the HDP as supporter of terrorism and stated that it was not 
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representing “my Kurdish brothers and sisters” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 10 June, 
2014). In another statement, Erdogan constructed the HDP as supporter of terrorism, described 
the Kurds as his brothers, and he claimed that Kurds who would abandon the HDP because it 
supported terrorism and it was responsible for their pains as he stated:  
“Don’t be deceived by their plots. They say, ‘We are the representative of Kurds.’ 
Go away. What service have you provided for my citizens, for my Kurdish brothers 
and sisters? What have you offered as a service other than tears?”  (quoted in Erkuş, 
2014).  
 
Constructing the Kurdish question as a problem of underdevelopment that was  
dealt with by the AKP authorities  
 
As stated earlier, during peace process period, the Turkish officials also constructed the 
Kurdish question as a problem of underdevelopment in the southeast region of Turkey. The 
Kurdish region is located in the east and south east of Turkey (see Maps 2 and 3 in chapter 
4).149 This narrative is discerned in the statements of Erdogan and other Turkish officials who 
claim that the AKP policy was to end the underdevelopment of the south-east (Al-Jazeera, 
February, 2014; BBC Monitoring, August, 2014, October, 2012, October, 2012b, 30 
November, 2014; Brookings, 17 May, 2013; Hurriyet Daily News, 1 April, 2013, 27 April, 
2013). Erdogan constructed the Kurdish problem as underdevelopment problem and claimed 
that there were development efforts by the Turkish authorities in the south-east of Turkey. 
However, these efforts according to Erdogan statement were limited to both building civic 
service or infrastructure, which he mixed with the term “investments” (quoted in Al-Jazeera, 
February, 2014; BBC Monitoring, October, 2012; Brookings, 17 May, 2013). Erdogan made a 
connection between the peace process and investments in the south-east of Turkey as he stated 
                                                          




that "when the chimney's of the factories start to emit smoke, when employment rises, the 
resolution process will be permanent" (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 27 April, 2013). 
Likewise, Turkish minister of finance, Mehmet Şimşek highlighted the underdevelopment of 
south-east and rendered it to the instability of the region, which was caused by terrorism 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 1 April, 2013). Şimşek also connected investment in the south-east to 
the peace process as he stated that “an investment flow will come to these regions with the 
peace process” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 1 April, 2013).   
 
 Erdogan claimed that the AKP government already achieved big part of investments in 
infrastructure as he stated that “we waged our campaign in conjunction with NGO's. We 
invested nearly 35 quadrillion [old] Turkish lira in this region alone.150 We invested in schools, 
hospitals, roads, power plants--you name it” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012).  
Erdogan in this statement used the number ‘35 quadrillion [old] Turkish lira’ as the amount of 
money spent by the authorities in the region.  This is although the old Lira that Erdogan referred 
to was replaced with the new Lira in 2005 (DW, 6 January, 2005; NBC News, 1 January, 2005). 
Each one million old Lira were converted into 1 new Lira. The old Lira was one of the lowest 
value currencies in the world. However, using such an enormous number of the old currency 
by Erdogan functions as a hyperbole that creates the sense of exclamation and aims at 
influencing the cognition of recipient of text in order to accept its message (Van Dijk, 2006).   
 
The claim that the Turkish authorities conducted large-scale investments in the south-east are 
repeated in other statements of Erdogan (Al-Jazeera, February, 2014; Brookings, 17 May, 
2013).  For example, Erdogan addressed the south east of Turkey and stated that “we've made 
a lot of investments in these areas -- investments which had not been the case in the history of 




the republic” (quoted in Brookings, 17 May, 2013). In another statement Erdogan stated that 
“we have provided very serious incentives for investment in that region. That region is the 
number one priority”, and he added that “we want to take good steps in southeastern Anatolia 
not just with infrastructure but superstructure investments too for reducing unemployment” 
(quoted in Al-Jazeera, February, 2014). 
 
The claims of Erdogan that the AKP authorise made such large-scale investments in the south-
east are inconsistent with his other statements that he made later. The latter reveal that the 
Turkish authorise did not conduct such investments in the south-east. For example, in a meeting 
with the Afghan president, Erdogan claimed that development and economic successes in 
Turkey depended on the public support and that these developments grew from low level (BBC 
Monitoring, 20 October, 2014). In order to support this argument, Erdogan claimed that the 
investments of the east and southeast of Turkey were mainly by the locals, and there were no 
such major investments by the authorities as he stated: 
“We do not have the level of investment we would like in our East and Southeast”, 
“There is small-scale investment”, “these investments are being made mainly by 
the people of the region. Outside investment is very rare. It is the people of that 
region who are making these investments” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 20 
October, 2014).   
   
The claims that the Turkish authorities conducted major investments in the Kurdish region also 
contradict with the dominant narrative of the Turkish officials that blamed the PKK terrorism 
for not achieving such investments. This narrative, which established an interdiscursive 
relationship between the discursive constructions of underdevelopment and terrorism is 
discerned in the statements of Erdogan and other Turkish officials (Al-Jazeera, February, 2014; 
BBC Monitoring, August, 2014, October, 2012; Brookings, 17 May, 2013; Hurriyet Daily 
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News, 1 April, 2013). For example, Erdogan stated that “investments have not been made in 
this region due to the risk of terrorism. If this is eliminated, investments will be made in this 
region” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, August, 2014). Other Turkish officials repeated this 
narrative in their statements and accused the PKK of targeting the efforts of development by 
the government. For example, Atalay claimed that the PKK militants targeted the government 
projects in the region because they “do not want to see investment in the region” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b). Erdogan even claimed that the PKK terrorism blocked the 
development progress of whole Turkey and hampered achieving the goal of Turkey to play a 
global economic role and stated that "if we didn't have the problem of terrorism, Turkey would 
be a very different Turkey right now”, and he added that “when we overcome terrorism, which 
we will, Turkey will offer new horizons to the world” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 4 February 
2013). 
 
The claims of the Turkish officials that the projects of the Turkish authorities in the Kurdish 
region were solely dedicated for the development of the region are also contested. One of the 
well-known projects of Turkey is the South-eastern Anatolia Project (in Turkish: 
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP), which has been carried out since the 1970s (see Map 8 
below). The Turkish governments described GAP as a strategic project of developing the south-
eastern region. During the peace process, the AKP authorities added another claim that the 
GAP project would help the peace process. This is discerned in the statement of Akdogan who 
said that “the action plan of GAP Project which has a budget of 27 billion TL and the peace 
process will promote both the region and Turkey” (quoted in BYEGM, 9 March, 2015). 
However, GAP main achievements were limited to the establishment of several dams on the 
Euphrates and Tigris revisers, which increased Turkey’s capacity of hydropower and irrigation. 
The GAP main goal is  the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the 
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revers of  Euphrates and Tigris (Tsakalidou, 2013). Furthermore, critics argue that the GAP 
project was used by the Turkish governments as a tool to assimilate the Kurds into the Turkish 
society, and they highlighted that hundreds of thousands of Kurds migrated to the majority 
Turkish cities because the dams destroyed their villages, which they were forced to evacuate 
(Jongerden, 2010; KHRP et al., 2002: 17; Tsakalidou, 2013).   
 
During the peace process and following its demise, the AKP authorities carried on the GAP 
project and have constructed Ilisu dam under the banner of developing the southeast region 
although the project was criticized by the EU parliament, environment defenders and others. 
The EU parliament stated that the dam “will have devastating social, environmental and 
political effects”, and added that “this particular region is mainly inhabited by Kurds and that 
the construction will have severe effects on the Kurdish population and culture” (EP, 2015).151  
The Ilisu Dam project was described as ‘controversial’ by the critics as it has caused the 
destruction of the 12.000-year-old historical settlement of Hasankeyf (in Kurdish: Heskif) in 
addition to about 300 other historical sites including Neolithic caves, which met 9 out of 10 
UNESCO criteria for World Heritage Sites (Dernegi, 2013; Duddu, 2014; Gusten, 2013; Harte, 
2014; Letsch, 29 August, 2017). The Kurds who protested the project have considered 
Hasankeyf as an important symbol of their ancient identity (Sweeney, September, 2017). 
Following the failure of the peace process, the AKP authorities forced the residents to evacuate 
Hasankeyf, and continued to destroy its Neolithic caves (Letsch, 29 August, 2017).  The project 
has displaced about 80.000 residents who lost their livelihood of farming, breeding animals 
and tourism (Letsch, 29 August, 2017).  Steve Sweeney (September, 2017) described the action 
of Turkish authorities as “cultural genocide” against the Kurds.   
 
                                                          




Map 8. Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP). Source: (Tsakalidou, 2013). The map shows that 
the project is located in the heart of the Kurdish region of Turkey. The map shows in different 
colours the constructed, under construction, and planned dams. Constructing the GAP dams 
has resulted in evacuating large number of Kurdish settlements. Many of the Kurdish 
settlement are located near the revers and areas of the dams. The map also shows that the dams 
would create a barrier between the Kurdish region of Turkey and the Kurdish regions of Syria 







The outcomes that the Turkish authorities expected from the peace process  
The Turkish authorities considered the disarmament of the PKK as the most important outcome 
that they wanted from the process. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities rejected the 
Kurdish demand of autonomy. Instead, they used the term ‘democratic reforms’ as a concept 
to respond to the Kurdish demands.  
 
Disarmament of the PKK  
The Turkish officials considered the disarmament of the PKK as a priority and the main 
condition for the continuation of the peace process. Gul stated that “it’s obvious that there are 
sincere efforts and intentions [on our side]. Now the other side should show sincerity too, by 
laying down arms” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 11 March, 2013).  According to Gul, the 
‘sincerity’ of the Turkish authorities was already demonstrated by entering the peace process, 
but the ‘sincerity’ of the PKK would be demonstrated if it laid down its arm. This is although 
the process was in its early stage and the Turkish authorities had not responded to the Kurdish 
demands. Erdogan also made similar calls for the PKK to lay down its arms (AA, 23 February, 
2013; BBC Monitoring, 17 February, 2013; Trend News, 18 November, 2013).  Erdogan stated 
that “we are calling on you [PKK] to bury arms, to lay down weapons. We have been sincerely 
working to maintain peace and brotherhood” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 17 February, 2013). 
In another statement Erdogan called the PKK and said:  
“There is only one thing to be done: You will [lay down] your weapons. You will 
conduct your political acts at Parliament. If you have an idea or a thought to say, 
you will express it. If you do that, you will find an interlocutor” (quoted in Hurriyet 
Daily News, 9 March, 2013).  
 
Constructing the disarmament of the PKK as a priority for Turkish authorities is also discerned 
in the statements of other Turkish officials from the beginning of the peace process until its 
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failure. This is discerned in several statements of Davutoglu, and the advisors of PM, Atalay, 
Akdogan, and Ete (BBC Monitoring, July, 2014, October, 2012b, 19 December, 2014; Daily 
Sabah, 8 September, 2014; Yinanç, 14 January, 2013). For example, while presenting his 
government program at the Turkish Parliament, Davutoglu stated that "as Turkey's 62nd 
cabinet, the targets of the new roadmap are ending terrorism, disarmament, and bringing PKK 
members into society and participation in democratic policy” (quoted in Daily Sabah, 8 
September, 2014).  Likewise, Atalay stated that “the goal is this: disarmament. There is nothing 
else to discuss. the whole point of them will be disarmament” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012b). Similarly, Ete emphasized that disarmament was the main subject of 
negotiations with the PKK as he stated that “the topics that the government is taking up and 
will take up with Ocalan are limited to the clarification of the disarmament process of an 
organization, which has decided to lay down arms” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 19 December, 
2014).152 
 
Although the PKK declared a ceasefire and began to withdraw its militant from Turkey to Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the Turkish officials claimed that such steps were not enough, and that the PKK 
should disarm (BBC, 21 March, 2013; Letsch, 8 May, 213). Murat Karayilan, the PKK 
executive leader announced the beginning of the withdrawal of PKK militants by the end of 
April, 2013 and this was followed by the withdrawal of first group of PKK militants from 
Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan  (quoted in BBC, 25 April, 2013; Letsch, 8 May, 213). However, the 
Turkish authorities devalued the step. Erdogan claimed that those who withdrew were only 
20% of the militants and were mostly ‘invalids, children, and old people’ (Perrier, September, 
2013).  The Turkish officials claimed that withdrawal was not enough and that only 
disarmament could convince the Turkish authorities to conduct concrete steps in the peace 
                                                          
152 See also the statement of Davutoglu (AA, 2 March, 2015) 
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process.  Erdogan stated that "from the moment that the arms are laid down, the peace and 
welfare will develop much better” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 1 March, 2015). This attitude 
of the Turkish authorities that devalued the withdrawal and emphasized on the disarmament is 
discerned in the statements of Turkish officials even before the withdrawal of the PKK 
militants in April 2013. This is although the withdrawal was considered by the Turkish 
authorities and PKK as one stage of the peace process. For example, in January, 2013 and 
before announcing the withdrawal, Akdogan stated that “a serious step is to retreat behind 
borders. Disarmament carries a meaning. We are not talking about laying down arms and taking 
them up again when they wish. We are talking about the elimination of arms” (quoted in 
Yinanç, 14 January, 2013).  
 
Rejecting Kurdish autonomy  
The PKK has called for “Democratic Autonomy” as a solution to the Kurdish question in 
Turkey (FT, 22 August, 2013; TATORT Kurdistan, 2013; Uzun, 2014: 22-23 & 19-23). As 
discussed in chapter 5, the notion of democratic autonomy is formed according to Ocalan’s 
doctrine of ‘Democratic Nation’, which demands the decentralization of state and the 
establishment of a new political and administrative system that empowers the status of various 
ethnic, religious and other identities instead of a single nationalist identity that has been 
imposed in countries like Turkey (Ocalan, 2016, 2011). Accordingly, the notion of democratic 
autonomy supports the political representation of not only the Kurds but also the minorities 
who live in the majority Kurdish region of Turkey (TATORT Kurdistan, 2013).  At the 
beginning of the peace negotiations, the representatives of Kurds did not highlight autonomy 
because of the sensitivities of subject and its rejection by the Turkish public (Hurriyet Daily 
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News, 10 December, 2014).153 However, it was expected that the PKK would voice it as the 
main Kurdish demand if the negotiations progressed staidly. In 2011 the Democratic Society 
Congress (DTK) that joined the BDP and other Kurdish parties in Turkey had symbolically 
called for ‘democratic autonomy’ in the Kurdish region of Turkey, and this call was supported 
by the PKK. The call included that “we organize communes in the villages, and councils in the 
cities, and in that way try to organize democratic self-management” (quoted in TATORT 
Kurdistan, 2013: 29). However, the Kurdish demand of democratic autonomy as the solution 
for their question in Turkey was unilaterally put in practice in 2015 when the DTK declared it 
(ANF, 27 December, 2015; BBC, 29 December, 2015). The declaration was violently rejected 
by the Turkish authorities (Reuters, 27 December, 2015).  This is discussed in the next chapter 
in more details.   
 
During the peace process, the Turkish authorities rejected any kind of autonomy for the Kurds 
and stressed on maintaining the indivisibility of Turkey. For example, Erdogan underscored 
the territorial integrity and national unity of Turkey and refused autonomy for Kurds whom he 
described as an element out of 36 other elements of the nation of Turkey (Al-Jazeera, February, 
2014). Erdogan stated that “we have no interest in distributing autonomy in Turkey. We would 
not allow such a thing in any case. Because Turkey with its 780.000 square Km territory is a 
whole, but there are 36 different ethnic elements in Turkey” (quoted in Al-Jazeera, February, 
2014). Likewise, Davutoglu denounced the demand of autonomy and implied that such a 
demand would lead to “dissolution” and implied the Kurds to be ‘a member’ of Turkey’s nation 
as he stated that “for us the resolution process is not a dissolution process, on the contrary it is 
a cohesive process for all the members of nation” (quoted in BYEGM, 10 December, 2014). 
                                                          
153 Democratic autonomy was included in the “draft negotiation framework”, which was proposed by Ocalan 
and supported by the PKK and HDP (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 10 December, 2014).   
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Hatem Ete was clearer as he ruled out autonomy to be part of the negotiations of the peace 
process as he stated that “autonomy is not discussed with Ocalan today and it will not be 
discussed with him tomorrow” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 19 December, 2014). Likewise, 
Akdogan refused the notion of autonomy and described it as an “extreme point”, and he called 
the Kurds to adopt instead a “more moderate point”, which would guarantee their “rational” 
rights as citizens of Turkey (quoted in Yinanç, 14 January, 2013).   
 
Erdogan also interdiscursively connected the constructions of brothering discourse to the 
constructions of anti-autonomy (see Fairclough, 2003). For example, Erdogan stated that “I 
said ‘one people’ against those who want to split us apart because that’s our belief. I love my 
Kurdish brother, my Arab brother and my Turkish brother in the same way. I don’t 
discriminate” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 9 March, 2013). In other statements, Erdogan 
used Islamist constructions to denounce autonomy. For example, Erdogan refused autonomy 
as a solution for the Kurdish question and stated that “these peoples are each other’s brothers, 
and we are the sons of this motherland”, “therefore, the Kurd is my brother and the Turk is my 
brother” and added that “this is because Allah created us like this” (quoted in Al-Jazeera, 
February, 2014).154  
 
The Turkish officials constructed the peace process as a project that would emphasize the 
indivisibility of Turkey. That is, it was constructed as a process that aimed at preserving 
Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. For example, Gul constructed the peace 
process as a project that would serve Turkey’s “national unity and integrity as well as its unitary 
structure” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 11 March, 2013). However, this narrative is mainly 
discerned in Erdogan’s statements who named the peace process as “the national unity and 
                                                          
154 Allah is the God of Muslims.  
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brotherhood project”, and “national unity and fraternity project” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012, 3 November, 2014, 1 January, 2015; BYEGM, 28 February, 2015). Likewise, 
Atalay claimed that Turkey and its nation would empower as the result of the peace process 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b). Similar claim is repeated in the texts of interview 
of deputy chairman of AKP, Mehmet Sahin (BBC Monitoring, April, 2013). 
 
During the peace process period Erdogan emphasized the notion of the indivisibility of Turkey.  
Erdogan repeated his maxim “one nation’, ‘one flag’ ‘one homeland,’ ‘one state” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, January, 2013; Hurriyet Daily News, 28 December, 2012; TCCB, 29 
January, 2015). This maxim of Erdogan is also referred to in chapter 5.  Erdogan also used the 
same terms in different forms such as “we have gathered under a single flag”, “we are a single 
motherland and we are the citizens of the republic of Turkey. We are a single motherland and 
a single country “(quoted in Al-Jazeera, February, 2014).  
 
Other terms of Turkish nationalist discourse that serve the notion of the indivisibility of Turkey 
are repeated in the statements of Turkish officials about the peace process. For example, the 
terms of “the nation”, “the people”, “this nation”, “this country”, “this homeland”, “my 
country”, “my nation”, and “my state”, which indicate the unity of Turkey’s territory and its 
single national identity are repeated in the statements Erdogan and other officials about the 
peace process and the Kurdish problem (quoted in BBC Monitoring, January, 2013, April, 
2013, October, 2012, October, 2012b). In addition, the term ‘citizens’, which emphasized the 
attachment of Kurds to Turkey was widely used by the Turkish officials (see: BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012, October, 2012b, 9 October, 2014; Brookings, 18 November 2013; Yinanç, 14 
January, 2013). For example, while referring to the peace process, Erdogan stated that “we will 
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advance on our path to embrace all citizens with this project of peace" (quoted in BYEGM, 31 
December, 2014).  
 
The democratic reforms  
The Turkish officials usually framed the demands of Kurds in the loose term ‘democratic 
reforms’. Constructing terms like democracy, and democratic reforms to be as the main 
commitment of the Turkish authorities towards the Kurds is discerned in the statements of 
Turkish president, PM, FM, and advisors of PM (Al-Jazeera, February, 2014; BBC Monitoring, 
October, 2012b, 19 December, 2014; Brookings, 17 May, 2013, 18 November 2013; BYEGM, 
December, 2013; Pen International, 13 November 2012; Yinanç, 14 January, 2013). Davutoglu 
described the peace process as “democratization and reconciliation process” (quoted in 
BYEGM, 19 October, 2014).  
 
The Turkish official also claimed that the democratic reforms would end the terrorism of PKK. 
Accordingly, they interdiscursively connected the constructions of democratic reforms to those 
of terrorism. Gul claimed that the best way to combat and isolate terrorism is to continue the 
democratic reforms (Pen International, 13 November 2012). Gul made an interdiscursive 
relationship between the constructions of democracy, terrorism and the peace process as he 
stated that “terrorist groups are uneasy about democratic reforms in Turkey, and that they 
increase terrorist acts to undermine this process” (quoted in Pen International, 13 November 
2012). Likewise, Davutoglu stated that "the peace process prioritizes the democratic politics. 
When the democratic politics is adopted, there is no room for guns, violence or terror acts” 
(quoted in BYEGM, 16 February, 2015). Erdogan made a similar claim as he described the 
peace process as “democratization process”, which would overthrow “all the excuses and 
pretexts that terror had in hand” (quoted in Brookings, 17 May 2013).  
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During the peace process, the Turkish authorities adopted modest reforms which served 
democracy and human rights in general. One of the reforms, which was part of ‘the fourth 
reform package’ adopted in April 2013 by the Turkish parliament eased the pressure over the 
freedom of expression by narrowing the scope of the charge of “terror propaganda” (HRW, 19 
December, 2014; Hurriyet Daily News, 11 April, 2013).  The latter is punished according to 
both the Turkish anti-terror law and penal code. However, the reform package lifted the ban on 
the journalists and media agencies to quote and publish the statements of ‘terrorist 
organizations’ including the PKK (HRW, 19 December, 2014). The reform package was also 
a response to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which stood 
against the repeatedly used charge of ‘terror propaganda’ that the ECHR considered as a 
violation against the freedom of expression (example, see ECHR, 2013: 28-29). Nevertheless, 
Amnesty International report (30 April, 2013) argues that these reforms adopted by the Turkish 
authorities fell short on the freedom of expression. Amnesty report argues that the amendment 
about the charge of terror propaganda included vague terms as it stated that the charge would 
be used only against statements that included “coercion, violence or threats” (quoted in AI, 30 
April, 2013). The latter terms were considered by Amnesty as to be too broad and subject to 
biased interpretations. Andrew Gardner, Amnesty International’s researcher on Turkey 
criticized the limitations of the amendment and stated that “Turkey has a history of broad and 
vague laws which have been applied in violation of the right to freedom of expression. Turkey’s 
lawmakers should have put an end to this” (quoted in AI, 30 April, 2013).  
 
The Turkish authorities also adopted certain laws to legally frame the peace process and to 
authorise the government to conduct certain steps in relation to the process. However, the laws 
were vague and the protection that the legal frame provided was limited to the Turkish officials 
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and excluded the Kurdish politicians and activists who were involved in the peace process.155 
In April 2014, the Turkish authorities amended the law of the National Intelligence 
Organisation (MIT). The amendment authorised the MIT to contact “any entity threatening 
national security” including “terrorist organizations” (BPC, April, 2014: 20).  Accordingly, the 
law legalized the MIT negotiations with Ocalan and the PKK leadership. This was followed by 
a broader law named ‘the Law on Ending Terror and Strengthening Social Integration’, which 
was adopted by the Turkish parliament on 10 July, 2014 (Zeldin, 15 August, 2014). In addition 
to authorizing the Turkish governmental institutions and officials to contact the PKK, the law 
also offered limited amnesty to the PKK members who would give up their arms and surrender 
to the Turkish authorities (Zeldin, 15 August, 2014). However, the law was unclear as it did 
not refer to the particular Kurdish issues that the government would deal with and omitted any 
reference to the party that would represent the Kurds in the negotiations either the PKK or the 
then legal Kurdish party BDP. Instated, the law used vague and broad terms to address the steps 
that the Turkish government supposed to take in the peace process as it stated that the 
government would deal with “political, legal, socio-economic, psychological, cultural, human 
rights, security, and disarmament fields and on related issues” (quoted in Zeldin, 15 August, 
2014).  
 
The main democratic reforms, which touched the Kurdish identity during the peace process 
were limited to removing the ban on practicing and teaching Kurdish language and using the 
Kurdish names of the villages and geographical locations, which were Turkified (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 2 March, 2014).156 However, the Turkish officials usually described the right to 
use the Kurdish language as a major issue in the peace process and Kurdish problem, and 
                                                          
155 See also IHD. (5 May, 2014). 
156 Turkified means their names were change by the Turkish authorities from Kurdish to Turkish names.   
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claimed that the AKP authorities already secured this right.  For example, in his speech in the 
parliament, Erdogan considered the right to practice the mother tongue as the principal 
indicator of cultural rights of Kurds, and as a main response by the Turkish authorities to the 
Kurdish expectations form the peace process (BYEGM, 1 October, 2014). Erdogan even 
claimed that the Turkish authorities permitted the practice of Kurdish language even before 
adopting the reforms that admitted using the Kurdish language by the Turkish parliament as he 
stated that “the AKP removed the hurdles preventing mothers from speaking in Kurdish to their 
children. The AKP cleared the way for the teaching of the Kurdish language” (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, October, 2012). Likewise, Atalay claimed that the AKP government was the first 
that made the Kurds practice their language without restrictions. Atalay stated that “these 
citizens were at one time unable to speak in their mother tongue, unable to make music in their 
mother tongue. Now look at where the state is at. It is now saying, if you want your mother 
language I shall teach you” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, October, 2012b).  
 
These statements, nevertheless, do not reflect the actual level of reforms adopted regarding the 
Kurdish language.  It was only in March 2014 when the Turkish parliament adopted the bill of 
'democracy package’, which lifted the ban on teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish language 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2 March, 2014; Taşpinar & Tol, 22 January, 2014). However, the law 
limited the permission of teaching Kurdish to private schools and did not support teaching the 
Kurdish language in the public schools (HRW, 19 December, 2014; Taşpinar & Tol, 22 
January, 2014: 5). Although the AKP manifesto supported the right of Kurds to use their mother 
tongue, it emphasized the status of the Turkish language as the official language of Turkey 




The reforms adopted by the Turkish authorities were short of dealing with another major 
obstacle of the peace process. This was the high threshold of 10% of the total votes in elections, 
which has been the condition to enter the parliament as a political party (HRW, 19 December, 
2014; Taşpinar, & Tol, 22 January, 2014; Tremblay, 29 March, 2014). This high threshold was 
a major barrier that prevented the Kurdish political parties from entering the Turkish parliament 
(Taşpinar, & Tol, 22 January, 2014).157 Although the reforms related to the Kurds needed 
voting in the Turkish parliament, there was no Kurdish political party representing the Kurds 
in the parliament. The BDP and HDP deputies in the parliament were elected to the parliament 
as independent individuals because their parties were not able to pass the high threshold of 
10% to enter the parliament as political parties. However, the HDP managed to pass the 10% 
in the elections of June 2015. This success was quite late as the research considers the era that 
followed the announcement of the results of June 2015 elections as the beginning of the failure 












                                                          
157 The HDP was the only pro-Kurdish party in the history of Turkey to enter the Turkish as it succeeded in 



















Figure 9. The interdiscursive relationship between the major constructions of chapter 7. 
The constructions of the peace process function as a node that was connected to all the 
constructions. Constructions of terrorism comes next in the number of connections to other 
constructions. This figure depends on the analysis of the Turkish officials’ statements and other 
texts that the chapter dealt with. CDA highlights the importance of revealing the aspects of 
interdiscursivity in the text (Fairclough, 2003).                
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Conclusion  
During the peace process the Turkish authorities adopted a non-military approach regarding 
the Kurdish question. The Turkish officials’ constructions of pro-peace and non-military 
approach are discerned throughout the chapter and they are interdiscursively connected to the 
other constructions that are discussed in the chapter.  
  
Constructions of the brothering discourse are also noticeable in the statements of Turkish 


















Erdogan. These constructions usually aimed at building the assumption that Kurds were in 
positive relationship with the AKP authorities depending on its Islamist background.  However, 
the discourse creates a dichotomy between the insider group, which includes those who were 
closer to the AKP and its ideology and the outsiders’ group, which includes those were at odd 
with the AKP. The latter were political parties, individuals, groups and governments. In other 
words, like the othering discourse, the brothering discourse usually uses ‘we and us’ and their 
associated terms and structures to refer to the insiders and ‘they and them’ and their associated 
terms and structures to refer to the outsiders.  
 
Although the AKP was the first ruling party of Turkey that acknowledged the discrimination 
against the Kurds, the AKP authorities rendered the discriminative policies against the Kurds 
to the previous governments that ruled Turkey before the AKP. The Turkish official discourse 
denied the existence of the Kurdish question, and the Turkish officials avoided using the term 
‘Kurdish question’. Instead, they named the question as ‘problems of Kurds’, which were 
constructed mainly as the problem of terrorism and the problem of underdevelopment.   
 
Terrorism was the dominant construction in describing the conflict and Kurdish question, and 
the discursive constructions of terrorism interdiscursively connected to the majority of the other 
constructions that are discussed in this chapter. Although the Turkish authorities were engaged 
in peace negotiations with the PKK, the Turkish officials continued to describe the PKK as a 
terrorist organization and the conflict as terrorism. This is discerned in the statements of the 
Turkish officials, which reflected the policies of the Turkish authorities. The Turkish officials 
usually omitted in their statements references to the violent role of the Turkish forces in the 
conflict. Instead, they constructed the conflict as an action of terrorism conducted by only one 
actor; the PKK. Accordingly, the Turkish authorities considered terrorism to be the main 
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problem that the peace process aimed at dealing with. In addition to the dominant description 
of the PKK as terrorist organization, the label of ‘supporter of terrorism’ was used against other 
groups, powers, and individuals. These included legal Kurdish parties of BDP and HDP, 
Turkish opposition parties, external powers, other groups and individuals who were at odd with 
the AKP policy. The constructions of terrorism are also inter-discursively connected to those 
of the brothering discourse in the statements of Turkish officials that construct Kurds as insider 
‘brothers’, while they construct the PKK, BDP and HDP as outsiders. Such statements usually 
use the terms of ‘the terrorist organization’ to refer to the PKK and ‘the supporters of the 
terrorist organization’ or ‘supporters of terrorism’ to refer to the BDP and HDP.  
 
The Turkish officials also constructed the Kurdish question as a problem of underdevelopment 
that the south-east of Turkey underwent. The Turkish officials claimed that the Turkish 
authorities have dealt with the underdevelopment of the south-east through major investments. 
This is although such claim is inconsistent with the other dominant narrative of the Turkish 
officials that the Turkish authorities were unable to conduct investments in the south-east 
because of the terrorism of the PKK. The Turkish officials also described the GAP project as a 
major investment that would support the peace process, and the Turkish authorities carried on 
implementing the project of Ilisu dam. This is although the project was criticized by the EU 
parliament, environmentalists and others as it has led to displacement of the inhabitant Kurds, 
and the destruction of their historical sites and culture.  
 
The statements of the Turkish officials considered the disarmament of the PKK as both the 
main subject of peace process and the main goal to be achieved. The disarmament of the PKK 
was called for by the Turkish officials even during the early stage of the peace process. In the 
other side, the Turkish officials refused the Kurdish demand of autonomy and emphasized on 
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the indivisibility of Turkey’s nation and territory.  The Turkish officials usually used the term 
‘democratic reforms’ to denote the response of the Turkish authorities to the political demands 
of the Kurds. However, the main reform that touched the Kurdish identity was the right to 
practice the Kurdish language as the mother tongue. The Turkish authorities also adopted 
modest legal reforms that supported human rights in general. This in addition to certain laws 
that provided the protection to its officials who were involved in the peace negotiations and 
other relevant acts related to the peace process. However, this protection was limited to the 
























Chapter 8: The impacts of the events and agendas of October, 2014-April, 2017 on the 







The previous chapter dealt with the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish 
question during the peace process. This chapter deals with the impacts of certain events and 
agendas on the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the peace process and Kurdish 
question. These events and agendas are related to the period between October, 2014-April, 
2017. The chapter concentrates on the AKP agendas that led to the failure of the peace process 
and changed its approach regarding the Kurdish question. The chapter also highlights the 
impacts of the pro-military and repressive measures approach of the AKP on human rights. As 
stated earlier, the research argues that the peace process failed following the elections of June 
2015.  
 
However, the first section of the chapter deals with the Kobani crisis, which caused a lack of 
confidence and a certain degree of stalemate in the peace process. This section discusses the 
constructions that the Turkish authorities used to describe both the events related to Kobani 
and the involved actors. Then the section reveals the security measures that were taken by the 
Turkish authorities in the Kurdish region during the crisis, and the laws that were adopted 
following the crisis. The analysis concentrates on the narratives that the Turkish officials used 
to describe such measures and laws.158 
                                                          
158 To avoid repetition of stating the positions of Turkish officials who have statements in the chapters of analysis, 




Then the analysis deals with the influence of the elections and voting agendas of AKP 
authorities on the peace process and their approach regarding the Kurdish question. These 
agendas are analysed in the context of relevant events. Accordingly, the analysis deals with 
these agendas in two stage. The first stage is about the agenda and events of pre-June 2015 
elections, and the second stage is about these following the June 2015 elections. However, the 
post-June 2015 stage is longer as it extends to 2017. This as the researcher argues that the post-
June 2015 approach was not limited to the agenda of the November 2015 snap elections that 
followed the June elections, but it also extended to serve the agenda of April, 2017 referendum 
to change the constitution. 
 
In the first stage, the analysis deals with the relationship between the June 2015 elections 
agenda and the pro-peace statements of the Turkish officials following the Kobani crisis. The 
analysis also discusses the Dolmabahce agreement of peace between the Turkish authorities 
and the representatives of Kurds. The analysis concentrates on the disarmament of the PKK as 
the main outcome that the AKP authorities wanted from the Dolmabahce agreement. The 
analysis also discusses the importance of the agreement and its limitations.  
 
In the second stage, the analysis reveals the impacts of the post-June 2015 elections and voting 
agendas of the AKP on the peace process and the Kurdish question. The analysis highlights the 
dramatic change of the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question. In 
particular, the analysis deals with the narratives of the Turkish authorities regarding the 
abandonment of the peace process and the adoption of a military campaign against the PKK. 




The analysis deals with the anti-HDP approach that the Turkish authorities adopted following 
the June 2015 elections. In particular, the analysis highlights the relationship between the 
agenda of the AKP regarding the snap elections of November, 2015 and its anti-HDP approach. 
The analysis concentrates on the constructions of the HDP as supporter of PKK terrorism, and 
the repressive measures that the HDP faced.  
 
The chapter also deals with the constructions and policy of the Turkish following the 
December, 2015 declaration of autonomy by Kurds in Turkey. The chapter discusses the 
relationship between the approach of the Turkish authorise regarding the autonomy of Kurds 
in Turkey and the referendum agenda of the AKP. The chapter reveals the violations against 
human rights perpetrated by the Turkish authorities and the way they used the narrative of 
terrorism against the HDP deputies, Kurdish mayors, journalists and other activists.  
 
The chapter, finally, discusses the rhetoric and military action of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Syrian Kurdish autonomy of Rojava. This section concentrates on the way the 
Turkish authorities used the narrative of terrorism to construct both the Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy and the attacks of the Turkish military against Rojava cantons.  
 
The Kobani crisis and its impacts on the peace process 
The Kobani crisis was the beginning of the change in the approach of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question. The language and policy of the Turkish authorities 
declined towards adopting repressive policies against the Kurds. This is although the Turkish 
authorities expressed their commitment to the peace process. However, the repressive approach 




Background     
Following the capture of Mosul in Iraq in June 2014 by ISIL, it conducted major attacks against 
the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria (Chulov, June, 2014; Knights, June, 2014; Pollack, 
August, 2014). In August 2014, ISIL conducted a major attack on the Kurdish inhabited areas 
of Iraq conquering the Yezidi Kurdish region of Sinjar (in Kurdish: Şingal), and other areas 
(Masters, August, 2014). Simultaneously, ISIL invaded the Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous 
canton of Kobani, which is adjacent to the Turkish border (Belfast Telegraph, 29 July 2014; 
Letsch, 22 September, 2014). However, ISIL invasion faced the resistance of Kurds in Iraq and 
Syria. Following the ISIL invasion of Sinjar, the PKK and YPG managed to open a corridor to 
save Yezidi Kurds who were trapped in the mountainous areas of Sinjar (Acik, 22 October, 
2014; Salih & Civiroglu, 2014). The corridor extended from Sinjar mountain to the Kurdish 
controlled areas inside Syria. In addition, the PKK joined the Iraqi Kurdish forces of Peshmerga 
in the anti-ISIL resistance in Erbil and Kerkuk provinces. The participation of the PKK and 
YPG in the anti-ISIL resistance and the coverage of international media of the conflict made 
the Turkish government worried about the international involvement in the resistance, which 
could end in rewarding the PKK with a certain degree of international legitimacy, and potential 
international involvement in the Kurdish question (Bagci & Gullu, 2016; Barkey, October, 
2014; NBC, August, 2014; Solomon & Dombey, 15 August, 2014). 159  
 
ISIL managed to conquer the entire canton of Kobani in October, 2014, except the city of 
Kobani where the YPG kept resisting the invasion (see Map 9) (Collar, October, 2014).160 ISIL 
                                                          
159 Bagci & Gullu (2016) stated that the PKK resistance of ISIL turned it into the “Oscar Schindler of Middle 
East”.  Oscar Schindler was member of the Nazi regime, but he manged to rescue hundreds of Jews from death. 
See: Holocaust Encyclopaedia. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005787 [accessed: 20 October. 2016].  
160 The Kurdish resistance continued until January 2015 when ISIL was defeated and Kobani was liberated 
(BBC, 25 June, 2015).   
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considered the battle of Kobani as a symbolic battle for which it devoted a large number of its 
fighters, and therefore, the US administration concentrated on the battle of Kobani (Misztal & 
Michek, 2014).  The US military supported the YPG resistance by conducting air-strikes 
against ISIL. During the early stage of the Kobani resistance, the US administration avoided 
acknowledging that its military was coordinating with the YPG. This is because the US 
administration avoided irritating the Turkish authorities who were at odd with such kind of 
cooperation between its NATO ally the US and the YPG whom it considered as the Syrian 
branch of the PKK. However, the cooperation between the US-led coalition against ISIL and 
the YPG continued to grow during the Kobani resistance and afterwards (Barfi, October, 2015; 
Chan, October, 2014).  
 
Rhetoric of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kobani resistance  
Worry and suspicion regarding the US and Western support of the YPG resistance against ISIL 
dominated the language of Turkish officials. The Turkish officials claimed that the US arms 
provided to the YPG would end in the hand of the PKK (Cerny, October, 2014; Sherlock, 16 
October, 2014). Erdogan denounced the US support to the YPG and considered it as a direct 
support to the PKK as he stated that "I have already said the aid you deliver to the PYD and 
the PKK is unacceptable as far as we are concerned" (quoted in Al-Akhbar, October, 2014). 
Erdogan also accused the Western countries who supported the Kobani resistance of dishonesty 
and adopting double standards, which targeted Islam and Muslims. Erdogan stated that “it is 
not fair to remain silent to the killing of 300 thousand people in Syria but rise up against the 
incidents in Kobane” (quoted in BYEGM, 31 October, 2014). Erdogan connected the Western 
support of Kurds in their anti-ISIL resistance to the “Islamophobia and racism”, which were 
“on the rise” in the Western countries (quoted in BYEGM, 31 October, 2014). Erdogan claimed 
that the Western powers were keen to fight ISIL, but they were not willing to do so against the 
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PKK although the PKK had conducted terrorism in Turkey for 32 years. Erdogan claimed that 
the main motivation of this kind of discrimination by the Western powers was that ISIL had 
the term of Islam in its name, unlike the PKK.  Erdogan stated:   
“The world is setting up a coalition to struggle against the terrorist organization 
ISIL now, but how about the terrorist activities of PKK which have been going on 
for 32 years in my country? Why hasn’t the world reacted against this terrorist 
organization which has extension even in some European countries. Why haven’t 
these countries brought up a struggle against this organization? The answer is 
simple: this terrorist organization does not have a word, Islam, in front of its name” 
(quoted in BYEGM, 29 September, 2014).   
 
During the Kobani crisis the Turkish officials started to frequently use the term ‘terrorism, 
terrorist, and terror’ against the PYD-YPG and constructed them as organic part of the PKK.  
Erdogan stated that “the PYD is for us, equal to the PKK. It is a terror organization” (quoted 
in Bajekal, 2014). Likewise, the advisor of PM, Hatem Ete claimed that the PKK used Kobani 
as an excuse to keep its arm and to act under the name of PYD (BBC Monitoring,19 December, 
2014).  The Turkish authorities also used the anti-PKK narrative of terrorism as an excuse for 
their refusal of using the Turkish border by the US to provide weapons to the YPG. Erdogan 
stated that "we cannot say yes to this", “for us, the PYD is at the moment the same thing as the 
PKK. It too is a terrorist organization” (quoted in Dow Jones, 19 October, 2014). However, the 
construction of the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official narrative of terrorism was more dominant 
following the failure of the peace process. Chapter 6 concentrates on the constructions and 
narratives used against the PYD-YPG in the context of the dominant Turkish official narrative 
of terrorism.   
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Pro-Kobani protests and the response of Turkish authorities   
Although the Kurdish armed resistance against ISIL was outside Turkey, the pro-Kobani 
protests made the crisis infiltrate inside Turkey. As the Turkish authorities refused to let the 
support for the Kobani resistance to cross its border, pro-Kobani Kurdish protests erupted in 
Turkey in the 6th of  October, 2014 (Letsch & Traynor, 8 October, 2014).  Demonstrators 
accused the AKP authorities of collaboration with ISIL against the Syrian Kurds, and 
demanded the Turkish authorities to open a corridor on the border in order to provide support 
to the Kobani resistance (BBC, 7 October, 2014).161 Adem Uzun who was a member of Kurdish 
team to the 2009 Oslo negotiations of peace accused the Turkish authorities of supporting ISIL 
against the Syrian Kurds, and he considered this as a threat against the peace process (Yildiz, 
September, 2014). On the other hand, the Turkish authorities considered the pro-Kobani calls 
and protests as a pretext used by forces who plotted to harm Turkey. For example, in his speech 
of 12 October, 2014, Erdogan stated that “Kobane is used as an excuse, the real purpose is 




different”, and he claimed that the protests targeted the “unity in Turkey” (quoted in BYEGM, 
12 October, 2014). This claim of Erdogan targeted various groups and individuals who were at 
odd with the AKP policy including the PKK, BDP, HDP, the main Turkish opposition party of 
CHP, and “the international media” and the users of social media whom Erdogan described as 
the “dark forces on the internet” (quoted in BYEGM, 12 October, 2014). 162  
 
Turkish officials described the protests and demonstrations that supported Kobani resistance 
as acts of ‘vandalism’, and ‘violence’ that threatened the public order, and that there was a need 
to adopt security measures by the authorities. This is discerned in the statements of Erdogan, 
Davutoglu, Akdogan, and Hatem Ete (BBC Monitoring, 30 November, 2014, 19 December, 
2014; Butler, & Hogg, 8 October, 2014; BYEGM, 9 October, 2014, 12 October, 2014). In his 
speech following the protests Erdogan used the constructions of the othering discourse as he 
considered the protesters as ‘outsiders’ (BYEGM, 12 October, 2014).  Erdogan claimed that 
the BDP received “orders from the terrorist organization” to conduct the protests, and he 
repeatedly used ‘they’ as a reference to the ‘outsider’ protestors who perpetrated acts of 
“violence, vandalism, and looting”, and he also used the term “traitors” to describe the 
protesters (quoted in BYEGM, 12 October, 2014). On the other hand, Erdogan constructed the 
AKP authorities and its supporters as the ‘insiders’ group by using the pronoun ‘we’ and 
described them as “the nation and country” who supported the peace process (quoted in 
BYEGM, 12 October, 2014). Davutoglu described the protests as “highly intensive acts of 
violence”, and “vandalism” which took place “after the call of BDP” who used “the incidents 
in Kobani as an excuse” to “create chaos in Turkey” (quoted in BYEGM, 9 October, 2014). 
Likewise, Akdogan described the protests as “the vandalism that took place after the Kobani” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 30 November, 2014). Moreover, Hatem Ete accused the 
                                                          
162 The Republican People's Party (in Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) 
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leadership of HDP of involvement in violence as he claimed that during the protests the HDP 
chairman was “in favour of the use of Molotov cocktail” against the Turkish security forces 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring, 19 December, 2014).   
 
Constructing the protests as ‘vandalism’ was used as an excuse to adopt security measures by 
the Turkish authorities in the Kurdish provinces of Turkey. For example, Davutoglu named the 
protesters “vandals”, and he warned them that the government would take security measures 
against them to restore “legal order” (quoted in BYEGM, 9 October, 2014).  Likewise, Efkan 
Ala, the Turkish interior-minister, warned the protestors that they “should withdraw from the 
streets”, otherwise, they would face "unpredictable" measures because they were "betraying 
their own country” (quoted in BBC, 8 October, 2014). Furthermore, deputy PM, Arinc, 
revealed that the Turkish authorities had a plan to adopt a legislation, which would give the 
security forces more power against "vandalism" (quoted in OxResearch, 14 October, 2014).   
 
The Turkish officials also constructed the security measures as a necessity for the peace 
process. Erdogan and Davutoglu described the security measures as a necessity to maintain the 
public order and the peace process (BYEGM, 9 October, 2014, 12 October, 2014, 19 October, 
2014). Akdogan who was a principal figure in the negotiations of peace process also expressed 
support to the security measures in the Kurdish region. Akdogan claimed that the measures 
were necessary to end the violence that was instructed by the PKK who used Kobani as an 
excuse for inciting such violence (BBC Monitoring, 23 October, 2014). Furthermore, Akdogan 
considered the security measures as a necessity to maintain the public order, and that the public 
order was “the prerequisite” to progress in the peace process (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 23 




The repressive measures that were adopted by the Turkish authorities, however, led to 
violations of human rights and left impacts on the peace process. The Turkish authorities 
imposed curfews in six provinces in the Kurdish region of Turkey (Butler & Hogg, 8 October, 
2014; Cockburn, 9 October 2014).  In addition, about 50 people were killed, and many others 
were wounded during the pro-Kobani protests (AI, 8 October, 2014; HRW, 2014b, 11 
December, 2014). The cases of these acts of killing were left without proper investigation by 
the Turkish authorities, according to the report of Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2014b, 19 
December, 2014). Furthermore, Diyarbakir mayor and BDP member, Gulten Kisanak accused 
the Turkish government of using Islamist militants of Huda Party, Turkish Hizbullah, and other 
paramilitary forces against the protestors (Daloglu, 8 October, 2014).  
 
In addition to the use of force against the protestors, the Turkish warplanes bombarded the 
PKK positions in the mountains. The bombardment was the first since the start of peace talks 
(BBC, 14 October, 2014; Letsch, 14 October, 2014; Zalewski, 14 October, 2014). The PKK 
leadership reacted to the military action of the Turkish military, and its executive leader Cemil 
Bayik announced that the PKK would send back all its fighter who were pulled out of Turkey 
as part of the peace process (Zalewski, 14 October, 2014).  Cengiz Candar, a columnist who is 
specialized in the Kurdish issues stated that the pro-military measures of the Turkish authorities 
and the reaction of the PKK would lead to a “political stalemate” for the peace process (quoted 
in Zalewski, 14 October, 2014).  
 
Security laws and the rhetoric of legalizing the repression  
 
The Kobani crisis left impacts on the legal system and the status of democracy and human 
rights in Turkey.  In December 2014, the Turkish parliament adopted a law proposed by the 
AKP, which increased the power of police, and accordingly, the new law reversed relevant 
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democratic reforms that were adopted earlier (HRW, 11 December, 2014). This was followed 
by another security law, which empowered the police with further authorities at the expense of 
the courts and the rights of individuals (AI, 27 March, 2015). This law is known as ‘the security 
bill’. The law permitted the police of using firearm against demonstrators in certain cases, and 
of searching, arresting and detaining individuals without court order (AI, 27 March, 2015; 
HRW, 11 December, 2014).163 The law also allowed governors to instruct the police in dealing 
with certain cases.  On the other hand, elected mayors were stripped from authority to refuse 
the instructions of governors or to question the action of the police (Alyanak, 14 March, 2015). 
The new law also increased the penalties against individuals who participated in 
demonstrations that accompanied with “violent” acts or “propaganda” (quoted in HRW, 11 
December, 2014). Repressing demonstrations and considering ‘propaganda’ during the 
demonstrations as a reason for prosecuting demonstrators left serious impacts on the freedom 
of expression.  
 
The Turkish authorities described the security law to be a necessity for maintaining the public 
order and to deal with terrorism. Davutoglu claimed that the law was a requirement to maintain 
the public order (BYEGM, 16 February, 2015). As the AKP deputies proposed the security bill 
to the parliament, they attached with it a section called “General Reasoning” (quoted in 
Alyanak, 14 March, 2015). The latter considers adopting the bill as a necessity to deter 
transforming the protests to propaganda platforms for ‘the terrorist organizations’ because this 
would threaten the public order and safety of the public (Alyanak, 14 March, 2015). 
 
The HDP denounced the security bill and claimed that the bill would be used against the Kurds 
and to impose Erdogan dictatorship. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities refused the 
                                                          
163 See also Alyanak (14 March, 2015), and Zeldin (September, 2015).  
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claims of HDP. The HDP co-chair, Demirtas claimed that the bill aimed at silencing the 
dissidents, and that this would serve Erdogan’s aspiration to gain more power and to maintain 
his position. Demirtas stated that the real aim of the security bill was “not to maintain national 
security, but rather to protect the palace” in reference to Erdogan’s presidential palace (quoted 
in Hurriyet Daily News, 3 February, 2015). However, Davutoglu refused HDP claims and 
considered the bill as a necessity to maintain the public order (BYEGM, 16 February, 2015). 
He also claimed that instead of questioning the bill, the HDP itself should be questioned 
because it incited violence during the pro-Kobani demonstration.  Davutoglu also claimed that 
the bill did not contradict with the commitment of the Turkish authorities to the peace process. 
Davutoglu stated that “we will do everything that our country needs. The Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey will pass this bill tomorrow and the peace process will also proceed" 
(quoted in BYEGM, 16 February 2015). 
 
The law was also criticized by international human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch 
criticized the law when it was proposed as a bill and after passing it by the parliament (HRW, 
19 December, 2014). In three of its reports Human Rights Watch considered the law as a 
decline towards violence and violations of human rights, which would mainly target opposition 
groups because the law legalises the use of force and repression by the Turkish authorities 
(HRW; 19 December, 2014, 11 December, 2014, October, 2014). Likewise, Amnesty 
International (27 March, 2015) criticized the law and described it as a “draconian” law because 
it gave the police “broad and dangerous new powers”.  Andrew Gardner, Turkey’s researcher 
at Amnesty International connected the law to the AKP policy regarding the coming elections, 
and he described it as a tool to oppress the opposition as he stated:164  
                                                          
164 See also Hogg  & Solaker (2015). 
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“The timing of the bill, so close to key parliamentary elections, provides the 
authorities with new powers to suppress dissent. Signing this bill into law will give 
a green light to widespread abuses against those who exercise their rights to 
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly” (quoted in AI, 27 March, 2015). 
 
The peace process and the elections and voting agendas of the AKP  
The AKP agendas of elections and voting had major influence over the approach of the Turkish 
authorities regarding the peace process and the Kurdish question. This is mainly discerned in 
two main stages including the following: Firstly, the stage of pre-June 2015 elections. This 
extends from the end of 2014 to the date of elections on 7 June 2015. Secondly, the stage of 
post-June 2015 elections. The research argues that during the campaign for the June 2015 
elections, the peace process was used as a tool to gain more votes in the elections. This is 
although the research considers the period between Kobani crisis and June 2015 elections as 
the period in which the peace process underwent a lack of confidence and a certain degree of 
stalemate. During the campaign for the June, 2015 elections, Demirtas claimed that the AKP 
authorities tried to use the peace process to gain more votes as he stated that the AKP sought 
turning “the desire for peace into votes” (quoted in Coskun & Solaker, April, 2015). However, 
following the June 2015 elections, the AKP authorities abandoned the peace process and 
dramatically changed their approach regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question. The new 
approach of the Turkish authorities following the demise of the peace process was pro-military 
and security measures. The change in the discursive constructions of the Turkish authorities 
following the event of June 2015 elections matches the perspectives of Foucault and CDA 
scholars that that changes in discourse depend on contingent historical events (Foucault (1972, 
1984; Wodak, 1996, 2001b). The two stages of pre-June 2015 and post-June 2015 elections are 




The stage of pre-June 2015 elections  
Although the Turkish authorities continued their repressive policies against the Kurds 
following the Kobani crisis, their rhetoric of supporting the peace process surfaced again during 
the campaign of June 2015 elections (BYEGM, 12 February 2015, 16 February, 2015, 18 
February 2015, 23 March, 2015). For example, Erdogan emphasized his refusal of armed 
violence and highlighted the importance of the peace process, which he named as “settlement 
process”, as he stated that “we are seeking peace and welfare with the settlement process” that 
he considered “of vital importance” (quoted in BYEGM, 18 February 2015). In another 
statement Erdogan claimed that the “fight against terrorism cannot be solely conducted via 
security measures” (quoted in BYEGM, 12 February 2015). Erdogan highlighted the 
importance of peaceful efforts to solve terrorism problem. Likewise, Davutoglu emphasized 
the importance of maintaining the peace process (BYEGM, 16 February, 2015). However, 
Davutoglu also stressed the necessity of keeping the security measures in order to protect the 
public order as he stated that “we will ensure both the public order and the peace process with 
determination” (quoted in BYEGM, 16 February, 2015).  
 
The AKP leadership used the peace process as a tool to gain votes in the June 2015 elections. 
Several sources argue that a major goal of Erdogan and the AKP was to win the votes of Kurds 
(Barchard, March, 2015; Butler, March, 2015; Ozpek, March, 2015; Werz, et al., 2015).  
However, such sources overlooked that the disarmament of the PKK would be the victory that 
the AKP and Erdogan sought to achieve through the peace process, and such a victory would 
encourage Turks who are the majority in Turkey to vote for the AKP. In order to persuade the 
PKK to start disarmament before the June 2015 elections, the AKP authorities announced on 
28 February, 2015 the Dolmabahce agreement of peace with the representatives of Kurds, 
which was the first and only peace accord between the Turkish authorities and the Kurds.    
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Dolmabahce agreement of peace  
Dolmabahce agreement was jointly announced by the Turkish officials and the HDP 
representatives (Bayramoğlu, 2015).165 Although it was the only written agreement of peace 
between the Turkish authorities and the representatives of Kurds, it came about 4 month after 
the Kobani events, which left impacts on the confidence of Kurds in the peace process. The 
agreement consisted of 10 vague articles (see the articles in the footnote, as stated in 
Bayramoğlu, 2015: 5; Çiçek & Coşkun, 2016: 9-10).166 In addition to the 10 articles, the HDP 
delegation also read out Ocalan’s message to the PKK for launching a congress to end the 
armed struggle (Al-Jazeera, 28 February, 2015).167  
 
The most important aspect of the agreement is that it demonstrated the HDP as the party that 
represented the Kurds in the peace process. As it is discerned in the statements of Turkish 
officials that were discussed in the previous chapter, it was a taboo in the Turkish official 
discourse to accept a Kurdish party as a political partner in the peace process. Although the 
                                                          
165 The Dolmabahce meeting was announced in the 28th of February, 2015 in the office of the Prime Minister in 
Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. The meeting was attended by three HDP deputies including Sırrı Süreyya 
Önder, İdris Baluken and Pervin Buldan, and three Turkish officials including Turkish deputy PM, Yalçın 
Akdogan and Turkish minister of interior Efgân Ala, and Security undersecretary Muammer Dervişoğlu 
(Bayramoğlu, 2015). 
166 The 10 Articles of the Dolmabahce agreement see (Bayramoğlu, 2015: 5; Çiçek & Coşkun, 2016: 9-10). The 
10 Articles are the following: “1. Definition of democratic politics and content 2. Definition of national and local 
dimensions of democratic resolution 3. Legal and democratic safeguards for free citizenship 4. Headings for 
relations between democratic politics and the state and society and for its institutionalisation 5. The socio-
economic dimensions of the process of resolution 6. The addressing of the relationship between democracy and 
security in the process of resolution in a manner that will protect public order and freedoms 7. Legal solutions and 
safeguards for problems of women, and cultural and ecological problems 8. The development of a pluralist 
democratic understanding recognising the concept of identity and its definition 9. The democratic definition of a 
democratic republic, joint homeland and people, and the introduction of legal and constitutional safeguards within 
a pluralist, democratic system 10. A new constitution to aim to internalise all these democratic transformations” 
(quoted in Bayramoğlu, 2015: 5).    
 
167 Member of the HDP delegation to Dolmabahce meeting, Sirri Sureyya Onder read out Ocalan message to the 
PKK in which he called for a congress to end the armed struggle. In the message Ocalan stated that "I invite the 
PKK to attend an extraordinary congress in the spring months in order to make the strategic and historic decision 




Turkish officials described the representatives of Kurds as the party that should respond to the 
Turkish demands of ending terrorism, they usually avoided to describe the peace process as a 
political process between two political parties.  Instead, the Turkish officials described the 
Turkish authorities as the only political party in the peace process, and the only party that was 
entitled to find the solution for the Kurdish problem through ‘democratic reforms’. This 
reflected the general Turkish approach which considered the peace process as a project of 
ending terrorism as discussed in chapter 7. However, the Dolmabahce agreement was a 
deviation from the general Turkish approach as it admitted the representatives of Kurds as the 
political partner in the agreement for the first time, and this was an acceptance by the Turkish 
authorities for the political characteristics of the peace process and its subjects. 
 
Erdogan, nevertheless, showed a vague rhetoric of dissatisfaction regarding the Dolmabahce 
agreement (Kirac, 29 March, 2015). Erdogan described it to be improper for the Turkish 
officials to conduct such a meeting with the Kurdish deputies of HDP as he stated that “I did 
not find the meeting that was held there to be right. I did not think the picture of the deputy 
prime minister side-by-side with a parliamentary faction was appropriate” (quoted in the 
Guardian, March, 2015). Erdogan expressed such dissatisfaction although he was well-aware 
of the agreement. Later, former deputy PM, Arinc revealed that Erdogan unlike what he stated, 
was closely following up the Dolmabahce agreement (BBC Monitoring, 8 February, 2016).  
Arinc stated that Erdogan “kept a close eye on the process” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 8 
February, 2016). However, Erdogan’s negative statements about the agreement aimed at 
securing the votes of nationalist Turks in the elections by showing indirect respect to their 
attitude, which considered any political concessions to the Kurds as a threat to the indivisibility 




The AKP officials used the Dolmabahce agreement as a tool to persuade the PKK to start 
disarmament. Following the agreement, Erdogan and other AKP officials kept highlighting the 
disarmament of the PKK as the main goal of the peace process and as the prerequisite for any 
step in the process by the Turkish authorities. For example, following the agreement, Erdogan 
stated that “the democratic initiative and the national unity and fraternity project are interpreted 
by laying down the arm of PKK”, and he added that “everything eventually depends on laying 
down the arms” (quoted in BYEGM, 28 February, 2015).168 Likewise, Akdogan who was the 
main representative of the Turkish authorities in the Dolmabahce agreement stated that "there 
is no room for weapons in the presence of democracy. If there are weapons, then there is no 
belief in democracy" (quoted in BYEGM, 11 March, 2015). Although Davutoglu showed 
acceptance for the articles of the agreement, he considered laying down the PKK arm as the 
pre-condition for adopting the content of the agreement as he stated: 
 “These 10 articles include the developmental and political aspects of the resolution 
process. There is nothing in it that would be absurd to be discussed. For us, the 
resolution process is functioning. Laying down the arms would pave the way for 
democratic politics” (quoted in BYEGM, 3 March, 2015). 
 
The PKK, however, was unwilling to lay down its arms or to call for a congress to end the 
armed struggle before taking certain steps by the Turkish authorities to guarantee the 
implementation of the agreement. Thus, the PKK leadership used the same strategy that the 
AKP authorities adopted as it considered addressing the 10 articles as pre-conditions for the 
disarmament.  Leadership member of the PKK, Jamil Bayik (Cemil Bayik: in Turkish) stated 
that “we have set out 10 conditions for laying down arms. If the government is willing to go 
                                                          
168 Following the agreement, Erdogan also stated that “you will fist lay down your arms; and if there is anything 
you will say, you will come and say it on the political platform within constitutional and democratic boundaries” 




through those conditions, we are ready to end armed resistance” (quoted in E-Kurd, 1 April, 
2015).  
 
The Dolmabahce agreement was unable to regain confidence in the peace process because the 
agreement was implicated with vagueness and the AKP authorities were unwilling to set up 
another peace meeting to clarify this vagueness by illustrating the practical demands of each 
side. Although the agreement has 10 articles, it looks like a preamble of agreement and does 
not look as an agreement that can be practically applied. The vague and broad articles and 
concepts of the agreement made it a subject to different interpretations by both parties of the 
agreement, and this surfaced soon following the announcement of the agreement as it is 
explained above. This required that the Turkish authorities and the representatives of Kurds to 
agree on certain interpretation and practical steps, and this would be possible by conducting 
further meetings to discuss the agreement. However, the Turkish authorise showed 
unwillingness to conduct any further meeting as Erdogan was worried about the potential loss 
of the votes of Turkish nationalists in the coming elections (Tastekin, 6 May, 2015).  This is 
because such meetings would require the authorities to directly negotiate the political demands 
of Kurds, and to make certain practical steps to address these demands. Moreover, Erdogan’s 
negative remarks about the agreement made the PKK leadership more suspicious about the 
intentions of the Turkish authorities regarding the agreement. Therefore, the agreement 
remained inapplicable, and was not able to make the peace process progress towards its goals.   
 
The stage of post-June 2015 elections  
The results of June 2015 elections were not as Erdogan and the AKP wished for, and the AKP 
heavily lost its voting position in the majority Kurdish provinces for the HDP (Tisdall, 7 June, 
2015). As explained earlier, Erdogan and the AKP wanted to change the system of Turkey from 
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parliamentary to presidency, and this needed to change the constitutions. However, the AKP 
was not able to secure the parliamentary majority, which would enable it to call for referendum 
to change the constitution. In order for the AKP to call for a referendum to change the 
constitution, it would need the support of 330 out of 550 members of the Turkish parliament 
(Letsch & Traynor, 7 June, 2015; Tisdall, 7 June, 2015).169 The AKP even lost the simple 
majority that would enable it to form the government (Letsch & Traynor, 7 June, 2015). The 
AKP got 41% of the vote, which was 8% less than what it got in the previous elections. Since 
2002 this was the first time for the AKP to lose the majority in the elections (Nardelli, 8 June, 
2015; Zanotti, 2015).  On the other hand, the HDP managed to win the majority of votes in the 
Kurdish region.  The HDP  won over 13 % of the overall votes of the elections, and this made 
it possible for a pro-Kurdish party to officially enter the parliament for the first time in the 
history of Turkey (Nardelli et al., 2015). As explained earlier,  the Turkish constitution 
stipulated that in order for a political party to enter the parliament it should gain 10% of the 
votes in the elections (Letsch & Traynor, 7 June, 2015; Tisdall, 7 June, 2015).  Accordingly, 
the HDP was able to secure 80 seats in the Turkish parliament (Nardelli et al., 2015).  The 
results of the June elections made Erdogan to call in August, 2015 for snap elections, which 
were conducted in November 2015 (Peker, August, 2015). However, following the June 2015 
elections the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurds and peace process 
changed and this is explained in the coming sections.  
 
Abandoning the peace process and adopting military and security measures  
After less than one month of the June 2015 elections, Erdogan denied the Dolmabahce 
agreement as he stated that “I do not recognize the phrase ‘Dolmabahçe Agreement.’ There 
cannot be an agreement with a political party that is being supported by a terrorist organization” 
                                                          
169 See also Nardelli, et al., (2015). 
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(quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 20 July, 2015).  This statement implies that in addition to the 
denial of the Dolmabahce agreement, Erdogan retrieved the same taboo of not accepting the 
representatives of Kurds as a partner in the peace process. That is, Erdogan denied that HDP 
to be a political partner in the peace process. Instead, Erdogan claimed that the Turkish 
parliament should be the place where to take the decisions related to the peace process.  
Erdogan stated that “if there is a step to take for the future of our country, this should be made 
in parliament” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 20 July, 2015). Accordingly, Erdogan re-
emphasized the AKP to be the only political party that had the right to propose and decide in 
the peace process. This is because the AKP had the majority in the parliament and was the only 
capable party to suggest and pass bills related to the Kurds and the peace process. Pervin 
Buldan, the deputy of HDP criticized Erdogan statement and his denial of the agreement as she 
stated that "I consider Mr President's statement as unfortunate” and she rendered the denial of 
the agreement by Erdogan to the failure of AKP to gain the desired majority in the elections 
(quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 20 July, 2015).   
 
The AKP authorities followed this by the abandonment of the entire peace process and resumed 
the military action against the PKK. Erdogan announced on 28 July, 2015 the end of the peace 
process as he stated that "it is not possible for us to continue the peace process with those who 
threaten our national unity and brotherhood” (quoted in DW, 28 July, 2015). Thus, in addition 
to the abonnement of the peace process, Erdogan constructed the HDP to be a threat to the 
‘national unity’ of Turkey. Akdogan also blamed the HDP for the failure of peace process and 
stated that the HDP “had been “used” to finish off the solution process” (quoted in AA, 27 July, 
2015).  On the other hand, Demirtas claimed that Erdogan ended the peace process because he 
understood that the peace process would not enable him to gain the votes, which he needed to 
convert Turkey from parliamentary into presidential system (Göksel, 2015). However, the 
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announcement of Erdogan that ended the peace process was also a declaration of war and 
repressive campaign against the Kurds. As Erdogan announced abandoning the peace process, 
he also emphasized that the Turkish authorities would resume its military campaign against the 
PKK as he stated that "no steps back will be taken in our fight against terrorism” (quoted in 
Karadeniz, 28 July, 2015). Erdogan followed his announcement of ending the peace process 
by a statement in which he emphasized the denial of the Kurdish question as he stated that 
"there is no such thing as the Kurdish issue" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 29 July, 2015). The 
following sections discuss the narratives of the Turkish officials to legitimize their new military 
campaign. 
 
Narratives of the Turkish officials regarding the military campaign   
Turkish officials produced statements, which preferred military confrontation against the PKK. 
Several narratives by the Turkish officials, which favoured the military action surfaced 
following the announcement of ending of the peace process.  Erdogan described the military 
action as the only option to deal with the PKK and stated that “we will maintain our struggle 
and speak the language they understand” (quoted in TCCB, 17 August, 2015).  Erdogan even 
described the military action against the PKK as a “struggle” by the “good” against the “evil” 
(quoted in TCCB, 17 August, 2015). Akdogan who was the main coordinator of Turkish 
authorities to the peace negotiations changed his position to defend the military action against 
the PKK (Hurriyet Daily News, 9 September, 2015). Akdogan described the military campaign 
as a necessity to deter the terror of the PKK whom he constructed as a group of murderers that 
targeted the entire population of Turkey as he stated that “this is not a war, this is slaughtering 
of our people by a terrorist organization” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 9 September, 2015). 
Likewise, Davutoglu who used religious constructions to show Islam as an identity that 
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gathered AKP authorities and the Kurds, described the military action as an action demanded 
by the pious Muslim Kurds who suffered from the repression of the PKK as he stated:  
“During the Eid prayer at Ulucami Mosque in Diyarbakir Province, several 
thousand people walked passed me and shook my hand. Tens of them leaned 
forward and whispered into my ear, " May God be pleased May God protect the 
state and the nation. Continue what you are doing. May God help you." This is the 
atmosphere. The people are suffering because of PKK's oppression” (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, 28 September, 2015).   
 
The Turkish officials also constructed the military action and security measures as a necessity 
for peace and democracy in Turkey.  For example, Erdogan stated that "fighting terrorism is 
the main requirement of democracy and law, because these two cannot coexist with terrorism" 
(BBC Monitoring, 12 August, 2015). Likewise, Davutoglu said that “we are conducting this 
operation to ensure peace. We need to restore tranquillity in our country” (quoted in BYEGM, 
30 August, 2015). Davutoglu even named the military campaign as “the peace and democracy 
operation” as he stated that “terrorism's Back Broken: Significant progress was made in the 
peace and democracy operation we launched on 23 July” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 28 
September, 2015).     
 
Connecting the anti-PKK campaign to the anti-ISIL international campaign  
The dominant narrative regarding the military action against the PKK was to construct it as 
part of a wider operation against terrorism. In particular, the military campaign against the PKK 
was constructed as it was connected to the international campaign against ISIL (Coskun 
&  Afanasieva, 24 July, 2015; Hafizoglu, 2015, Jul 28; Letsch, 29 July, 2015). This narrative 
also involved the PYD and YPG as explained in chapter 6. The Turkish official repeatedly 
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stated that there was no difference between the PKK, PYD-YPG and ISIL (BBC Monitoring, 
12 August, 2015; Candrowicz & Weise, 2015; Peker, 14 October, 2015; TCCB, 14 October, 
2015). While talking about the military action against the PKK, Erdogan stated that "we do not 
make any distinction between terrorist organizations; they are terror organizations for us 
regardless of their name, purpose, symbol or discourse" (quoted in BBC Monitoring. 12August, 
2015). In another statement, Erdogan said that “let me say this clearly; to Turkey, there is no 
difference between PKK and its extensions PYD-YPG and DHKPC and Daesh. They are all 
terrorist organizations, targeting our existence and future” (quoted in TCCB, 14 October, 2015). 
Likewise, Turkish FM Cavusoglu stated that “there is no difference between PKK and Daesh 
[Isis]” (quoted in Candrowicz & Weise, 2015).  
 
The Turkish officials also claimed that the PKK and PYD-YPG coordinated with ISIL and 
other actors to target Turkey. This is although the PKK and the YPG were in war with ISIL 
(Graeber, 18 November, 2015; Popp, & Reuter, 2015). In addition, and as discussed in chapter 
6, the PYD is a Syrian Kurdish party, and the military operations of its armed wing; the YPG 
were limited to fighting ISIL in Syria. The narrative of Turkish officials is discerned in the 
statement of Davutoglu who said that "three terrorist organizations Daesh, the PKK and the 
DHKP-C have started simultaneous attacks on Turkey" (quoted in AA, 27 July, 2015).  The 
Turkish officials even accused the PKK, YPG-PYD of collaboration with ISIL in the explosive 
attacks of Suruc and Ankara in Turkey, although these attacks targeted the HDP and pro-
Kurdish activists (BYEGM, 10 August, 2015; Peker, 2015, Oct 14).   
 
 
The narrative of the Turkish authorities, which described the operation against the PKK to be 
in connection with the anti-ISIL campaign is contested. Several sources demonstrated that the 
Turkish attacks were largely against the PKK (Barnard, 28 July, 2015; Candrowicz & Weise, 
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2015; Graeber, 18 November, 2015; Popp & Reuter, 2015). This was also highlighted by the 
US special envoy to the collation against ISIL, Brett McGurk who stated that “Turkey has done 
only a couple of airstrikes against Daesh and has done a number of attacks against the PKK” 
(quoted in BBC Monitoring,17 August, 2015).  Metin Gurcan, a retired Turkish military officer 
revealed that the Turkish authorities’ goal of this narrative was to legitimize the war on the 
PKK (Peker, 14 October, 2015).  
 
Others sources challenged the narrative of Turkish authorities and argue that the Turkish 
authorities had certain agenda behind its new military campaign against the PKK (Barnard, 28 
July, 2015; Candrowicz & Weise, 2015; Graeber, 18 November, 2015; Peker, 14 October, 
2015;  Popp & Reuter, 2015). Graeber (18 November, 2015) renders the new campaign against 
the PKK to the concerns of Turkish authorities regarding the growth of YPG’s power in Syria, 
and he argues that there was no room to accept the claim of the Turkish authorities, which 
grouped the PKK and YPG with ISIL, and he accused the Turkish authorities of supporting 
ISIL and other Jihadist groups. Likewise, Popp and  Reuter (2015) argue that the AKP 
authorities had tolerated ISIL activities across the Turkish border, but resorted to the 
international campaign against ISIL in order to attack the PKK and to stop the expansion of 
YPG control in Syria. Popp and Reuter (2015) also argue that the new pro-military approach 
of the AKP authorities was an appeal to win the votes of Turkish nationalists in the coming 
elections.  
 
Critics highlighted that the elections’ agenda of the AKP had a major influence over its new 
military approach.  Aaron Stein, a researcher at Atlantic Council think-tank argue that this 
approach served certain agenda and was used “for domestic political consumption and tied to 
a political strategy designed to lessen the appeal of the HDP" (quoted in Peker, 14 October, 
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2015).  Likewise, the former judge at the European Court of Human Right, Riza Turmen 
denounced comparing the PKK to ISIL and claimed that elections agenda of Erdogan were 
behind abandoning the peace process and adopting the military approach against the PKK as 
he stated that “this is politics under the cloak and guise of fighting terrorists. Erdogan wishes 
to have early elections and such a nationalist movement would help AKP to increase their 
votes” (quoted in Candrowicz & Weise, 2015). Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador to 
Turkey made similar argument during a panel discussion on Turkey-US relations as he talked 
about the failure of the peace process and argued the Erdogan’s military campaign against the 
PKK was an appeal to win the votes of Turkish nationalists in the coming elections (C-SPAN, 
March 26, 2018). Edelman stated that Erdogan “had lost the elections essentially in June 2015 
in the sense that for the first time AKP did not have a majority. He had a Kurdish party in the 
parliament he lost votes to the HDP, which he had to steal back” (quoted in C-SPAN, 26 March, 
2018: Minute 53-55).170 
 
The US and NATO position regarding the Turkish military campaign against the PKK  
The US administration and the NATO secretary expressed approval for the Turkish military 
action against the PKK, although they called Turkey to return to the peace negotiations (Beck, 
July 2015). This is because the PKK was effective on-ground force against ISIL in Iraq, and 
NATO allies worried that the Turkish campaign against the PKK could distract the efforts 
against ISIL (Barnes, et al., 2015, Jul 28; Graeber, 18 November, 2015). NATO secretary 
general, Jens Stoltenberg expressed NATO support to Turkey campaign against the PKK as he 
stated that "following developments very closely and we stand in strong solidarity with our ally 
Turkey" (quoted in DW, 28 July, 2015). Likewise, Brett McGurk, the U.S. special envoy in the 
                                                          
170 Guelists are followers of the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen who were accused later of the coup-attempt of 
July, 2016. As explained in chapter 5, the Turkish authorities use FETO as an acronym for Fethullah Gulen 
organization. FETO is designated by the Turkish authorities as a terrorist organization.    
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campaign against ISIL stated that “we have strongly condemned the PKK’s terrorist attacks in 
Turkey and we fully respect our ally Turkey’s right to self-defence” (quoted in Sly, 25 July 
2015). However, McGurk also called for resuming the peace negotiations as he stated that “we 
also urge de-escalation and that both sides remain committed to the peaceful 'solution process'" 
(quoted in Albayrak, 2015, Jul 26). Several reports argue that the US allowed Turkey to 
bombard the PKK in the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan as Turkey allowed the US to use 
the Turkish military airports and bases in the anti-ISIL campaign (Almukhtar & Wallace, 2015; 
BBC Monitoring, 17 August, 2015; Popp, & Reuter, 2015; Sly, 25 July 2015).   
 
Impacts of the military campaign    
 
In addition to the bombardment of PKK positions by the Turkish warplanes, the Turkish 
military and security forces imposed curfews in several Kurdish provinces (ABC, 13 
September, 2015; AI, 11 September, 2015; BBC, 9 September, 2015; TIHV, December, 2015) 
(see Map 10, below). The Turkish military also imposed other special military measures in the 
Kurdish region and considered many areas as military zones (Bayramoğlu, 2015: 38; BBC, 9 
September, 2015; OSCE, 2015: 8).  
 
The Turkish authorities claimed that the military and security operations did not target 
civilians. Davutoglu claimed that the Turkish military and security forces never targeted 
civilians, but the PKK did. This is to create the assumption that all civilian casualties were 
targeted by the PKK. Davutoglu stated that “thank God, to date, there are no civilian casualties 
apart from the ones [who died] in the PKK attacks” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 28 September, 
2015). In another statement Davutoglu emphasized that “we have given instructions to take 
every measure for not allowing even a single civilian to be killed [during the military 
operations], neither in Turkey nor in Iraq,” (quoted in AA, 24 August, 2015).   
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This claim of the Turkish authorities is contested by the human rights reports, which reveal that 
flagrant violations against civilians were perpetrated by the Turkish forces.  Human Rights 
Watch in its reports about the events of 2015 in the Kurdish region of Turkey accuses the 
Turkish authorities of “violations of the right to life, arrests of non-violent protesters and 
activists on terrorism charges, and ill-treatment of detainees” (HRW, 2016). Benjamin Ward, 
deputy director of Europe and Central Asia division at Human Rights Watch stated that “it’s 
deeply worrying that police in Turkey’s southeast seem to be returning to abusive tactics in 
response to the security threats” (quoted in HRW, September, 2015). Likewise, Nils Muižnieks, 
Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe referred to violations against human 
rights, which were perpetrated under the excuse of “anti-terror operations” by the Turkish 
authorities during the curfews that were imposed in the Kurdish region, and he highlighted “the 
disproportionate use of force by security forces against civilians” (Commissioner for Human 
Rights, September, 2015). Amnesty International (AI, 11 September, 2015) report also 
highlights the violations against civilians during the curfew in the Kurdish city of Cizre and it 
states that “residents including children and elderly people have been killed and injured by live 
ammunition” (AI, 11 September, 2015).  
 
The bombardment of Turkish warplanes on Qandil mountainous area of Iraqi Kurdistan also 
left casualties among civilian Iraqi Kurds and caused destruction of their houses and properties. 
In its report about the bombardment of Qandil area, Amnesty International states that “evidence 
gathered during a visit by Amnesty International to the village of Zergele three days after the 
airstrikes suggests all those killed and injured in the attack were not affiliated with the PKK” 
(AI, 11 August, 2015). In addition, Lama Fakih, senior advisor at Amnesty International who 
headed the delegation of Amnesty to the Qandil area stated:    
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 “The recent attacks in Kandil maimed, killed, and displaced residents, destroying 
homes and terrifying locals in an area where no military targets appeared to be 
present”, “the apparent absence of a military target within the vicinity of the 
airstrikes suggests that these strikes are unlawful whether or not there is an armed 
conflict between the Turkish authorities and the PKK. The Turkish government has 
displayed a flagrant disregard for the lives of local residents and failed to take 
necessary precautions to minimize harm to them, or to discriminate between them 
and PKK fighters” (quoted in AI, 11 August, 2015). 
 
 
Map 10. Map of curfews in the Kurdish region of Turkey. The provinces, which were 
under curfews from August, 20015 to December, 2015 are in red colour (Source: TIHV, 
December, 2015). 
 
Anti-HDP approach  
Following June 2015 elections, the Turkish officials made many statements against the HDP 
constructing it as a collaborator with the terrorist organization; the PKK.  The construction of 
the Kurdish legal parties of BDP and HDP as supporters of PKK terrorism in the Turkish 
official discourse is also discussed in chapters 5 and 7. However, following the elections of 
June 2015, this narrative against the HDP was more dominant.  Erdogan named the HDP as 
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“the extension” of the PKK in the parliament (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 20 July, 2015). In 
another statement, Erdogan reproduced statements, which blamed the HDP for the violence 
during the pro-Kobani protests of October, 2014 because it was the HDP who "made the call 
[for people to take to the streets]" as he claimed (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 20 July, 2015). 
Erdogan also threatened the HDP to “pay a heavy price” because it was supported by “the 
terrorist organization” (quoted in BYEGM, 14 August 2015). Likewise, Akdogan stated that 
“the HDP is acting like an open supporter, extension and political branch of the terrorist 
organization” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 9 September, 2015). 
 
The Turkish officials denounced and threatened the HDP for not adopting the same position of 
AKP and other Turkish parties against the PKK. Erdogan addressed the HDP without using its 
name and stated that "I repeat my call to the party that has difficulty in distancing itself from 
the terrorist PKK: Make your choice. Do you side with democracy or terrorism?"  (quoted in 
BBC Monitoring, 10 September, 2015).  Other Turkish officials made similar statements 
against the HDP when it refused to sign a declaration condemning the PKK and legitimizing 
the military and security operations in the Kurdish region, which was signed by the Turkish 
parties in the parliament. The Turkish officials considered the HDP unwillingness to sign the 
declaration as collaboration with the terrorists. Davutoglu stated that "HDP avoided to sign a 
joint declaration. Can we be sure that those who did not even condemn [the attacks] are fighting 
against terrorism?" (quoted in AA, 27 July, 2015).  Likewise, Akdogan accused the HDP of 
indirectly supporting the PKK because it could not “say a word against terror” and “terrorists” 
(quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 9 September, 2015).   
 
This is although the HDP condemned violations by both the PKK and Turkish authorities and 
called them to return to the peace process.  The co-chair of HDP, Demirtas stated that “this 
country’s children are losing their lives. Our young people are dying. Soldiers, police, 
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guerrillas, civilians: all of them are people of this society, our brothers” (quoted in AA, 27 July, 
2015).   Demirtas repeatedly called the Turkish government and PKK to adopt ceasefire (ABC, 
13 September, 2015; Asia News Monitor, 11 August, 2015; Göksel, 2015).  Demirtas also 
called the Turkish government and PKK to resume the peace negotiations as he stated: “both 
Ankara and Qandil must take a position that responds to the people's expectation with a clear, 
concrete project”, "even if the peace (talks) table has been upturned it is in our power to put it 
up again" (quoted in ABC, 13 September, 2015).171  
 
The rhetoric of blaming the HDP for the action of the PKK incited violence by mobs against 
the HDP.  Following the dissemination of news about the casualties among the Turkish forces, 
nationalist Turks attacked HDP headquarter in Ankara, which was set on fire, and they also 
attacked HDP offices in other cities (AI, 22 September, 2015; BBC, 9 September, 2015). 
Amnesty international condemned the attacks against the HDP, which it described as “violent 
attacks by mobs” and called the Turkish authorities "to carry out prompt, thorough and 
impartial investigations” in the attacks (AI, 22 September, 2015). Likewise, Human Rights 
Watch condemned the attacks on the HDP offices and highlighted that these attacks occurred 
during the campaigns for June and November 2015 elections as its stated that “hundreds of 
attacks on HDP offices took place in the run-up to both elections” (HRW, 2016).  
 
The HDP leadership considered the attacks against its offices as part of an anti-HDP campaign 
by the AKP authorities. Demirtas claimed that 130 buildings of HDP were attacked, and he 
claimed that the attacks were part of a "campaign of lynching" by the AKP against the HDP 
(Today’s Zaman, 9 September, 2015). Likewise, HDP deputy Garo Paylan accused the Turkish 
authorities of tacitly supporting the attacks and stated that the police were "just watching” 
                                                          
171 Qandil is reference to the headquarter of PKK leadership in the Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan.   
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(quoted in BBC, 8 September, 2015).  Demirtas stressed that the HDP had nothing to do with 
the armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish government, and he accused the AKP 
authorities of pushing Turkey to a civil war (BBC, 9 September, 2015).  Demirtas stated that 
“the decision [to start a war] belongs to the president and the prime minister” (quoted in 
Today’s Zaman, 9 September, 2015).   
 
The relationship between the anti-HDP approach and the AKP’s elections agenda  
 
The HDP leadership rendered the repressive approach of AKP authorities against the HDP to 
the elections’ agenda of the AKP. Demirtas stated that "we have committed no unforgivable 
crimes. Our only crime was winning 13 percent of vote" (quoted in Karadeniz, 28 July, 2015). 
The HDP and several Kurdish NGOs issued a joint declaration accusing Erdogan and AKP of 
choosing a repressive approach because they were not able to win the majority that they sought 
in the elections (Albayrak, 26 July, 2015). The declaration stated that "they are deliberately 
creating a security crisis to continue to stay in power and to play a saviour" (quoted in Albayrak, 
26 July, 2015). Co-chair of HDP referred to Erdogan and the AKP and stated that "those who 
call us traitors, terrorists, separatists have themselves thrown the country into the fire" (quoted 
in Barnes, et al., 2015, Jul 28).  
 
The relationship between the elections and the anti-HDP approach was also argued by 
international observers.  Turkey’s rapporteur in the European parliament, Kati Piri highlighted 
that the issue was related to the elections results as she stated that "dangerous rhetoric’s in 
Turkey against HDP, which won 6 million votes in last elections. Time to face that reality" 
(quoted in Karadeniz, 28 July, 2015). Likewise, Nigar Göksel, senior analyst at International 
Crisis Group connected this anti-HDP approach to the elections agenda of the AKP, and she 
argued that the goal of Erdogan and the AKP was to “attract nationalist votes” (Göksel, 2015). 
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Göksel highlighted that HDP deputies were sued for “inciting violence and carrying out 
terrorist propaganda”, and that they faced such charges only two days following the 28 July, 
2015 call of Erdogan to strip their parliamentary immunity (Göksel, 2015). It is also relevant 
to notice that Erdogan call for stripping the immunity of HDP deputies was the same day in 
which Erdogan announced the end of peace process, and it was only few days after launching 
the military campaign against the PKK on 23 July, 2015 (Coskun &  Afanasieva, 24 July, 2015; 
Karadeniz, 28 July, 2015). This is although the immunity of the HDP deputies was stripped 
later in May, 2016 by the Turkish parliament (OHCHR, 2017: 21). The Bipartisan Policy 
Centre, a U.S. think tank also made similar argument, which connected this approach of the 
AKP authorities to the elections. In its September report the centre described the campaign 
against the HDP by the AKP authorities as “a smear campaign” (Bipartisan Policy Centre, 
September, 2015: 3), and that the pro-military rhetoric of AKP was a “transparent attempt to 
rally the Turkish nationalist vote” (Bipartisan Policy Centre, October, 2015: 9).  The report of 
September, 2015 stated that “bolstering nationalist rhetoric and undermining the HDP and the 
Kurds seems to have become the AKP’s path to a second-round electoral victory” (Bipartisan 
Policy Center, September, 2015: 15).  
 
Erdogan also used his rhetoric, which connected the HDP to terrorism as a tool to support the 
AKP during the November, 2015 elections’ campaign, and his support of the AKP was a 
violation to the Turkish constitution (Göksel, 2015; Tisdall, 7 June, 2015). For example, the 
AKP launched a demonstration and named it “anti-terrorism rally” in which Erdogan loathed 
the HDP as supporter of PKK terrorism and called to vote for the AKP in the coming elections 
(Coskun & Toksabay, 21 September, 2015). However, Erdogan’s support of AKP in the 
elections campaign was a breach of the principle of impartiality in the Turkish constitution, 
which stipulates that the president not to play a partisan role (Göksel, 2015; Tisdall, 7 June, 
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2015). Article 101 of the constitution of Turkey states that “if the President-elect is a member 
of a party, his/her relationship with his party shall be severed and his/her membership of the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall cease” (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 
n.d.).  
 
Influence of the repressive policy on the snap elections of 1 November, 2015  
The elections of 1 November, 2015 resulted in the winning of AKP with the majority, while 
the HDP barely managed to cross the 10 % threshold to enter the parliament. The AKP gained 
49.9 % of the overall votes, and accordingly the AKP won 316 out of 550 of the seats of the 
Turkish parliament (BBC, 2 November, 2015; Henley, et al., 2 November, 2015). The CHP 
got 25.4, and the MHP got 11.9 % of the votes (BBC, 2 November, 2015). The votes that AKP 
gained in the Kurdish region were considerably higher than those of the previous elections.  
According to a report by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), 
which is a Turkish think-tank “the top four cities that AK Party increased its votes were cities 
of Eastern or Southeastern Turkey, Igdir (20 percent), Sanliurfa (17 percent), Bingol (17 
percent) and Kilis (16 percent)” (Kanat , 2 November, 2015). The AKP officials showed 
satisfaction of the results. Erdogan hailed the results and stated that the electorate had "given 
proof of their strong desire for the unity and integrity" (quoted in BBC, 2 November, 2015), 
while Davutoglu expressed his celebration using the religious term “Elhamdulillah”, which 
means thanks to Allah (quoted in Henley, et al., 2 November, 2015).  
 
The HDP and Kurds, on the other hand, protested the results of the elections. As the results 
were announced, people in the main Kurdish city of Diyarbakir protested and accused the 
Turkish authorities of stealing their votes (Henley, et al., 2 November, 2015). Demirtas stated 
that the elections were not "a fair or equal” (quoted in BBC, 2 November, 2015). The HDP 
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leadership also appealed to the Turkish Supreme Election Board (YSK) in order to cancel the 
November, 2015 elections results and claimed that the results were “illegitimate” because the 
elections process was short of “free and equal voting” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 16 
November, 2015). Nevertheless, the peal was refused by YSK (MacDonald, 2015). In its 
appeal, the HDP leadership referred to the role that Erdogan played in campaigning for the 
AKP and against the HDP, which was not allowed to a president to play (Hurriyet Daily News, 
16 November, 2015).172 The HDP appeal also claimed that the AKP authorities adopted certain 
security measures in the south-eastern provinces in order to make it difficult for the voters to 
give free votes, and to make it easier for fraud in the elections in some areas where the 
authorities imposed certain security measures.  The HDP appeal also referred to the attacks 
against its offices. The HDP appeal stated: 
“Voters were scared and terrorized and prevented from going to vote”, 
“additionally, governors, sub-governors, gendarmerie commanders and police 
chiefs who work under the government/the Interior Ministry tried to manipulate 
and influence provincial and district ballot box committees with false information 
and exerted a series of efforts for merging of ballot boxes” (quoted in Hurriyet 
Daily News, 16 November, 2015).  
 
The claims that the elections of November, 2015 were not successful in the south-east is 
supported by the report of Organisation for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
that observed the Turkish election. In its report, OSCE demonstrated that elections in the south-
east of Turkey were not free and the contestants were not able to campaign freely (OSCE, 2015: 
1-2). The report considered the curfews and special security zones, which were imposed by the 
Turkish authorities in certain areas in the south-east “as politically motivated and beyond the 
                                                          
172 Several journalist reports support this claim. See Arango & Yeginsu, November, 2015; De-Bellaigue, 
December, 2015; Jones, 30 October, 2015; and Paul & Seyrek, October, 2015. 
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legal framework” (OSCE, 2015: 8). The report counted 129 attacks against HDP offices 
between 6 September and 9 October, 2015. The report also highlighted that during the elections 
campaign, the authorities imposed restrictions on the freedom of expression and the media 
outlets by using Anti-Terrorism law to charge journalists (OSCE, 2015: 9-10).173  
 
Declaring the Kurdish autonomy and the response of Turkish authorities 
On 27 December, 2015 the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), which joined several Kurdish 
NGOs and political parties including the HDP, BDP and KCK, declared autonomy of the 
Kurdish region in Turkey (Reuters, 27 December, 2015). DTK declaration titled “Declaration 
of Political Resolution Regarding Self-rule” (ANF, 27 December, 2015).  The declaration 
supported a type of autonomy that emphasized on the principles of democracy and local 
governance of the Kurdish provinces as part of Turkey and considered autonomy as a 
democratic practice that could be applied in all provinces of Turkey (ANF, 27 December, 2015; 
BBC, 29 December, 2015).  Co-chair of HDP, Figen Yuksekdag stated that “autonomy is a 
right. Not only for Cizre, Silopi and Nusaybin, but it is also a right for Istanbul, Rize, Mersin 
and Ankara too. We will go on defending this demand” (Hurriyet Daily News, 29 December, 
2015).174 Cizre, Silopi and Nusaybin are three Kurdish cities, while the other cities that she 
referred to are majority Turkish cities.  
 
The Turkish authorities denounced this declaration and refused any autonomy for Kurds 
considering it as separation. Erdogan stated that “now they are talking about separating our 
land in this country. With God’s permission, we will never allow a surgery on the unity of our 
                                                          
173 The report stated: “At the end of July, violence escalated in the southeast part of the country, where a significant 
part of the Kurdish population lives. During the campaign, offices of the HDP were targeted, a high number of 
HDP members were taken into custody, HDP affiliated mayors were suspended, and its campaign leaflets were 
confiscated” (OSCE, 2015: 8).  
 
174 See the 14 points of declaration in ANF. (27 December, 2015) and in Biehl, J. (February, 2016).   
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country” (quoted in Reuters, 27 December, 2015). Erdogan considered autonomy as the 
establishment of a separate state as he stated that “how dare you talk about establishing a state 
in the southeast and the east within Turkey's existing unitary structure?" (quoted in BBC 
Monitoring, December, 2015). Erdogan also considered the declaration of autonomy as a crime 
of “treason”, which violated “the indivisible integrity" of Turkey (quoted in BBC, 29 
December, 2015).  Likewise, Davutoglu described autonomy and self-governance as "illegal 
structures" (BBC Monitoring, January, 2016b). In addition, both Erdogan and Davutoglu 
threatened the Kurdish politicians who called for autonomy that they would face punishment 
(BBC Monitoring, December, 2015, January, 2016b).  
 
The dominant narrative of Turkish officials constructed the declaration of autonomy as an 
action of supporting terrorism, and those who were involved in it as ‘supporters of terrorism’ 
(BBC, 29 December, 2015; BBC Monitoring, January, 2016, January, 2016d; Trend News, 31 
December, 2015).  For example, Davutoglu described the declaration as "terrorist ideology" 
which was spread through "polemics, lies and black propaganda" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 
January, 2016b).  Davutoglu stated that "no group can have a right and priority to commit a 
crime and support terrorism explicitly”, Davutoglu added that "HDP should decide if it is a 
political party or an extension of the terror organization?" (quoted in Trend News, 31 
December, 2015). In another statement, Davutoglu described the mayoral administrations of 
the Kurdish region to be “logistical centres for the terrorist organization [PKK]”, and he 
threatened the Kurdish mayors that they “will definitely pay the price for all of this treason and 
wrong practices" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, January, 2016C).   
 
The Turkish authorities intensified their military and security operations against the Kurdish 
provinces that declared autonomy, and they constructed these operations as a continuation of 
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the campaign against terrorism. Davutoglu stated that "our priority now is to clear all the 
neighbourhoods and streets of all our cities of the terrorist organization [PKK] and its terror 
activities" (quoted in Trend News, 31 December, 2015). In another statement, Davutoglu 
described the action of Kurdish youth who held arm and built barrier to prevent the Turkish 
military from entering their cities and districts as terrorism (AA, 6 January, 2016). Davutoglu 
also threatened everyone who provided any kind of support to these youths and claimed that 
their actions “encourage terror” (quoted in AA, 6 January, 2016). 
 
Anti-autonomy approach and the AKP agenda of April, 2017 referendum 
As AKP won the majority in the November, 2015 elections, Erdogan and the AKP leadership 
worked on paving the ground for the referendum to change the constitution, and accordingly 
the political system of Turkey from parliamentary to presidential. The AKP leadership found 
that the anti-Kurdish rhetoric and policy is serving their agenda of winning the support of 
nationalist Turks. Accordingly, Erdogan and the AKP leadership found the Kurdish declaration 
of ‘democratic autonomy’ which came after the November elections as an opportunity to 
practice more repression and to show themselves as the guards of Turkish indivisibility in order 
to maintain the support of Turkish nationalists. Therefore, the AKP authorities dramatically 
raised their anti-autonomy rhetoric and exerted repressive policy against the Kurds. This led to 
higher level of violence and further deterioration of human rights. 
 
The statements of Turkish officials also interdiscursively connected their constructions of anti-
autonomy to the constructions that supported the change of the constitution for the advantage 
of presidential system for Turkey. For example, in a statement that targeted the HDP and 
autonomy, Erdogan propagandized for the presidential system, which he described as 
"authentic presidential system framed by Turkish customs and traditions" (quoted in BBC 
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Monitoring, January, 2016d). Likewise, Davutoglu in a statement that mainly targeted the 
PKK, HDP and Kurdish autonomy, propagandized for changing the constitution for the 
advantage of establishing a presidential system as he stated that "let's draft such a constitution 
that will not be bound by the current conjuncture", and added that “the right thing to do is to 
shift the political system to presidency” (quoted in Trend News, 31 December, 2015). 
 
The refusal of Kurdish autonomy and the repressive approach of AKP against the Kurds 
reflected positively on the AKP referendum agenda as the referendum proposal was passed in 
the parliament in February, 2017 after gaining the support of the ultra-nationalist Turkish party 
of MHP, and later in April, 2017 it gained the desired public votes (Bipartisan Policy Center, 
May, 2017: 11-12; CEFTUS, November, 2016; Hurriyet Daily News, 17 February, 2017).  
Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli vowed that his party would vote “yes” in the referendum. 
Bahçeli claimed that voting ‘yes’ for the presidential system would protect the indivisibility of 
Turkey including the “people, the state, the republic, the future of Turkishness, and Turkey”, 
and he added that ““yes” vote would be a blow to the terrorist organizations of FETO, the PKK 
and DHKP-C, and the “crusaders”, and that the ‘yes’ vote would be a lesson to the CHP who 
remained “silent to the so-called Kurdistan dreams” (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News, 7 March, 
2017).      
 
Impacts of the military and security operations against the Kurdish autonomy    
The Turkish military and security forces conducted large-scale operations in the Kurdish 
region. The bombardment of Turkish heavy weapons caused extensive damage in the Kurdish 
region, and hundreds of thousands of civilians were forcibly displaced. The operation involved 
thousands of troops of combat-ready infantry and heavy weapons including artillery, 
warplanes, and armoured vehicles, and the operation targeted at least 30 urban areas and 
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unknown number of rural areas of the Kurdish region (OHCHR, 2017: 5). The Office of UN 
High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), and Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
documented demolition of entire neighbourhoods in the Kurdish cities of Diyarbakır, 
Nusaybin, Cizre, Sirnak and Yüksekova (HRW, 2017; OHCHR, 2017: 9). The report of 
OHCHR stated that the demolition caused “a permanent change in the population, patterns of 
ownership and architectural character of entire cities” (OHCHR, 2017: 9).175 The report also 
quoted Diyarbakir’s municipality office that “70 percent of buildings in the eastern part of Sur 
neighbourhood were destroyed by shelling” (OHCHR, 2017: 11). The reports of OHCHR and 
HRW included satellite images for the demolished areas. The reports compare images taken 
before the military campaign to these taken after the campaign (see Appendix Satellite Images 
1-8). The report of OHCHR also estimated that between 335 thousand and half a million of 
civilian Kurds were forcibly displaced by the Turkish forces (OHCHR, 2017: 5). Amnesty 
international (2018) report estimated the number of those forcibly displaced to be 500.000, 
while Human Rights Watch estimated the number to be over 400.000 (AI, 2018; HRW, 2017).  
 
The reports of OHCHR, HRW and Amnesty International accused the Turkish authorities of 
perpetrating flagrant violations of human rights against Kurds in the southeast under the banner 
of fighting against terrorism (AI, 2018; HRW, July, 2016, 2017; OHCHR, 2017). The reports 
highlighted that the Turkish forces imposed around-the-clock curfews in the targeted Kurdish 
areas (HRW, July, 2016; OHCHR, 2017: 5-6). The OHCHR and HRW claimed that the Turkish 
authorities also did not allow the UN and international organizations of human rights to access 
those areas in order investigate violations (HRW, July, 2016; OHCHR, 2017:6). Emma 
Sinclair-Webb, senior Turkey researcher at Human Rights Watch stated that “the Turkish 
                                                          
175 Photo of Turkish military celebrating in the destroyed Nusaybin city Centre. Source:  Ayasun, A. (2017). The 
Globe Post. Available at: https://www.theglobepost.com/2017/03/11/un-turkish-military-kills-hundreds-of-
kurdish-civilians/ [accessed: 22 May, 2017].  
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government’s effective blockade of areas of the southeast fuels concerns of a major cover-up”, 
and she added “credible accounts of Turkish security forces deliberately killing civilians, 
including children, when they were carrying white flags or trapped in basements should be 
ringing loud alarm bells” (quoted in HRW, July, 2016).176 The Turkish ministry of defence 
stated that 10,657 "terrorists were neutralized” from 23 July 2015 to 11 June 2017 (OHCHR, 
2018: 25). The OHCHR requested from the Turkish authorities to provide clarification for the 
term ‘neutralized’ and more details about the number of victims. Furthermore, OHCHR stated 
in its 2017 report:  
“Apart from unlawful deaths and the excessive use of force (such as shelling 
densely populated areas with heavy artillery and tanks), OHCHR has also 
documented numerous cases of enforced disappearances; torture; destruction of 
housing and cultural heritage; incitement to hatred; prevention of access to 
emergency medical care, food, water and livelihoods; violence against women; and 
severe curtailment of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression as well as 
interference with the right to participate in public life” (OHCHR, 2017: 5).  
 
The repressive measures against Kurdish deputies, mayors, and others  
Following the declaration of autonomy, the Turkish authorities targeted the HDP deputies in 
the parliament and the Kurdish mayors and officials of municipalities. However, the Turkish 
officials usually used the narrative of terrorism against them, and they faced terrorism related 
charges. For example, Erdogan constructed those who supported autonomy as they supported 
the PKK terrorism, and therefore, the should face terrorism related charges as he stated that 
“the titles of lawmaker, mayor and party leader cannot and should not save anyone from paying 
the price before the law if he has stood by the terrorist organization” (quoted in BBC 
                                                          
176 See also HRW. (22 December, 2015).  
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Monitoring, January, 2016d). As he did when he ended the peace process, Erdogan also called 
the parliament and judiciary to strip the immunities of the HDP co-chair Demirtas and 
Yuksekdag, and to make them liable to terrorism related charges as he stated that “both 
parliament and the judiciary should take action against those who act as though they are 
members of a terrorist organization" (quoted in BBC Monitoring, January, 2016).  
 
The immunity of many HDP deputies was stripped and they faced terrorism related charges.   
In May 2016, the Turkish parliament adopted a law which stripped parliamentary immunity of 
138 deputes in the parliament (OHCHR, 2017: 21). These deputes were mainly critical to 
Erdogan and his approach that favours military and security measures. However, the law 
mainly targeted the HDP deputies as it stripped the immunity of 50 out of its 59 members in 
the parliament and made them liable to prosecution and detention (AI, 2018; HRW, 2017: 9, 
2018; OHCHR, 2017). The law was proposed by the AKP parliamentarian group claiming that 
the HDP was acting in affiliation with the terrorist organization; the PKK (OHCHR, 2017: 21). 
As the parliament adopted the law, the Turkish authorities commenced the prosecution of the 
HDP deputies including Yuksekdag and Demirtas, and the deputies faced terrorism related 
charges (AI, 2018; HRW, 2018). As the immunity of HDP deputes was stripped, Erdogan 
stated that "in this historic vote, my nation doesn't want to see guilty lawmakers in this 
parliament -- especially those that the separatist terrorist organization supports" (quoted in 
Dow Jones, 21 May, 2016).  
 
The elected Kurdish mayors and their deputies were also stripped of their posts, detained and 
faced terrorism related charges. Furthermore, the Turkish authorities appointed pro-AKP 
trustees in their positions (AI, 2018; HRW, 2018; OHCHR, 2018: 26).  According to the last 
report of OHCHR, the Turkish authorities detained 87 out of 105 mayor and deputy mayors in 
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the south-east of Turkey including 35 women and 52 men (OHCHR, 2018: 26).  The mayors 
faced several terrorism related charges including “membership in a terrorist organization”, 
“making terrorist propaganda", "acting as a human shield", and "providing logistical support 
to a terrorist organization” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, January, 2016C). In addition, the 
mayors faced the charge of "disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state", which 
Erdogan described as a "constitutional crime" (quote in BBC Monitoring, January, 2016). By 
the end of 2017, the Turkish authorities appointed 94 pro-AKP trustees in the municipalities of 
the south-east, and all the appointed trustees were men (OHCHR, 2018: 26).  Erdogan claimed 
that the removal of mayors and appointing of trustees in their place was legitimate decision as 
he stated that “they ask how come the elected can be removed from their positions. Certainly, 
they can be. To be elected doesn’t give anyone the right to act endlessly against the state and 
the nation” (quoted in Bizarre Turkey, 13 September, 2016). 
 
Thousands of Kurdish activists, journalists, writers, and others were also detained and faced 
terrorism related charges (AI, 6 July, 2017, 2018; Freedom House, 2016, 2016b, 2017; HRW, 
2017: 7; OHCHR, 2017: 20). About 8,711 members and supporters of HDP were detained and 
faced terrorism related charges (OHCHR, 2017: 22). Human Rights Watch named Turkey as 
“the world leader” in jailing journalists, and that pro-Kurdish journalists constituted the 
majority of detained journalists in Turkey (HRW, 2018: 2).  Report of OHCHR stated that “as 
of the end of December 2016, most of the independent and Kurdish language media outlets 
were shut down, including JINHA one of the few world’s news agencies run entirely by 
women” (OHCHR, 2017: 20). Arrested Kurdish journalists mainly faced terrorism related 
charges of ‘membership of terrorist organization and spreading propaganda of a terrorist 




Journalists of non-Kurdish media who disseminated information about the violations against 
Kurds in Turkey also faced the charge of ‘spreading propaganda of a terrorist organization; the 
PKK’. This was the case of Deniz Yücel, correspondent for the German Die Welt newspaper, 
and Ayla Albayrak, journalist of Wall Street Journal (AI, 2018). In addition, those who showed 
solidarity with the arrested Kurdish journalists and their papers usually faced similar charges 
(HRW, 2017: 7). This was the case of dozens of public figures and human rights defenders 
who showed solidarity with the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem, which was closed down by 
the authorities and its journalist team were arrested to face terrorism related charges (HRW, 20 
June, 2016, 2017: 7, 2018: 3). The list of those who faced such charges because they showed 
solidarity with the arrested journalists included, among others, famous figures like the novelists 
Necmiye Alpay and Aslı Erdogan, and the representative of the Reporters Without Borders in 
Turkey, Erol Önderoglu, and the professor at Istanbul University and chair of the Human 
Rights Foundation of Turkey, Şebnem Korur (HRW, 20 June, 2016, 2017: 7).  
 
Many of the pro-peace academics were also dismissed from their institutions and faced 
terrorism related charges because they denounced the military campaign and called for reviving 
the peace process. In January 2016, more than 1100 academics signed a petition criticizing the 
military operation in the south-east and called for the return to the peace process (AI, 6 July, 
2017; HRW, 2017). The signatories named themselves as “Academics for Peace” and included 
Turkish and Kurdish academics (Academics for Peace, 10 January, 2016). The petition was 
also supported by famous scholars from different countries like Noam Chomsky, Judith Butler, 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Slavoj Žižek, David Harvey and Etienne Balibar (Baser et al., 2017: 
392). However, the signatories were targeted by Erdogan who described them as ‘supporters 
of terrorism’ and called for making them liable to criminal investigation (AI, 6 July, 2017; 
HRW, 2017).  Erdogan stated that “those so-called intellectuals” are the “fifth columns” of 
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foreign powers, sympathising with terrorists and bent on undermining Turkey’s national 
security” (quoted in Weaver, 15 January, 2016). Many of the signatories were dismissed by 
their academic institutions, and faced charges related to making propaganda for a terrorist 
organization; the PKK’ (AI, 6 July, 2017; Baser et al., 2017: 175; HRW, 2017). 
 
Constructing the Syrian Kurdish autonomy as a source of terrorism  
The Turkish officials usually avoided reference to the influence of the nationalist sentiments 
of the Syrian Kurdish autonomy of Rojava on Kurds in Turkey and their declaration of 
autonomy, and although such influence has been the actual concern of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Syrian Kurdish autonomy (BBC, 27 October, 2015; Beauchamp, 2016; Egret & 
Anderson, 2016; Ekim, 2015; Hall, 1 February, 2014; Park, 2016).  In particular, the principles 
of autonomy of Rojava stemmed from the same theoretical perspectives of Ocalan of 
‘Democratic Nation’, which constituted the foundations of the declared ‘democratic autonomy’ 
of the Kurds in Turkey (Ocalan, 2016, 2011).  Eliza Egret and Tom Anderson (2016: 46) quoted 
the chair of DTK who stated that the autonomous system that they declared for the Kurds in 
Turkey is similar to that of Rojava as both stemmed “from the same perspective” and added 
that “we are trying to build this system but in Rojava they have already built it”.  
 
Instead of referring to the nationalist influence of Syrian Kurdish autonomy over Kurds in 
Turkey, The Turkish official discourse denounced the Kurdish autonomy in Syria and 
constructed it as a source of terrorism which targeted Turkey. Thus, Rojava autonomy and the 
autonomy of Kurds in Turkey were similarly constructed as sources of terrorism. As discussed 
in chapter 6, the Turkish officials usually used structures such as “terror corridor”, and “terror 
cantons” to describe the Rojava cantons (quoted in AA, 2 September, 2016; Hurriyet Daily 
News, 29 December, 2016, 28 April, 2017).  For example, Erdogan stated that “we are not 
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going to let the PYD terrorist organization form a corridor there”, “we are opposed to the PYD 
terrorist organization forming a corridor” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 3 February, 2016). In a 
meeting with the US president Obama, Erdogan demanded the US to cut ties with the YPG and 
to label it as a terrorist organization because the YPG as he claimed was part of the PKK and 
incited terrorism inside Turkey (Landler, 2016). Erdogan stated that “our hope is never to see 
a belt of terrorism, a corridor of terrorism emerging in or around our region” (quoted in Landler, 
2016).  
 
During the campaign against the Kurdish autonomy in Turkey, the Turkish military bombarded 
the semi-autonomous cantons of Rojava (Dow Jones, 17 March, 2016; Rollo, 28 December, 
2015). Although the Turkish military attacked the Syrian Kurdish forces of YPG before the 
announcement of autonomy in Turkey, such attacks were intensified during the Turkish 
campaign against the Kurdish autonomy in Turkey (BBC, 27 October, 2015; Istanbullu, 
September, 2016 Said, 17 March, 2016). The Turkish officials threatened to conduct more 
attacks against Rojava and the YPG and described this as a matter of Turkish national security 
and counterterrorism policy.  For example, Erdogan stated that “Turkey has every right to 
conduct operations in Syria and the places where terror organizations are nested with regards 
to the struggle against the threats that Turkey faces” (quoted in BBC Monitoring, 21 February, 
2016).  Likewise, Davutoglu constructed the military action against the YPG as part of the 
counterterrorism campaign against the PKK as he stated that “when there is any threat to 
Turkey, we will take in Syria the measures that we took in Iraq and in Qandil and will not 
hesitate to implement the necessary measures” (quoted in the Guardian, 13 February, 2016).177 
This is although the Turkish authorities could not produce concrete evidence that the Syrian 
                                                          
177 Qandil is the mountainous area of Iraqi Kurdistan where the PKK headquarter is located.  
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Kurdish cantons and the YPG had involved in armed violence inside Turkey as explained in 
chapter 6 (see also Zaman, 18 February, 2016).  
 
The actual aim of the attacks of the Turkish military were to hamper the advance of the YPG 
and to prevent it from connecting the Rojava cantons. As the YPG was advancing in an attempt 
to connect the canton of Afrin to the rest of Rojava through the towns of Azaz and Jarabulus 
in the north of  Syria, they were shelled by the Turkish military (BBC, 15 February, 2016; 
Coskun & Butler, 13 February, 2016; The Guardian, 13 February, 2016). Davutoglu threatened 
that the Turkish military would conduct further attacks if the YPG did not stop advancing 
towards Azaz city as he stated that "if they approach again, they will see the harshest reaction. 
We will not allow Azaz to fall" (quoted in BBC, 15 February, 2016). Although  the US 
administration called the Turkish authorities to stop the attacks against the YPG, the Turkish 
military repeatedly attacked the Syrian Kurdish cantons even after crushing the Kurdish 
autonomy in Turkey (Coles & Davison, April, 2017; Nissenbaum, 13 February, 2016; 
Toksabay & McDowall, October, 2016).  
 
The Turkish military conducted two major invasions against the Syrian Kurdish autonomous 
cantons of Rojava.  The first invasion of the Turkish military was in August, 2016 and was 
named the Euphrates Shield Operation. This operation mainly aimed at preventing the 
connection between the canton of Afrin and the rest of Rojava. This is explained in chapter 6. 
The second invasion was between January-March, 2018 and targeted Afrin canton itself. In 
January, 2018 the Turkish military and Islamist factions of FSA conducted a military operation 
named ‘Operation Olive Branch’ against Afrin and managed to conquer the canton in March, 
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2018 and they forcibly displaced a large number of its Kurdish population (BBC, 25 January, 
2018; Chulov & Shaheen, 2018; OCHA, 2018; Rasmussen & Aydin, 18 March, 2018).178 179 
 
Conclusion  
The analysis reveals that before its failure, the peace process underwent a certain degree of 
stalemate and lack of confidence caused by the Kobani crisis and the ensuing repressive 
measures adopted by the Turkish authorities. This is although the Turkish officials continued 
to express their commitment to the peace process during and following the crisis. In addition, 
they announced alongside the representatives of Kurds the peace agreement of Dolmabahce. 
The importance of the agreement is that it implied the representatives of Kurds as political 
partners of the peace process for the first time. However, the agreement was vague and not 
enough to regain confidence in the peace process. The Turkish authorities who were 
concentrating on disarming the PKK as their main goal and as a prerequisite for adopting the 
agreement were not ready to conduct further meetings to make the agreement function.     
 
The analysis highlights that approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question 
was influenced by the elections and voting agendas of the AKP. The chapter reveals that during 
the campaign for the June 2015 elections, the AKP authorities used the peace process as a tool 
to gain more votes. However, this did not function as the authorities were unable to disarm the 
PKK. As the AKP was unable to win the majority, which it hoped for in the June 2015 elections, 
the AKP authorities abandoned the peace process and adopted a pro-military approach to gain 
the votes of nationalist Turks in the next snap elections of November, 2015. This approach 
reflected positively on the AKP votes as it managed to gain the desired majority in the elections. 
                                                          
178 See Koker, I. (2018). Reality check: How many attacks did Turkey face from Afrin? BBC News. [online]. 
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43262839 [accessed: 22 March, 2018].  
179 See Maps 4 and 13.  
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The AKP continued its repressive approach, and the repression peaked following the 
declaration of autonomy in December, 2015 by the representatives of Kurds in Turkey. The 
repressive approach of the AKP encouraged the nationalist Turks to support the April, 2017 
referendum of changing the constitution which was called for by Erdogan and the AKP.  
  
The analysis highlights that the Turkish official narrative of terrorism was dominant in framing 
both the events and policies of 2014-2017, which this chapter deals with. However, this 
narrative was more dominant following the demise of the peace process. This is mainly 
discerned in the constructions of the Turkish authorities regarding each of the military 
campaign against the PKK, their repressive approach against the HDP and other Kurdish 
groups and activists, and their anti-autonomy campaign. This was not limited to the Kurds 
inside Turkey, but it also impacted Kurds outside Turkey. In particular, it targeted the PYD-
YPG and Rojava autonomy. The Turkish officials omitted reference to the nationalist 
relationship between the Rojava autonomy and the declaration of autonomy by Kurds in 
Turkey. Instead, they constructed Rojava as an action of terrorism by the PKK and as a sources 
of PKK terrorism, which required counter-terrorism measures.  
 
The analysis reveals that the military and security operations of the Turkish authorities resulted 
in flagrant violations of human rights. In addition, the parliamentary immunity of 50 out of 59 
HDP deputies was stripped, and they faced terrorism related charges. Likewise, the elected 
mayors of the Kurdish municipalities were stripped of their posts, detained and faced terrorism 
related charges. Furthermore, thousands of HDP members, journalists and other activists were 






Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
This concluding chapter discusses the main arguments of the research and highlights its 
contribution to the literature. This is organised according to the following four main sections: 
The first section deals with the location of this research in the academic literature and its 
significance. This section begins with discussing the gaps in the literature. Next, the section 
highlights the contribution of the research in bridging these gaps. The second section deals with 
the response to the research questions. This section discusses the major findings of the analysis 
and gathers its main arguments, which constitute the responses to the research questions. The 
third section deals with the major features of the analysed texts in the light of the concepts of 
CDA. The last section deals with the recommendations of the researcher for the future 
academic studies. These recommendations are based on the perspectives that the researcher 
developed while conducting this research.  
Location of the research in the literature and its significance 
Gaps of the literature   
The mainstream studies on terrorism usually construct it as an objective phenomenon, and they 
are usually limited to exploring the causes and effects of terrorism and the strategies of counter 
terrorism. The mainstream studies are usually influenced by the view of governments as they 
consider the armed violence of certain non-state actors as ‘terrorism’, while they exclude from 
such description the violence of repressive state apparatus. This is although there is no universal 
consensus over the definition of terrorism. In addition, the armed non-state actors that are 
designated by the governments as terrorist organizations are dissimilar in their characteristics, 
motivations and methods of action.  These main inconsistencies in the mainstream studies are 
highlighted in the critical studies on terrorism (CST). Nevertheless, the approach of CST 
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remains actor-centered like that of the mainstream studies as these studies concentrate on 
comparing the action of state to those of non-state actors.  
 
The discursive studies of terrorism demonstrate that the concept of terrorism is a linguistic 
construction, and therefore, it is subjectively influenced by the interpretations of the researcher. 
Accordingly, the discursive studies question the concept of terrorism itself. However, the 
majority of the discursive researches give more space to the study of the American narrative of 
‘War on Terror’ which influenced the formation of contemporary discourses of terrorism.  
Accordingly, the discursive studies lack comprehensive researches on the characteristics of 
various case studies.  
 
The mainstream studies on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict construct it as terrorism, which is 
perpetrated by one party; the PKK. Likewise, the studies on the PYD-YPG and Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy of Rojava, which favor the Turkish official view, construct the PYD-YPG and 
Rojava in the context of the Turkish official narrative of terrorism. The later considers the 
PYD-YPG as part of the PKK, and as a security threat against Turkey. Thus, the mainstream 
work dislocates the Turkish-Kurdish conflict from its political and historical context, and 
therefore, it is short of discussing the origins of the Kurdish question. Several critical studies 
highlight the political and historical context of the conflict and the origins of the Kurdish 
question. However, there is no sufficient academic work on the discursive construction of the 
PKK and the Kurdish question in the Turkish official discourse.  Although the Turkish official 
position regarding the PYD-YPG and Syrian Kurdish autonomy is a growing matter since the 
Kobani events of 2014, the literature review found no academic research on the construction 




Contribution of the research to the literature  
The above discussed deficiencies in the literature encouraged the researcher to conduct this 
research, which focuses on Turkish official discourse regarding the PKK and PYD-YPG, and 
the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey. Thus, this 
research is a contribution in bridging the identified gaps in the literature on terrorism in general 
and in the studies on the Turkish official discourse regarding the PKK and PYD-YPG, in 
particular. The research is a step forward in the discursive studies of terrorism as it is the first 
research that joins the construction of the PKK and PYD-YPG in the Turkish official discourse 
and the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question.     
 
This research adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a philosophical and anaptyctical 
approach. This is although the perspective of the research is not in conformity with that of CDA 
as it does not agree CDA that agency can manipulate the entire entity of discourse. The research 
demonstrated that the role of agency is limited to the formation of the discursive constructions 
and practices.  In the case of this research, agency is represented in the Turkish authorities who 
construct the PKK and the other Kurdish movements and their action in the context of the 
Turkish official narrative of terrorism. The research demonstrated that the Turkish official 
narrative of terrorism and its affiliated constructions have certain implied messages and serve 
certain agendas of the Turkish authorities. Revealing the implied message and agenda of 
discursive texts is the main commitment of CDA, as explained in chapter 3.   
 
The research provides a historical background for the Kurdish question and Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict. The historical background highlights that following the demise of Ottoman and 
Safavid empires the Kurdish homeland ‘Kurdistan’ was divided and annexed to the then 
established nation-states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The historical background also 
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highlights that Kurds were deprived from the right to self-determination, and it refers to the 
Kurdish rebellions, and the way they were suppressed.   
 
The historical background discusses the repressive policies of the Turkish governments and 
their denial of the Kurdish identity, which led to the emergence of the PKK rebellion. It also 
reveals that the Turkish official discourse constructed the PKK militants as ‘‘bandits’ at the 
beginning of their rebellion, and then it constructed them as ‘terrorists’ when this construction 
was widely used by the US and the NATO members against certain movements. In addition, it 
highlights the impacts of the conflict and counter-terrorism measures on human rights in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey.  
 
The historical background discusses the ideology of AKP and concentrates on its Kurdish 
opening approach. The background highlights that the Islamist ideology of the AKP that aimed 
at showing Turkey as a role model for the Arab countries following the Arab spring. The 
research argues that the Kurdish opening approach was a turning point in the history of Turkish-
Kurdish relationship. The approach offered a limited recognition for the Kurdish identity, but 
it paved the ground for the later peace process, which began in September 2012. The Kurdish 
opening was accompanied with concealed peace talks with the PKK leadership between the 
years 2008-2011. The chapter highlights the relationship between the AKP opening approach 
regarding the Kurds and its agenda of both limiting the role of Turkish military and gaining the 
Kurdish support in the elections and changing the constitution.   
 
The response to the research questions  
The responses to the four research questions are summarized in Appendix Table 7. However, 
these responses are interconnected (see Figure 10 below). Chapter 5 and 6 constitute main parts 
of the responses to the first and third questions of the research as they deal with the 
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constructions and narratives regarding the PKK, and PYD-YPG in the context of the Turkish 
official narrative of terrorism. Chapter 7 and 8 constitute the response to the second and fourth 
questions as they deal with the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish 
question during the peace process and following its failure, and they reveal the way the Turkish 
authorities dealt with the HDP and civic Kurdish activists. However, chapter 7 and 8 also 
contribute to the responses of the first and third questions as these two chapters highlight the 
influence of the narrative of terrorism on the policy of the Turkish authorities regarding the 
Kurdish question. Chapter 8 also reveals the relationship between certain agendas of the AKP 
on the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question. This makes the main 
arguments of chapters 7 and 8 interconnected to these of chapter 5 and 6. 
Figure 10. The interconnection of the research responses.  
 
 
    










The Kurdish nationalist activism as separatist-terrorism  
The Turkish definition of terrorism is not limited to violent actions, but it also includes various 
non-violent acts. This is applied against wide-range pro-Kurdish activities, which could be 
interpreted as acts that aim at “damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and 
nation” as stated in the Turkish law of Fight Against Terrorism (quoted in Legislationline, 
2016). The principle of the indivisibility of Turkey is highly preserved in the Turkish 
constitution, and it denotes ‘the territorial integrity of Turkey and its national Turkish identity’.  
The actions that the Turkish authorities consider to be against the principle of ‘indivisibility’ 
are described as ‘separatism’. Accordingly, separatism is not limited to the actions that target 
the territorial integrity of Turkey but also the actions that target its national ‘Turkish’ identity. 
Separatism is considered in the Turkish official discourse as a form of terrorism, which is 
named as ‘separatist-terrorism’. Thus, the Turkish official narrative of terrorism 
interdiscursively connects three discursive constructions including the constitutional principle 
of indivisibility, separatism, and terrorism. As it is elaborated in this research, the Kurdish 
aspiration of self-rule or ‘separatism’ is the main concern of the Turkish authorise since the 
establishment of Turkey as a nation state and even before that as it was a concern for the 
authorities of the Ottoman empire (see chapter 4).  However, before using the terms ‘terrorism’ 
to denote the Kurdish separatism, the Turkish official discourse constructed the Kurdish 
rebellions or separatist attempts as actions of ‘banditry’ and the Kurdish rebels as ‘brigands 
and bandits’ (see chapter 4).  
 
The inclusion of various actions that share the characteristic of Kurdish nationalism in the 
Turkish official narrative of terrorism made this narrative transcend the PKK to include other 
Kurdish movements and individuals. This narrative has impacted on the legal Kurdish parties 
(HDP and BDP) and the civic Kurdish activists in Turkey who are usually constructed as 
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‘supporters of terrorism’. The Turkish narrative of terrorism also goes beyond the Turkish 
border to include the Syrian Kurdish PYD and YPG. The narrative even shaped the way the 
Turkish official discourse constructed the Kurdish question and the way the Turkish authorities 
visualized the solution to this question (see Figure 11).  The researcher argues that there are 
two principal aims behind the constructions that are used against the PKK and the other Kurdish 
movements in the Turkish official narrative of terrorism. These are characterised in both the 
de-legitimization of the PKK and other Kurdish movements and the legitimization of the policy 
of the Turkish authorities regarding these movements, and regarding the Kurdish question (see 
Figure 12).    
Figure 11. Influence of the Turkish official narrative of ‘PKK terrorism’ on framing the 
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Figure 12. Function of the Turkish official narrative of terrorism regarding the PKK and 
other Kurdish movements. This figure shows the main themes of the response to the third 
quesitons of research.  
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Construction of the PKK, PYD and YPG in the Turkish official discourse 
The first question of the research is ‘How has the Turkish official discourse constructed the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG)?’ To respond this question, the analysis revealed certain constructions 
and narratives regarding the PKK, PYD, and YPG in the context of the dominant Turkish 
official narrative of terrorism.180 The analysis critically challenged these constructions and 
narratives, and discovered that these constructions and narratives have certain functions, and 
this constituted the response to the third question of the research, which is ‘How did 
such constructions function in producing particular meanings for events or legitimatising 
particular actors or policies?’  Both of these questions are mainly responded in chapters 5 and 
6 (see Figure 12 above, and Appendix Table 8). As stated earlier, chapter 7 and 8 also contribute 
in the response to these questions. Chapter 7 and 8 demonstrated that the narrative of terrorism 
framed the Kurdish question and its solution. In addition, they demonstrated that this narrative 
functions in legitimizing the Turkish policy regarding the PKK and the other Kurdish 
movements in particular, and regarding the Kurdish question in general (see Appendix Table 
7). 
 
The construction of the PKK in the Turkish official discourse 
Although the Turkish official discourse made references regarding the PKK more than the other 
organizations that are designated as terrorist by the Turkish authorities, it omits the full name 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party, and this is due to certain ideological considerations.  The main 
                                                          
180 The research uses both terms ‘construction and narrative’. Both terms have the same semantic indication in the 
research. However, the research uses both terms to tackle the grammatical indication of each term. The term 





ideological consideration is related to the term ‘Kurdistan’, which is considered as a taboo in 
the Turkish nationalist discourse and its usage is punished by the Turkish law.  
 
The analysis highlighted five constructions and narratives regarding the PKK that are framed 
in the context of the Turkish official narrative of terrorism. These include the following:    
a). The PKK is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization. This construction has two 
implications. First, it creates the assumption that the PKK doctrine is anti-capitalism like the 
doctrine of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movements that have been designated as 
terrorist organizations by the US and its allies. This assumption aims at maintaining both the 
negative attitude of the Western governments regarding the PKK and their designation of the 
PKK as a terrorist organization. Second, the label of Marxists alongside other terms like 
‘Zoroastrians’, and ‘atheists’ are used by the Turkish officials as an indication of devaluing 
Islam by the PKK militants, and this aims at inciting the antagonism of conservative Muslims 
in Turkey against the PKK. 
 
b). The PKK is a separatist organization. The terms ‘separatist’ and ‘separatism’ are used in 
the Turkish official texts to denote the PKK and its action. As stated earlier, the Turkish official 
discourse considers separatism as a form of terrorism and names it as ‘separatist-terrorism’. 
Accordingly, the term ‘the separatist-terrorist organization’ is used in the Turkish official texts 
to denote the PKK. In addition, the terms ‘separatist and separatism’ have no status in the 
international law unlike the terms of ‘self-determination’ and independence’, and this implies 





c).  The PKK is an ethnically motivated organization.  This construction is used alongside terms 
like ‘the PKK is anti-diversity’ in Turkey. Like the construction ‘separatist’, the terms ‘ethnic’ 
implies that the PKK motivations have no status of legitimacy in the international law unlike 
terms ‘nation’ and ‘people’, which are linked in the UN and other international texts to the right 
of self-determination.  
 
d). The PKK is a group of murderers who target civilians and civic services.  This narrative is 
taking space in the Turkish official texts more than all other narratives. This narrative supports 
the description of the PKK action as terrorism. In addition, the linguistic structures that are 
used to describe the PKK as a criminal group aim at creating the sense of condemnation. This 
narrative is supported by the claim that ‘the PKK terrorism resulted in the death of 40 thousand 
people’, which is repeated by the Turkish officials and widely used in the media. Thus, the 
PKK terrorism is constructed as a reason of the death of such a big number of people similarly 
to the impacts of an epidemic disease. In addition, the narrative aims at concealing the violent 
role of the Turkish forces in the conflict although the reports of international human rights 
organizations emphasize such principal role of the Turkish forces.   
  
e). The PKK is a criminal group involved in the organized crime of international drug-
trafficking in order to fund its terrorism. This narrative creates the assumption that that the 
PKK constitutes a criminal threat against the international community. In particular, it 
constructs the pro-PKK Kurdish community in Europe as a criminal threat against the European 
countries. This narrative aims at inciting the European countries to adopt tough measures 
against the Kurdish community. The narrative also aims at legitimizing the repressive measures 




As stated earlier, the analysis revealed that the construction of the PKK as a terrorist 
organization and its action as terrorism is not used only to delegitimize the group but also to 
legitimize the Turkish policy regarding the Kurds and Kurdish question. The latter is elaborated 
in chapters 7 and 8. The analysis highlighted that during the peace process and following its 
failure, the narrative of terrorism was dominant, and that the Turkish authorities framed the 
Kurdish question and its solution according to this narrative. However, the narrative of 
terrorism was more dominant following the failure of the peace process and it was used as an 
excuse for the military action and repressive security measures in the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
In addition, the narrative of terrorism particularly framed the legal Kurdish party of the HDP 
and was used against its members and other Kurdish activists who faced terrorism related 
charges.  The Turkish official narrative of terrorism has also similar implications regarding the 
PYD-YPG and the Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous administration of Rojava as discussed 
below. 
 
The construction of the PYD-YPG in the Turkish official discourse  
The analysis of the Turkish official texts regarding the PYD-YPG revealed that the dominant 
construction in the Turkish official discourse regarding the PYD-YPG is that they are organic 
parts of the PKK. Accordingly, the texts about the PYD and YPG usually involve the PKK as 
well. However, the construction of PYD-YPG in the Turkish official narrative of terrorism has 
three dimensions and each dimension has certain narratives. 
 
A). The first dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat to the national security of Turkey. 
This dimension has the following narratives:  
a). The PYD-YPG are organic parts of the PKK. 
b). The PYD-YPG have been involved in ‘terrorist’ attacks inside Turkey. 
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 c). The PYD-YPG are used by other countries as proxies against Turkey. 
d). The PYD-YPG separatist goals in Syria constitute a threat against Turkey.   
 
B). The second dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a security threat against the 
international community. In particular, the PYD-YPG are constructed as a terrorist threat 
against the US and European countries although these countries are involved in supporting the 
YPG in the anti-ISIL campaign. 
 
C). The third dimension constructs the PYD-YPG as a threat against Syria. This dimension 
consists of two narratives:  
b). The PYD-YPG separatism is a threat to the territorial integrity of Syria.   
c). The PYD-YPG are criminal organizations involved in the ethnic cleansing of Syrians.  
 
The analysis revealed that these constructions and narratives have certain implied messages 
and they serve certain agendas. The construction of the PYD-YPG as a security threat against 
Turkey, and particularly the narrative that they are organic parts of the PKK is used to 
legitimize the frequent attacks against the Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous cantons of Rojava, 
and Turkish military interventions in Syria. Whereas, the construction of the PYD-YPG as a 
threat against the international community and as criminal groups that perpetrated acts of ethnic 
cleansing is used to internationally delegitimize the PYD-YPG. In particular, these narratives 
aim at convincing the US and its allies to end their support to the YPG, and to consider the 
PYD-YPG as terrorist organizations as they did with the PKK. However, as an excuse for the 
Turkish military intervention in Syria, the Turkish officials also used the narratives of 
‘preventing the ethnic cleansing of Syrians by the YPG and protecting the territorial integrity 
of Syria from the PYD-YPG separatism.  
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The analysis revealed that two main ideological considerations influenced the Turkish official 
policy regarding the PYD-YPG and Rojava. The first consideration is related to the concern of 
the Turkish authorities regarding the influence of the Rojava experience of autonomy on the 
nationalist aspiration and action of the Kurds in Turkey. The second consideration is related to 
the enthusiastically secular doctrine of PYD, YPG and Rojava, which constituted an obstacle 
to the Islamist agendas of the AKP authorities in Syria.    
  
The approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question during the peace 
process and following its failure.  
This section constitutes the main points of the response to the second question of the research, 
which is ‘How did the Turkish authorities construct and deal with the Kurdish question during 
the peace process and following its failure?’ However, this section and the following 
subsections also contribute in the responses to the three other questions (see Appendix Table 
7). This section includes the main findings of analysis regarding the approach of the Turkish 
authorities during the peace process and following its demise (see Appendix Table 9).  The 
analysis revealed that the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question 
during the peace process, which extends from the end of September, 2012 until June, 2015, 
was pro-peace negotiations and non-military action. However, this approach was impacted to 
a certain degree by the Kobani crisis. The analysis also highlighted that as the peace process 
failed following the June 2015 elections, the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the 
Kurdish question changed, dramatically. This is as the authorities adopted an approach that 
favoured military action and security measures.  
 
During the peace process, the constructions of ‘brothering discourse’ were part of the pro-peace 
language of Turkish officials. These constructions were interdiscursively connected to other 
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constructions of the peace process. Nevertheless, the brothering discursive constructions 
functioned similarly to the ‘othering’ discursive constructions as they considered the ingroup 
to be those who were pro-AKP and the outgroup to be those who were at odd with the AKP. 
The outgroup usually included the PKK, PYD-YPG, HDP-BDP, Kurdish activists and others.   
 
Although the Turkish authorities were conducting peace negotiations with the PKK, they kept 
labelling the PKK as a terrorist organization and the conflict as an action of terrorism by the 
PKK. The terrorism constructions are interdiscursively connected to the majority of the 
constructions and narratives of Turkish authorities during the peace process.  The narrative of 
terrorism even framed the way the Turkish authorities constructed the Kurdish question.  
 
During the peace process, the Turkish authorities carried on denying the existence of the 
Kurdish question. This is because the term Kurdish question implies a political question of a 
nation, and this is considered as a taboo in the Turkish nationalist discourse, which denies the 
exitance of a nation other than the Turkish nation in Turkey. Instead of the term ‘Kurdish 
question, the Turkish officials usually used terms like ‘problems of the Kurds’ and ‘Kurdish 
problems’. These Kurdish problems are identified as terrorism and underdevelopment of the 
south-east Turkey, which is the major part of the Kurdish region in Turkey.  However, the PKK 
terrorism is constructed as the main problem, which also impacted the problem of 
underdevelopment.  Although the AKP authorities acknowledged that Kurds were subject of 
policies of discrimination, they rendered such policies to the previous governments, and they 
claimed that they already ended such policies.  
 
The Turkish authorities expected certain outcomes from the peace process. The disarmament 
of the PKK was the main outcome that the Turkish authorities aimed at achieving. The Turkish 
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officials also constructed the PKK disarmament as the major subject of the peace process.  On 
the other hand, the Turkish authorities refused the Kurdish demands of autonomy, and stressed 
on the ‘indivisibility’ of Turkey. Instead of autonomy, the Turkish authorities used the term 
‘democratic reforms’ as a response to the Kurdish demands. The Turkish authorities adopted 
some legal reforms, which supported general human rights in Turkey. However, the reforms 
related to the Kurdish identity were limited to the permission of practicing the Kurdish 
language as a mother tongue. This is although the Turkish authorities did not include the 
Kurdish language in the education curriculum.  In addition, the Turkish authorities adopted 
certain laws to protect the Turkish officials who were involved in the peace process. However, 
such laws did not provide similar protection to the members of the Kurdish parties of BDP and 
HDP and Kurdish activists who were involved in the peace process.  
 
As stated earlier, the analysis revealed that the peaceful approach of the Turkish authorities 
regarding the Kurdish question was impacted by the Kobani crisis in October 2014, which 
caused a lack of confidence and a certain degree of stalemate in the peace process. This is 
although the Turkish officials continued to express their commitment to the peace process.  
During the crisis, the Turkish authorities adopted repressive measures against the pro-Kobani 
demonstrators. In addition, the Turkish authorities adopted certain laws that empowered the 
authority of the police and security forces at the expense of the rights of individuals and 
political groups.  
 
Nevertheless, it was during the stalling of the peace process when the Turkish authorities and 
HDP deputes who represented the Kurds declared the peace agreement of Dolmabahce. 
Although the Dolmabahce articles are vague, the agreement was an important incident as it 
revealed the political character of the peace process by admitting that it was between two 
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partners including the Turkish authorities and the HDP as the representative of Kurds. Before 
this agreement, the Turkish authorities avoided to refer to the political role of the 
representatives of Kurds and to the political character of the peace process. They usually 
constructed the peace process as a process of ending terrorism and conducting democratic 
reforms.  
 
The elections and voting agendas of AKP 
The analysis highlights that election and voting agendas of Erdogan and the AKP influenced 
the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the peace process and the Kurdish question. 
The analysis highlights two major stages of such influence of elections and voting agendas (see 
Figure 13). The first stage was before the June 2015 elections, and the second stage was 
following the June 2015 elections.  
 
The stage of pre-June 2015 elections   
The analysis revealed that before the June 2015 elections, and particularly during the elections 
campaign, the peace process was used by the AKP leadership as a tool to win votes in the 
elections. Relevant academic sources argue that Erdogan and the AKP wished of the peace 
process to gain the Kurdish votes. However, such sources overlook that Erdogan and the AKP 
authorities also wished for the votes of the majority Turks. This is as they aimed at disarming 
the PKK and ending its rebellion, which has been desired by the majority of Turks. For this 
reason, the Turkish authorities emphasized on the disarmament of the PKK as the key condition 
for adopting the Dolmabahce agreement. However, disarmament was not possible to achieve 




This led to the failure of the AKP in securing the majority that it sought in the elections of June 
2015. Such a majority would enable the AKP to call for the referendum to change the ruling 
system of Turkey by changing the constitution. Furthermore, the AKP lost a several 
constituencies to the HDP who was able to enter the Turkish parliament, and this was the first 
time in the history of Turkey for a Kurdish party to enter the Turkish parliament. For the AKP 
leadership the results of the elections were an indicator of the failure of the peace process, 
which the AKP leadership mainly used to consolidate its power.  
 
The stage of post-June 2015 elections  
The analysis revealed that the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish 
question changed dramatically following the June 2015 elections. Following the elections, 
Erdogan planned to go for snap elections appealing to the votes of the nationalist Turks, and 
accordingly, he employed a new rhetoric that appeased the Turkish nationalist sentiments. The 
latter favoured tough policy against the PKK and Kurdish nationalism. Erdogan announced the 
failure of the peace process in July 2015. This was preceded by launching a new military 
campaign against the PKK. The Turkish authorities also imposed curfews in several Kurdish 
provinces. Simultaneously, the Turkish authorities adopted a tough approach against the HDP. 
The military action and repressive policies of the Turkish authorities resulted in violations of 
human rights. However, the AKP managed to win the majority in the snap elections of 
November 2015. Reports of international institutions accused the Turkish authorities of 
abusing the elections in the Kurdish provinces where they imposed curfews and exceptional 
military measures.   
 
The same approach continued to serve the agenda of the April, 2017 referendum to change the 
constitution. On 27 December, 2015 the HDP leadership and other representatives of Kurds 
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declared autonomy in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Erdogan and the AKP leadership found 
the Kurdish declaration of autonomy as another opportunity to show themselves as the 
guardians of the indivisibility of Turkey and Turkish nationalism, and this was the tool to win 
the votes of nationalist Turks in the referendum of changing the constitution. Accordingly, the 
Turkish authorities voiced highly against autonomy and adopted further military and security 
measures in the Kurdish region of Turkey. This matched the ideology of ultranationalist 
Turkish party of MHP who stood by the AKP in the parliament in passing the referendum 
proposal, which gained enough public votes in April, 2017, and the AKP managed to change 
the ruling system of Turkey from parliamentary to presidential.   
 
The Turkish authorities constructed the Kurdish declaration of autonomy as an action of 
separatist-terrorism by the PKK. Accordingly, they constructed the military and security 
campaign against the Kurdish autonomy as a campaign against the PKK terrorism. The 
campaign resulted in large-scale armed violence and flagrant violations of human rights. Large 
parts of the Kurdish cities and towns were demolished and hundreds of thousands of civilian 
Kurds were forcibly displaced by the Turkish military. In addition, the Turkish authorities 
detained the representatives of Kurds and thousands of Kurdish civic activists who faced 
‘terrorism’ related charges.  
 
During and following the campaign against the Kurdish autonomy in Turkey, the Turkish 
authorities expressed antagonism against Rojava and conducted military attacks against it. The 
Turkish officials omitted any reference connecting the Syrian Kurdish autonomy to the Kurdish 
nationalism. Instead, the Turkish officials constructed the Syrian Kurdish autonomy as ‘a 
source of PKK terrorism’ as they constructed the Kurdish project of autonomy in Turkey.  The 
Turkish officials used terms like ‘corridor of terrorism’ and ‘camps of terrorism’ to construct 
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the Syrian Kurdish semi-autonomous cantons of Rojava. In other words, the Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy was constructed as a source of terrorism and a threat to the national security of 
Turkey. Accordingly, the Turkish authorities constructed the attacks of Turkish military against 
the Syrian Kurdish autonomy as part of the operations of countering the PKK terrorism and 
protecting Turkey’s national security.  
 
The approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the HDP, BDP and civic Kurdish 
activists   
This is a subsection for the main section above, which deals with the approach of the Turkish 
authorities regarding the Kurdish question. This subsection gathers the main points of the 
response to the fourth question, which is ‘How did these constructions interact with the way 
that the Turkish authorities dealt with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and civic Kurdish 
activists in Turkey?’ 
 
As stated earlier, the legal Kurdish parties of HDP, BDP and other Kurdish activists were 
constructed as ‘supporters of terrorism’ in the Turkish official texts even during the peace 
process. This is although the Turkish officials acknowledged that the BDP and HDP played a 
significant role in conveying messages related to the peace negotiations between Ocalan, the 
PKK leadership in Qandil and the public in Turkey. As stated earlier, the HDP entered the 
Dolmabahce agreement with the Turkish authorities and this made the HDP a political 
interlocuter and partner in the peace process for the first time.  
 
However, the construction of ‘supporter of terrorism’ was more frequently used against the 
HDP and civic Kurdish activists following the demise of the peace process. As Erdogan 
declared the failure of the peace process in July 2015, the AKP authorities launched a campaign 
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against the HDP.  Erdogan and the AKP officials used the narrative of terrorism to incite the 
Turkish public against the HDP. This resulted in several arson attacks against the HDP offices 
in the Turkish cities by nationalist Turks. However, the repressive measures against the HDP 
and other Kurdish groups and activists peaked after declaring autonomy. Following the 
declaration of autonomy, the majority of HDP deputes in the Turkish parliament, Kurdish 
mayors and officials of municipalities, journalists, and thousands of HDP and BDP members 
and other civic Kurdish activists were detained by the Turkish authorities and faced terrorism 
























Figure 13. The relationship between the elections and voting agendas of the AKP and 
the change of its approach regarding the peace process and the Kurdish question.   
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Main features of the analysed texts in the light of the concepts of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). 
Findings of the research reflected certain features of the Turkish official texts. These features 
match the concepts of CDA, which are highlighted in the framework of analysis (see chapter 
3). These include the influence of historical events on changing discourse, interdiscursivity, 
and the semantic and grammatical structures that serve bias and ideology. This is discussed in 
the following points.  
 
First, the influence of certain historical events on changing discourse. Scholars of critical 
discourse analysis emphasize that discourses are not fixed entities, but they change according 
to social and historical conditions (Wodak, 2001a, 2001b; Van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 2003). 
However, they also highlight that discourses are not evolving progressively.  Critical discourse 
analysts agree the Foucauldian perspective that discourses are subject to contingent changes 
according to certain historical events (Foucault, 1972, 1984; Wodak, 1996, 2001b). The major 
discursive change that this research revealed is represented in the change of  the approach of 
the Turkish authorities from pro-peace and non-military action to pro-military action and 
repressive measures (see chapter 8). The research revealed that the dramatic change in the 
language and policy of the Turkish authorities occurred after the June 2015 elections.  Thus, 
the June 2015 elections constituted the major event that influenced this change. In addition, the 
events that followed the June elections including the declaration of autonomy in December, 
2015 and the April, 2017 referendum led to the adoption of further repressive approach.  
 
Second, interdiscursivity. Fairclough (2003: 35) underlined the importance of revealing the 
interdiscursive aspects of texts as he stated that “the analysis of interdiscursive hybridity in 
texts provides a potentially valuable resource for enhancing research based upon these 
329 
 
perspectives, offering a level of detailed analysis which is not achievable within other 
methods”. The analysis revealed several types of interdiscursivity between various 
constructions of the Turkish official texts. However, the interdiscursive relationship between 
the constructions of terrorism and other constructions is dominant. For example, during the 
peace process, the constructions of terrorism were connected to the constructions of the 
brothering discourse, non-military action, underdevelopment, democratic reforms, and anti-
autonomy (see figure 9). The analysis also revealed that following the failure of the peace 
process, the constructions of terrorism were more frequent in the Turkish official texts and 
were interdiscursively connected to the constructions that favoured military action and 
repressive measures.   
 
Third, the grammatic and semantic structures of text that serve bias and ideological 
implications. Revealing the structures of text that serve bias and ideology is considered by 
critical discourse analysts as a principal goal of CDA. Wodak (2001a: 10) states that “one of 
the aims of CDA is to ‘demystify' discourses by deciphering ideologies”.  CDA emphasizes 
that ideological features of text are related to power relations, domination and exploitation 
(Fairclough, 2003: 218).  There are various semantic and grammatical structures that explicitly 
or implicitly serve bias and ideology.  However, the major structures that served bias and 
ideology in the Turkish official texts include ‘creating assumption’, ‘the othering 
constructions’, ‘omitting certain information’, and ‘using certain lexicons and rhetorical 
figures’.   These are discussed below: 
 
a). Creating assumptions. Assumption is an abstracted description of certain phenomenon and 
constructing it as a reality that is taken-for granted (Fairclough, 1995: 2). Fairclough (2003) 
highlights that assumptions are usually implicit. However, assumptions depend on oppressing 
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or keeping untold the details that reflect different views (Fairclough, 2003: 41, 55-60). Thus, 
assumption depends on hiding certain information that contradict with the claim of text 
producer. However, in order to create an assumption, the text producer tries to make the 
recipient considers the account of the text as an unquestionable reality (Locke, 2004: 59-60).  
 
The analysis revealed that assumptions dominated the way  the Turkish official texts 
constructed the PKK and PYD-YPG. For example, the construction of the PKK as a 
revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization forms the assumption that the PKK is an anti-
capitalist organization although the PKK is a national liberation movement and not a 
communist organization (MFA, n. d., e). Another example is the construction of the PKK as a 
criminal group that is involved in international drug trafficking although the Turkish texts do 
not provide reliable evidence for this claim (MFA, n.d., e). Likewise, the Turkish official texts 
build certain assumptions against the  PYD-YPG. For example, the Turkish official texts 
construct the PYD-YPG as internationally designated terrorist groups and compare them to 
ISIL and other Jihadist groups that have conducted suicide attacks in several countries 
(BYEGM, 29 March, 2016; BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 2016). This is although the PYD-
YPG are not internationally designated terrorist organisations, and on the contrary, the PYD-
YPG have been part of the international campaign against ISIL.    
 
 b).  The othering constructions, or the othering discourse (Bartolucci, 2010: 123). Hansen 
(2006:33-34) describes the ‘othering process’ as the formation of the identity of ‘the self’ 
through the construction of the identity of ‘the other’. As explained earlier, the othering 
constructions serve ideology as they form a dichotomy between the in-group, or ‘we’ and the 
out-group, or ‘they’, which serves the positive presentation of the ingroup and the negative 




The analysis revealed that the Turkish official texts employed the othering constructions 
against the PKK, BDP, HDP and others who were at odd with the AKP and Erdogan. The 
analysis highlighted that the ‘brothering constructions’ that Erdogan and other Turkish official 
used aimed at creating the assumption that the Kurds were in favour of the AKP and its 
ideology. However, the brothering discourse functions as the othering discourse. This is as the 
brothering constructions demarcate the boundaries between ‘we’ or the in-group of the AKP 
and those who supported it and the out-group or ‘they’ that denotes those were at odd with the 
AKP.  
 
 c). Omitting certain information. This technique is practiced in order to hide certain 
information or to oppress certain views, which contradict with the interests of text producer 
(Fairclough, 2003; Van Dijk, 2006b; Mayr 2008). The analysis revealed that the Turkish 
official texts omit the full name of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and this is due to 
ideological considerations. In particular, the term ‘Kurdistan’ is considered as a taboo in both 
Turkish law and nationalist discourse. The Turkish official texts also omit the involvement of 
the Turkish military and security forces in the armed violence and violations against human 
rights. This is described by Van Dijk (2001: 107) as omitting the agent of negative action. 
Furthermore, the majority of Turkish official texts omit reference to the conflict itself, and 
instead they construct it as a phenomenon of terrorism perpetrated by one party; the PKK. 
Omitting relevant information is also discerned in the Turkish official texts about the PYD-
YPG such as omitting any details about the political goals and agendas of PYD-YPG, which 
are dissimilar to these of the PKK. Omitting information in this case serves the construction of 




d). Using certain lexicons and rhetorical figures (Van Dijk, 2006: 126). These include 
metaphors, hyperboles, euphemisms, and other lexicons that serve the negative presentation of 
the PKK and other Kurdish movements. As explained earlier, metaphor is a term or phrase, 
which is located in an unusual setting,  and it targets the emotional cognition of the recipient 
of text to make them accept its message (Bhatia, 2009: 280). The Turkish official texts used 
metaphors such as “blood sucking vampires” to describe the PKK (BBC Monitoring, 11 June, 
2014), and “the snake” that  “can bite” to describe the PYD-YPG (BBC Monitoring, 27 March, 
2016).  
 
Hyperboles and  euphemisms also aim at exerting certain influence over the cognition of 
recipient to accept the message of text (Van Dijk, 2006, 2006a, 2006b). While hyperboles are 
represented in in structures of exaggerations, euphemisms are reflected in structures that aim 
at alleviating the negative impacts of certain action. An example of hyperbole in the Turkish 
official texts is Erdogan’s statement that the Turkish government spent “35 quadrillion [old] 
Turkish lira” in investments in the south-east (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012), and an 
example of euphemism is the usage of the term “integration” to describe the forced assimilation 
of Kurds (MFA, n. d., e).   
 
The analysis also revealed that in addition to the terms and structures of terrorism such as 
‘terrorist’ and ‘supporter of terrorist organization’, the Turkish official texts contain various 
lexicons that aim at creating the sense of condemnation and criminalization against the PKK, 
PYD-YPG and HDP. For example, the terms and structures “murderers”, “lowlifes”, 
“bloodstained”,  and “enemies of humanity, democracy and freedom” are used against the PKK 
and PYD-YPG (BBC Monitoring, October, 2012; 10 November, 2014; 27 March, 2016), and 
the terms and structures like  “vandals”, “who turn blind eye to murders”, and “make children 
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Overgeneralization in understanding certain social or political phenomena usually stem from 
using a single concept to collectively identify more than one phenomenon regardless of their 
different characteristics. This is the case of the concept of terrorism, which is used in the 
mainstream studies to describe various cases of armed action and various armed groups 
regardless of the differences in their characteristics, motivations and methods of action.  The 
research revealed the importance of the critical study of the characteristics of each case of 
conflict in order to avoid overgeneralization.   
 
The research demonstrated that the narrative of terrorism and its associated constructions are 
usually used by the authorities of states as a tool to delegitimize certain non-state actors and 
their causes, and to legitimize the policies that the authorities adopt against such non-state 
actors and against their wider communities. In the case of this research, such delegitimization 
targeted not only the PKK, PYD-YPG but also the Kurdish question and Kurdish legal parties 
and civic activists, and likewise the terrorism narrative functioned as a tool for the 
legitimization of the relevant repressive policies of the Turkish authorities.  
 
The research demonstrated the need for an in-depth research on a definition for ‘terrorism’ in 
the light of international law and norms. The researcher acknowledges that such kind of 
research is quite difficult to accomplish since there are no universal criteria to define terrorism.  
However, such type of research is particularly important as the absence of a universal definition 
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of terrorism has caused the exacerbation of the suffering of human beings in several parts of 
the world.   
 
The researcher suggests that certain international codes could be the point of departure in 
establishing the criteria that identify certain form of armed violence as illegitimate or 
‘terrorism’.  Important examples of such codes that identify certain acts as illegitimate violence 
during war and peace are the Geneva conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols, and 
the 1988 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICRC 2010; ICC, 2002). Such 
research would be promising if it also considers the internationally warrantied texts, which 
identify the right of subjugated nations to self-determination and recognise the characteristics 
of legitimate ‘armed struggle’ of national liberation such as the 3103 UN Resolution of 1973 














                                                          






Appendix table 6. List of Turkish officials  
This list is for the main Turkish official who have more than one statement in the chapters of 
analysis. This list helps avoiding repetition in writing the positions of these officials.  The 
researcher also uses the acronyms PM and FM instead of the terms Turkish prime-mister and 
foreign minster.182  
 
Name  Position  Duration of holding the position  
Abdullah Gul President of Turkey 28 August 2007- 28 August, 
2014 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan 183 
 
Prime-minster of Turkey  14 March 2003 – 28 August 
2014 
President of Turkey  28 August 2014 to date  
Ahmet Davutoglu Minister of foreign affairs 1 May 2009 to 29 August 2014 
Prime-minster  28 August 2014 - 22 May 2016 
Binali Yildirim Prime-minster  24 May, 2016-9 July, 2018 
Ibrahim Kalin Spokesman (or press-secretary) 
of the Turkish president  
11 December 2014 to date  
Yalcın Akdogan Advisor of prime-mister 
(Erdogan) then deputy of the 
prime-minster (Davutoglu)  
During the peace process until 
24 May 2016 
Mevlut Cavusoglu Minister of foreign affairs 29 August 2014 to date 
Basir Atalay184 Advisor of the prime-minster 
and later deputy of the prime-
minster. 
14 July 2011 – 29 August 2014 
Bulent Arinc Deputy of the prime-minster  1 May 2009 – 28 August 2015 
Hatem Ete Advisor of the prime-minster  September 2014-May 2016 
                                                          
182 The list highlights the positions of these officials during the period that the research covers. However, these 
positions demonstrate that they were all high-ranking officials.   
183 Erdogan made more statements about the Kurdish issue than any other Turkish official, and accordingly, he 
has more statements in this research.  
184 Basir Ataly was also Turkey’s minister of interior between 28 August 2007 – 14 July 2011.   
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Appendix Table 7. The main themes of the responses to the research questions  
Subject of enquiry and main themes of the response 
Response 1: Turkish official constructions regarding the PKK, PYD and YPG.  
Constructions and narratives regarding the PKK, and PYD-YPG in the contexts of the 
Turkish official narrative of terrorism:  
A). PKK: 
 a). Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist, b). Separatist, c). Ethnically motivated, c). A group of 
murderers who target civilians and civil services, d). A criminal group involved in 
international drug-trafficking.  
B). PYD-YPG  
A). Threat to the national security of Turkey: a). Organic parts of the PKK, b). Involved in 
terrorist attacks in Turkey, c). Used as proxies by other countries against Turkey, d). Their 
separatist threat to the Syrian territory is a threat to Turkey.  
B). They constitute a security threat against the international community. In particular, they 
are a terrorist threat against the EU and US.  
C). They are a threat against Syria:  
a). They are a threat to the territorial integrity of Syria. b). They have perpetrated ethnic 
cleansing against Syrians.   
Response 2: Approach of Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question during 
the peace process and following its failure.    
A). During the peace process: Pro-peace and non-military approach.  
This is although the Kobani crisis left impacts on the peace process  
B). following the failure of the peace process: AKP adopted an approach that favoured 
military action and security measures.   
Relationship between the approach of the AKP authorities and their elections and 
voting agendas:    
A). Pre-June 2015 elections. The Turkish authorities expressed their commitment to the 
peace process. The agenda that this approach served aimed at winning the voted of both 
Kurds and Turks by progressing in the peace process and achieving the disarmament of the 
PKK.   
B). Post-June 2015 elections. As the AKP was not able to secure the majority that it sought, 
its authorities abandoned the peace process and adopted military action and security 
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measures. This approach served the AKP agenda of wining the votes of nationalist Turks in 
the snap elections of November 2015, and later in the referendum to change the constitution 
in April, 2017.   
Response 3: Function of the terrorism constructions  
Regarding the PKK and PYD-YPG 
A). Delegitimizing: PKK, PYD-YPG and their action.  
B). Legitimizing: The Turkish policy against the PKK and PYD-YPG.  
Regarding the Kurdish question and its solution    
A). Denial of the Kurdish question. Instead, usually terms like Kurdish problems. These 
include: a). Terrorism by the PKK, b). Underdevelopment of the Kurdish region impacted 
by the PKK terrorism.     
B). Disarmament of PKK is the main step to solve the Kurdish problem.   
C). Military and security measures are part of the counter-terrorism policy.  
D). Kurdish autonomies in Turkey and Syria are an action of terrorism by the PKK and they 
are also sources of PKK terrorism. Therefore, Turkish military and security action against 
Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Syria are part of the counter-terrorism policy.  
  
Response 4: Interconnection of constructions and approach regarding HDP and civic 
Kurdish activists. 
    
A). During the peace process: HDP and BDP were part of the peace process but were also 
constructed as ‘supporters of terrorism’.   
B). Following the failure of the peace process:  a). HDP and civic Kurdish activists were 
more frequently constructed as ‘supporters of terrorism’.  
b). Turkish authorities adopted an anti-HDP campaign. c). Following the declaration of 
autonomy:  HDP deputes, Kurdish mayor and thousands of HDP members and other civic 












Appendix Table 8. Constructions and narratives used against the PKK, PYD and YPG in 
the context of the Turkish official narrative of terrorism.  
 
PKK                                                                                    
Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist                                   
Separatist                                                       
Ethnically motivated                                       
A group of murderers who target civilians and civic services  
Involved in international drug trafficking 
PYD-YPG 
A).  They constitute a threat to the national security of Turkey: 
- Organic parts of the PKK 
- Involved in ‘terrorist’ attacks inside Turkey 
- Used by other countries as proxies against Turkey  
- Their separatist goal in Syria is a threat against Turkey.   
B). They constitute a security threat against the international community. In particular, they 
constitute a terrorist threat against the EU and US.  
C). They are a threat against Syria:  
- They are a threat to the territorial integrity of Syria  















Appendix Table 9. Major themes of the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding 
the Kurdish question during the peace process and following its failure.  
During the peace process (September, 2012-June, 2015) 
. Rhetoric of pro-peace and non-military action.  
. Brothering discursive constructions, which also function as othering constructions.     
. Denial of Kurdish questions. Instead, problems of Kurds: Terrorism and 
underdevelopment impacted by terrorism.  
Outcomes that the Turkish authorities expected from the peace process and their response 
to the Kurdish demands:  
. Disarmament of the PKK.  
. Refusing the Kurdish autonomy.  
. Adopting limited reforms named ‘democratic reforms’.  
 
The Kobani crisis led to a certain degree of stalemate in the peace process  
During the crisis, the Turkish authorities adopted certain security measures and laws.  
This was also the beginning of anti-PYD-YPG rhetoric.  
The Turkish authorities carried on expressing commitment to the peace process.  
Declaring the Dolmabahce agreement.  
 
Following the failure of the peace process (following the elections of June 2015)  
Adopting a pro-military approach.  
Anti-HDP approach.  
AKP gained the desired majority in the November 2015 elections.  
Anti-Autonomy campaign.  
Large-scale violations of human rights.  










Appendix Texts of TMFA 1-7. Texts of Turkish Ministry of foreign affairs 
 
The following are texts by the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, which were published in the 
website of the ministry in the section ‘terrorism’. Reference details are under each text. These 







Turkey’s Contributions to International Community’s Efforts to Fight Terrorism  
Turkey’s Contributions to Anti-Deash Coalition 
Turkey’s Contributions in the Fight Against Drug Trafficking  
PKK 
DHKP-C 
Fight Against FETÖ and July 15 Coup Attempt  
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
MFA. (n. d., a). Terrorism. Republic of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [online]. 
Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?b5f54c11-33be-4b40-aa34-
















   
Turkey’s Contributions to International Community’s Efforts to Fight Terrorism 
 
Turkey has been countering terrorism in different forms and manifestations for decades, from 
the ethnic separatist PKK terrorism, and the leftist DHKPC to religiously motivated terrorist 
groups such as Al Qaeda and DAESH, as well as “17 November” “ASALA” terrorist 
organizations. 
 
The call for international cooperation is not just a rhetoric or an academic interest for Turkey: 
The terrorist groups targeting our country have been operating across national borders: 
Running training camps, acquiring financial resources, operating media outlets to disseminate 
their propaganda and glorify their vicious acts, abroad. Perpetrators of terrorist crimes, their 
mentors and financiers have been able to escape justice and travel freely. Our own struggle 
against this menace has thought us the crucial lesson that we cannot succeed in our 
counterterrorism efforts in the absence of solid international cooperation. 
 
Accordingly, Turkey has been on the forefront of efforts to increase awareness of the 
international community on the threat of terrorism. We have worked hard bilaterally and at the 
various international platforms to create mechanisms for more effective counterterrorism 
measures. 
 
Turkey has all along been underlining that: 
-Terrorism poses major threat to international peace and security and regardless of their 
motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed, all acts of terrorism are 
unjustified. 
 
-There should be increased cooperation between states on the basis of the “extradite or 
prosecute” principle, in order to deny any safe haven to terrorists. 
 
- International community should not discriminate between terrorist organizations and must act 
with equal determination in preventing, suppressing, pursuing and prosecuting all terrorist 
groups, their members and activities. 
 
-Any attempt to affiliate terrorism with any religion or ethnic group is utterly wrong and would 
in fact play into the hands of terrorists. 
 
The growing threat of terrorism in the past years revealed even more the importance of 
international cooperation. What we are being faced today is unprecedented. There is a drastic 
proliferation of terrorist groups all around the world that possess enhanced capacity to inflict 
much serious physical damage on us, and ever-increasing ability to disseminate their 
“narratives” and to lure disillusioned young people to commit heinous forms of violence. 
Hardly a day goes by without an act of terrorism taking place somewhere in the world, 
indiscriminately affecting innocent people, who just happened to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. As such, terrorism has become a truly global and rapidly evolving threat. The very 
phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters is a very disturbing illustration of this reality. 





The good news is that, international solidarity and collective capabilities against this 
transnational threat has been enhanced considerably. International community owes this 
particulary to the United Nations. By virtue of its universal representation and capacity to 
interlink various aspects in addressing terrorism, the United Nations is playing the central role 
in garnering a global response to this scourge. 
 
It is very important that we have now a global legal framework, criminalizing terrorist acts and 
obliging member states to cooperate in suppressing various aspects of terrorism: To this date, 
eighteen universal instruments against terrorism have been put in force relating to specific 
terrorist activities. 
 
Moreover, the Security Council has also been active in countering terrorism through 
resolutions, in particular 1267 (and ensuing resolutions) and 1373, and by establishing several 
subsidiary bodies. 
 
At the same time a number of programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system 
have been engaged in specific activities against terrorism, further assisting Member States in 
building effective counterterrorism capacities. 
 
One should also highlight the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy, adopted in 2006. Based on four 
main pillars, the Strategy marks the first time that all Member States of the United Nations 
have agreed to a common strategic and operational framework, to fight terrorism, committed 
by whomsoever, wherever and for whatever purposes. 
 
Turkey has been playing an active role in the development of a universal legal framework under 
the UN system. Accordingly, Turkey has become a party to all UN counterterrorism 
instruments. We strongly support the Global Strategy and implement UN Security Council 
Resolutions in a determined manner. 
 
Turkey has also initiated, together with the US, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, and has 
cochaired this body between September 2011- April 2016. Turkey also cochairs the Horn of 
Africa Working Group within the GCTF together with the EU. 
 
Turkey is an active member of the Anti-Deash Coalition and is co-leading the FTF working 
group within this coalition. 
 
Turkey is also a member of the FATF, the global anti-money laundering/countering terrorist 
financing body. Turkey is constantly reviewing legislation as well as implementation on 
countering terrorist financing, in order to be fully compliant with the FATF recommendations.  
Turkey has also co-led, together with the US, in preparing the report on ISIL financing in 2015 
within the FATF. Turkey’s Financial Intelligence Unit (MASAK) operates in cooperation and 
coordination with the law enforcement authorities and prosecutors at the national level. 
MASAK also cooperates with other FIU’s through EGMONT Group and actively contributes 
to the efforts of the FATF. Turkey has created the legal framework in line with the FATF 
recommendations in order to implement effectively UNSC resolutions 1267 and 1373, which 
calls for criminalizing terrorist financing and freezing terrorist assets. 
 
Over the years, Turkey made bilateral agreements with more than over 70 countries around the 
world in the field of counterterrorism. These agreements provide the legal basis for bilateral 
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cooperation against illegal entities including terrorist organization and facilitate exchange of 
information among the relevant agencies. 
 
Moreover, Turkey is also an active contributor to counter terrorism capacity-building 
programmes of several states around the world. Counterterrorism Department, established in 
1986 within the General Directorate of Turkish National Police, contributes significantly to 
building better international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism by organizing trainings 
with various countries. International trainings courses covers topics such as counterterrorism 
basic training, radicalization process leading to terrorism and preventive measures, public 
awareness and prevention activities, combating terrorist organizations abusing religion, crisis 
management in terrorist attacks, suicide attacks and preventive strategies, investigation 
process, combating the financing of terrorism. Turkish National Police is also organizing other 
training programmes in various aspects of the law enforcement work. Between 19972015 
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Turkey’s Contributions to Anti-Deash Coalition 
 
Since its formation, Turkey has been actively participating activities of the anti-DEASH 
coalition which specified five lines of effort to degrade the capabilities of, and ultimately defeat 
DEASH. A diverse group of countries from across the globe have embarked on persistent and 
comprehensive approach. In that regard, members of the anti-DEASH Coalition have made 
significant progress to degrading DEASH on the battle field, challenged them in the media, cut 
their funding and recruitment, and stabilize the territories they have left devastated. 
 
It has been fundamental to anti-DEASH Coalition to degrade and defeat DEASH through 
denying safe haven and building up military capacity. Within this context, Turkey; 
 
• has participated in the Coalition Campaign military planning from day one, 
• has declared its national contributions to the Coalition as part of the Campaign Plan as of 
February 2015, 
• has allowed it airspace to be used by Coalition aircraft for both combat and noncombat 
roles, including intelligence gathering, personnel recovery, 
• has opened its facilities to the US and other Coalition partners, allowing over 60 aircraft with 
over 1200 personnel to be deployed to support operations, for counter-DEASH operations in 
Syria and Iraq, 
• has been hitting DEASH targets since the beginning through air, artillery and other assets, 
• has actively been hosting the Train-Equip Program, 
• only since January this year, hit 487 DEASH targets eliminating at least 86 DEASH terrorists, 
• has developed plans to clear DEASH from our borders, and these efforts will continue. 
 
 
Turkey has also put in place a broad array of mechanisms to disrupt or stop the flow of 
foreign fighters. Turkey is continuously enhancing security measures to stop and intercept 
foreign terrorist fighters at airports and other border crossing points through Risk 
Analysis Units established specifically for this purpose. Turkey has begun to counter threat 
of foreign terrorist fighters since 2011 and called for source countries to take necessary 
legal and administrative measures to prevent departure and travel of FTFs from their 
countries. In this regard, Turkey, as of February 2016, has included about 37.000 
foreigners in the no entry list since the Syrian crisis erupted. More than 3.000 
foreigners were deported since 2011 in the context of measures against foreign fighters. 
 
Within the context of anti-DEASH coalition, Turkey is cochairing Counter ISIL Coalition 
Working Group on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (WGFTF) which focuses on supporting and 
encouraging actions that directly complement and support Coalition efforts to degrade and 
ultimately defeat DEASH in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, Turkey, in the context of WG’s 
plan including nine strand of action assumed to lead “promote intensified and accelerated 
exchange of actionable information on FTF travel, facilitating effective communication 
channels and points of contacts between Coalition members” and in that respect an 
international meeting was held in Ankara on 2324 November 2015. Results of this meeting is 
shared with the members of the Coalition. 
 
Turkey, in line with the Security Council resolutions 2178(2014) and 2199(2015) has 
launched a comprehensive strategy and took effective measures to combat DEASH’s 
finances and disrupt and prevent the terrorist organization from raising, moving and using 
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funds. Turkey co-led a FATF typology project on DEASH with the US. Turkey also takes 
part in the Working Group on counter financing. At the same time, 
as an active member of FATF, Turkish Financial Intelligence Unit (MASAK) also 
cooperates with other FIUs. 
 
Turkey, along with its 911 kilometers land border with Syria and 331 kilometers with Iraq 
employs effective and robust measures to prevent smuggling activities. Turkey conducts a zero-
tolerance policy regarding illegal cross-border activities. 
 
Actually, oil smuggling along Turkey’s southeastern borders is not a new phenomenon. Turkey 
has been victimized by this phenomenon for decades, losing millions in tax revenue, and the 
Government has been actively fighting oil smuggling and the use of smuggled oil in gas stations 
all around the country through inspections and enhanced legislation, in particular since the 
beginning of the 2000s. In this context, the Anti-Smuggling Law was adopted in 2003, and a 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was set up in 2005 to investigate oil smuggling, which 
led to the revision of the Petroleum Market Law in 2006. In 2012, the Action Plan on 
Countering Oil Smuggling was revised. A Circular Order (2012/19) by Prime Ministry for 
enhanced measures were introduced. A legislation was passed on April 11, 2013, which 
increased the penalties for smuggling of oil as well as the sale of smuggled oil in gas stations 
in the country. 
 
After the beginning of the Syrian crisis, in response to increasing lawlessness at the other side 
of the borders, Turkish law enforcement and security forces stepped up their efforts to counter 
all threats to our security including smuggling activities stemming from Syria. 
 
 
These enhanced measures targeting smuggling networks were introduced in 2012, and 
preceded the capture of two major oil fields in Syria and Iraq by DEASH in June and July 
2014 and months before the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2170 in August 
2014 and 2199 in February 2015 respectively.  
 
 
Turkey, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 2199 (2015) regularly provides 
information to the UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee about the incidents of 
smuggled oil and amount of oil seized in the border area with Syria and Iraq although the link 
between material seized and DEASH or ANF terrorist groups cannot be established. Due to 
enhanced and effective border security measures amount of smuggled oil is decreased 
considerably. This is clear indication of Turkey’s determination to fight any illicit trade activity 
across our borders. 
 
 
While in 2014, 79 million liters (21 million gallons) of smuggled oil was intercepted by the 
Turkish law enforcement and customs authorities all over Turkey, in 2015 this amount 
decreased to 1,22 million liters (322,289 gallons) due to effective measures taken to prevent 
oil smuggling. On the other hand, amount of intercepted smuggled oil at Syrian border which 
was 12,6 million liters in 2014 decreased to 887 thousand liters in 2015. Within the context of 
counter measures 300 kilometers of illegal pipelines, which are often little more than hoses 
used for oil smuggling across the Syrian border, were destroyed. 
 
 




• Only two border gates are operating at Syrian border area and no vehicle transit is allowed. 
Goods, not subject to UN sanctions, are unloaded at zero point and delivered to the other side 
of the border after customs check. 
 
• Measures at the Turkish-Syria and Turkish-Iraq borders are enhanced by additional personnel, 
patrols and equipment. 
 
• Overall land borders of Turkey (with Iran, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Iraq and Syria) are secured by 50.000 military personnel. Within the framework of enhanced 
security measures at Syrian border, number of the personnel of the existing 12 Border 
Battalions which was 12.000 in 2104, has been increased to 20.000. 
 
• New units of air defense and reconnaissance have been added to the battalions. 
 
• 90 percent of the operations of unmanned air vehicles are focused in Syrian border area to 
detect illegal crossing and smuggling activities. 
 
• Turkey has also strengthened physical security measures along its 911 kilometers border with 
Syria. Within this context, Turkey is in the process of establishment of “Syrian border physical 
security system” which includes construction of 192 kilometers of wall and 93 kilometers part 
of the said wall has already been completed. This project is expected to cost 81 million US 
Dollars. At the same time the number of border patrol stations are increased, 375,6 kilometers 
length of trenches are dug, 153,3 kilometers barbed wire installed, 19,8 kilometers of movable 
concrete wall formed, 26,3 kilometers of accordion barrier systems positioned, along 422.630 
meters part of Syrian border illumination poles installed at every 50 meters, 79,5 kilometers 
embankment (3x3 m.) formed, 1,217 kilometers length of border patrol path improved and 7,8 
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Turkey’s Contributions in the Fight Against Drug Trafficking  
 
Due to its location Turkey is exposed to extensive flow of licit and illicit goods. This location 
lies at the crossroads of the heroin production sites in Afghanistan and consumption markets 
in Europe. Turkey is also intensively exposed to the growing ATS and precursor trade 
between Europe and the Middle East. 
 
Turkish counter narcotics policy is based on three pillars. The first pillar focuses on the fight 
against domestic distribution networks and street dealers. The second pillar deals with the 
dismantling of the international drug trafficking networks. The third pillar concentrates on 
investigations related to the financing of terrorism (particularly the PKK) through drug 
trafficking. 
 
In recent years, the Turkish National Police (TNP) has made nearly 20 percent of the global 
heroin seizures. Over the past decade, Turkey’s consistent cooperation with European 
counterparts led to the dismantling of numerous heroin networks along the Balkan route. 
 
On the other hand, we have been observing that the Northern route is gaining gravity in terms 
of heroin trafficking, which led the Turkish law enforcement agencies to develop operational 
partnerships with our counterparts along this route. More recently, (2012-2013-2014) Anti-
Smuggling & Organized Crime Department (KOM) under the TNP has conducted 11 heroin 
operations in collaboration with Sweden, USA, UK, Canada, Austria and Macedonia. These 
operations resulted in the seizure of over 20.400 kilograms of heroin and 56.738 kilograms of 
opium gum. 
 
In addition to active participation in bilateral and multilateral operations, Turkey also provides 
distinguished training to the personnel of the national law enforcement agencies of many 
countries. We have been organizing training programs through the Turkish International 
Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) for the benefit of the counternarcotic 
units of many countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, as well as the countries of the Middle 
East, Central Asia and the Balkans. TADOC is also a significant contributor to the training 
projects organized within international organizations and institutions such as the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC), and SELEC. Currently, TADOC, as a leading Academy in the region, is 
referred to by UNODC as a “Center 
of Excellence” while its work is presented as “best practices” to the rest of the world. Since its 
establishment in 2000, TADOC has organized a total of over 500 international training 
programs with the participation of nearly 9.000 law enforcement personnel from 88 countries. 
 
Methamphetamine has become a new threat after 2009. Over the past two years, the number of 
meth operations have increased by 55.7 % and the volume of its seizures by 39 %. Turkish 
authorities work closely with Malaysian, Japanese and Thai authorities against 
methamphetamine trafficking. In 2012, a joint investigation of Turkish and US agencies led to 
the seizure of nearly 2,6 kilograms of meth. A Turkish-Italian joint investigation led to the 
seizure of 2,8 kilograms and a Turkish-UK joint investigation led to the seizure of nearly 709 




Currently, Turkey is affected by the cocaine traffic both as a transit and a target country. 
 
We have also been working closely with Saudi Arabian and Bulgarian law enforcement 
agencies against captagon trafficking. 
 
Turkey is a target country for ecstasy which is produced in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Turkish law enforcement agencies are engaged in close cooperation with the source countries 
and are keen to increase the level of cooperation. 
 
To increase the efficiency of police cooperation, Turkey has recently expanded its police 
liaison network to 27 countries across the world. We use this network to conduct international 
operations. 
 
In 2012, Turkey conducted 14 joint operations with Romania, Macedonia, Germany, USA, 
Sweden, Italy and the UK. In 2013, 25 joint operations were conducted by the Turkish law 
enforcement authorities with 15 countries, 10 of these operations being controlled deliveries. 
In 2014, Turkey conducted a joint operation with France and 4 controlled delivery operations 
with Germany, UK, Austria and Sweden. 
During the last decade, nearly 119 international operations and 91 multinational controlled 
deliveries have been carried out with 35. Despite these achievements, we sometimes face 
challenges in international cooperation emanating mainly from differences in 
national legislations and diversity in institutional priorities of countries. 
 
In other words, Turkey efficiently contributes to all efforts in fighting drug abuse as well as 
trafficking, through an effectively functioning network of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. Turkey is present in major activities of international organizations and readily 
shares expertise and experience in this area. 
 
PKK/KCK terrorist organization is considered to be an important player in the international 
drug smuggling network due to its widespread connections in Turkey and Europe. Conducted 
operations indicate that the narco-terrorist activities of PKK/KCK terrorist organization are 
not limited to extortion or collection of protection money from smugglers but also include 
international delivery of drugs. Details of statistics and related analysis may be accessed 
through “www.kom.pol.tr”. 
 
During the last decade, TNPKOM has become a principal actor in global and regional 
counternarcotic efforts. This accomplishment is mainly due to utmost care in deployment of 
the KOM staff and their sophisticated training schemes. All new recruits are obliged to 
participate in long term training programs in TADOC, which are jointly developed by KOM 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  
 
Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM), which operates under 
KOM, has been established as a national focal point of the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), with the aim of monitoring drug use as well as the 
supply and demand aspect of drugs, in order to collect and report data to EMCDDA. 
 
TUBİM is also responsible for the preparation of The National Strategy/Action Plans and The 




“National Drug Policy and Strategy Document” covering the period 20132018 and the “Third 
National Drug Action Plan” covering the period 20132015 have both been prepared by the 
Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM). The above Action Plan 
seeks a balanced, effective and coordinated approach at the national level with regard to 
tackling the demand and supply of drugs. 
 
As proposed by the first Action Plan, Provincial Coordination Boards on Drugs have been 
established in all provinces of Turkey. Furthermore, local Action Plans were prepared in 78 
provinces. 
 
There is an Early Warning System (EWS) controlled by TUBIM to identify and assess new 
drugs. If the Working Group of the EWS deems necessary, a substance may be brought under 
legal control in accordance with the Law 2313 on the Control of Drugs. In 2011, 19 new 
substances were brought under legal control including bonsai, khat, synthetic cannabinoid and 
cathinone. A total of 274 substances were included in the mentioned Law by the Early Warning 
System between 2008 and 2015. 
 
Besides monitoring, TUBİM and its local contact points (ILTEMs) also carry out demand 
reduction activities. Demand reduction experts conduct awareness raising activities to reduce 
the demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. TUBİM and the ILTEMs publish 
books, magazines and other relevant material to raise the consciousness and awareness of the 
public (particularly the youth) against drug abuse. They also follow issues related to treatment. 
 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that TUBİM has been the organizer of two International 
Drug Conferences in 2011 and 2013, which brought together national and international experts 
to discuss contemporary issues on the global drug problem. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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PKK is a terrorist organization. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by 
numerous countries, including the members of the European Union and others such as United 
States, Canada and Australia. European Union also designated PKK as a terrorist entity in 2004. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) also refers to PKK as a terrorist entity. 
 
Since its foundation in 1984 more than 40 thousand people lost their lives because of PKK 
terrorism. PKK's ideology is founded on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and separatist 
ethnonationalism. PKK wants to suppress the diversity of Turkey, prevent participation and 
integration of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish origin and intimidate the people in the region. 
PKK’s primary targets include police, military, economic, and social assets in Turkey. PKK 
also attacks on civilians and diplomatic and consular facilities. PKK is also involved in 
extortion, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. 
 
Turkey's tourism industry, economic infrastructure, educational Institutions, teachers, 
hospitals, public and private enterprises particularly in southeast Turkey have been the main 
targets of PKK terrorists. It uses a wide range of method to carry out acts of terror ranging from 
attacking infrastructure, various facilities, schools and ambulances, kidnapping nurses, 
customs officials to using cyanide to poison drinking water supplies; and engaging in 
unconventional tactics, assassination to drive by shootings, executing uncooperative civilians, 
ambushes, kidnapping etc. 
 
Until 1998 PKK found a safe haven in Syria. Then its leader Abdullah Öcalan had to flee the 
country only to be captured several months later. He is now serving life sentence in a prison in 
Turkey.  
 
Following the power vacuum in the north of Iraq after the Gulf War, PKK established camps 
in various points around the Qandil Mountain where they receive training and infiltrate to 
Turkey to carry out attacks.  
 
PKK’s funding is based on variety of sources. In a number of European countries there are 
ongoing investigations and court cases related to financing of PKK terrorism. In a major 
European country, the number of court files related to PKK related illegal activities exceeded 
five thousands. 
 
PKK is also into organized crime, illegal human smuggling and drug trafficking. On 14 October 
2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted 
the senior leadership of the PKK, designating Murat Karayılan, the head of the PKK, and high-
ranking members Ali Riza Altun and Zübeyir Aydar as significant foreign narcotics traffickers. 
On 20 April 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the designation of PKK 
founders Cemil Bayık and Duran Kalkan and other high-ranking members as Specially 





PKK subsidiaries and offshoots exploit the democratic rights and freedoms in Europe. In 
certain countries, there are continuing major investigations against PKK financing and other 
unlawful acts by PKK affiliated entities and individuals. In some others there are ongoing court 
cases related to PKK activities. As stated in TESAT reports, in addition to collection of money 
from private persons and firms there are cases that revenues are also obtained from criminal 
organizations. PKK also continues its systematic recruitment activities of young persons living 
in European countries and trains them in various camps. It also forges identity documents. 
 
PKK has also offshoots and affilates in Iran, Syria and Iraq. KCK, headed by imprisoned 
Öcalan, is the same organization with PKK. “KCK” is “PJAK” in IRAN, “Tawgari Azadi” in 
Iraq and PYD/YPG in Syria. 
 
PYD/YPG’s affiliation with PKK is clear. PYD/YPG was set up under the control of PKK 
terrorist organization in 2003. They share the same leadership cadres, organizational structure, 
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DHKP-C is a terrorist organization. The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C) is enlisted as a terrorist group by Turkey, the European Union and US.  
 
The DHKP-C was originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol. It was a splinter 
faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. It was renamed as the DHKP-C in 1994 
after factional infighting. It has a Marxist-Leninist ideology. It aims at overthrowing the 
Turkish state through violence and removing the US and NATO presence in Turkey. 
 
The DHKP/C uses several tactics in the form of armed attacks, such as assassinations, suicide 
bombings and bomb traps which are still maintained among the terrorist organization’s 
attempts. 
 
Some recent major terrorist acts of the DHKP-C include: 
 
-August 10, 2015, Attack to US Consulate General: Two suspected DHKP-C members attacked 
the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul. There were no casualties. 
 
-March 31, 2015, Killing of a Prosecutor: Two DHKP-C members took hostage and then killed 
Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz at the Istanbul Courthouse. 
 
-On February 1, 2013, US Embassy bombing: a suicide bomber attacked to the US Embassy in 
Ankara, killing a Turkish security guard, and wounding three others. 
 
-The DHKP/C carries out a variety of activities such as propaganda, recruitment and financing 
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Fight Against FETÖ and July 15 Coup Attempt 
Please press for the link 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix Satellite Images 1-8. Demolished areas in the Kurdish cities   
Images1 & 2. Cudi neighbourhood in Cizre city. Source: (HRW, July, 2016).  





























Images 3 & 4. Nusaybin city in Mardin province. Source: (OHCHR, 2017: 11) 
The below image was taken on 22 May, 2016 during the military operation.  
 








Images 5 & 6. Sure district in Diyarbakir. The images were taken before the operation and the 
after the operation. Source: (Riley, 2017).  
 






































Images 7 & 8. Sure district in Diyarbakir. Source: (Ayasun, 2017).  










Appendix Image 9. Demolished Nusaybin city centre. Turkish military celebrating their 



















Appendix Map 11. The southern and eastern areas of Ottoman Empire. The map was 
drawn by the authorities of Ottoman Empire in Arabic language. The map shows Kurdistan (in 
Arabic  Source: Farrokh (2010). The researcher added to the map a yellow .( :كردستان













Appendix Map 12. Map of Kurdistan claimed by the Kurdish national movements. 










Appendix Map 13. Updated military control map of Syria. The map shows the area of 
YPG and SDF control in yellow. Source: Chughtai (September, 2018). This map shows the 
Rojava canton of Afrin controlled by Turkey and connected to the area which was already 
invaded in the Euphrates Shied Operation of August, 2016. Afrin was invaded in March 2018 
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